CfP: Conference--"Thicker Notions of Human Rights Accountability" 19-21 November 2025: Future Proofing Human Rights IBOF Project

 

I am delighted to pass along this call for contributions for a very exciting and timely conference: Thicker Notions of Human Rights Accountabilities. The description nicely captures the project:

BACKGROUND
Human rights are increasingly described as in crisis. One reason for this is the fact that current
accountability mechanisms cannot adequately deal with intricate and multilayered human rights violations that occur in rapidly changing and vastly complex social contexts. Thus, if human rights are to continue to offer a widely accepted framework for thinking about (social) justice, we urgently need to reconstruct the very notion of accountability on which it is pinned, so that better protection is offered. In spite of a relatively robust legal framework there is a continued reality of human rights violations and rather low degrees of accountability. This closing conference, ‘Thicker Notions of Human Rights Accountabilities’, revisits the questions of what qualifies as a human rights violation, who holds human rights duties and how to actually deliver human rights accountability in the context of pressing and complex challenges. Our particular concern is the disconnect between the formal legal system and the lived experiences of those who suffer harms that could logically be –but are not yet – understood as a human rights violation. (CfP).

The organizers have identified four themes:

Conference information follows and may be accessed HERE. The Cnference is part of a larger and quite interesting project:

This closing conference is part of the iBOF-funded project ‘Future-proofing human rights: Developing thicker forms of accountability’ project. This project adopts a multi-disciplinary approach that allows us to rethink human rights accountability in the face of current challenges. We do not believe that legal structures can or should be bypassed in the quest for thicker accountability, yet by looking beyond human rights law and even beyond the legal domain, we aim to (also) identify approaches to accountability that (better) capture the experiences and lived realities of rights-holders who have been bypassed by the legal framework altogether. In doing so, we explore different avenues for achieving better human rights protection, which will provide the basis for a more robust conceptualisation of the notion of (human rights) accountability. The project is funded by the Universities of Ghent, Antwerp, Brussels and Hasselt (IBOF Special Research Fund: iBOF/21/031; University of Antwerp Special Research Fund, grant no: 42367, Hasselt University grant code: BOF21IU04).

CASE OF LOCASCIA AND OTHERS v. ITALY (Application no. 35648/10)--Failure to Address Pollution May Violate a Person's Right to Life

 

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The European Court of Human Rights has devoted a bit of its jurisprudence to human rights related obligations arising from State failure to address environmental adverse impacts on their populations. As reported by Politico:

Italy has put the lives of its citizens at risk by not addressing illegal waste dumping by the mafia in the Campania region, the European Court of Human Rights ruled Thursday. The landmark ruling found the Italian Republic was guilty of violating citizens' right to life by failing "to deal with the problem of widespread dumping" on private land by criminal groups in the Terra dei Fuochi area — home to roughly 2.9 million people.  The case was brought by 41 Italian nationals living in the provinces of Caserta and Naples, and five regional organizations based in Campania. (European court slams Italy over mafia toxic waste dumping )

 The reporting notes that Italy is no stranger to this type of litigation--and not just from the European Court of Human Rights.

In 2010, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that Italy broke EU law by failing to ensure adequate waste disposal in the Campania region. Following the judgment, in December 2014, the court fined Italy €40 million for not addressing the issue — its highest-ever fine against an EU member country at that time. In 2015, the court fined Italy an additional €20 million and imposed a daily fine of €120,000 until the problems were resolved. (European court slams Italy over mafia toxic waste dumping )

One of the more interesting findings is the possibility of reading the opinion to suggest that inaction by the State in the face of knowledge of adverse impact might effectively amount to complicity under the general principles of law expressed in §§ 120-125 of the opinion. In this case the level of in action in the face of knowledge of harm was quite high.

141. The documents provided by the parties show the existence of serious environmental pollution from the “Lo Uttaro” landfill site as a result of approximately twenty years of illegal waste disposal. From the late 1980s until the plant definitively ceased to operate in 2007, the landfill site was operated – in breach of the relevant legislative provisions and administrative authorisations – beyond the boundaries of the quarry, beyond the limits of its capacity and for the illegal disposal of hazardous waste. Since at least 2001 the authorities had been aware that the landfill posed a serious environmental hazard. Despite the environmental situation of the area and its inclusion in the PBR since 2005, the deputy commissioner authorised the reopening of the waste disposal plant, creating the conditions for worsening the environmental damage. The reports of the parliamentary commission and the findings of national courts from 2007 onwards describe a long pattern of problems in managerial and monitoring activities and considered the “Lo Uttaro” area a risk to public health, particularly as regards groundwater (see paragraphs 34 - 40 and 76-77 above).

The ECHR Decision in Locascia and Others v. Italy follows and may also be accessed HERE.

The Mechanics of Win-Win in the Americas First Post-Global--Mr. Trump Imposes Tariffs on China, Mexico and Canada: Executive Order, Fact Sheet, and Presidential Action texts

 

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A Nation without borders is not a nation at all. I will not stand by and allow our sovereignty to be eroded, our laws to be trampled, our citizens to be endangered, or our borders to be disrespected anymore. (Executive Order: Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our National Border (February 1, 2025), §1(a))

As Mr. Rubio traveled to Central America to introduce U.S. neighbors to the new realities of American foreign policy, Mr. Trump announced that the U.S. would be imposing substantial sanctions on Mexico, Canada, and China (Twitter announcement HERE). That was followed by the release of the text of  Executive Orders: (1) Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our National Border (February 1, 2025) (Canada), the text of which follows below.

 The tariffs are connected to negotiations on issues of migration and flows of proscribed narcotics into the U.S. For those who failed to take seriously the full measure of what Mr. Rubio suggested was the new Americas First win-win policy, it might be useful now to reconsider that rhetoric in light of the action that transposes Mr. Rubio's textual tropes into specific forms of action (see HERE). Mr. Trump's discussion of the America First Policy (in a Memorandum issued on 20 January, the first day of the 2nd Administration of Mr. Trump) follows below.

The situation in China and Canada will have their own dynamic. The situation in Mexico might require substantially more attention as an emerging template of the basis of the relationship between the US and its first order intertwined neighbors. The analysis by the New York Times suggest some contours.

Carlos Pérez Ricart, a political scientist at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics in Mexico City, called the tariffs the equivalent of a “bomb” in a social media post. “Many production chains will simply cease to exist,” Dr. Pérez Ricart said, arguing that Mexican authorities need to reformulate the country’s industrial policy. “The suffering will be enormous. Recession is inevitable.”

Mexico had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Trump administration that it was taking action to diminish China’s sway in Mexico’s economy, and that it was intensifying efforts to reduce the migration of people and the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States. Now, in addition to the tariff-induced economic turbulence, the country faces pressure from the Trump administration’s aggressive immigration agenda. Mexico may be forced to absorb greater numbers of its own deported citizens and deportees from other countries. And the Trump administration has threatened to carry out U.S. military attacks on drug cartels operating in Mexico. Mr. Trump already designated cartels as terrorist organizations in an executive order, which could open the way for military intervention. (Simon Romero, "Mexico faces a devastating economic blow from the tariffs.")

More likely the effects of the tariffs are meant to bring the Mexican political apparatus to the bargaining table with a clearer understanding of the differences they now face in dealing with their Northern neighbor. It is clear the rule shave changed; the question remains whether or how the Mexican apparatus can salvage something of value in this new relationship.  As the  Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China, leverage is an essential element of the new reality--for which all objects may have multiple uses, including tariffs. But  leverage also suggests layering-- tariffs serve as an expression of countermeasures that respond to earlier declarations of national emergencies, the protection of sovereignty, and the determination that an invasion has occurred--involving both people (migration as the instrument) and stability threatening objects (narcotics and criminal activities). This is underscored in the text of the Executive Order (Canada Tariffs):

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the sustained influx of illicit opioids and other drugs has profound consequences on our Nation, endangering lives and putting a severe strain on our healthcare system, public services, and communities.

This challenge threatens the fabric of our society. Gang members, smugglers, human traffickers, and illicit drugs of all kinds have poured across our borders and into our communities. Canada has played a central role in these challenges, including by failing to devote sufficient attention and resources or meaningfully coordinate with United States law enforcement partners to effectively stem the tide of illicit drugs.

Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are the world’s leading producers of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and other illicit drugs, and they cultivate, process, and distribute massive quantities of narcotics that fuel addiction and violence in communities across the United States. These DTOs often collaborate with transnational cartels to smuggle illicit drugs into the United States, utilizing clandestine airstrips, maritime routes, and overland corridors.

The challenges at our southern border are foremost in the public consciousness, but our northern border is not exempt from these issues. Criminal networks are implicated in human trafficking and smuggling operations, enabling unvetted illegal migration across our northern border. There is also a growing presence of Mexican cartels operating fentanyl and nitazene synthesis labs in Canada. The flow of illicit drugs like fentanyl to the United States through both illicit distribution networks and international mail * * *  has created a public health crisis in the United States, as outlined in the Presidential Memorandum of January 20, 2025 (America First Trade Policy) and Executive Order 14157 of January 20, 2025 (Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists). * * * Immediate action is required to finally end this public health crisis and national emergency, which will not happen unless the compliance and cooperation of Canada is assured.

That leverage is more than a one way street.  It is unlikely that any of these States will be passive--eiter rhetorically or by some sort of countermeasures (Canada and Mexico order retaliatory tariffs on U.S. as Trump’s tariffs spur trade war).  They might even act in concert (eg here). That certainly will likely be the case between Mexico and Canada. China is likely to both seek to use the mechanisms of the WTO and engage in mutually beneficial negotiations (China Assails Trump Tariffs and Threatens ‘Countermeasures’; also here). The strategy has application well beyond the first three objects of its approach:

The orders also include retaliation clauses that would ramp up tariffs if the countries respond in kind. Trump cut the levy on imports of Canadian energy to 10%, the official said. Trump officially announced plans to impose new tariffs on imports including computer chips, pharmaceuticals (without specifying which, at what level or when it would take effect), steel, aluminum, copper, oil, and gas by mid-February, expanding his administration’s trade war strategy. He said he would put new taxes on imported oil and gas on Feb. 18 and aimed to do the same for steel and aluminum this month or next month. This move is separate from scheduled tariffs — 25% on Canadian and Mexican goods and 10% on Chinese products set for Saturday, Feb. 1 — and aims to pressure Mexico, Canada, and China to address issues such as border security, drug trafficking, and migration. (Trump Officially Signs Three Executive Orders Imposing 25% Tariffs on Canada and Mexico, 10% Tariffs on China)

At the same time, the forms of 

A video recording from the White House of Mr. Trump speaking to tariffs as part of the emerging foreign policy of the United States may be accessed HERE. Now might a a useful time to review Mr. Trump's 20 January 2025 Memorandum to a number of Senior officials, and especially Section 2 (Addressing Unfair and Unbalanced Trade) and Section 3 (Economic and Trade Relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)). Its text follows below. The Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China and the Executive Order Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our National Border (February 1, 2025) also follow below.

The 2025 Telos-Paul Piccone Institute Annual Conference: China Keywords/ 中国关键词

  For those interested, a quite interesting series. This from the organizers:

Conference Description

The Telos circle falls outside many conventional intellectual categories. During the Cold War, this quality enabled us to form a bridge between the Anglosphere and eastern and central Europe. We fostered work by Soviet-bloc intellectuals, helping Western readers understand the ideological dynamics at play behind the Iron Curtain; we supported a wide variety of dissidents in their opposition to bureaucratic centralization, as we have likewise for opponents of bureaucratic governance in the West; and we brokered an encounter between Marxism and phenomenology that was vital for critical thinkers in the Soviet and the liberal democratic worlds.

We believe that the future of the TPPI now lies in a parallel reciprocal engagement with China, to which we have given steadily increasing focus for the past ten years in our annual conferences. These meetings have laid the basis for seven special issues of the journal Telos. With the Telos China Initiative, we seek to become a key bridge for a mutually regarding, critical discussion of social and political theory between China and the West, well beyond the circles of East Asia specialists.

In that spirit, the “China Keywords” conference explores key terms in contemporary Chinese political thought and tests their resources for the theorization of Chinese and Western politics and society. What critical potential do concepts like tianxia, wangdao, daobi, nei-wai, and tianren heyi carry—in both China and the West? What are their implicit assumptions? Where do they challenge ideological dogmas? Where do they ground them? How do they challenge or disrupt bureaucratized power? Likewise, how do Chinese and Western political traditions speak to each other? How do Chinese thinkers interpret both Western liberalism and thinkers critical of liberalism such as Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt? How can an intellectual encounter between Chinese and Western thought help advance democratic political development?

Our twenty-five speakers include Huimin Jin of Sichuan University, who will be delivering a keynote address about the concepts of “cultural subjectivity” and the “cultural subject” in contemporary China. Other speakers include Stephen Angle of Wesleyan University; Joseph Bendersky of Virginia Commonwealth University; David Ownby of the University of Montreal; Adrian Pabst of the University of Kent; Zhao Sikong of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; Kiron Skinner, former Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department; and Zheng Qi of East China University of Political Science and Law.

In the West, China figures significantly as an object and a projection screen, its interpretive subjectivity structurally obscured. From a strategic standpoint, as well as for the development of critically engaged theory in the service of democratic development, it is essential to examine China’s perspectives, stories, ideals, and intellectual traditions. 

Keyword list and conference registration information follows below.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is "Flying Down to Rio" to Dance the Carioca with an "An Americas First Foreign Policy" (With text of Secretary Rubio's Essay, State Dept. Press Briefing of Trip, and Brief Reflections)

 

Pix credit Flying Down to Rio (1933)

For many in Latin America, the United States occupies an interesting place.  Ir has been an inspiration as well as a morality tale; it has been an overbearing neighbor, a mortal enemy, as well as a sometimes much needed friend; it has been the alien in the transplantation of conflicts between the  cognitive cages of the European South (and its Spanish imperium) and the the North (and its first British overseas Empire (excluding Ireland)), as well as between Europeans and indigenous peoples in the Western Hemisphere in the post-imperial spaces that became much of the Americas. The relationship has been intimate and complicated--and emotional. It has also been strategic and volatile. a mixture of mutual disdain and admiration, one the perspective of which changes depending on race, class, ethnicity, education, and the pathways of cultural ties. But whatever the trajectories of drama, it is hard for either to escape the attention of the other for long--even after or perhaps because of long periods of inattention as other places and adventures diverted appeal and attention--on all sides. The United States was notorious was interventionism in the politics of Latin America and deep economic ties; Latin America, and especially its intellectuals and elites were equally notorious for the politics and policy of a cultivated anti-American intellectualism and efforts to sometimes (and to mixes results).  Perhaps the essence of the relationship was nicely summarized in a famous line from Brokeback Mountain: "I wish I knew how to quit you."

Pix credit Brokeback Mtn here

And so things have gotten interesting enough again for the United States to turn its attention back to Latin America. To that end, Marco Rubio, the new Secretary of State for the Trump Administration 2nd Term, has chosen to make his first trip abroad to Latin America with a focus on Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic. 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio will travel to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic from February 1-6 to advance President Trump’s America First foreign policy. Secretary Rubio’s engagements with senior officials and business leaders will promote regional cooperation on our core, shared interests: stopping illegal and large-scale migration, fighting the scourge of transnational criminal organizations and drug traffickers, countering China, and deepening economic partnerships to enhance prosperity in our hemisphere. (Secretary Rubio’s Travel)

The trip is meant to underline the new template for relations--at least as it will be formulated on the side of the United States.  And in the process it better illuminates how the United States will continue to evolve its part of the emerging post-global imperial system alongside of and in competition with that of the Chinese post-global imperium (for related theoretical consideration, consider Pomper, 'The History and Theory of Empire, (2005) 44(4) History and Empire 1-27). These terms are not meant in the pejorative. It is true that earlier versions of imperium, ones closely aligned with the emergence of the characteristics of the modernist state--territory in which  a settled population can be managed by a government constituted to that ends and engaged in relations with other like political communities. In the post modern, the imperial project (however one wants to name it) references hierarchically rationalized relations among states organized in interlinked communities of various forms of dependence around a hub apex state. The ordering principle is not territory but pathways: supply chains, resource chains, migration pathways, communications, and the like. Control or management of these pathways  are the objects of these hierarchical relations, in which territory and traditional national characteristics (race, religion, ethnicity and the like) recede into the background.

In the run up to the trip, Secretary Rubio, quite rightly, sought to describe both the essence of the trip and the normative agendas that trip is meant to further--again at least from the U.S. side.  In the process, Secretary Rubio achieves two goals: (1) to begin to describe the America First policy in the form of effects and expectations from the US hub; and (2) to suggest to rival imperial centers (and especially the only equally potent apex power) those spaces in which US interest may trigger responses if threatened.  The essay, which was published in the Wall Street Journal ("An Americas First Foreign Policy" 30 January) along with the posting to the State Department Website of an "On-the-Record Briefing on Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s First Trip to the Western Hemisphere." Both of these follow below.  These recall the lyrics of the most famous tune from the 1933 "Flying Down to Rio"--and the Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers dance number to go along with it--perhaps a metaphor for the trip. My quite brief thoughts after the lyrics.

Say! Have you seen the Carioca? It's not a foxtrot or a polka,
It has a little bit of new rhythm, a blue rhythm that sighs.
It has a metre that is tricky, a bit of wicked, wackiwicky,
But when you dance it, with a new love,
There'll be true love in her eyes.

You'll dream of the new Carioca, it's theme is a kiss and a sigh
You'll dream of the new carioca, When music and lights are gone and we're saying "Goodbye".

Bridge:
Two heads together, they say, are better than one.
Two heads together, that's how the dance is begun;
Two arms around you and lips that sigh, "I am yours and your are mine."
While the Carioca carries you away.
Mine, while, we Carioca till the break of day, and you are mine.

Now that you've done the Carioca, You'll never care to do the polka.
And then you realize the blue hula and bamboola are through.
Tomorrow morning you'll discover, you're just a Carioca lover;
And when you dance it, with each new love,
There'll be true love just for you. Chorus
Carioca Vincent Youmans, Gus Kahn (written 1933), Enric Madriguera (#1 in 1934),
Harry Sosnik (#2 in 1934), Castillian Troubadors (#4 in 1934)

Flying Down to Rio, Carioca (Fred Astarire/Ginger Rogers dancing1933) 

1. The notion of a special relationship between the United States and Latin America--one which has undergone substantial definitional gyrations over the course of the last two centuries--appears to be back on the table. For the moment that interest is discursive, but the tropes in Mr Rubio's essay and in the "On-the-Record Briefing," has suggested its new contours. To some undefined extent, America First means the Americas are first in the range of interests of the U.S. metropolis. As Mr. Rubio put it in his essay, "this means paying closer attention to our own neighborhood—the Western Hemisphere" ("An Americas First Foreign Policy"). 

It’s no accident that my first trip abroad as secretary of state, to Central America on Friday, will keep me in the hemisphere. This is rare among secretaries of state over the past century. For many reasons, U.S. foreign policy has long focused on other regions while overlooking our own. As a result, we’ve let problems fester, missed opportunities and neglected partners. That ends now. ("An Americas First Foreign Policy").

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2. And that closer association with Latin American partners focuses on those actions and inaction that have created problems and dangers for the United States, problems which reflect challenges in the problematic States that require correction for win-win solutions.  Among the first of these issues and challenges is migration. And the way in which U.S. Latin-American relations will be structured will, at least for the present, be understood as a function of the challenge of migration. "President Trump’s foreign-policy agenda begins close to home. Among his top priorities is securing our borders and reversing the disastrous invasion abetted by the last administration. Diplomacy’s role in this effort is central." (Ibid.)

3. This ought not to come as a surprise. One has had  four years to prepare for this; unless of course one chose not to believe what was coming from either the oratory of Mr. Trump or the actions taken during Mr. Trump's first administration. More interesting, though, is the way that the challenge of migration serves to fix the template of relations  down the Latin American spoke from the U.S. hub. That template is based on cooperation grounded in mutual interest and deals. The essence of this system is a simple binary--cooperating states that adhere to their deals will be rewarded, others will be subject to nudging using the power of tariffs, sanctions, and diplomatic availability.

Some countries are cooperating with us enthusiastically—others, less so. The former will be rewarded. As for the latter, Mr. Trump has already shown that he is more than willing to use America’s considerable leverage to protect our interests. Just ask Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro. ("An Americas First Foreign Policy")

4. And the reward: prosperity and security under the guidance and leadership of the United States. 

We see a prosperous region rife with opportunities. We can strengthen trade ties, create partnerships to control migration, and enhance our hemisphere’s security.El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic—the countries I will visit on this trip—all stand to benefit tremendously from greater cooperation with the U.S. (Ibid.).

5. Security and prosperity, on one important level, is assessed against  the extent of Chinese involvement in local economies, government, politics, and social collectives. "These nations were neglected by past administrations that prioritized the global over the local and pursued policies that accelerated China’s economic development, often at our neighbors’ expense." (Ibid.). But that assessment is not merely negative, it offers a positive aspect as well--one grounded in the pivot back to the tighter alignment of Latin American economies within U.S. supply chains. Here the United States itself admits its own obligations downstream, a U.S. Latin American "Americas First" policy world only if the relationship is reciprocal with respect to economic and security activities. "We can reverse this. Covid exposed the fragility of America’s dependence on far-flung supply chains. Relocating our critical supply chains to the Western Hemisphere would clear a path for our neighbors’ economic growth and safeguard Americans’ own economic security."  (Ibid.).

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6. And this prosperity has substantial positive win-wins for both the U.S. and its Latin American partners.  For Latin America the focus of the "win" is in increasing jobs and accelerated growth rates; for the United States a reduction in migratory pressure from States  whose economies are growing. Of course is this an old song with a new melody. There were substantial echoes of this in portions of the Latin America policies of the Obama Administration (most recently) in which the focus was on prosperity rather than in the more brutal repatriation campaigns. The problems, from the Latin American perspectives remain the same--(1) quality of jobs; (2) the staying power of these policies (the perennial issue of U.S. fickleness and distraction); and (3) investment in capacity building, tech transfer and self-sufficiency. Beyond that, of course, are the old--ancient really--issues of Latin America regional integration, sovereign sensitivity, and the fractures within societies in Latin American states.  Moreover, migration has sometimes been said to have a net positive effect for home states especially with respect to (1) skills training in the host states; (2)  flows of money from migrants back to family in the host state (remittances); and (3) the development of pathways for developing economic supply chains grounded in migrant communities in the host state. More importantly, none of this addresses migrant issues within Latin America, which then spills over into migrant flows into the US. And so on. But solving migration is a hoped for result of the visit; the objective of the trip, though is far broader--to develop and apply a new template in the relationships of the U.S. with its partners.

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7. Yet there are points of substantial convergence of interests, including the interests of the big "elephant" in the room--Mexico--in central America and the specters of relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela but perhaps mostly Mexico, the dominant state in the region and the one with respect to which relations with the US. are most complicated and dynamic.  The critical convergence point are the great non-state actors that have substantially eroded the internal sovereignty of  some Latin American states in ways that might be thought to be more decisive than anything coming from the United States.  Here the convergence of interest also suggests an alignment of objectives.

"Drug cartels—now correctly categorized, thanks to the president, as foreign terrorist organizations—are taking over our communities, sowing violence and poisoning our families with fentanyl. Illegitimate regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are intentionally amplifying the chaos. All the while, the Chinese Communist Party uses diplomatic and economic leverage—such as at the Panama Canal—to oppose the U.S. and turn sovereign nations into vassal states." ("An Americas First Foreign Policy")

All of this, of course makes sense in the way it is articulated to the United States.  However what Latin American partners hear (given their own histories and cognitive cages) may not be what the U.S. thinks it is saying. Those cleavages may pose greater obstacles to U.S.-Latin American cooperation than anything the Chinese can try to do to upset or displace that relationship. Security based cooperation can be heard by US partners as a means of military extraterritorial interventionism that might be less palatable than the home grown erosion of effective state control over its own territory at the hands of cartels and other international criminal elements. Interventionism in Venezuela and Cuba may suggest a return to the more ancient forms of imperialism that Latin America also find unpalatable even if they have no love for the governments of those states. Perception and cognitive cages are potent obstacles to arriving at a common language from which the possibilities of the win-win might be realized. 

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8. On the other hand. Secretary Rubio has the glimmerings of a discursive trope that, if it handled well, might produce some positive effect: "Making America great again also means helping our neighbors achieve greatness. The threats Mr. Trump was elected to stop are threats to the nations of our hemisphere as well" ("An Americas First Foreign Policy"). This is the sort of shared values win-win that China has also sought to development through the discourse of the Belt & Road Initiative.  And in that sense, it indicates a convergence among apex powers in ordering their spheres of operation, while at the same time offering a high level of autonomy within frameworks that require cooperation but in ways that might also serve the interests of states along the spokes. 

This is an approach to foreign policy based on concrete shared interests, not vague platitudes or utopian ideologies. It is representative of the approach the State Department will be taking to all its international dealings. We will extend our hand to all nations of goodwill, in the confident expectation that they will recognize what we can do together. ("An Americas First Foreign Policy")

 9. All too soon to tell.  And yet it may be important to remember that this time there may be at least a small alignment between discursive tropes and action (however strongly one might disagree with the form of action chosen). Even as Secretary Rubio begins his voyage to Central American States, Mr. Trump "is set to impose tariffs on goods from Canada, Mexico and China on Saturday, placing pressure on three top U.S. trade partners while risking price increases for essential products like gasoline and groceries. The policy is expected to slap a 25% tariff on all products from Canada and Mexico, as well as a 10% tariff on goods from China. Hours before the tariffs were set to take effect, leaders in Canada and Mexico vowed to respond, indicating the possibility of a trade war." (Trump set to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China). This, too, appears to be the emerging modalities of post global imperial communication--indirect signalling and direct action that touches not on territorial sovereignty but on the markers of loyalty, solidarity and mutual obligations within production, political, social, and cultural chains. All of this might also clear the air discursively, and perhaps make more unavoidable the clarification of power relations among interlinked groups of actors arranged in all sorts of hierarchies--political, ideological, social, cultural--shaken and stirred both by history and the preferred perception of history.

But at least assuming the discourse is aligned with actions taken, suggests something less disagreeable than the unfortunate term "America First" suggests.  On the other hand, what clearly emerges in a system of rationalizing relationships based on rewards and punishments in which all of the instruments of inter-governmental relations may be strategically deployed. That this approach is not unique to the United States also suggests that the trajectories of moving further away from the old premises of universalizing convergence around multilateral rules based orders in which power flows up to inter-governmental institutions managed through a global techno-bureaucracy may now be far more difficult to resist. All States will be dancing the Carioca now.

Legal Dimensions of China's Presence in Latin America: Conference Agenda (10-12 February 2025, Barcelona)

 

 

I am delighted to pass along the Conference agenda for what I expect to be a quite exciting event:  Legal Dimensions of China's Presence in Latin America (more about the project HERE). It takes place on the campus of the faculty of Law at the University of Barcelona. Great thanks to an old friend and the Dean of the Law Faculty Andreu Olesti and Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado, Executive Director of the Andrés Bello Foundation, China Latin America Research Center (Bogotá, Columbia) and to the supporters of this event. Special shout out to the incredible organizers and project leads: Dr. Monika Prusinowska (UB) & Dr. Daniel Sprick (UoC)

The Conference Agenda (with authors and titles of presentations, along with the Participant bio pages follow below.

OEIGWG Updates: 10th session elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises

 

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My friend and colleague, the extraordinary Linda Wood has provided really quite useful resources for those of us who are interested in following the continuing work of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) which holds the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises  on which they have been working for the last decade.

This project is particularly important as parallel and quite different efforts to develop legal regimes for business compliance with expectations relating to human rights and sustainability have been ongoing in the European Union, the U.S. (sanctions based) and China (environmental and governance ESG regimes). The E.U. effort is the one most closely aligned this this effort but its current efforts at simplification of a complex system of layered compliance  based structures is undergoing a simplification that may substantially alter the application of those rules (discussed in President Ursula von der Leyen's Remarks at Davos HERE, including links to the relevant EU documents). 

And, as I have suggested before, the project encapsulates the frustration of some frm the stakeholder community about what for them was a near fatal set of flaws in the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, accompanied by a strategic decision to support them as a wedge toward this law based project,  and the conviction by others that the old Nor,s Project (see here) was indeed the better course and that a Treaty Project developed under cover of the UNGPs might succeed where the Norms project failed. (see eg here, here, and here). This is beside the critical point that while the text of a decade's work may serve best as a framework of some sort, it might serve less well as statutory text (other than as a invitation for that to let loose their techno-bureaucracies to create substance from the aggregated directives that, however supportive one wants to be, is in essence what the project reduces itself too (here on the Zero Draft as law)). And the treaty projects supporters would naturally disagree most strongly, as they have and for the reasons advanced since the project got underway in 2014, and reflected as well in the criticisms of the choices represented in the UNGP criticized almost from the time of the UNGP's endorsement. Of course these sorts of ideas  take one out of the conversation, especially among those who are convinced otherwise and are driving the project. Fair enough--the treaty, at its core and a specifically framed legal project, is an ideologically driven political project, even if the core normative values may be more widely shared (here). For those who support it, the Treaty project may be the best contemporary expression of the premises and objectives  represented in its text.

My sense is that given the commitment of the BHR intelligentsia and the interwoven collectives of civil society and public techno-bureaucracies, a legal project like this treaty project is inevitable and must run its course.  It plays into much broader streams of development of advanced political and social relations that are driven toward the sort of public policy fulfilling premise around which all social relations must be bent, and that bending must be guided and led by interlocking public and private techno-bureaucracies wielding managerial authority through increasingly complex and interlocking regulatory frameworks. All of this, of course is prelude to what can only be perfected through technology--the construction of big data, generative descriptive and predictive programs that will be substituted for the human techno-bureaucrats to manage a system with an endless thirst for data, real time analytics and nuanced nudging  techniques. And it is in this sense that I watch developments with great interest as each of these actors play their roles within a larger performative space to the development of which theirs is a critical contribution--assuming, of course, that they can fend off the oppositional forces and their countermeasures; and assuming as well that they are not sooner rather than later absorbed within the larger big-data analytics techno-revolution in managing humans. 

The draft report on the tenth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights may be accessed HERE.

Report on the tenth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights may be accessed HERE.

The OEIGWG Chair-Rapporteur 2025 Roadmap updated 27 January 2025 follows below.

The dates of the intersessional thematic consultation have changed due to funding. The letter to that effect from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights follows below. The issue appears to be the unsettled state of funding.

Links to recordings; 1st Meeting; 2nd Meeting; 3rd meeting; 4th meeting; 5th meeting; 6th meeting; 7th meeting; 8th meeting; 9th meeting (no recording available); 10th meeting 

More information available one the OEIGWG website HERE.

 

US Mission to the United Nations: Remarks at Holocaust Memorial Ceremony 2025 at the United Nations and the UN Statement Prepared for the 2025 Event

 

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The United Nations as designated 27 January as International Holocaust Remembrance Day (IHRD). Within a more complicated context for the living, one full of ironies and reversals, and as a means engaging in acts of memory, posted below please find the (1) UN Statement on the 2025 observance; (2) the US Mission to the United Nations Remarks at Holocaust Memorial Ceremony 2025; and (3) a most interesting and perhaps provocative (in its neutral sense of provoking thought) essay by Jan Gerber recently posted to Telos Insights. Each in its own way recalls the cognitive cages of memory and the pathways to remembering.

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Davos Discourse 3: Europe between Between Eagle, Bear, and Dragon and No Place to Go--Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum

 

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This new engagement with countries across the world is not only an economic necessity – but a message to the world. It is Europe's response to rising global competition. We want more cooperation with all who are open for it. And this of course includes our closest partners. I think, of course, of the United States of America.* * * A lot is at stake for both sides. So our first priority will be to engage early, discuss common interests, and be ready to negotiate. We will be pragmatic, but we will always stand by our principles to protect our interests and uphold our values – that is the European way. (Remarks of Ursula von der Leyen)

Ursula von der Leyen is no stranger to the WEF; nor has she been reluctant to strongly describe a vision for Europe and European leadership that leverages both its culture and practices as they have emerged after 1945. In 2024, von der Leyen offered trust in a techno-bureaucracy guiding a rationalized process embedding normatively infused values. This techno-bureaucracy interlinked with apparatus of political, social and economic collectives within an accountability based system of oversight and compliance grounded in the objective of realizing public policy (President von der Leyen establishes fourteen Project Groups to deliver on political priorities). Its signature product of the last several years was the construction of a layered set of comprehensive regulatory systems which are now in the process of "simplification" and alignment. 

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The EU plans to re-open the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Taxonomy, opening the door for all three to be revised. Speaking at a press conference on a different topic earlier this month, Ursula von der Leyen said the European Commission would propose an omnibus legislation in a bid to “reduce bureaucracy [and] reduce reporting burdens”.  An omnibus is a rarely-used instrument that uses a single piece of legislation to amend multiple EU laws. (here; Budapest Declaration 11-2024 here; von der Leyen Political Guidelines here)

Of course simplification has becme more than that--it has become a vehicle for the rethinking and perhaps substantive revision of these regulations as well (see, here). 

It is this project--the European vision for ordering itself and at least that potion of the world (or its pathways to production)--which now appears challenged internally by key stakeholders, and externally by a trio of threats. The first is that of the United States which has embarked far more aggressively on a different path toward the management of economic and social relations. That was made clear by Mr. Trump at Davos, and elsewhere). The second is that of the Chinese whose own Marxist-Leninist world view threatens the breadth of the influence of Europe and its normative projects both on the European periphery and along its production chains. And the third is  the threat that Russia poses to and as Europe, a point stressed from the Ukrainian perspective by President Zelenskyy at Davos).

It is to the exposition and defense of the European project--as it is to be further developed under her leadership--that President von der  Leyen spoke to in her Davos remarks (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum), the text of which follows below with my brief reflections.

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1. von der Leyen starts with a bit of nostalgia for what was within grasp and is now lost, perhaps irrevocably. 

 The first quarter of the century has come to an end. And it has brought about a sea-change in global affairs. This century started with great expectations. 25 years ago, the era of hyperglobalisation was nearing its peak. As supply chains went global, hundreds of millions of people were being lifted out of poverty, especially in India and China. * * * The global economy reaped the dividends. And here in Davos, world leaders discussed how global cooperation, and technology could help the fight against poverty and disease. It was the promise of a more integrated and cooperative world. 25 years on, has this promise been fulfilled? Yes, the world today is still nearly as connected as ever. But it has also started fracturing along new lines.  * * * The cooperative world order we imagined 25 years ago has not turned into reality. Instead, we have entered a new era of harsh geostrategic competition.(Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum)

It is this idea, once nearly realized, as serves as the lodestar of the European project--and that project's burden. It is a burden that situates the European uniquely between the eagle, the dragon, and the bear.

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2. What is the nature of that burden, and the unique perspective that Europe might bring to the table? Ursula von der Leyen suggests both. The burden is a consequence of fracture--and from fracture a turning away from the convergence based rules based and normatively congruent system of economic and social relations. In place of state based labor  and functional specialization within an increasingly singular global system of production, the break up of that system in to at least two major subsystems  created the context in which retreat from the ideal of the vision for a one world order at the turn of the century. "As this competition intensifies, we will likely continue to see frequent use of economic tools, such as sanctions, export controls, and tariffs, that are intended to safeguard economic and national security."  (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).  The irony, of course, is the Europe itself has been no slouch when it comes to deploying these tools. But that is the point--that current conditions make such use of these instruments compelling suggests the contours of the problem which is left for Europe to solve--or at least to show the way forward, to bring the global community back to its golden age. "Because it is in no one's interest, to break the bonds in the global economy. Rather we need to modernise the rules to sustain our ability to produce mutual gain for our citizens." (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).  And there is a the first point--what Mr. Trump in his remarks described as the fundamental characteristics of a new golden age, Presidentvon der Leyen described as the end of that golden age.

3. What then, as Mr. Lenin once asked of what becomes a class of professional revolutionaries, what is to be done? Like the Chinese are attempting with their own vision for the future as a forward movement wrapped in the Chinese path forward, President von der Leyen offers Europe up as the shining example of a return to the ideal state once nearly within the global grasp.  Nonetheless, the Europe that offers itself up is also a work in progress toward the ideal. More importantly, that offering of oneself as the template for the future also requires that Europe liberate itself so that it might offer itself up as something that is not an appendage of, or in the thrall of the eagle, the dragon, and the bear.

For us Europeans, the race begins at home. Europe has a unique social market economy. We have the second largest economy and the biggest trading sector in the world. * * * Our capacity to invent and create is underappreciated – Europe's global share of patent applications is on par with the US and China. But the world is changing. So must we. In the last 25 years, Europe has relied on the rising tide of global trade to drive its growth. It has relied on cheap energy from Russia. And Europe has too often outsourced its own security. But those days are gone. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

 4. Nonetheless, to preserve Europe, to guarantee its autonomy, and to protect its role as a center for global innovation in all spheres, the European trajectory must also change. The focus is on efficiency, which can then be used to leverage and project out European values, and the European regulatory approach as basis for a return to a golden age of proper convergence. 

This is why I asked Mario Draghi to deliver a report on European Competitiveness. And on that basis, next week the European Commission is presenting our roadmap, which will drive our work for the next five years. The focus will be to increase productivity by closing the innovation gap. A joint plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to overcome skills and labour shortages and cut red tape. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

But can this work, in the sense of achieving efficiencies without sacrificing the core of European values and its delivery through its emerging systems of interlocking compliance based techno-bureaucracies?

5. President von der Leyen's three step plan for reform and revitalization suggests both the possibilities and the structural debilitation that has moved Europe into an unwanted dependency. 

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First, Europe needs a deep and liquid Capital Markets Union. European household savings reach almost EUR 1.4 trillion, compared with just over EUR 800 billion in the US. But European companies struggle to tap into that and raise the funding they need because our domestic capital market is fragmented.* * * Second, we must make business much easier all across Europe. Too much of our top talent is leaving the EU because it is easier to grow their companies elsewhere. And too many firms are holding back investment in Europe because of unnecessary red tape. * * * The third foundation is energy. Before the start of Putin's war, Europe got 45% of its gas supply and 50% of its coal imports from Russia. Russia was also one of our largest oil suppliers. This energy appeared cheap, but it exposed us to blackmail. * * * Not only must we continue to diversify our energy supplies, and expand clean sources of generation from renewables and, in some countries, also from nuclear. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

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Foregrounded in this action plan for a Europe that reforms its apparatus but keeps safe the normative framework from from this apparatus arose was the Draghi Report, “The Future of European Competitiveness," a 400 or so page document detailing what might be understood as a hard turn in the seemingly organic evolution of increasingly tightly interwoven techno-bureaucracies within the public and private sectors around whose oversight state policy could drive the social relations of the masses through their economic (broadly understood) activities. " Draghi’s text is far more strategic and ambitious, addressing three key challenges for the European Union: closing the innovation gap with the United States, harmonizing decarbonization with competitiveness, and enhancing economic security by reducing dependencies." (CISIS). That was what Europe had vigorously offered as an alternative to the Chinese model, and as a challenge to the U.S. model, vigorously defended a year earlier.  Nonetheless, in some respects, President von der Leyen's remarks might be understood as a summary report and affirmation of Draghi's core proposals and the embrace of the insights on which it is based. It is in effect the cri du coeur of all states fearful of the consequences of being consigned to the level of second order powers in a fractured world--dependency and control. But President von der Leyen does not merely echos Mr. Draghi; she effectively concedes the point more brutally made in President Zelenskyy's own remarks.  And even more brutally--this is the state that a century or more of self-destructive behaviors has reduced  the  European condition--comfortably dependent on friend and foe. And that is the challenge--to find a pathway to drive global discourse between the bear (energy), the eagle (markets dependency), and the dragon (tributary status of a foreign vanguard). But can Europe preserve its own uniqueness in the process?

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6. And energy is the key, a point to which President von der Leyen devoted a substantial amount of space. European success in energy transition is the key to vindicating the European approach to a public policy based normative framework for arranging and managing their social relations.

This is our plan. And the next few years will be vital to stay in the race of clean and disruptive technologies. Europe has everything it needs to make this happen. We have a private sector with a long tradition of innovation. We have a top-class workforce. We have a huge Single Market of 450 million people and a unique social infrastructure to protect people from the great risks of life.  (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

It  is through the lens of energy that one can properly position what Europe has to offer for itself and as a model of others. "The coming years will be vital well beyond Europe. All continents will have to speed up the transition towards net zero, and deal with the growing burden of climate change. Its impact is impossible to ignore." (Ibid.). This is what is on offer as a new model of multilateralism--one not grounded on economic productivity, but in which economic productivity os a means through which welfare based public policy can be realized, energy transition is possible and collective efforts can be developed to meet common threats: "Likewise, all continents will have to grasp the opportunities of AI and manage its risks. On challenges like these, we are not in a race against each other, but in a race against time. Even in a moment of harsh competition, we need to join forces." (Ibid.)

7.   That leaves the role of leading force for global multilateralism ready for the taking. In that context Europe is marketed as a territorial and normative space that permits other, smaller states to avoid choosing between one of the two great apex powers. "And as great power competition intensifies, I see a growing appetite across the world to engage more closely with us." (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum). This is the Chinese offer packaged in the Belt & Road Initiative but in Europe's favor--and the market for influence points South. 

In the last two months only, we concluded new partnerships with Switzerland, Mercosur and Mexico. This means that 400 million Latin Americans will soon be engaged in a privileged partnership with Europe. These deals were in the making for years, if not decades. * * * It is how we diversify our own supply chains. And this is why Europe's offer is so attractive, all across the world. From our neighbours in Africa, who are working with us to develop local clean-tech value chains and clean fuels to the vast Asia-Pacific region. Hence, the first trip of my new Commission will be to India. Together with Prime Minister Modi we want to upgrade the strategic partnership with the largest country and democracy in the world. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

And the reason is bound up in European values--normative and structural. "So, why are they all happening today? It is not only because Europe is a large and attractive market. But because with Europe, what you see is what you get. We play by the rules. Our deals have no hidden strings attached. And while others are only interested in exporting and extracting, we want to see local industries flourish in partner countries." (Ibid.). 

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8. And what of the great competitors--the apex powers? China is a frenemy. On the one hand Europe "should also strive for mutual benefits in our conversation with China." (Ibid.). But at the same time 

Defensive trade measures are being adopted across the world, including in the Global South, as a response to Chinese market distortions. This is also why Europe has taken measures, for instance on electric cars. At the same time, I have always stressed that we are ready to continue our discussions. And we will continue to de-risk our economy. * * * 2025 marks 50 years of our Union's diplomatic relations with China. I see it as an opportunity to engage and deepen our relationship with China, and where possible, even to expand our trade and investment ties. It is time to pursue a more balanced relationship with China, in a spirit of fairness and reciprocity. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

There is little room for e return to the golden age except within the community of States willing to join the community of European believers.  Put differently, the path for European  prosperity and autonomy requires it to abandon convergence and to leverage energy and values as a means for restoring its place of independence from China and the United States. "This new engagement with countries across the world is not only an economic necessity – but a message to the world. It is Europe's response to rising global competition. We want more cooperation with all who are open for it." (Ibid.).

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9. And so we come the the United States. They are offered the same terms as China--cooperation to the extent that the U.S. is open to the European path. For the moment Europe appears intent on bending, bit it will not conform to the American path to its own golden age. "A lot is at stake for both sides. So our first priority will be to engage early, discuss common interests, and be ready to negotiate. We will be pragmatic, but we will always stand by our principles to protect our interests and uphold our values – that is the European way." (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum). The difference between China and the United States, for Europe, is the difference in the extent of the integration of their economies, and the value of production at stake in disruption.

The rules of engagement between global powers are changing. We should not take anything for granted. And while some in Europe may not like this new reality, we are ready to deal with it. Our values do not change. But to defend these values in a changing world, we must change the way we act. We must look for new opportunities wherever they arise. This is the moment to engage beyond blocs and taboos. And Europe is ready for change.  (Ibid., emphasis supplied).

The risk is telling. President von der Leyen ends her remarks the way that President Zelenskyy ended his: "Thank you very much, and long live Europe." (Ibid.).  And that more than anything may suggest not just the stakes  but the risks. This is a very different discourse than that of 2024.

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