Liberal Democracy's Yalta Moment: Burning Opportunity Along With Bridges; Thoughts on Framing a Blueprint for Post Conflict Settlement in a Post Global Order

 

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There has been much interest in what appears to be the collapse of the forward movement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One of the more spectacular symbols of this collapse--with the potential to roll time back to 2013, was the successful crippling of a key bridge that linked territories generally recognized as Russian, to the Crimean territories that Russia and the rest of the world recognized as Ukrainian as memorialized in that brief period of Russian embrace of global legality in the  Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation signed in 1997 (superseding the 1990 Treaty), effectively abrogated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and allowed to lapse in 2019. All during this period of legalism turned adventurism, the liberal democracies charged with the heavy responsibility for preserving the global order legitimated by the blood sacrifice of millions of its citizens, treated the even in the manner of a violation of administrative law meriting a civil fine (in the form of sanctions and the loss of invitations to attend the social gatherings of political institutions).  It was no wonder that the opportunist class in Russia took that administrative approach--the notion that if one was willing to pay the price anything was possible with respect at least to "territorial adjustments" --as a markets driven bargaining space for territory.

And that brings one back to the crippled bridge decoupling Crimea from Ukraine. In a global ordering in which the symbolic value of an event, or an object, is more real than its physical manifestation--the successful destruction of that link between Russia and territories conquered in 2014 looms semiotically as of much larger importance than the decoupling if a transport vector. It, along with the successes against Russian conventional forces separatist areas that define the Ukrainian-Russian border of 1991 and that have served as the focus of conventional warfare over the last several weeks. It suggests in this case that it is time for the development and coordination of approaches to dealing with defeated states (Russia primarily, but all state supporters ought to bear costs for befriending and supporting this sort of aggression) and defeated leaders.

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It is a Yalta moment. By that I reference both the famous/infamous conference in the Crimea (irony) held between the aging and sickly President of the United States, the UK Prime minister close to losing power, and the first secretary of the communist party of the Soviet Union who managed remarkably to profit from his relationships with National Socialist Germany and the liberal democratic west with impunity), and its related conferences in Potsdam (after) and Tehran (before). The object was to coordinate a set of post  war impositions--from territory, to spheres of influence, to the approval for the construction of a new world order.  It is a reminder that what was bought with blood in war can be dissipated in the terms of its resolution. And that is the problem--and the danger for Ukraine and also for Russia.  

For Yalta brings up a number of quite sensitive points that so far have been scrupulously avoided. Perhaps the avoidance creates a strategic safe space within which it may be possible to concoct a "solution" to the "problem" of Ukraine that satisfies the needs of those invested in that form of solution but may prove ill thought from other perspectives  and may be judged harshly in hindsight.  By the time condemnation occurs all the protagonists will be dead or irrelevant. Considered here are 5 key points: (1) the problem of representation; (2) the problem of territorial adjustment; (3) the problem of the reliability of allies; (4) the problem of Russia; and (5) deathwishes.

1. The problem of representation. Empire means not having to ask permission to make decisions that effects the sovereign character of political communities enmeshed with or dependent on imperial cores of leadership.  Yalta (and Potsdam) reminds us that all may be forgiven as between imperial equals--but that everything (other than fairness perhaps) is on the table with respect to the settlement of the "grand schemes" that produce stability along the borderlands of empire.  To these political power fests the states and other communities that will pay the price of such bargaining are generally not invited--they are objects, not subject of such bargaining.  That may be fatally dangerous to Ukraine; less so for Russia (though here the danger is disintegration territoriality and politically). It is sometimes hard for liberal democratic, and Marxist Leninist cores of leadership (or at least their nomenklatura) to recall that it is not 1885 and that map drawing since than has proven to be disastrous. But they will continue trying until they get it right. The example of course is the UN as the better version of the League of Nations (and currently the call to shift from out of the failures of the UN system to a more successful future version of the model). At least in Yalta the ticket to representation was the blood and material expended by the powers. But here the blood has been Ukrainian .... and Russian.The former ought to be nourished and the latter disciplined, to be sure (an application of the notion that for patriots democracy an inclusion, for those who betray the rules of international ordering there is punishment and dictatorship).  But both require deeper embedding within networks of power that reduce the probabilities for violence on this borderland.  And that requires the presence of both (though in the case of Russia the issue of legitimate representation requires some deeper thinking). It also requires the presence of the Marxist Leninist camp and its leadership core.  But they appear to be on the losing side and must accept the humiliation that comes with that (lessons are lessons).  Thus while it is perfectly reasonable for the liberal democratic camp may decisively lead and manage the situation (assuming that there is leadership up to the task but that is the subject of another essay. . . ). 

2. The problem of territorial adjustment. In its weakness (and even in its strength) liberal demarcates view borders (other than their own) as matters of convenience that may be readjusted to suit markets for power relationships, for stability, and perceived notions of prosperity. Apex states (both liberal democracies and Marxist Leninist states) are as indifferent to the realities of bargaining away the territorial claims of subaltern states as they are vigilant in the protection fo their own territorial claims.  Russia's mistake in this case was to presume that it too was an apex state when it was incapable of making good on the claim. But Yalta thinking again may induce the Liberal Democracies (and certainly the Marxist Leninist camp is eager for this result) to seek to pressure the Ukrainians, as the "price of peace" to cede territory in some way to (1) protect the political stability of Russia and (2) perhaps at its most ambitious to enhance the transition of that state back to democracy of some sort. The pressure may be irresistible--certainly if the French leadership and the intellectual and administrative governing classes in the EU and US have their way.   For the Ukrainians the difficulty will be the realization that they cannot go it alone.  That is well understood in their deft use of non conventional managerial techniques to goad the liberal democracies to do more than send them best wishes and good luck in their defense of national territory. In this case Ukrainians might already start thinking about the price they will demand for being forced to concede some measure of sovereignty over their territories as the "price of peace."  

One approach is a modification of the Chinese "One Country-Two Systems" approach that preserves territorial sovereignty intact  and concedes a measure of autonomy to locals--but one managed by Ukraine. 

Another is based on the creation of neutral zones along BOTH sides of the pre-2014 borders in which UN peacekeepers will assume a permanent presence.

Yet another is to concede territory (in whatever style may be required) but in exchange for something: (1) ownership or control of all or some Russian mineral resources or the entirety of the Russian petrochenical sector (and in this way indirectly punish the Chinese for their bad choices in aligning with Russia and then losing  that gamble).

The key here is to ensure that "peace" is not the only consideration for which the Ukrainians bargain.  Their blood, their compensation.

3. The problem of the reliability of allies. Both Ukraine and Russia have learned some lessons--lessons harder for Russia to digest than Ukraine.  Among the most important is that subaltern states must constantly negotiate their position with their patrons.  But their patrons have no real sense of duty any more to align their goals and interests with those of their subalterns.  Guarantees by patron states (the US and EU for Ukraine, and China for Russia) may mean little beyond the few weeks after the agreements are inked. For Ukraine that may mean something more is required.  For example--if the liberal democracies seek to pressure Ukraine to "adjust territory" as a price for peace, it may be necessary to condition that transfer on admission to NATO and the EU.  That is that territories shift only after membership in both is finalized, along with financial guarantees for rebuilding, etc. But more than that the Ukrainians will have to bargain for such "payment" upfront.  At this stage in the historical development of the liberal democratic and Marxist Leninist camps only a fool would trust a promise to be realized later.  Frontloading the full realization of the bargain (especially since payment on the Ukrainian side will be immediate in any case) is essential to the extent possible. The certainty here is that neither leadership group can be trusted if only because they no longer wield enough power to discipline dependencies that act out. And there are any number of them in need of disciplining at the moment (though one can hardly blame them for taking strategic advantage of a warring states period).

4. The problem of Russia. In some ways Russia presents the world with the same set of issues presented by Prussia to the allies in 1945. Yalta teaches us that the traditional solution may not be much of a solution after all.  The Allies believed that the solution to all of their problems were--to paraphrase one of the leaders--to wipe Prussia and what it represented off the map and off the political consciousness of the world. Territorial adjustments, mass populations displacements (of the sort that now constitute major breaches of human rights and humanitarian law, but proved to be of little concern in 1945-1948) and the constitution of puppet regimes along a new set of artificial boundaries made more real by the forcible displacement of millions), along with de-nazification and de-Prussification programs (at least in the territories controlled by the liberal democratic part of the allies) did not necessarily produce the hoped for results. And yet Russia needs fixing (whatever global tolerance level for the culturally contingent choices of its peoples with respect to the political organization of the state) at least with respect to its cultural approaches to engagement with its neighbors.  The principal objective--the de-Putinification project, must aim in reorienting Russian ambitions from external domination to internal perfectionism, and to reduce the scope of its international ambitions from global to regional. That may require severe rectification among its political and intellectual sectors; they took the risk, they bet their lives and livelihoods on a failed adventure and the bill is coming due. Easier said than done. At the same time the cost of this adventurism--and perhaps more broadly the adventurism that includes interference with other post Soviet states--needs to be addressed. Russia, perhaps, is in this stage of global historical development best suited to the role of bridge state--between Anglo-European and Asian leadership cores.  In that respect Russian dignity ought to be preserved for its people, even as its state apparatus and those who drive it are held to account.  And Russia of course must pay for what they have broken., and its allies for what they facilitated.

Danish sculpture in UN Trusteeship Council Chambers NY

5. Deathwishes. All of this goes away, of course, the moment Russia engineers some sert of "accident" or uncontrolled use of tactical nuclear weapons or engineers a nuclear accident. One moves then, if the liberal democratic camp has the stomach for it--an unconditional surrender playbook, and substantially greater misery for victors and especially for those in defeated states. If that is the case then Mr. Putin and his loyal apparatus will have gotten what they wanted--the Russian leadership will take down the entire nation as punishment for their failures to realize the vision of that group.  And we return to April 1945. In that context, it will be for Ukraine, the liberal democracies, and the Marxist Leninist camp to figure out how to pick up the pieces and reconstitute what is left of that state. Partition would only add a layer of ironic hypocrisy in a war fought to defend against partition (though here all great powers are complicit in giving in to the temptation of bargaining away the territorial claims of inferior powers). But hypocrisy is sometimes embraced by the ruling classes as a virtue in politics; they never do live long enough to reap the results. Onerous reparation schemes would be temporarily satisfying in a 1918 Versailles Treaty sort of way.  But we have been down that road even if in this case it is offered in a new and improved version. Something new: after its defeat Russia might be made a mandate territory administered by a resurrected and reinvented UN Trusteeship Council or for those with a sense of the absurd, overseen by the Security Council until its internal structure can be re calibrated and it might be made suitable for re-entry into the community of nations. The object need not be to try to mold it into a liberal democracy, but rather to refashion its politics so that it becomes more pacific and the Tsarist projects and later that if Russia's Leninist masters, be turned inward. A significant penalty indeed, but one that may be required one the nuclear button is pushed.

In any case the Yalta moment of the Russo-Ukrainian war is coming--its commencement may be marked by the blowing up of a bridge and its ending may be radioactive. Whether that moment is undertaken consciously and strategically, out of weakness, in the service of narrow objectives, or with the broader objective of (perhaps with sadness for an era receding into history) strengthening the framework of the emerging global order to ensure a measure of peace, stability, and prosperity, remains to be seen.  But one way or another it will happen. One can only hope that the leadership cores and their apparatus are up to the task.  That, for the moment is more fragile hope than expectation. In any case all we can do now is watch and wait.  In the meantime these brief musings on a likely insolvable problem of this historical era.