Common Understandings Between China and Brazil on Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis 23 May 2024

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Between 2008 and 2010 I wrote a number of essays about the political and ideological tutelege of Lula da Silva by his friend and mentor Fidel Catro Ruz. In that context (in 2010) I wrote:

Brazil has been seeking to re-make its place within the Hemispheric pecking order since the ascension of Lula to the Brazilian Presidency. Brazil, rightly, sees itself as arriving at a point in its development that it might assume some of the role traditionally exercised solely by the United States in Latin America. It seeks to assert its hegemony in concert with or opposition to that traditionally exercised by the United States. The recent efforts at exclusionary clubbiness with the construciton of the Comunidad de estados de América Latina y el Caribe. The almost successful efforts to dominate the settlement in Honduras in the wake of the removal of Mr. Zelaya all attest to Brazil's self conscious willingness to chart a new courser and finds a new place in the hierarchy of states within the Western Hemisphere.

These efforts have put Brazil and the United States on opposite sides of a number of issues. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Brazil and the Washington Consensus, Law at the End of the Day, Nov. 10, 2008. From the efforts to export carrier technology to the Chinese, to the opposition to Hemispheric trade on terms originally conceived by the United States, to intrusion into everything from climate change to the Jewish-Muslim war in the Middle East, Brazil has sought to have its influence felt more acutely in international affairs. That effort was unimpeded during the Presidency of George Bush, whose ideological foundations were irreconcilable with those of Mr. Lula. It has been a bit more difficult, but not impossible, with the Administration of Mr. Obama, who some in the Lula Administration might have thought would be easier to manage with respect to Latin American affairs.

Yet Brazil does not mean to step into the role of opponent, in the style of Cuba. Instead, Lula has meant to serve as a bridge and mediator between the interests of Latin America, which it seeks to dominate, and those of the English speaking peoples of the Western Hemisphere, which it cannot. Critical to that role has been the relationship between Lula and Fidel Castro. It joins Castro, the Sandinistas, and the ideological consequences of Liberation theology as a political ideology with continuing relevance in Brazil and the Caribbean region. I have suggested some of the contours of that relationship in the past. See, Larry Catá Backer, Cuba and Brazil, Part I: Castro Lectures Lula da Silva, Law at the End of the Day, Jan. 26, 2008; Larry Catá Backer, Cuba and Brazil Part II: Castro Continues His Wooing of Lula, Law at the End of the Day, Feb. 10, 2008; Larry Catá Backer, Cuba and Brazil Part III: Cuba and Brazil in Parallel Strokes, Law at the End of the Day, Feb. 24, 2008; Larry Catá Backer, Cuba and Brazil Part IV: Bringing Lula Into the Cuban Orbit; Bringing Cuba Into the Brazilian Orbit?, Law at the End of the Day, March 7, 2008. One was recently reminded of the strength and importance of that relationship in a recent essay posted to Fidel Castro's blog: Fidel Castro Ruz, El Último encuentro con Lula, Relexiones del compañero Fidel, Grandma, March 1, 2010. (The Cultivation of Brazil: Lula Between Castro and Obama)

Very little has changed in the fundamental orientation since the start of the Obama administration.  Mr. Lula, is now joined byAMLO (Andrés Manuel López Obrador) of Mexico and others. The objectives, however, and the context in which solidarity is performed has changed substantially.  No longer Venezuela and Cuba, but China now provides, through the BRISs collective, provides the necessary outlet for Mr. Lula to continue applying the lessons of his earlier tutelage under Mr. Castro.  BRICS provides a better stage, and the leadership and guidance of its most prominent member fills the void that was once located in Havana.

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All of this, perhaps, may be reflected in contemporary form in an intervention by the Brazilian foreign affairs apparatus when, in aligning with their Chinese counterpart, they advanced a Common Understandings Between China and Brazil on Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis. There is little new here.  But À la recherche du temps perdu can be a powerful analytical lens. . . and an iterative trope--cognitive and automatic. "Common understanding" in the present, then, provides a powerful window to a past the present form carries with it wisps of the mustiness of a world the recapture of which is possible only in the dreams of the aged. Yet, again, there is a reminder that old lessons, well learned, remain effective against an opponent who remain s stubbornly obtuse to the implications.  The Common position follows below. But the Chinese vanguard is not Fidel; and Cuba has fallen on hard times as a consequences of its unwavering commitment to the Caribbean Marxism of  the founding leadership. China is a loose collar, though perhaps, when it matters, with a short leash. And of course, all international politics is ultimately local. "To expect Brazil to fully align with the West on the war in Ukraine is, of course, naïve. From a Global South perspective, Lula’s stance makes sense. He is not only defending vital national interests related to Brazilian agribusiness, but is also ideologically consistent with the neutral position Brazil occupies in global politics." (here).  And in the shadows, the long and complicated history with Lula's neighbors to the North--one sentimental and ideologically compatible, the other much less so. Neither can be ignored.

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Common Understandings Between China and Brazil on Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

2024-05-23 21:30

On May 23, 2024, H.E. Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, met with H.E. Celso Amorim, Chief Advisor to the President of Brazil, in Beijing. The two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on pushing for the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis and calling for the deescalation of the situation, and reached the following common understandings:

1. The two sides call on all relevant parties to observe three principles for deescalating the situation, namely no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no provocation by any party.

2. The two sides believe that dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All parties should create conditions for the resumption of direct dialogue and push for the deescalation of the situation until the realization of a comprehensive ceasefire. China and Brazil support an international peace conference held at a proper time that is recognized by both Russia and Ukraine, with equal participation of all parties as well as fair discussion of all peace plans.

3. Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant regions and prevent a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. Attacks on civilians or civilian facilities must be avoided, and civilians including women and children and prisoners of war (POWs) must be protected. The two sides support the exchange of POWs between the parties to the conflict.

4. The use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons must be opposed. All possible efforts must be made to prevent nuclear proliferation and avoid nuclear crisis.

5. Attacks on nuclear power plants and other peaceful nuclear facilities must be opposed. All parties should comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety and resolutely prevent man-made nuclear accidents.

6. Dividing the world into isolated political or economic groups should be opposed. The two sides call for efforts to enhance international cooperation on energy, currency, finance, trade, food security and the security of critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, undersea optical cables, electricity and energy facilities, and fiber-optic networks, so as to protect the stability of global industrial and supply chains.

The two sides welcome members of the international community to support and endorse the above-mentioned common understandings, and jointly play a constructive role in deescalating the situation and promoting peace talks.