For those interested in governance developments in Cuba, Eusebio Mujal León of Georgetown University has just published a very interesting article--“Survival, Adaptation and Uncertainty, The Case of
Cuba,” Journal of International
Affairs, Fall/Winter 65(1):149-168 (2011).
(From Eusebio Mujal-León: “Raúl no puede ejercer el poder como Fidel y menos aún podrá su sucesor” FAES, 01.07.2009)
Here is the abstract:
The Cuban Revolution recently experienced a major transition of leadership as power shifted hands from Fidel Castro to his younger brother, Raúl. Eschewing the role of caretaker, Raúl embarked on an ambitious program aiming to streamline a cumbersome and inefficient state while reforming the economy in ways that will increase agricultural production, encourage self-employment and lead to sustainable economic growth. At the same time, Raúl Castro refashioned the ruling coalition and proposed major changes to the ruling Communist Party, including term limits, leadership rotation and the separation of party and state functions. This article analyzes the emergence of a new Cuban political elite, explores how power is distributed between its military and party wings and examines the major challenges this coalition must overcome if it is to successfully manage the transition from the Castro era and stabilize Cuban autocracy.
(From Star Media, Raúl Castro)
Professor Mujal León concludes:
While the eighty-one-year-old Raúl Castro is in control, odds are that tensions within the ruling coalition can be managed. What will happen when he disappears from the scene? The succession from Fidel to Raúl came off without a hitch, but the real challenge will be to maintain stability within the leadership when both Castro brothers exit the political stage. Communist elites in Vietnam and China have successfully managed such a transition. Can Cuban elites do the same? Perhaps. China’s Deng Xiaoping took more than a decade to manage this process, and he had strong economic winds at his back. A successful transition in Cuba will require that the FAR-PCC coalition remains united. Military discipline and democratic centralism will undoubtedly help in this regard, but the post-Castro era will have no dominant figure to manage the competition and cleavages that will inevitably emerge. . . . .
There is a domestic side to the coin of national reconstruction. The past fifty years have torn the Cuban nation apart. . . . One of the most important developments since Raúl Castro took power has been the opening of social and cultural spaces that allowed the emergence of a lively debate, albeit with clearly defined limits. The situation is complicated and contradictory; its implications are still unclear. On the one hand, the repres- sion and harassment of dissidents continues unabated andhas recently intensified. On the other hand, the range of debate and discussion in various journals and blogs—from Catholic Church–sponsored journals like Espacio Laical and Palabra Nueva to the website Havana Times, the nonconformist Generación Y and the more orthodox magazine Temas—continues to expand. Behind these efforts lies the Raúlista strategy of broadening social consensus and fostering a less restrictive cultural environment. . . . .
Raúlismo represents the transition from Fidelismo. It is an effort to shore up the revolutionary project by stabilizing the economy and clearing the way for a suc- cessor generation to take up the reins of leadership. But if the point of departure is known in Cuba, its final destination is not. It is unclear—and will remain so for several years—whether Raúl Castro and the new ruling coalition will be suc- cessful in their venture. If they succeed, we shall see the stabilization of the Cuban autocracy. If they fall short, regime instability will be the most likely result. The greatest challenges will come once the Castro brothers and other members of the revolutionary generation pass from the scene. Only then will we learn if the younger brother of the líder máximo was the architect of the stabilization of the Cuban autocracy.
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