Zhiwei Tong (童之伟) remains one of the most innovative scholars of constitutional law in China. Professor Tong has been developing his thought in part in a essay site that was started in 2010. See, Larry Catá Backer, Introducing a New Essay Site on Chinese Law by Zhiwei Tong, Law at the End of the Day, Oct. 16, 2010. Professor Tong is on the faculty of law at East China University of Political Science and Law. The Series continues.
Professor Tong recently published an excellent essay on China's State Supervision Law draft legislation. That essay, "国家监察立法预案仍须着力完善 The State Supervision Law Legislation Need Further Improvement," was published by Zhengzhi yu falv 《政治与法律》 [Politics and Law] Vol 10, 2017. The essay examines the thrust of the reform legislation and offers a roadmap for improvement. That road map itself provides a masterful analysis of the evolving and dynamic state of Chinese constitutional thought. A more concise version of the article was originally published on line in Chinese. The English translation of the Draft Supervision Law (courtesy of China Law Translate) can be accessed HERE; 中国语言 version HERE.
Professor Tong has given me his permission to publish an English translation of that essay, more accessible to Western audiences. It appears below along with the original Chinese language version. My thanks to Dr. GAO Shan for his excellent translation.
国家监察立法预案仍须着力完善
The State Supervision Law
Legislation Need Further Improvement
This essay was published by Zhengzhi
yu falv 《政治与法律》 [Politics and Law] Vol 10, 2017. Here is the full text of my original blog
post. In cases of any differences in the text of the essay, please refer to the
journal version of this essay for citation or reference for any differences in
the texts
Abstract: With intensive studies and researches on promoting the legislation of the state supervision system, Chinese legal academics have reached common consensuses on some legal issues. However, for major political reform such as state supervision system, we shall remain cautious and diligent without being unnecessarily hasty. Perhaps it is appropriate to consider delaying the vote for the new state supervision law from the next National People’s Congress to 2019 or even later. If the timetable for state supervision law legislation planning and the required constitutional amendment had already been set by the authority, it is understandable for following the plan without any delay. In that case, I would recommend for a comprehensive state supervision law legislation that includes “how the agency organized,” “jurisdiction of the agency” “procedure of the enforcement” and the “enforcer of the law.” In addition, I proposed 14 points discussing how to improve the current legislation plan in the area of the forms of the law, the target of supervision, the jurisdiction, and accountability.
Keywords:
state supervision committee, state supervision legislation, constitution,
custody, crimes involving taking advantage of one’s institutional functions
(abuse of power)
State supervision
law legislation plan refers to all legislative arrangements that are made for
enabling the objectives of the state supervision system reform. In general, it
involves required constitutional amendments
and a reasonable length of time that coordinates the vote for constitutional
amendments and relevant basic law lawmaking. Improving state supervision law
legislation plan is an urgent issue that relates to an effective implementation
of the Constitution and the constitutional principle “rule the state in
accordance with the Constitution.” Although Chinese legal circle and academics
had reached a broad consensus on many core issues, some aspect of the current
legislation plan requires further study and debate for improvement.
I.
A
Broad Consensus Among Chinese Legal Academia
The project of the state supervision
law legislation involves multiple issues, especially in the area of the
constitutional law, which is self-evident. Since December 2016, many issues have
been intensively discussed and debated at various events or forums by Chinese
academics, which enabled us to reach a broad consensus. As the following
illustrates, the consensus formed a common ground for Chinese academics to explore the state supervision system reform further.
For example:
First, a comprehensive state
supervision system reform must be based on the Constitution. My first comment
to the media’s announcement of the
Central authority’s state supervision system reform plan was that “the
constitutional basis for new state supervision system reform can be only
obtained through a constitution amendment…the preparation for constitutional
amendment must be in place when the regional pilot program for state
supervision reform proved to be a success and before a nationwide
implementation. ” [2]
Another scholar (Qing) thoughtfully explained that
“the state supervision system reform and the establishment of the
state supervision committee are major political reforms with a ‘Top-Down’
design. These reforms would face great uncertainty without a proper
consideration of the Constitutional system…The
core of these reforms underscored the redistribution of the power, which
require constitutional basis. As a consequence, a constitutional amendment is a
natural prerequisite for the success of these reforms.”[3]
Based on the
observation from the China Constitutional Annual Conference (host in Jilin
University) in August 2017, the constitutional paradigm reached highly
agreement on this issue.
Second, the constitutional
basis for state supervision law legislation has
to be ascertained by the constitutional amendment. In other words, as the legal
circle agreed that state supervision law legislation could proceed after the
constitutional amendment. “the state supervision system reform and the
establishment of the state supervision committee are major political reforms
with a ‘Top-Down’ design. These important reforms cannot proceed without consideration of the
Constitution. when the reform involves the constitutional system, a
constitutional basis is required to support the legitimacy of the reform. The
current Constitution cannot provide a theoretical framework to justify the
state supervision system reform, which we need to have a constitutional amendment
to remove the legal obstacles of the lack of the constitutional basis.”[4] Many scholars had already vigorously discussed
the issue, and thus it is unnecessary to repeat some argument.
Third, the proposed new state supervisory authority shall be named as
“People’s Supervision Committee” with a central-local structure. The
Constitution provided that “state authority at all levels is taken by People’s
Congress, the executive authority at all levels is taken by People’s Government.” (as a
tradition, the Central People’s
Government is called as State Council in common usage) The State judiciary is
called People’s Court. The state prosecutorate
authority is called People’s Procuratorate. Even the Central Military
Committee, a single level with less clear political structure, its predecessor was
also known as People’s Revolutionary
Military Committee. As a tradition, these institutions were created by NPC and
held responsible to NPC, supervised by NPC, which all carried the title “People.”
This tradition is coherent with the principle of respecting People’s Congress
system as the fundamental political system. However, it is strange that there
have been people and organizations insisted on an inappropriate name for this organization even with repeated explanations by Chinese constitution
scholars. I
am bewildered by this fact, but I hope this does not result
from a lack of basic constitutional knowledge, or being arrogant, or even a
little bit of both.
Fourth,
the legislature shall give priority to
Organization Law of the People’s Supervision Committee before making other laws
enabling the functions of the supervisory
authority. The People’s Congress is guided by Organization law of People’s
Congress. The State Council is guided by Organization Law of the State Council.
Local institutions such as People’s Congress and government at various levels
are respectively guided by Organization Law of Local People’s Congress and
Organization Law of Local People’s Government. The same applies to People’s
Court and People’s Procuratorate. Why People’s Supervision Committee is an
exception without Organization Law? based on China’s constitutional tradition
and practice, and the practical need of the supervision system, the legislature
shall first make the Organization Law of the People’s Supervision Committee. In
this regard, the author had long proposed that
“the People’s Supervision Committee, same as People’s Government (including
State Council), People’s Court, and People’s Procuratorate, shall first
establish Organization Law instead of State Supervision Law. The same principle
should equally apply to these institutions.” [5]
In
addition, some scholars had demonstrated the need for organization law with
other reasons. “the only central institutions without organization law is the
Central Military Committee. The lack of organization law for supervision
committee may create an impression that considering supervision committee and
military committee sharing same political nature. Does supervision committee
follow the same military operation rules as the military committee? The
misunderstanding under such impression shall be dismissed because the nature of
the supervision committee is drastically different from the military committee.
The function of the supervision committee is anti-corruption, safeguard human
rights. It is a state function with clear democratic nature. There are fundamental
differences between the supervisory
system in feudal China and the proposed reform.” [6]
Fifth,
the state supervision system reform pilot program cannot be a superficial one.
The program must be carried out in a down to earth manner, which means the
experiment cannot be too short, preferably, it shall last at least until the
spring of 2019. Just as the process of fermentation in winemaking requires a certain amount
of time, evaluation of the effectiveness of the pilot program cannot be done in
a short time. One scholar questioned that, “one shall carefully exam the
reasonableness of the length of the time between the proposed constitutional amendment and the start of the
supervision system reform pilot program. For example, the Standing Committee of
the NPC announced the decision for the pilot program on December 25th
of 2016, and the execution of the authorization under the pilot program started
at the following day. By carefully reviewing the authorization announcement,
one would notice that there was no mention of
the time limits for the pilot program or
even suggestion about pilot program shall be finalized within a year or two.”
This Scholar (Liu) further argued that
“Recent media reported that the upcoming 13th National People’s
Congress first meeting would discuss the constitutional
amendment and the legislation of the state supervision law in March 2018. One
may suspect that the Standing Committee of the NPC purposely omitted the length
of the experiment due to such extreme time restraint. If this is the case, then
one would ask whether important reform program such as state supervision system
can be implemented within a year and a few months? Could any policymakers fully appreciate the experience of
the pilot program, identify issues and find proper solutions within such short
time?” These concerns are quite common among Chinese academics.
Scholars
who studied 17 authorizations of the reform program by the Standing Committee
of the NPC between December 28 of 2012 to
December 25 of 2016 discovered that “all
17 authorizations set a time limit of two years. This suggested that the
authority generally consider 2 years is an appropriate time to assess the
effectiveness of a reform program.” [7] It is
noted that all these 17 authorizations
involved small reforms, which significance is far less than the political
system reform such as the supervision system reform. Thus, it is appropriate to
have a five-year experiment for major political system reform such as state supervision
system.
In
addition, the PRC Legislative Law defined the authorization shall not exceed
five years unless otherwise specified…the
authorized authority shall report to the institution that confers such authorization six months prior to
the expiration about the implementation of the authorized matters and makes recommendations for whether legislation
is needed for the authorized matters. If the extension
is needed, the NPC and Standing Committee can make the decision.” Although this
rule may not apply to the state supervision system reform pilot program, the five-year time limit and the six-month report mandate provides necessary
guidance.
In
contrast to the state supervision system reform program, people have reasons to
believe that the pilot program tend to be superficial and there would be no
sufficient empirical data from the experience if NPC decided to vote basic law
related to the state supervision law on March 2018. Although the resolution for
the pilot program was announced at the 25th
meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th NPC on December 25th
of 2016, the actual implementation was
quite late. Take the example of the author’s personal study, the author’s field research indicated that even on April of
2017, the personnel that exited Provincial Procuratorate had yet transferred to
the designated institution until May. The legislative research and study of the
pilot program shall occur at least 3 months prior to the legislation work. Otherwise, it would be too late to
incorporate any empirical data from the pilot program. There are only 9 months
between June 2017 and February 2018. It got
worse when we consider 3 months for research and study should be taken out from
the 9 months, which only gave us 6 months. The outcome of the six months
legislative experiment is extremely limited. Even we presume the other two
provinces under the pilot program started in March 2017, earlier than the
sample I used, we still only have 8 months of time for the experiment. It is
hard to have a meaningful experiment within such short time for such major
political reform. All other 17 smaller and less important reforms had been
screened for significantly longer time
than the current state supervision system reform.
Six,
the draft for the PRC Supervision Law shall be released for public and academic
commenting as soon as possible. The further state supervision system reform is
not only a major political system reform
but also a critical part of improving and modernizing state governing system.
The reform shall incorporate opinions from both party and the mass, and the
experts. One of the greatest political tradition since the Reform and Open Up
is to promptly publicize the legislation draft involving interests of all
Chinese and the basic legal system for public commenting. Public debates for
Constitutional amendment and draft has been a long-established tradition for
more than six decades. Three months had passed since the review of the current
draft for PRC supervision by the Standing Committee of the NPC, but there was
no scheduled public commenting, which is a bit of unusual. The society and
China’s legal communities are anxious to see the draft.
The
six issues discussed here are well reasoned and supported by the law. Relevant
opinions under these issues are resonant with Chinese scholars. These opinions
shall be taken consideration with respect.
II.
Recommended idea process
for state supervision law legislation
Supervision
system reform is a major political system reform, which means it requires careful
planning and execution to avoid any unnecessary rush. There is no need to pass
any supervision law at the NPC held in March 2018.
The
legislation of state supervision system can proceed
with the balance between the quality and efficiency. If time permitted, it
would be better to proceed by the following steps:
First,
prior to any substance legislation relate to state supervision system,
establish supervision institution through a constitutional
amendment. Some may argue that there would be no issues concerning
constitutionality for NPC Standing Committee reviewing proposed supervision law
draft when the higher party authority is
simultaneously preparing proposals for constitutional amendment. However, the
author holds a different opinion.
The
principle of enacting laws in accordance with the constitution refer to enact
laws in accordance with the preexisted and effective constitution provisions. The legislation is not a one-time event by
members of the legislature to vote on the subject. In fact, legislation is a
process of implementing constitutional authority, which involves multiple
parts. This process can take many years or few months. In the history of
Chinese legislation, the Supervision Law of the Standing Committee of People’s
Congress at all levels took 20 years to make. As the longest legislation, it
was considered as “one sword, 20 years in making.” [8] The
legislation process for relevant laws enabling the supervision system starts
from the initial review by Standing Committee of NPC, it then needs to be passed by NPC, and later signed by
the President. Based on current legislation work by the Standing Committee of
the 12th NPC, one of the issues is that there are no constitutional
provisions concerning the state supervision institution when the legislature
starts to consider the establishment of such institution. In other words, the
substance supervision law legislation occurred prior to any necessary
constitutional amendment.
Now,
one solution to the above problem would be passing the constitutional amendment at the National People’s Congress in March 2018. The legislature can make more
adjustment on the draft and have the NPC vote the legislation on March 2019.
A
more desired supervision lawmaking
process requires a delayed voting by 2019 or even later.
Second, between
now and the March of 2018 (when 12th NPC ended), the authority shall
focus on the substance of the
constitutional amendment enabling the newly
proposed state supervision institution. the current formula is: Central CPC
make a recommendation to NPC Standing Committee for a constitutional amendment. The NPC Standing Committee publicize the
constitutional amendment proposal for public comments and make a proposed draft
to the NPC. The constitutional amendment would be enacted after it passed by
required votes at the NPC. The difficulty of the constitutional amendment is
not the procedure aspect, but how to ensure Central CPC’s constitutional
amendment proposal is the most reasonable, and how to reflect the majority
opinions of the party. Three specific issues need to be considered in order to proceed this process properly.
1.
As
a principal issue, the Constitution need
to clarify the position of the state supervisory organ under the state system.
For example, the current Constitution established a constitutional hierarchy,
which is NPC and Standing Committee, the President, State Council, Central
Military Committee, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
Based on the author’s observation, there have been three opinions circulated
among Chinese academics on how to position the supervisory organ under current
Constitutional hierarchy. (1) position in between Central Military Committee
and Supreme People’s Court; (2) position in between Supreme People’s Court and
Supreme People’s Procuratorate; (3) position after Supreme People’s
Procuratorate. Based on study and research, it is the author’s opinion that any
legislative design cannot install a supervisory organ that would be above state
judiciary organs. The court is one of the
main state organs in almost all nations while the supervisory organ is merely
an ancillary institution. [9]
It would be unusual to design a
hierarchy that places the state supervisory organ above the Supreme People’s
Court. As a principle, the judiciary is
the last line of defense for the social justice. The judiciary would be much
weakened by an institutional design that places
supervisory organ above the judiciary. As a consequence, this would be
counterproductive to the goal of improving Chinese political and legal system. [10] In
addition, for the modernization of the state governance, the constitutional and
actual position of People’s Court shall be
higher than the supervisory organ.
2.
Define
the structure, authority, and leadership
of the supervisory organ. The structure of the supervisory
organ is a relatively easier task for the
legislature. However, the authority of the supervisory organ is a much more
difficult subject with great controversy. As for the issue of the leadership,
there are two concerns. Within the supervisory organ, the lawmakers need to decide
whether to have a collegiate system (collective leadership) or director
responsibility system or even certain
compromised system arrangement. The lawmakers
also need to decide the nature of the inter-institutional relationship: whether
the subordinate supervisory organs need to be led by the higher organs, or
higher organ only supervises the subordinate or even a third option of
compromise. Here, the author would pay special attention to the issue of
defining the duty of the supervisory organ.
In general, unlike the state legislature and
judiciary, including the court system,
the driving force of the state, the supervisory organ functions as a braking system of the state. Thus, it is common
that supervisory organs are ranked low under any
nation’s constitutional hierarchies with
limited power than the legislature, executive,
and judiciary. By giving more power to the supervisory organs, we could have a
great design flaw because we are actually giving
priority to a braking system over a driving
system. In addition, we cannot attribute the insufficient power or ranking of
the supervisory organs as the main causation for the rising of a corruption issue when there are multiple
factors concern this issue. We shall be cautious to a form of thinking that
solving the problem of corruption by giving more power and rank to supervisory
organs. Such solution may be a wrong
medicine for the corruption.
3.
The
lawmakers should try to coordinate and adjust the relationship between state supervisory organs and other state
organs within the framework of NPC. Based on the proposed plan, it appears to
be a new framework that the state supervisory organs do not report its work to
NPC and Standing Committee. This plan may
suggest an idea to construct a supervisory organ out of the constraint by the
NPC. However, the author believed that this idea violates both the provisions
and sprite of the Constitution and the
NPC system. Currently, there has been no
consensus among the interested parties on how to properly allocate power and
duties between the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. We cannot rush for speed
because resolving the issues concerning the duty of the supervisory organ
requires a tremendous amount of time to
carefully research and debate.
Third,
this issue concerns the balance of political resource in state prosecution
organs, which requires reaching consensus among party cadres and
institutionalization. Political party resource refers to the totality of the
resources obtained by a state organ, which includes Party political resource
and any other resource given by Constitution and related laws. Interestingly
there are some discrepancies (sometimes small and sometimes big) between the
constitutional and actual rank (influence) of a Chinese state organ. This could
be a result of a specific provision in the law.
However, this issue is mainly caused by the unbalanced
distribution of Party resource in different state organ. For example, under the
Constitution, Chinese court at all levels are ranked same as an executive organ. However, the rank was
effectively distorted in favor for the executive organ by certain laws. The
actual rank of the court also further weakened the position of the court by the
unbalanced distribution of power. For example, under the current political system, one of the benchmarks
to measure the political resource of a state organ is determined by how many
officers of the state organ are simultaneously serving on the Standing Committee of the Party Committee. Under the current arrangement, the executive organ took two seats at the Standing Committee of the
Party Committee while the court has no representation at all. The difference in
political resource creates a huge gap
between the executive organ and judicial organs.
It
is noted that the distribution of the Party-political resource could
effectively change the constitutional dynamics between different state organs.
One of the most striking examples would be the seat of the Party Political and
Law Committee (PPLC). Traditionally, PPLC Party secretary is seated by the head
of the State Public Security Burau. As a result, although State Public Security
Burau is lower ranking than the Court by the design of Constitution, the
political resource of the State Security Burau outweigh the court
substantially. In addition, this arrangement led to a police authority-oriented (criminal investigation centered)
criminal justice system, which is one of the reasons for the high rate of
wrongful prosecution. Fortunately, this trend has been corrected by now. In the
event of the constitutional amendment and
establishing state supervisory organs, the policymakers
and lawmakers shall pay special attention
to the past experience and the balance of political resource for different
state organs. The political resource shall be readjusted to ensure judicial
independence under the Constitution. The criminal investigation, prosecution,
and adjudication against corruption shall be insulated from being taken control
by the state supervisory organs at the same or higher level. All these ideas
shall be institutionalized and written into governing political document. The 4th
Plenary Session of the 18th Central CPC Congress provided that
“promote the trail-centered litigation system reform, to ensure that the facts
from investigation and prosecution can withstand the test of the law.” The
author believed that the political resource allocated to judiciary should be no less than the state supervisory
organ. This idea is coherent with the principle of the 4th Plenary
Session of the 18th Central CPC Congress and the substance of the
Chinese political system reform.
Fourth,
this issue concerns the drafter of the law. The law should not be drafted by
the department of a specific organ. The law should be drafted by a specific
department subordinate to NPC Standing Committee. The proposed legislation is
currently drafted under the leadership of Central Discipline and Investigation
Committee of CPC with the assistant of Law Committee of the Standing Committee
of the NPC. The state supervision law concerns the reallocation of the power
and the basic rights of the people, which requires the leadership from the
highest power of the state organ to prevent CDIC inappropriately expand its
power by weakening the position of other state organs and basic rights of the
people.
The
idea of having relevant subcommittee of the highest state organ to draft
supervision related law is coherent with the principle of the 4th
Plenary Session of the 18th Central CPC, which provided that “strengthening
and perfecting a legislation system led by NPC, bring NPC and its standing
committee’s main role in charging the legislative work. Establish a legislation
system that is organized and charged by special sub-committee of the NPC and
Law Committee of the NPC Standing Committee with participation by relevant
departments for making comprehensive and basic law.” The proposed supervision
law is a basic law that would substantially affect the political and legal
system of China, which might not be appropriate
to have CCDIC exclusively charge the legislation.
Based
on the dominant state supervision law theory, when the power unreasonably
favoring supervision organ would, it would negatively weaken the power of the
other state organs, which could unreasonably limit or even infringe the basic
constitutional rights of the citizen who is serving the political institution
and breach the basic constitutional principle “equality before the law”. The
draft is the foundation of one legislation. It would be impossible to correct
during the reviewing period if there are too many issues in the draft. Thus, it
is important to avoid the scenario that the pass of a state supervision law
would cause constitutionality controversies.
Fifth,
if possible, the policymakers can first
publicize the details of the supervision system reform for public comments
prior to the voting of the constitutional
amendment and the state supervision law; then the policymakers can proceed with decisions. The proposed reform plan
would result in a new anti-corruption
institution with great power and unification of party and state, which
possesses equivalent constitutional and actual political power as the state
council. The author believes we should be
cautious to such organization. From reading various Chinese and foreign
studies, the author concluded that many
nations around the world, include America, Japan, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, France, and German all of them do not have an
institution with such power. Although the Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau (CPIB) of Singapore, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) of India, and
Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption suggested a higher level
anti-corruption agency, they are either ranked at a minister-level or at a level direct subordinate to the prime
minister. There is no anti-corruption agency at the same level as a cabinet
level. In addition, China has never had a supervision agency with such power
and structure.
The
author would like the policymakers to have further study and debates on the
plausibility of establishing a new agency with the unification of party and
state, and concentration of great power. Preferably we could proceed the
legislation when we reached consensus on the necessity of such institution
within the whole Party and the whole
society.
III.
The perfection of the state supervision legislation when the legislative
plan unchanged
The
legislative plan refers to the timetable and the roadmap for reviewing and
voting the basic law relate to the state supervision system. Reform is a
complicated task entangled with other issues. With this in mind, it is
acceptable that it might be impossible to readjust the present timetable and roadmap. It is hard to readjust the timetable
mainly because the March 2018 need to vote and pass the necessary
constitutional amendment at the first meeting of the 13th NPC, and
establish the legislative plan to implement the legislation of the state
supervision organ. However, besides these two events, another aspect of the plan can be readjusted.
The
discussion of the state supervision legislation shall especially respect the principle of the Constitution, and basic
rights of the people established by the Constitution, which includes the basic
rights of the officials who are the subject of the law. This principle provides
ethical supports of the law. the empirical experience and other countries’
experience suggested that an effective anti-corruption system cannot rely too much on the power and rank of the anti-corruption
agency. The anti-corruption mechanism shall bring NPC into the full function
under the constitution. in addition, the anti-corruption system shall respect
the basic rights of the people in constraining the corruption.
The
anti-corruption system shall encourage the public institution to fulfill its duty and protecting people’s basic
rights. An anti-corruption system without participation by the mass cannot be fully effective.
During the Ming dynasty, the Hongwu Emperor tried public execution of the
corrupted officers, public display of the corpus, skinning the corpus, and
other various cruel punishments against corruption with the very limited result. Without proper constraint
and democratic oversight, a powerful anti-corruption agency itself could be the
source of the corruption. It is noted that there are many nations maintained an
honest and upright government without the need for a powerful and sophisticated
supervision system.
Based
on the above discussion, the author provides14 recommendations:
1.
Under
the principle of the Constitution, and the nature of socialist state system and the tradition of the Constitution,
the title for the new state supervision organ legislation shall be People’s Republic of China the Organization
Law of the People’s Supervision Committee. If the legislature decides to
use the title People’s Republic of China
Supervision Law for other considerations, the part relates to the
organization of the supervision organ shall be incorporated to form a
comprehensive supervision law. As a tradition, all state organ has coordinated
organization law, which should be respected. However, the supervision law
legislation can be achieved with the form and the substance. The legislature
could have the supervision law related provision as the form of the law, and
the organizational and procedural law related provision as the substance of the
law. If time allowed, the legislature should consider incorporating provisions relating
to the duties and responsibilities of the Supervision officer.
2.
Under
the constitution, the state supervisory organ can only execute the law, not the Constitution. Thus, we shall
dismiss the argument that supervisory organ can execute the Constitution and
“defend the Constitution.” As a basic
constitution principle, the NPC and its standing committee have the prerogative in executing the
Constitution exclusively. If the state supervisory organ could execute the
Constitution or “defend the Constitution,” does it mean from the central organ
to lower organs at all levels possess the prerogative of supervising the
execution of the Constitution. One of the core tenants of the Supervising the
execution of the Constitution is that the institution could review the
constitutionality of the rules passed by the NPC and its Standing Committee.
The State Supervisory organ shall not have such authority.
The
dominant theory in Chinese constitutional academics is that the NPC and its standing committee can directly execute the
Constitution. The President, State Council, and the Central Military Committee have limited power in executing the
Constitution. The court and the procuratorate execute the law by directly
executing judicial power in a specific case. The court and the procuratorate
cannot directly apply Constitution in the case. Direct application of the
Constitution in the case would have a negative
effect, and one can consult the incident
of the “judiciary application of the Constitution” a decade ago. [11] This
incident indicated the consensus among Chinese policymakers
and academics that the court and the procuratorate have no power in applying the
Constitution in the case directly. This principle should equally apply
to the state supervisory organ. Thus, it is inappropriate to have state
supervisory organ and its officers to execute
the Constitution directly.
3.
The
proposal that to exempt the supervisory investigation and supervisory organs
from the jurisdiction of the Criminal Procedure Law violates the principle and
the provision of the Constitution, which should be dismissed. This proposal
based on a presumption that the supervisory investigation shall be off limits
from the restrictions of the Criminal Procedure Law, which would create a
discriminatory treatment for the officers subject to the supervisory
investigation by removing constitutional
protection on officers’ basic rights. The article 33 (2) of the Constitution
provided that “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before
the law.” article 33 (4) provided that “Every citizen is entitled to the rights
and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and
other laws.” It is noted that “every citizen” here prohibit NPC and any other
organization to exclude a citizen with public duties from the constitutional
protection.
Some
may argue that the proposed provision would confine the free movement of a
citizen for 3 months or longer under the supervisory investigation but not
create any conflict with the constitutional protection provided by the Criminal
Procedure Law because the supervisory investigation is different than the
criminal investigation. This argument is ridiculous because it is as if one
arguing the rice steamed in the iron pot is steamed
rice, but the rice steamed in the aluminum pot is
not steamed rice! Such argument lacks basic respect to the Constitution
and the facts, which is unreasonable and ridiculous. Any legislation need
supports from reasons and facts, without reasons and facts, we cannot do it,
this is the basic principle of the rule of law.
In
investigating crimes involving abuse of power, the supervisory organ shall be
treated as same as the people’s procuratorate under the Criminal Procedure Law.
The state supervision system reform shall improve basic human rights in this
regard, not reverse it.
4.
The
proposed supervision law can establish a tier system for the length of the
detention. The proposed supervision law established a 3-month detention period
for all situation subject to one extension for extra 3 months approved by the agency at next higher level. Based on the
author’s research and investigation, investors from local CDIC and
procuratorate commonly agreed that 3 months is sufficient for an investigation
involving a high-level official, such as an official at the provincial level. It is not uncommon for them
to apply for an extension of detention in
such cases. However, 3-month detention might be unreasonably long for cases
involving a lower level bureaucrat, such as an official at the municipal or
departmental level. In addition, the 3-month detention may produce undesired
and complicated outcomes for the local community. For example, when a
businessman is detained by supervision organ for 3 months due to his or her
involvement in bribing government officials, his or her business would be
unattended during the detention. It is uncommon that a 3-month absence could
substantially affect the normal business operation and those people in the
community whose livelihoods are relied on the business operation. It is the
author’s opinion that, a better alternative would be a limited application of
the 3-month detention measure: reserving the power of issuing 3-month detention
to the central and provincial level supervision organ exclusively with the possibility a one-time
extension for extra 3 months. Any lower supervision organ can only issue 30
days detention with a possibility of extension of extra 30 days approved by the
organ at the next higher level. In addition, the detention measure can be
applied to an investigation involving
abuse of power. Other less severe acts shall not subject to detention measure.
If the legislature considering detention for less severe acts, then it shall
specify the length of the time measured by days or hours.
5.
Under
Criminal Procedure Law, when the time limit for holding a criminal suspect in
custody during the investigation expired, an extension shall be reported to and
approved by the People’s Procuratorate at the next higher level. (article 154
criminal procedure law) However, the nature of the restrictive measure under proposed
supervision law would be harsher than the arrest of a suspect under the
criminal law due to the extended 3-month time limit for holding the suspect in
custody without any approval from the People’s Procuratorate. Article 37 (2)
provided that “No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by the decision of
people’s procuratorate or by the decision
of people’s court, and arrests must be
made by a public security organ.” Under current law, the criminal arrest is the most severe measure,
which requires the approval from the People’s Procuratorate. The arrest would not necessarily lead to a prosecution, and a prosecution would
not necessarily lead to judgment, even a judgment for imprisonment could be less than 6 months and in some cases less than 1 months.
Thus, the proposed supervision detention is a harsher measure because it could
potentially restrict the freedom of a person for 6 months without any approval
from the third agency.
In
conclusion, the proposed 3-month or 6-month detention without approval from
People’s Procuratorate is incoherent with the principle and provisions of the
Constitution. If the lawmakers wish to keep the proposed detention rule, then
they should amend article 33 (2) and 27 (2) or provide an interpretation to
resolve the conflict.
6.
The
jurisdiction of the supervision organ should be restricted within the
corruption or abuse of power crimes. Other crimes should be investigated by the
People’s Procuratorate. The proposed legislation considering investigating
crimes involving (abuse of power/ duty-related crimes or unlawful activities),
which is a function related to anti-corruption. The supervision organ is an
anti-corruption agency; thus it is reasonable to separate non-corruption
related crimes from the duty of the supervision organ.
7.
The
proposed legislation should specify the leadership structure of the supervision
organ. The new organ incorporates the duty of both government and judiciary,
which should not be modeled on a centralized leadership structure. A better
structure would be modeled on the People’s Procuratorate, a collective
leadership under democratic centralism. To be more specific, the director of
the supervisory committee in charge of the administrative work of the organ,
the subcommittee discuss the cases under democratic centralism with the
director as the host of the discussion. When the director disagrees with the majority of the discussion,
the case can be reported to local NPC Standing Committee for decision. The
planned the supervision organ can be modeled on the current People’s
Procuratorate system.
8.
The
proposed legislation should offer a remedial mechanism for severe disciplinary
or ordinary administrative punishment. The punished individual or organization
should be able to ask the court to review
the punishment. Maintaining a balance between the supervision power and the
subject of the supervision power is coherent with the principle of civilized
supervision system. The author supports that, “the state supervision law
legislation should introduce remedy mechanism through judicial review. People
can litigate supervision decision on detention, enforcing the injunctions
against one’s property, or sever administrative punishment, such as discharge
official duties.” [12]
As for less severe punishments, the proposed legislation should offer complaint
and review mechanism. It is only fair to have a judicial review mechanism when
many supervision measures involving restrictions on the personal freedom and
property rights of the people. As for the decision of recommending for criminal
prosecution, the legislation should follow the preexisted criminal procedure
regulations and laws that requiring a prompt notification to the suspect.
9.
It
may be inappropriate to establish a supervisory organ or supervisor inside
state organ or any other public organs. The proposed legislation plans to allow
supervisory organ, with approval, dispatch supervisor into Party organ, state
organ, and any other public organs at the same level. This proposal may be
inconsistent with the modernized government function. The dispatch mechanism is
an unordinary measure, which could create contentious between different
functionaries. This dispatch measure is quite rare in other countries. The
CCDIC dispatch practice should not be legalized through supervision law.
10. The supervision law
should limit its enforcement on the part of ethics and morality related issues.
Private matters can be regulated by the party discipline. The proposed
legislation plans to incorporate inspection on the ethics and morality of the
individual, which is incoherent with the general principle under
Marxism-Leninism. Rule the state by virtue does not suggest the state to enforce moral values directly. The
legislation should distinguish the difference between moral values and laws, it
can express moral values through the principle of the law, and the judiciary
should promote virtue through the judicial discretion. In addition, enforcement
of moral values requires a context. For example, the state needs to first legislate moral values by
identification and legalization. The enforcement requires definition and
standard. The law cannot directly say the supervision organ inspect
individual’s moral values. This is inappropriate. However, this does not
suggest the law cannot supervise the behavior of the public officials because
it is appropriate to ensure the behavior of the public official is consistent
with the public value.
11. The proposed legislation
should avoid the unjustified
discretionary power of the supervisor in enforcing the law and investigation.
One of the main complaints from the overseas and Chinese about anti-corruption
was the unjustified discretionary enforcement of the law and investigation.
Such discretion is unfair to the people but also is bad for the reputation of the anti-corruption. The debates on the
supervision law rarely focus on how to avoid or limit discretionary power by
the supervisor. The supervision law should include the following rules: the supervision organs and its staff
should have a general registration system to collect corruption complaints and
information, the registration should be shared by everyone within the organ.
The registration should be summarized and file to the next higher level for
recording. The investigation of the complaints and information should be
discussed and decided by a committee
under democratic centralism. No individual supervisor can make the decision
about the complaint. When the case involves state security, foreign relations,
military or other areas requires confidentiality, the staff can report it to
the director or deputy director.
12. We should pay special
attention to avoid the legislation is hijacked by one organ. The current state supervision law is drafted by CCDIC; the CCDIC will transform into the state
supervision committee. The current legislation tends to fall into the
“department-oriented” legislation model. Thus, it is quite obvious that, as the
author learned from research, the
legislation tends to create more power and reduce the responsibility of the agency. It is noted that the state
supervision organ would become part of the state organ under the Constitution.
There is no justification to take supervision organ as a special Party organ
covered with state function. The distribution of state power should be
justified by the Constitution. It is important to maintain a balance of different state power. It is inappropriate
to establish a system centered on the needs of the state supervision organ.
However, the current legislation tends to specialize the supervision power,
tends to construct the state system and people’s basic rights based on the
supervision power. This tendency should be corrected during the
legislation.
13. Anti-corruption is the
project belongs to the whole people. The
supervision system should be the framework
of the people with engagement by democratic parties and other people. “China
has a large size of people works with state functionaries. It is hard to rely on the supervision committee to restrain the
corruption fully. The anti-corruption is a political project requires
the participation of whole people. The proposed state supervision system barred
social and mass engagement. The democratic values are not fully expressed by
the proposed legislation. Thus…the lawmakers can expand supervision power
through the social and mass engagement.” The state supervision organ should not
function as military or intelligence agency, or function as an internal party
organ constituted by the party members. The
project of Anti-Corruption concerns everyone’s interest. Thus, the
nature of the anti-corruption project requires a culture of openness. This cultural is coherent with the Democratic
Centralism and the Mass Line. It is better to encourage
more people to engage in the project of
anti-corruption.
14. The proposed legislation
should pay attention to the previous experience. There has been a great improvement in the past decades on the legislation quality. However, the main
issue would be “broadness,” many important issues remained unclear. It is
common to see the term “execute in accordance with the law.” There is no clear
indication on which provision of the law
or there is no provision that could support it. Other expression includes
“follow the procedure” or “reasonable arrangement” or “strictly follow the
process” or “accept supervision.” These expressions are confusing for its
ambiguity. For example, follow what process? How to judge the strictness? What
is “reasonable” arrangement in comparison with the arbitrary arrangement? The lawmakers need to pay attention to these
ambiguous expressions.
The
current legislation would be a successful one with improvement on those
discussed issues.
[1]作者简介：童之伟，华东政法大学法律学院、华东政法大学法治中国建设研究中心教授。本文系国家社会科学基金重大项目“人民代表大会制度理论创新研究”（项目编号：１４ＺＤＡ０１４）的中期成果。
[11]最高人民法院2001年就齐玉苓案做出的《关于以侵犯姓名权的手段侵犯宪法保护的公民受教育的基本权利是否应承担民事责任的批复》（法释〔2001〕25号），被认为是“宪法司法化”的实例，但2008年12月18日，最高人民法院发布公告称，自当月24日起，废止2007年底以前发布的27项司法解释，其中包括上述（法释〔2001〕25号）批复。
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国家监察立法预案仍须着力完善
【本文发表在《政治与法律》２０１７年第１０期；这里网发的是文章原稿，其格式和表述与纸面版可能有细微差别，援引请以纸面版为准。】
摘要：推进国家监察立法的研究已比较深入，有些意见已获我国法学界普遍认同。监察体制改革是我国政治体制的重大改革，没必要抢时间赶进度，也不必赶在下一届全国人民代表大会召开时通过改革国家监察体制所需的法律。可以考虑将全国人大审议表决监察立法的时间推迟到２０１９年或更晚。如果为建立国家监察体制而修改宪法、制定相关法律的路线图时间表不能调整，也完全可以理解，不过，此种情势下最好制定出一部包括监察机关组织、权限，监察程序和监察官等方面内容的综合监察法，应考虑从制定综合性的监察法的形式、调整对象的范围、职权、工作责任制等十四个具体方面完善现有的改革设想。
关键词：监察委员会；监察立法；宪法；留置；职务犯罪
国家监察立法预案指的是为实现国家监察体制改革的目标在立法方面所做的全部安排，涉及的事项有宪法相应部分的修改，修改宪法与制定相关法律的时间衔接，所需制定的法律的名称、内容，全国人大常委会和全国人民代表大会审议该法律案的时间节点等。完善现有的国家监察立法预案，是关系到全面有效实施宪法和依宪治国之全局的具有现实紧迫性的课题。我国法律界和法学界对涉及国家监察立法预案的不少问题，已经有了较广泛共识，同时，从总体说来，国家监察立法预案有待理顺、改进之处还有很多，仍需下大力气研究，以促成其完善。
一、我国法学界已取得广泛共识的意见
推进国家监察立法涉及很多方面的问题，都有讨论的必要。就宪法层面来说，其中有些问题的答案是不言而喻的，实际上处在常识领域。从 ２０１６年 １２月以来，不少常识性问题其实已经在多种场合、以多种形式被说清楚了，因而可以说我国法学界已就这些话题达成了广泛共识。这些共识可以作为进一步讨论国家监察体制改革领域其他话题的基础。已达成广泛共识的意见主要有以下方面。
第一，全面进行国家监察体制改革必须有宪法根据。在中央的国家监察体制改革方案见诸新闻报道之初，笔者就提出：“要为改革试点成功后全面推开国家监察体制改革创制宪法根据，只能修改宪法。……只要认真谋划改革试点成功后的改革全面铺开事务，就一定得做修宪准备，并且应当在改革试点宣布成功和将新监察体制改革在全国范围铺开前完成修宪。”[2]接下来，另有学者说得非常到位，他说：“国家监察体制的改革与监察委员会的设立，乃是事关全局的重大政治改革，是国家监察制度的顶层设计。如此重大的政治改革，若缺失宪法的参与，改革可能因此面临更多的变数……监察体制改革的实质在于国家监督监察权的重新配置，由于权力的配置须‘仰仗’宪法为其提供正当性基础，如此一来，宪法的适时修改便成了改革的必然结果，也是改革得以实质性推进的前提。”[3]从２０１７年８月中国宪法学会年会（召开于吉林大学）的讨论情况看，我国宪法学界在这个问题上看法已经高度一致。
第二，国家监察立法要于宪法有据，须先行修改宪法，待相关宪法修正案生效，再着手进行国家监察立法。重大改革必须于法有据，这是全社会早已形成的政治共识。在这个基础上，我国宪法学界也形成了国家监察立法必须于宪法有据的广泛学术共识。“国家监察体制改革与监察委员会的设立，乃是事关全局的重大政治改革，是国家监察制度的顶层设计。如此重大的政治改革，不能缺少宪法的参与。改革的内容关涉国家的宪制结构，改革的进行也应做到于法有据，改革的成果同样需要借由法律予以固化。传统的宪法解释理论不能回应我国国家监察体制改革，因此，必须要用修宪保障国家监察体制改革的顺利进行。”[4]
这方面的内容，我国法律界、法学界人士已进行了很多论述，为避免重复论说，这里不一一列举。
第三，所设立的国家监察机关的名称应该是人民监察委员会，分中央人民监察委员会和地方各级人民监察委员会。按照《宪法》的规定，我国的各级国家权力机关称为人民代表大会；各级国家行政机关称为人民政府（其中最高国家行政机关虽考虑到历史传统被称为国务院，但宪法还是专门解说它“即中央人民政府”）；国家各级审判机关称为人民法院；国家各级检察机关称为人民检察院；即使是单层级、政权组织特征不明显的中央军事委员会，其前身也称为人民革命军事委员会。因此，由各级人民代表大会产生、对各级人民代表大会负责、受各级人民代表大会监督的各级国家监察机关的名称，理所当然要冠以“人民”的称谓。如果愿意把人民代表大会制度作为根本政治制度加以尊重，这就是一种常识。然而奇怪的是，我国法学界，尤其是宪法学界在过去近一年间反反复复解说和普及这个常识，可有些机构和人员仍坚持原有的不当提法，其中原因不好妄测，但愿不是宪法常识缺乏，也不是权力傲慢，更不是两者兼而有之。
第四，应优先制定《人民监察委员会组织法》，再制定监察机关行使职权所需的其它法律。我们知道，全国人民代表大会有《全国人民代表大会组织法》，国务院有《国务院组织法》，地方各级人大和地方各级人民政府有《地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法》，人民法院有《人民法院组织法》，人民检察院有《人民检察院组织法》,为什么人民监察委员会不要组织法？按成文宪法和制定法传统，按中国法治建设的惯例和形成国家监察体制的需要，国家监察立法首先应制定的是《人民监察委员会组织法》。对此，笔者早就提出：“同人民政府（包括国务院）、人民法院、人民检察院这样完整意义的其他国家机关一样，设立人民监察委员会优先需要的法律，是《人民监察委员会组织法》，而不是《国家监察法》，就像国务院需要《国务院组织法》、地方各级人大和地方各级人民政府需要地方组织法、人民法院需要《人民法院组织法》等一样的道理。”[5]
此外，也有学者从其他方面论证了为监察机关制定组织法的必要性：“在中央一级国家机构中，唯一没有组织法的是中央军事委员会，如果监察委员会不制定自己的组织法，会让人联想到它是否与中央军事委员会属于同类机构？其内部是否也实行军事化管理？从而引起对监察机构的种种误解。监察机关的性质与军事机关应该是明显不同的，监察委员会应当是反腐败、保卫人权的国家机构，具有鲜明的民主性，这与我国古代的监察制度有本质区别。”[6]
以上这些道理不仅是我国宪法学界已经形成的共识，也是专职从事我国法制建设工作的人们应该懂得的常识。然而同样令人不解的是，宪法学界在过去近一年间反反复复解说和普及这些常识，可有些机构和人员也是罔顾常识置之不理。但愿这不是因为宪法常识缺乏，也不是因为权力傲慢，更不是两者兼而有之。
第五，国家监察体制改革试点不能走过场、做样子，必须扎扎实实地进行，因而试点时间不可太短，至少应持续至２０１９年春。像酿酒需要发酵时间一样，测试试点监察体制改革措施的效果也需要时间。有学者提出：“慎重考虑授权试点与修宪立法之间的时间衔接。仔细分析全国人大常委会 ２０１６年１２月２５日决定、第二天就开始实施的对三省市的授权决定，即可发现，对这三个地方的授权试点，并没有规定时间，更没有说一年或者两年之内必须完成试点。”该学者质疑道：“现有舆论报道，２０１８年３月召开的十三届全国人大一次会议就要讨论修改宪法、制定国家监察法了。是不是由于修改宪法和制定国家监察法时间紧迫，全国人大常委会在授权决定中就没有规定具体的授权期限？若是这样，如此重大的试点改革在一年零几个月的时间内能否完成？能否充分总结经验、充分发现问题并找到解决问题的办法？”[7]应当说，这种担忧在我国法学界相当普遍。
还有学者在研究了自２０１２年１２月２８日至２０１６年１２月２５日止，全国人大常委会围绕地方改革试点共形成的17项授权决定后，发现“全部１７项决定都将试点期限定为２年以上，这表明授权机关认为２年的时间跨度可以检验出试点措施的有效性”。[8]须知，这17项涉及都是比较小的改革，其重要性远远不足以同国家监察体制改革这种政治体制重大改革相比。相对而言，国家监察体制改革这种重大政治改革，试点时间应该达到5年才合适。
另外，关于授权试点时间，我国《立法法》第１０条规定：“授权的期限不得超过5年，但是授权决定另有规定的除外……被授权机关应当在授权期限届满的6个月以前，向授权机关报告授权决定实施的情况，并提出是否需要制定有关法律的意见；需要继续授权的，可以提出相关意见，由全国人民代表大会及其常务委员会决定。”这项规定或许对国家监察体制改革试点不具约束力，但至少其规定的时间点可供参考。其中，试点5年的时间长度值得重视，授权期限届满6个月以前向授权机关报告授权决定实施情况的规定更值得重视。
反观国家监察体制改革试点，人们有理由得出这样的结论：如果要全国人大赶在２０１８年３月审议表决设立国家监察机关的基本的法律，改革试点的经验是不够充分的，易导致这项试点“走过场”。因为，第十二届全国人大常委会第二十五次会议于２０１６年１２月２５日通过此项试点决定，但实施试点的时间要晚得多。以笔者对某试点省的调查研究为例，笔者去该试点省调查研究是在 ２０１７年 ４月，那时该省从检察院剥离的人员还未到位，后来到位是进入５月的事情。再说，总结国家监察体制改革试点至少应在综合性的监察法通过前3个月，否则试点经验教训可能来不及进入监察立法。那么，从２０１７年６月算起，到２０１８年２月，总共只有9个月，扣除3个月，只剩下6个月了。6个月试点能试出的效果是相当有限的。就算另外两省市走得快，人员在２０１７年３月就到位了，也只有8个来月的试点时间。国家重大政治体制改革试点只用8个月时间，难以获取充分有效的试点经验。前述17项授权试点数据表明，那些改革试点的重要性远不及国家监察体制改革，但它们试点所用时间都比事关全局的监察体制改革多出一大段。
第六，现有的《中华人民共和国监察法（草案）》应该尽快公开，向社会征求意见，让学术界和社会各界公开讨论。深化国家监察体制改革，既然是事关全局的重大政治体制的改革，是推动国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重大步骤，就应及早倾听全党全民意见，接纳专家献计献策。改革开放以来，我国形成的优良政治习惯之一，就是凡涉及全民利益或法制建设全局的立法，都及时公布草案听取社会各界的意见。至于宪法草案和宪法修正案草案交付全民讨论，则更是过去六十多年的好传统。现有的《中华人民共和国监察法（草案）》，全国人大常委会已经审议过一次，且时间又过了3个多月却尚未向社会公布征求意见，这有点不合常规。对公布这份法律草案，社会各界尤其是法学界有很热烈的期待。
以上六个方面问题，于法律于情理，都很清楚，相关意见已获我国学界普遍认同。对这类意见，需要的是尊重和吸纳。
二、做好国家监察立法的较理想步骤
监察体制改革既然是我国政治体制的重大改革，就应稳扎稳打，一步一个脚印地逐步进行，没必要抢时间赶进度，没必要赶在２０１８年３月召开的全国人民代表大会上通过国家监察体制改革所需的法律。
进行国家监察立法，应在质量和效率之间求得平衡。如果时间允许的话，按以下步骤推行国家监察立法相对而言比较理想。
第一，先通过设立国家监察机关的宪法修正案，然后再实质性推进国家监察立法。可能有些人士认为，在高层不公开地酝酿中共中央向全国人大常委会提出关于修改宪法部分内容的建议稿草稿的同时，全国人大常委会审议监察法草案，没有什么不合宪不合法的问题。然而，笔者认为，不能这样简单地看问题。
根据宪法制定法律，本意是根据已经生效的宪法条款的规定和精神制定法律。制定法律并不是立法机关成员举手表决一下就完成的一次性活动，而是一个由一系列必要环节组成的行使宪定职权的过程。在我国立法史上，这个过程最长的达到20年，如我国《各级人民代表大会常务委员会监督法》的制定历程，被人们称为“20年磨一剑”[9]，最短的也需要好几个月。制定设立国家监察机关所必需的基本的法律，其过程至少包括从全国人大常委会首次审议相关议案开始，到全国人民代表大会表决通过、国家主席签署公布之间的许多个环节，持续时间不可能很短。不过，从十二届全国人大常委会已审议监察法草案的情况看，现在面临的一个难题是，最高国家权力机关已经开始行使制定设立监察机关的法律的职权，但宪法上还没有关于国家监察机关的任何条款。也就是说，最高国家权力机关已经进入了监察立法过程，但尚没有必要的宪法实体性条款做立法根据。
现在看来，解决上述问题的较好办法是，全国人大２０１８年３月通过设立国家监察机关的宪法修正案，待宪法修正案生效后，再根据相应宪法修正案完善现有的法律草案，到２０１９年３月由全国人大常委会提请全国人大审议。
若按较理想步骤推进综合性的监察法的制定，关键就在于将全国人民代表大会审议表决该法律议案的时间推迟到２０１９年或更晚。
第二，从现在起到２０１８年３月十二届全国人大任期结束这段时间（以下简称现阶段），最好集中力量解决设立国家监察机关所需之宪法修正案的具体内容安排。从形式上看，修宪无非是由中共中央通过并向全国人大常委会提出相应修宪建议，然后全国人大常委会据此向社会征求意见，向全国人大提出修宪议案，最后再由全国人大审议表决通过。修宪过程真正困难的地方，不在于走程序，而在于必须保证中共中央修宪建议的内容具有最大合理性，其中包括充分反映党内外的广泛共识。做好这些工作需要在充分研究讨论的基础上处理好三个方面的具体问题：
1.从宪法上明确国家监察机关在国家机构体系中的位置。这是一个原则性很强的问题。以中央国家机构为例，现行我国宪法的排列顺序是：全国人大及其常委会、国家主席、国务院、中央军委、最高人民法院、最高人民检察院。关于中央国家监察机关应处的宪法位置，据笔者了解，迄今为止有三种意见：放中央军委之后、最高人民法院之前；放最高人民法院之后，最高人民检察院之前；放最高人民法院、最高人民检察院之后。笔者的研究结论是，无论怎么摆，国家监察机关的实际地位不能高于国家审判机关。因为无论哪个国家的法院都是主要国家机关之一，而监察组织在各国往往只是主要国家机关的从属机构。[10] 如果将其地位放在最高人民法院之上，那就不符合常规了。审判是实现社会正义的最后防线，而若在宪法上把监察机关置于审判机关之前，可能会削弱国家审判机关的地位，不利于实现我国政治法律制度的综合效用。“凡是司法没有权威性和公信力的地方，就不可能有能够担当‘维护社会公平正义最后一道防线’的司法。”[11]从国家治理体系现代化的要求看，我国人民法院的宪法法律地位和实际地位，都应该高于监察机关。
2.明确国家监察机关的组成、职权、责任制。国家监察机关的组成方面的事项可能不太难处理。然而，关于监察机关的职权范围，则是事关中国宪法实施之全局的大问题，现在争议非常大。至于工作责任制，横向涉及同一级监察机关内部实行合议制还是委员会主任负责制，抑或是实行某种折中的体制的安排，纵向涉及上下级监察机关之间是应该定位为领导被领导关系、监督被监督关系，还是应该做某种折中的制度安排的问题，也很复杂。不过，以上三方面事务中须特别评说一下的是国家监察机关的职权。
一般来说，国家的立法、司法和审判机关，都属于承担驱动职能的机构，监察机构所起的是制动作用。所以，世界各国监察机构，其法律地位往往比较低，权力十分有限，远不及国会、行政机关和审判机关。可以说，在国家机构体系内起制动作用的监察机关位不高权不重是常态。制动机构的权力和地位如果超过驱动机构，其设计一定存在很大问题。另外，导致官场严重贪腐的原因是多方面而且极为复杂的，监察机构位不高权不重极可能并非主因。所以，仅仅用加强监察机构权力、提高监察机构地位的方式反贪，极可能下的是不对症之药。这点应引起足够的注意和重视。
3.在人大制度框架内平衡协调国家监察机关与其它国家机关的关系。按现有的国家监察机关职权安排方案，似乎将来的国家监察机关可以不向人大及其常委会报告工作，这或许反映了欲将监察机关建设成一个不受人大制度约束的社会特权机构的意图。然而，笔者认为，这违背中国宪法的规定、精神和人民代表大会制度的要求。至于国家监察机关同人民检察院如何合理分配职权的问题，似乎还没有形成各方有共识的方案。解决好这些问题也要花大量时间调查研究和展开讨论，不能盲目赶立法进度。
第三，同设立国家检察机关相关的党政综合资源平衡问题，需在党内形成共识并记载在有关的权威性文献中。党政资源综合，指不同国家机关分享的党的资源与其从宪法、法律的规定中获得的资源之总和。我国国家机关的宪法地位与实际地位，有时是相同的，有时差别很大。造成这种状况的原因，固然同宪法之下的普通法律的具体规定有关，但更主要的是由党内资源的分配状况不均衡造成的。例如，我国各级法院的宪法地位同行政机关相同，但有关法律降低了法院的相对地位，使法院的法律地位低于行政机关。与此同时，党内资源的分配又在事实上进一步降低了法院地位。例如，目前在我国的各级政权中，国家机关的党内资源分配主要反映在是否拥有常委席位以及拥有几个常委席位上。现在通行的安排，是行政机关分享两个党委常委席位，法院却一个常委席位也不拥有。这就造成了行政机关与审判机关获得的党政综合资源量拉开了很大差距。
尤其应该注意，党内资源的分配，可以完全改变国家机关或其中某个部门与其他国家机关之间的宪法地位。这方面最明显的例证，是过去长期实行的政法委书记与公安局长两个职位由一人担任的安排，这种安排使得宪法地位低于法院的同级行政机关的公安部门，其获得的党政综合资源量超过了法院，因而其实际地位处于法院之上。这种做法在相当程度上导致了刑事犯罪案件办理过程中以侦查为中心的倾向，也是一段时期内我国刑事冤假错案偏多的重要原因之一。好在这种做法现在已经基本得到了纠正。在修宪、立法设立国家监察机关的时候，鉴于以上教训，应特别重视和研究与此相关的党政资源分配的综合平衡问题。在这方面，我国应通过调整党政资源的综合分配，确保法院真正能够按宪法的要求独立行使审判权，有效防止涉嫌贪腐犯罪的案件从调查到审查起诉和审判被同级或上级监察机关主导。这方面相应的制度化安排，须形成共识并记载在有政治约束力的权威性文献中。中共十八届四中全会提出：“推进以审判为中心的诉讼制度改革，确保侦查、审查起诉的案件事实证据经得起法律的检验。”笔者认为，保证党政综合资源分配中国家审判机关所得的量不少于国家监察机关，是落实党的十八届四中全会这项决定所必须有的保障，也是我国政治体制改革应有的内容。
第四，为避免事实上的部门立法，综合性监察法相关方案的起草，应改由全国人大常委会下属专门机构主导。目前的国家监察立法方案，是以中央纪委机关为主导方负责起草的，全国人大常委会法工委处于协助地位。国家监察立法涉及国家权力的全面再分配，也涉及相当一部分公民基本权利的保障。为防止将变身为国家监察机关的纪委不适当地压缩其它国家机关的职权和公民基本权利，自行扩权，有必要改变现有做法，将国家监察立法相关草案的起草主导权，交给最高国家权力机关的下属专门机构。
将综合性的监察法相关草案的起草主导权交给最高国家权力机关的下属专门机构，本身就是中共十八届四中全会的要求。十八届四中全会提出：“健全有立法权的人大主导立法工作的体制机制，发挥人大及其常委会在立法工作中的主导作用。建立由全国人大相关专门委员会、全国人大常委会法制工作委员会组织有关部门参与起草综合性、全局性、基础性等重要法律方案制度。”正在制定的正是设立国家监察机关所需的基本的法律，是一部深刻影响我国政治法律制度之全局的综合性、基础性法律，不适宜由中纪委主导其起草工作。
从目前居主流地位的国家监察立法意向看，国家权力配置过分偏重监察机关，不适当地压缩了其它国家机关职权，不合理限制甚至剥夺了担任党政公职的公民依宪法享有的基本权利或依法律平等享有的权利。制定一部法律，法律草案是基础，如果基础性文本问题太多，后续的审议过程就很难完全纠正。所以，必须考虑改变监察立法草案的拟定主体。特别要防止出现通过了一部设立国家监察机关的法律，却导致许多违宪质疑和国家法制不统一的情况。
第五，如果有可能，在进行相应的修宪和立法之前，决策层也完全可以将监察体制改革的详细方案向全社会公开并征求意见，然后再做进一步决定。按现有方案，国家监察体制改革的结果，会形成一个位高权重、党政合一、集中统一的最高国家反贪腐机关及地方各级国家反贪腐机关，其宪法地位和实际政治地位都与国务院和地方各级人民政府相同。笔者认为，建立这样的机构应该慎重。笔者查阅了诸多中外文资料，得出的基本结论是：美国、日本、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰和包括英国、法国与德国在内的欧洲国家几乎都没有位高权重的反贪腐专门机构。新加坡的贪污调查局、印度的中央调查局、韩国的全国反腐败委员会相对而言已经是位高权重了，但它们的法律地位要么是内阁的部会级，要么是总理的直属机构，没有与内阁平级的反贪腐监察机关。中国历史上也没有具备这样的权位和这么系统的架构的监察组织。
笔者希望国家决策层能就设立这样一个位高权重、党政合一、集中统一的反贪腐机关的必要性做进一步论证。先就建立这样一个反腐监察机关的必要性在全党和全社会取得基本共识，再谈下一步，是最稳妥的安排。
三、既定规划基本不变时国家监察立法预案之完善
既定方案指现有的审议表决国家监察基本法的时间表和路线图。
改革的任务很繁重，且“全国一盘棋”，因此，为建立国家监察体制而修宪、立法的路线图和时间表可能无法调整。这完全可以理解。此处所谓既定规划基本不变，包括已经制定的路线图和时间表能调整的应该调整，实在难以调整的就按计划推进两方面的含义。难以调整的内容，可能主要是２０１８年３月召开的第十三届全国人大一次会议先审议通过必要的宪法修正案，随后在同一次会议上审议通过设立国家监察机关所需的法律的规划。除此之外，国家监察体制改革的其它规划，应该都是可以调整的。
在具体讨论国家监察立法方案调整的时候，特别需要强调真诚地面对宪法、尊重宪法，须尊重和保障宪法确认的公民基本权利，包括作为被监察对象的各级官员的公民基本权利。做到了这一点，就具备了道义高度、具有了道义力量，否则就可能失掉这份宝贵的软实力。还有，历史经验和当代世界各国反贪廉政的经验教训表明，要获取足够反贪廉政效果，不能过度依靠提高反贪机构的法律地位和加强其权力的方式，而是必须充分发挥以人民代表大会制度为根本的中国宪制的整体效用，其中尤其应该重视有效保障公民基本权利必然形成的遏制腐败的作用。
反贪廉政须激发公共机关行使权力和普通公民运用基本权利的两个积极性。缺乏普通公民充分参与的反贪腐体制难以真正奏效，中国历史上明太祖把贪腐较严重的官员都弃尸街头，或枭首示众、剥皮实草，反贪效果仍然有限。反贪腐机构位高权重而又缺乏有效权力制约和民主监督，其本身也可能成为贪腐之源，甚至可能比其它机构腐败更严重。另外，还应该看到，公共反腐败机构名不见经传，地位无足轻重，但国家机构和官员队伍比较清廉的国家，当今世界也不胜枚举。当代许多法治国家的现实状况直观地证明，位高权重的监察机构之存在，并不是国家或政府清正廉洁的必备要件。
基于以上考虑，下面笔者就现有监察立法规划的完善，提出十四项具体建议。
1.按宪法的规定、国家政权性质的要求和实行制定法制度的惯例，我国设立监察机关的法律的全称，最好是《中华人民共和国人民监察委员会组织法》，但如果出于其它因素的考虑必须用《中华人民共和国监察法》的名称，那可以把监察机关组织法全部应有内容纳入其中，形成一部综合性的监察法的方式来解决监察立法名与实冲突的问题。完整系统的国家机关必须有组织法，这是包括中国在内的实行制定法制度的国家的法制传统，不宜轻易改变。不过，国家机关组织法有形式和内容之分，完全可以制定一部监察法为其表，监察委员会组织法内容和监察程序法内容为其里的法律。如果来得及的话，甚至可以考虑把监察官法的内容也放进出，形成三部分内容合一的综合性的监察法。
2.按宪法，国家监察机关只宜“依法”行使职权，不能“依宪”行使职权，因而那种试图让国家监察机关依宪行使职权或责成国家监察机关“维护宪法”的想法应放弃。国家监察机关除“依法”行使职权外，能不能“依宪”行使职权或“维护宪法”？这是一个原则性问题。通过制定法律、决定重大问题等形式适用宪法，监督宪法实施，是全国人大及其常委会的排他性职权。国家监察机关的职权若包括“依宪”行使职权或“维护宪法”，那是不是意味着从中央到县、区，各级国家监察机关都有监督宪法实施之权？而监督宪法实施的核心内容，就是对全国人大、有立法权的各级人大及其常委会通过的规范性文件进行合宪性审查。所以，国家监察机关不应拥有这项职权。
我国宪法学界的主流观点是：全国人大及其常委会可直接依宪行使职权；国家主席、国务院、中央军委有少许直接依宪行使的职权；我国法院、检察院都是“依照法律规定”，以办理案件形式具体行使审判权、检察权的国家机关，无权直接适用宪法；办理具体案件的机关直接依宪行使职权会有大弊端，不可行。在这方面，如果回顾一下十多年前“宪法司法化”的风波，就能清楚领悟我国政治决策层否定“宪法司法化”的立场。[12] 这个立场充分反映了我国政治决策层和学术界在法院、检察院无权直接适用宪法、运用宪法裁判案件问题上的共识。这个共识应当也适用于主要以调查和办案方式行使职权的国家监察机关。
所以，试图让国家监察机关及其官员直接依宪法行使职权之类的规定是不适当的。
3.关于监察机关及其官员调查职务犯罪适用监察法而不适用我国《刑事诉讼法》之设想，违背宪法的规定和精神，不应该继续坚持。现有的国家监察立法预案安排国家监察机关调查职务犯罪适用监察法而不适用我国《刑事诉讼法》，目的在于克减担任公职的这部分公民根据宪法享有的人身权利，因而有置这部分公民于受歧视地位的可能。这种构想如果落实，会导致克减或剥夺涉嫌犯罪的被调查对象在事实上被刑事侦查时受刑事诉讼法保护的权利。
应当注意，我国《宪法》第３３条第２款规定：“公民在法律面前一律平等。”该条第４款规定：“任何公民享有宪法和法律规定的权利，同时必须履行宪法和法律规定的义务。”这里要特别注意，我国《宪法》规定的是 “任何公民”都享有宪法和法律规定的权利，这个规定不允许最高国家权力机关和任何其它组织把担任公职的公民排除在受宪法、法律平等保护的公民群体之外。
现在有人说监察机关以剥夺人身自由达3个月甚至6个月之久的方式对公职人员进行的犯罪调查不同于刑事侦查，试图以此为由剥夺这部分公民受宪法法律平等保护的权利。这种“理由”，正像有人说铁锅蒸熟的米是饭，铝锅蒸熟的米不是饭同样荒谬。这是一部分人对宪法法律缺乏最起码真诚、尊重的表现，很不应该。不论想做什么，一定要有充分的理由和根据，没有充分理由和根据，就不应该做———这也是法治的要求之一。
在职务犯罪调查方面，监察机关应当同此前的检察机关一致，遵守我国《刑事诉讼法》。国家监察体制改革在基本人权保障方面只能向前走，不能倒退。
4.综合性的监察法可将留置时间分两档，形成级差，区别对待。按现有的改革规划，监察机关不分级别，采取留置措施的时间一律为3个月，报上级监察机关批准可延长一次，也一律是3个月。据笔者调查了解，地方纪检、监察官员普遍认为这么长的留置时间，对于调查省部级干部是必要的，甚至可能还不够，但对厅局级，特别是处级科级干部并无必要。尤其是，留置对象如果是涉嫌行贿的民营企业家，对他们留置时间过长，他们的企业就群龙无首，容易被拖跨，果真这样的话，对地方经济发展、民生就业负面影响较大。鉴于以上情况，似应考虑将中央和省级监察委员会决定采取留置措施的时间维持在初次3个月，经报批延长一次，延长时间为3个月的现行方案，但将省级以下监察委员会决定采取留置措施的时间改为初次30日，经报批可延长一次，延长时间为30日。
另外，留置应只适用于涉嫌职务犯罪的被调查对象，违纪和一般违法案件的被调查对象不应适用留置。如果一定要将留置措施适用于违纪和一般违法的监察对象，法律应另行具体规定多少日或多少小时。
5.按宪法相关条款的规定和精神，综合性的监察法宜规定，留置若超过我国《刑事诉讼法》规定的刑事拘留时间，必须报检察院批准。从现有改革方案规划的剥夺被调查者人身自由的时间长度看，留置是比逮捕严厉得多的刑事强制措施，应该报检察院批准，否则明显不合乎宪法。我国《宪法》第３７条第２款规定：“任何公民，非经人民检察院批准或者决定或者人民法院决定，并由公安机关执行，不受逮捕。”刑事拘留不需要检察院批准，但逮捕需要检察院批准，这是因为在没有留置规定前，逮捕是最严厉的刑事强制措施。有了留置之后，留置是比逮捕更严厉的刑事强制措施。犯罪嫌疑人被逮捕之后，不一定会提被起公诉；即使提起公诉，也不一定定罪；即使定罪，所科刑罚也可能轻于剥夺人身自由6个月，甚至可能低于剥夺人身自由1个月。因此，既然逮捕需要检察院批准，留置就更需要报检察院批准。
可以说，综合性的监察法若规定监察机关无须人民检察院批准可将监察对象留置3个月甚至6个月，有可能涉嫌严重违反宪法的规定和精神的，并不可行。换一个角度说，监察法若欲保留或间接肯定凡留置皆无须报人民检察院批准的内容，那就应该先修改我国《宪法》第３３条第２款和第３７条第２款，或解释我国《宪法》第３７条第２款，否则无法消除监察法的这项规定与我国《宪法》这两个条款的规定相抵触的嫌疑。
6.综合性的监察法对涉嫌犯罪行为的调查范围，最好限于涉嫌贪污受贿犯罪的案件，非贪腐职务犯罪案件的侦查权宜仍由检察院行使。关于监察机关的权限范围，现有监察改革设想坚持的是调查职务违法和职务犯罪。对此，应该考虑调整为调查职务违法和涉嫌贪污贿赂的职务犯罪行为。其理由主要是：调查职务违纪和一般违法符合监察权的性质；监察委的性质是国家反贪腐机关，非贪腐案职务犯罪调查超出了性质的要求，增加了反贪腐机关的不必要负担；把非贪腐性职务犯罪侦查权留给检察院，有利于保持检察院法律监督机关性质，有利于发挥检察院应有的职能作用。
7.综合性的监察法应具体规定监察机关的工作责任制。现有国家监察体制改革设想对监察机关的工作责任制尚未涉及，这显然是不够的。监察委员会是兼具行政和司法双重特征的国家机关，不宜实行首长负责制，可实行类似检察院的民主集中制。笔者建议做这样的规定：监察委员会主任统一领导监察院的行政工作；各级监察委员会实行民主集中制，在监察委员会主任的主持下，讨论决定重大案件和其他重大问题。如果监察委员会主任在重大问题上不同意多数人的决定，可以报请本级人大常委会决定。从中央到地方，各级国家监察机关的纵向关系，也可以采用类似检察院现有的垂直领导体制。
8.对一些比较严厉的政纪和一般性违法处分，综合性的监察法应规定被处理人寻求救济的程序，受严厉处分的被处理人应可申请司法审查。维持监察权与被监察对象权利保障的平衡，是文明监察的基本要求。笔者赞成这样的意见：“国家监察法立法有必要适当引入司法救济机制，即监察对象对于监察机关采取的限制人身自由的强制措施（如留置）、对财产的部分强制措施（如查封、冻结、扣押、搜查等），以及个别最严厉的行政处分决定（如开除公职）不服，国家监察法应赋予相对人向法院提起诉讼的权利。”[13]对于一般的违纪违法行为处理，因监察机关可以直接作出法定实体性处分决定，对于不服这处分的，应当赋予被处理人申诉、申请复审等权利。无论如何，对于开除这样剥夺生计、事实上包含许多财产内容的严厉处分，应当规定被开除者有权向法院提起行政诉讼。对于不服移送审查起诉的被调查对象，则应当根据刑事程序法律的相关规定，及时通知犯罪嫌疑人，由其向检察机关提出意见。
9.国家监察机关向其它国家机关等公共组织派驻常设监察机构、监察专员的做法不宜写进综合性的监察法。按现有改革设想，各级监察委根据工作需要，经批准，可以向本级党的机关、国家机关、管理公共事务的组织、所管辖的行政区域派出监察机构、监察专员。按法治和治理现代化的标准衡量，这种派驻的做法不是国家机关的正常工作方式，不应成为常态。一个国家机关向其他国家机关、公共团体派出本机关常驻机构和人员的做法，造成国家机关之间、国家机关与其它公共团体之间职权犬牙交错，违反各公共机关按权力性质分置、自主行使职权的国家治理现代化要求。再者，一个国家机关向其它国家机关等公共组织派驻常设机构和人员，是当今世界各国罕见的做法，所以，我国设立国家监察机关后，纪委原来那种做法即使不马上取消，也应该作为临时举措严格加以限制，不能让这种状况由法律加以确认。
10.综合性的监察法应压缩监察机关监督检查道德操守的范围，将监督检查限于公德；至于私德，如果要加以检查，不妨留给党纪处理。按现有改革构想，将来国家监察机关行使监察权的主要职能之一，是对被监察对象的道德操守情况进行监督检查，这种设想不符合马克思主义关于道德与法的一般理论，应有所限制。法治社会的以德治国不是让国家直接制定和实施道德规范，将道德法律不加区分，而主要是强调立法要考虑道德教化的要求，执法和司法要在自由裁量的限度内鼓励优良道德操守，贬抑不道德行为。依法治国和以德治国相结合的背景下，从根本上说，国家运用道德之前得有一个道德法律化的过程，其典型做法是将相关道德准则通过立法程序转化为法律条款。至于执法和司法，运用道德也一定要有一个参照法律的具体规定将道德因素的考量控制在自由裁量幅度内的问题。法律若直接规定国家监察机关监督检查被监察对象道德操守情况，就属于道德与法律不分的表现，并不合适。不过，考虑到监察对象是国家公职人员，对后者执行职务时遵守公共道德的情况进行检查监督是可以的，这也符合其它法治国家通行的标准。
11.综合性的监察法应包含防止选择性办案的规定。反腐败过程中选择性办案，是国内外受广泛诟病的弊端，不仅对当事人不公平，也败坏了反腐败体制的声誉。但历来人们讨论监察法的内容，很少涉及为杜绝或遏止选择性办案而应当做出的规定。为杜绝或尽可能减少选择性办案，国家监察基本法应该包含以下内容：监察委员会组成人员获得的贪污受贿举报和其它问题线索，应该统一登记，由本级监察委员会全体委员共享信息，并形成清单定期报上级备案；任何举报和其它问题线索的处理，都应该召开监察委员会委员会议按民主集中制原则讨论决定；任何个人不得擅自处理举报等问题线索。如果案件涉及国安、外交、军事等需保密的人与事的问题，以及国家秘密、外交等信息的，首先获悉相关信息的人员可以以向主任报告或直接向上级监察委主任、副主任报告的方式处理。
12.要采取措施防止综合性的监察法的立法过程出现本机关中心主义的立法倾向。现有监察法由中纪委主导起草，而各级纪委将来都会变身为监察委员会。现在正在进行的国家监察立法，存在着人们过去多有诟病的那种“部门立法”的可能性。这种情况下，立法草案的本机关中心主义倾向可能会十分明显。其具体表现，正像笔者在某试点省调查时听到的反映那样，是让监察机关的职权尽量多，义务尽量少，并竭力规避其他国家机关的权力制约和社会的民主监督。
应该认识到，原来的监察组织进入宪法，就是宪定国家机关，那种把监察机关视为一个穿着国家机关外衣的、有特殊地位的党的机关的看法是没有根据的。国家权力的纵向横向配置应以宪法为基准，维持国家权力各部分的平衡，不应该也不可能以监察机关的需要为中心做安排。然而，现有监察法制定规划确实有将监察权特殊化，以监察机关为中心考虑国家权力配置和公民基本权利保障的倾向。这种倾向在监察体制改革方案逐步完善的过程中应该努力消除。
13.反贪廉政是全体人民的事业，综合性的监察法应该为民主党派和无党派公民参与国家监察机关的工作提供组织框架。“我国拥有庞大的公职人员群体，如此规模的反腐仅靠监察委员会是难以完成的，可以说反腐是一项需要全民参与的伟大政治事业。但观察目前国家监察体制的顶层设计，它实际上阻隔了国家监察委员会和社会、公民在反腐语境中的互动，现代政治强调的民主价值并未得到体现。因此……应拓展监察权能，充分调动和发挥社会组织、公民个人在监察腐败中的作用。”国家监察机关不应该是军事化的或类似反间谍机构的组织，也不应该是仅由中共党员构成的党务机关。反腐廉政牵涉到每一个人的利益，是每一个明白事理的人都关心的事情。所以，就职业性质而言，它应该是开放性较强、包容性较大的一种国家机关。开放性强、包容性大可以扩大中共领导的反腐廉政事业的民主基础或群众基础。从另一个角度看，这也可以说是保证反腐廉政事业有更多人参与、更多人为其担责，鼓励更多人为中共分忧。
14.综合性的监察法的有关文本草案应吸收已有立法经验，处理好立法技术问题。迄今为止，我国的立法技术虽然日臻成熟，但还是存在一些缺憾，其主要表现往往是：“线条”过粗，许多应该做详细规定的地方没规定清楚；有些法律本身就是国家基本的法律，很多规定应该写清楚，但法律文本往往规定依法处理了事，至于依本法还是依其它什么法律，依哪一条哪一款，都通常不规定；又如规定“按程序请示报告”、“严禁”、“合理安排”、“履行严格批准手续”、“接受监督”等等，这类表述都会显得过于抽象，让人产生疑义：按什么程序请示报告？严禁怎么体现其严？合理安排与任意安排在实践中有什么差别？履行批准手续严格或不严格实践上是否有区别标准？这样模糊的表述应该避免。另外，制定综合性的监察法这样的国家基本的法律，应该改变“宜粗不宜细”的传统指导思想，努力做到“粗”“细”适宜。
现有国家监察立法预案若能在以上方面获切实完善，按原定时间表和路线图推进，相信也会形成优良的改革成果。
（责任编辑：姚 魏）
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