Delighted to pass this along from our colleagues at the Carter Center China Focus and Yawei Liu. The Carter Center will be hosting a Virtual Program entitled "How Should the U.S. and China Manage Their Nuclear Relationship During the “New Cold War”?" The brief Concept Note provides:
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War.” China has continued to expand its nuclear capabilities while the United States feels under pressure to enhance its own capabilities. While some experts describe the bilateral relationship currently as being in a moment of “fragile stability,” this remains precarious. Bilateral military-to-military talks have resumed after Presidents Biden and Xi met in San Francisco last November; and the two sides held a consultation on arms control and nonproliferation last November, but the meeting produced no specific results. During this period of fragile stability, to what extent has risk in the nuclear domain decreased, and what risks remain? What actions do experts recommend both sides take to reduce nuclear risk? What should we expect for the future of U.S.-China nuclear relations?
The Virtual event will be held 28 May 2024 at 1500 US East Coast Time. Speakers include Dr. Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for Peace; Dr. David Santoro, President of the Pacific Forum; Dr. M Taylor Fravel, Political Science Professor at MIT. The program is occasioned by the Carter Center’s publication of Modernizing Sino-U.S. Confidence-Building Measures: Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives (Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh; March 2024), a study drawing lessons from U.S.-Soviet nuclear confidence-building measures to apply to the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship today. Tong Zhao's recently published essay in Foreign Affairs, "The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion: Beijing Seeks Geopolitical Leverage More Than Military Advantage (March 2024) (点击此链接阅读中文版 (Read in Chinese)), adds perspective.
Tong suggests greater clarity on Chinese perspectives as a point of departure for engagement:
A close assessment of the evolving thinking within China’s political leadership and security policy circles reveals that Chinese officials are not simply expanding their nuclear arsenal for military-technical purposes. Rather, Chinese leaders seem to have embraced the untested belief that nuclear weaponry grants them greater geopolitical leverage to counter perceived threats. Beijing’s objections to what it sees as an unfair U.S. nuclear strategy and illegitimate U.S. security interests further solidify its willingness to use unilateral measures to address its security concerns. Washington must understand how these underlying perceptions shape Beijing’s nuclear policy if it wants to steer the U.S.-Chinese relationship in a more prudent direction—or risk responding on the basis of flawed assumptions, with potentially counterproductive or even catastrophic results. [仔细评估中国高层和安全政策圈内的思想演变显示,中国并非是完全出于军事和技术层面的目的而扩大其核武库。相反,中国领导人似乎接受了一种未经验证的理念,即认为核武器可以赋予中国更大的地缘政治影响力,以对抗其所认为的战略威胁。同时,北京认为美国的核战略不公平、美国追求的安全利益也不合理,这进一步巩固了中方使用自主措施解决战略关切的意愿。华盛顿必须了解这些潜在观念如何塑造了中国的核政策,以推动中美关系朝着更稳定的方向发展,并降低由于错误假设而造成适得其反甚至灾难性后果的风险。] ( "The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion)
Witherspoon, Wichterman, and Shankar suggest the utility lessons from the last nuclear crisis updated in time, space, and place:
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. * * * The authors draw on these Cold War case studies and as well as Chinese perspectives on CBMs to inform policy recommendations for the modern Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship. The United States and China should institute measures to enhance mutual understanding and foster epistemic communities to generate mutually acceptable shared principles and ideas about nuclear crisis prevention and management, personnel, and mechanisms. These ideas should be discussed among government officials in Track 1 dialogues prior to implementation. Furthermore, the U.S. and China should prioritize reducing risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding by revitalizing direct communications links (DCLs) and strengthening institutions that mimic the functions of the National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. (Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives, p. 7).
The authors all share a fundamental view about the importance of confidence building measures to stabilize and perhaps diffuse the threat. A lively discussion is anticipated. Chinese language announcement and translation of the Tong essay follows (赵通:中国扩大核力量的真实关切).
Registration may be accessed here.
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