The 51st Session of the Human Rights Council is now ongoing. It serves as an important site for the development of fundamental narratives through which the form, direction, and meaning of the work of the Human Rights Council generally, and of the apparatus of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights may be undertaken and implemented. The stakes for states and other actors invested in those narratives is quite high. For the last several years there has been an increasingly intense debate between liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist meaning making communities around the core project of international human rights, markets, development, and the cultures of the state system itself in its managerial role. That debate, and the contest for domination of the narratives of human rights, development, and globalization, has taken a quite intense turn with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the case China the contest over narrative and ordering ideology was fully exposed in the context of the OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China (31 August 2022); and the equally pointed Chinese response attached as an appendix to the OHCHR Report (HERE). The stakes, then, are quite high.
In that context Zheng Zhihang, Professor at the Law School of Shandong University organized a side event on the occasion of the 51st Session of the Human Rights Council. That side event, entitled "Human Rights Development in the Perspective of Community with Shared Future for Mankind" was hosted by the China Society for Human Rights Studies and organized by Shandong University. It was held on the morning of 29 September 2022. A number of topics were considered as a function of the concept of "community with shared future for mankind", including global human rights governance, the right of development, environmental policy, and climate change.
It was my great honor to be asked to deliver brief remarks at that side event. I spoke to the core normative and ideological structures around which the construction of socialist internationalism and human rights has emerged, and its relationship ti the dominate discourse of human rights developed in international institutions with increasing precision since the end of the last World War. The remarks now follow.
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Brief Reflections on the Building of a
Theory and Practice of Community with a Shared Future for Mankind and Global
Human Rights Governance [建立具有人类共同未来的社区理论和实践以及全球人权治理的简要思考]
Larry Catá Backer (白 轲)
I am grateful for the opportunity to
participate in this side event, Human Rights Development in the Perspective of
Community With Shared Future for Mankind, hosted by the China Society for Human
Rights and organized by Shandong University on the occasion of the 51st
Human Rights Council. I am especially grateful to Professor Zheng Zhihang for
his leadership in those efforts. Today I speak to the construction of Chinese
Socialist Human Rights Internationalism. That discussion is undertaken within
the broader context of the internationalization of human rights as both have
developed over the last decades. The resulting reconceptualization of human
rights offers an important window on the current state of discourse around what
most political societies seek, each in their own way—that is, a fair and just
international order. Yet this striving is now undertaken at a time when the
vision of those ideals have become more sharply contested.
What exactly are the principals that
make up this new socialist internationalism vision? The principles were
comprehensively identified in the 2019 South-South Human Rights Forum,
organized by the Chinese State Council Information Office and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The principles are both well-known and clearly identified.
They include the following concept principles: (1) “Building a Community with a
Shared Future for Mankind and Global Human Rights Governance,” (2) “The Right
to Development: The Belt and Road Initiative Promotes the Realization of the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” and (3) “The Practice and Experience
of Human Rights Protection in the Countries of Global South.”
These principles interlink three fundamental concepts—globalism, sustainable
development, and human rights. Today, these concepts serve as the foundational
principles for the construction of a Socialist System of Human Rights and
Socialist Internationalism. They represent the outward face of the development
of the advanced contemporary structures of Chinese Marxist-Leninism in its
current New Era.
The current expression of these
principles were initially elaborated in their current form at the start of the
leadership of Xi Jingling. In his now well-known 23 March 2013 speech at Moscow
State Institute of International Relations, President Xi Jinping elaborated
China’s vision for a community with shared future for mankind at about the time
that China first announced what would become the Belt & Road Initiative. In
2021, President Xi Jinping’ further elaborated China’s vision of a Socialist
global order in his remarks to the UN General Assembly.
Its principal components included overcoming the challenge of pandemic,
pursuing greener and more balanced global development, embracing a revamped
ordering of international relations, enhancing global solidarity around concepts of mutual
respect and win-win cooperation, and on that of establishing a more refined
practice of global governance and multilateralism.
This approach was expanded in the same
year (2021) in a State Council White Paper entitled “China’s International
Development Cooperation in the New Era.” The important principles of prosperity and stability features prominently in
this White Paper.
Most recently, in a keynote address delivered 21 September 2022 by State
Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Ministerial Meeting of the Group
of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GRI),
Chinese officials broadened and deepened the visions for human rights and
development. The object was to solidify a counter-approach to the dominant
vision of human rights and development long developed under the leadership of liberal
democratic states and embedded within the working style of international
organs.
Taken together these
events provide a glimpse of the key
elements of Chinese socialist internationalism . They also point to the way in
which these elements align the doctrine of the community with shared values for
mankind, with principles of socialist human rights. Combined, they are offered
as an alternative global model in the form
of the GDI, the Belt & Road Initiative, and more generally, of Chinese
socialist internationalism. At an even deeper level, these movements evidence a
more mature manifestation of New Era theory in its outward expression, and also
as a template by which states with similar approaches to internal and global
ordering might shape their own destinies.
Jointly, these emerging expressions of Chinese theory
provide a basis to consider some of the more profound ramifications of this
project of Socialist human rights, its foundations in theories of the human
right to development, and grounded in the overall principles of a “Community of
Shared Future for Mankind.” In particular, it may be worth considering some of
the scope and implications of critical differences between the “standard” or
orthodox human rights narrative overseen by the U.N. apparatus in Geneva and
(sometimes) New York, and what may be emerging from South-South conversations
under the leadership of China. These shifts will have important consequences
for emerging specific conceptions of the integrity of human rights as a global
concept, and on the movements toward its fracture, which mirror the fracture of
global trade along regional lines.
The object is to offer a path to a fundamental shift in the focus of human
rights and human rights discourse. That shift would move the core of discussion
from one framed in the discursive tropes of liberal democratic ideology to one
framed in an emerging Marxist-Leninist discourse. The shift is occurring even as those who think themselves the vanguard of traditional
internationalist human rights ideology continue to advance and more deeply develop
the dominant approach to human rights, development, and internationalism. Under
the core leadership of liberal democratic states that project remains strongly
embedded in the basic structures of the institutional international law and
norms. It continues to function as the legitimating discourse of the international
community.
But the challenge of a more mature Socialist path to international
relations and to the framing of human rights within it now evidences a greater and more open divide between Socialist
and Liberal Democratic approaches to shaping the world order. That divide may
not affect many objectives or practices. It does, however, affect the approach
to important fundamental principles and interpretations on which are built the structures
and understandings, that is, the ideologies, of development, of the nature and
content of human rights, and of the centrality of sustainability. The result is
to return the international community to a time when it operated in the shadow
of a clear cut choice. That choice is between systems that view economic,
social, and cultural rights as a necessary predicate to the effective nurturing
of civil and political rights, and those systems that are based on the ordering
principle that civil and political rights are the predicate to effective and
legitimate development and protection of economic, social, and cultural rights.
It
is therefore important to understand the Chinese path. It is equally important
to study the way it shifts the discourse from that of traditional liberal
democratic markets-driven actors. Traditional human rights and human rights
discourse takes as its starting point the key premises of the ideology on which
liberal democratic social-political-economic orders are organized and through
which they understand both themselves. That human rights discourse is
centered on the individual. It speaks to the relationship between the
individual and centers of power that affect the individual as an autonomous
being and within collective organization. Individuals have rights--states
and other organs of power have duties and responsibilities.
Marxist-Leninist
States take as their starting point the key ideological baselines that human
rights proceeds from and is centered on the collective. Better put, it is
centered on a pyramidal system of hubs of collectives all connected by the
spokes of obligation to a leadership core. Individuals have expectations;
collective authority has rights, duties, and responsibilities. The
betterment of the welfare of the individual collectively is the primary duty of
the state. And thus the core framework within which human rights can
be understood and elaborated are through the principle that the state's primary
duty is to ensure the prosperity and stability of the collective.
Civil and political rights are understood as necessarily constrained by and
proceeding from the overall imperative to ensure prosperity and
stability.
This new language of human rights
requires, in turn, a new vocabulary. It requires a vocabulary that shifts
the emphasis of discourse (and thus the way that terms are understood and
applied as policy and rules and norms) from the language and vocabularies of
human rights (of the individual) to that of development (of society and
collective institutions).
This is an important project. It
builds not just structures of rights and responsibilities but also narratives
that rationalize and order the way that societies understand the world around
them. Some control of the way that narratives are constructed and people
(including influential collective leadership groups) is critical to the
investing of great principles with ideologically aligned meaning. That is
possible only when they are attached to a collectively embraced system of common
understanding of meanings and markers of legitimacy. In that context China understands
that it is important to both develop a new vocabulary and a new framing for
those core matters traditionally monopolized by the discursive tropes of
liberal democratic ideologies (the authority of which had been virtually
undisputed since the fall of the Soviet Union and its dependencies in the late
1980s). Chinese leaders now appear to act on the understanding that it is
impossible to acquire influence over meaning making unless one can exercise
some control over the ideological perspectives from out of which objects,
thoughts, and actions are invested with meaning. Here is the essence of the Chinese
"win -win" strategy, and more generally of Chinese Socialists
internationalism.
Thank you.
A longer and lightly annotated ENGLISH VERSION follows below. Both can be downloaded HERE.
CHINESE LANGUAGE VERSION OF REMARKS (Gao Shan, trans.) also follow below.
A video recording of the remarks (for those who prefer to listen rather than read) is available HERE.
Engagement always welcome.