Larry Catá Backer's comments on current issues in transnational law and policy. These essays focus on the constitution of regulatory communities (political, economic, and religious) as they manage their constituencies and the conflicts between them. The context is globalization. This is an academic field-free zone: expect to travel "without documents" through the sometimes strongly guarded boundaries of international relations, constitutional, international, comparative, and corporate law.
Tuesday, May 10, 2022
Shucheng Wang on Authoritarian Legality and Legal Instrumentalism in China (European Chinese Law Research Hub)
The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub
(with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research
Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have
posted a marvelous discussion, by Shucheng Wang (Associate Professor Scool of Law City University of Hing Kong & affiliated researcher of the Law and Religion in the Asia Pacific Region program at The University of Queensland, Australia) of his upcoming book on authoritarian legality in his blogpost about a piece that dissects the instantiations of legal instrumentalism. Shucheng Wang’s paper Authoritarian Legality and Legal Instrumentalism in Chinawas published in the The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, a free draft is available here).
The study is quite important, and the typologies presented are important and insightful. One
of the most interesting aspects would appear marginal--but to anyone sensitive to the semiotic power of language can be central to any consideration of substantive discussion--and that is the rise of a certain terminology to describe developing legality in China. While the Chinese name this "Socialist Legality" or "Socialist Democracy" or "Socialist instrumentalism" and the like, others, especially those who may not share a fidelity to the fundamental ordering premises of the Chinese political-economic order and its expression as Marxist-Leninist constitutionalism, call these manifestations something else. For them, what the Chinese seek to manifest is "illiberal" or "authoritarian" and the like. The intimation, usually unconscious but sometimes telling is to de-center the object of study and to frame non-conforming systems by reference--not to itself--but to liberal democratic institutions and normative baseline principles as the "gold" standard against which all other efforts must be judged. The same, of course, increasingly applies in the other direction as well. That is a pity, in either case, if only because it moves from a study of the ting in itself to the thing as against an ideal. And where that ideal is inherently driven by an orthodox ideology, then comparison can easily slip into politics. Not that it is is bad or unnecessary. Quite the contrary. It is the essence of the dialogue emerging between the two great imperial houses of the 21st century. Nonetheless, the semiosis of the vocabulary and its analytics provides a window on a much larger and more fundamental engagement between two systems whose differences are causing, in Gunther Teubner's famous characterization--inter-systemic irritations, that might well affect both but in quite different ways.
I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE.
And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law
Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research
that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to
spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a
paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.
Can authoritarian regimes use the ‘law’ – as construed from a
liberal-rational legal perspective – to solidify and legitimize their
rule? Scholarship increasingly pays attention to the role of law in
authoritarian regimes. As far as Chinese law is concerned, Mary Gallagher, Hualing Fu & Michael Dowdle, and Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg have investigated the role of law for China’s Party-state, among others.
Against the backdrop of the rise of illiberal democracy, this short
article titled “Authoritarian Legality and Legal Instrumentalism in
China” engages with this scholarship by unpacking the dynamics of
authoritarian legality. As the term indicates, authoritarian legality
refers to legal norms advanced by authoritarian regimes, where an active
adherence to law may nonetheless thrive without political or democratic
reform. The article describes two pure types of authoritarian politics
namely, normal politics, and exceptional politics. In normal politics,
the law is relatively stable and predictable, particularly on issues
relating to apolitical matters. In exceptional politics, however, the
law may be adjusted, redefined or even suspended in order to accord with
specific socio-political goals.
Using China as a case study, the article takes note of the effort
that has been made in establishing a comprehensive system of positive
law and in institutionalizing authoritarian legality through a
politically controllable congress and court system. Yet, these efforts
remain counterintuitive – since legality requires institutionalisation,
predictability, and certainty – all of which are seemingly absent in an
authoritarian regime. This is not to say that the ‘law’ still does not
serve as a crucial instrument for distinguishing ‘lawful’ from
‘unlawful’ actions, but rather, that law is inextricable from politics.
The inner logic of authoritarian legality is therefore revealed in the
existence of political penetration – either explicit or implicit – into
formal laws and informal practices. In essence, while authoritarian
legality indicates the legalistic aspirations of illiberal regimes, the
legality of the laws is often premised on illiberal fundamentals.
The article identifies three pure types of instantiations of legal
instrumentalism, based on the variance of political ideologies: liberal,
apolitical, and illiberal. The theory of legal instrumentalism posits
that laws should not be seen as a manifestation of universally fixed
norms, but rather as a tool for promoting the interests of society and
the State. This theory has largely been delinked from the religious and
historical roots of western jurisprudence. Legal instrumentalism,
therefore, has become far more reflective of a non-Western context and
may have found a widespread resonance beyond the differences between
liberal and illiberal political ideologies.
The rest of the article argues that legal instrumentalism as
instantiated in China’s illiberal context provides a stronger
explanatory framework for the law’s function as a crucial instrument in
developing the enterprise of legality grounded in illiberal principles
than Marxist or Confucian legal theories. Overall, unlike the liberal
instantiation of instrumentalism posited within liberal ideologies, the
illiberal instantiation of instrumentalism in China shows a dimension of
law as an instrument for facilitating China’s development and
developing the enterprise of legality grounded on illiberal principles.
Shucheng Wang is an Associate Professor at the School of Law,
City University of Hong Kong and an affiliated researcher of the Law and
Religion in the Asia Pacific Region program at The University of
Queensland, Australia. He was a Fulbright Scholar (Emory University) and
a Clarendon Scholar (Oxford University). He has authored four books,
including most recently Law as an Instrument: Sources of Chinese Law for Authoritarian Legality (Cambridge University Press 2022 forthcoming), as well as over fifty articles.
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