Shuyu Chu: The Infrastructure of Control: Rethinking Party Discipline in China’s Political-Legal System (European China Law Research Hub)

 

Pix credit here

 

 

 The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub (with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have posted  a marvelous new short essay authored by Shuyu Chu (former China Law and Policy Fellow at Georgetown University (2021–2023)), The Infrastructure of Control: Rethinking Party Discipline in China’s Political-Legal System.

Von Blomberg sets the stage:

Drawing on unique access to internal Party materials, extensive empirical research, and an innovative application of Foucauldian theory, this groundbreaking study offers unprecedented insights into China’s disciplinary systems. It is now being developed into a book manuscript. She welcomes discussions with publishers interested in bringing this timely analysis to market. 

The research is described this way:

[It] examines a fundamental puzzle: why does the CCP persist with its opaque, Party-centered disciplinary approach despite widespread criticism? Drawing on Party regulations, news reports, propaganda TV programs, internal cadre training materials, Chinese and English scholarship, and interviews with Party disciplinary officials, I argue that the answer lies in understanding the dual nature of Party discipline (党纪). While commonly viewed as a regulatory system of rules and punishments, Party discipline also functions as what I call a “disciplinary infrastructure”, a Foucauldian framework, in that it simultaneously shapes Party members’ behavior and deters misconduct. This duality reveals that the CCP uses discipline not just as a control mechanism, but as an elaborate apparatus for producing political compliance. 

Shuyu Chu identifies four critical characteristics: (1) it shapes behavior; (2) it seeks to naturalize those behaviors in cadres; (3) it is maintained through the structures of power/knowledge frameworks; and (4) it functions as a comprehensive system of surveillance.  This Shuyu Chu explains helps "explain several paradoxes in the CCP’s approach to discipline. Consider the Party’s handling of official misconduct through internal disciplinary system." The analysis provides a quite interesting perspective on what is usually an ideologically grounded analytics. In that respect, the application of Foucault's insights are particularly relevant for the way they suggest two insights: The first is that Foucault helps bridge party discipline as an ideological expression and as a phenomenological closed system of experiential dialectics grounded in biopolitics. The second is that this biopolitics, and its expression in the Party's disciplinary systems can be transposed to any closed system of managing people through internalized self-referencing systems.  In this later case one might wonder about the insights that systems of Party discipline may, under a Foucaultian analytics, be useful in constructing disciplinary systems within operational units elsewhere. There is a link here, of course, to social credit mechanisms that will likely add depth to the analysis.  There is also a link  to notions of systemic autonomy and the critical role of what is now known as self-revolution. More interesting may be the way in which the biopolitics and governmentality of Party discipline may, in the face of technological advances, become a self-operating system without the need for a human apparatus of the kind currently in place. All of this suggests the likely richness of the analysis.

I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE. And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.

 

The Infrastructure of Control: Rethinking Party Discipline in China’s Political-Legal System


A new book proposal by Shuyu Chu
 

The headquarters of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection / National Supervision Commission at 41 Pinganli West Street (平安里西大街41号) in Beijing

When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he spoke of institutional cages to constrain public power. While many saw this as signaling a move toward legal constraints, the reality has evolved quite differently. Instead of strengthening external checks, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has developed an elaborate disciplinary apparatus that simultaneously constrains and shapes its members’ behavior.

My research examines a fundamental puzzle: why does the CCP persist with its opaque, Party-centered disciplinary approach despite widespread criticism? Drawing on Party regulations, news reports, propaganda TV programs, internal cadre training materials, Chinese and English scholarship, and interviews with Party disciplinary officials, I argue that the answer lies in understanding the dual nature of Party discipline (党纪). While commonly viewed as a regulatory system of rules and punishments, Party discipline also functions as what I call a “disciplinary infrastructure”, a Foucauldian framework, in that it simultaneously shapes Party members’ behavior and deters misconduct. This duality reveals that the CCP uses discipline not just as a control mechanism, but as an elaborate apparatus for producing political compliance.

The metaphor of infrastructure is purposeful. Much like urban infrastructure shapes city life while remaining largely invisible, the Party’s disciplinary mechanisms operate through everyday practices and routines that fundamentally mold behavior. This infrastructure becomes apparent mainly when it malfunctions, as its influence permeates all aspects of Party life. Consider how water systems shape urban development – similarly, the Party’s disciplinary infrastructure determines the flow of power, the patterns of behavior, and the development of political culture within the organization.

The system’s effectiveness stems from four distinctive characteristics. First, it functions productively, actively shaping behavior rather than merely constraining it. This is exemplified by the Party’s “comprehensive and strict governance” (全面从严治党) approach, which integrates political education with detailed conduct regulations. Cadre training programs, for instance, don’t just teach rules; they create experiences that reshape how officials understand their role and responsibilities.

This leads to the infrastructure’s second key characteristic: it addresses not only external behavior but also seeks to transform the “soul”. The Party’s rhetoric of “curing the illness to save the patient” reflects this deeper aim. The goal is inner transformation, not just external compliance. Study sessions, self-criticism meetings, and political education serve to reshape members’ fundamental orientations rather than just their outward compliance. This therapeutic approach transcends simple deterrence, aiming instead to manufacture compliance through deep psychological transformation.

The system also generates comprehensive knowledge about its subjects, creating a power/knowledge nexus that reinforces Party control. Beyond tracking professional performance, the Party maintains detailed records of personal connections, political attitudes, and daily behavior. This accumulated knowledge enables precise calibration of control mechanisms, allowing the Party to shape conduct through carefully targeted interventions. The depth and breadth of this information collection creates full legibility of the members- a condition where every aspect of member behavior becomes potential data for evaluation and control.

Finally, drawing on the concept of the panopticon, the system creates an environment of constant potential oversight that converts external monitoring into internalized self-discipline. Party members are acutely aware that supervision can occur at any moment—whether through inspection teams, peer monitoring, or documentation reviews. This unpredictability, combined with calculated isolation, promotes self-regulation as members internalize disciplinary standards. The system’s brilliance lies in how it creates an automatic, self-sustaining disciplinary mechanism where members effectively police themselves, significantly reducing the need for costly direct oversight.

This framework helps explain several paradoxes in the CCP’s approach to discipline. Consider the Party’s handling of official misconduct through internal disciplinary system. While seemingly lenient compared to criminal prosecution, this “therapeutic” approach actually optimizes power by preserving valuable human capital while reinforcing the Party’s authority to discipline and reform. The official is isolated, made to study Party documents, write self-criticisms, and undergo “thought reform” – a process aimed at producing not just compliance but loyalty.

The disciplinary infrastructure’s interaction with China’s legal system reveals its calibrated design. At one level, it creates fine-grained behavioral controls that operate beneath legal thresholds – regulating matters too subtle for formal law to address. It also maintains parallel oversight mechanisms outside legal frameworks, allowing the Party to address conduct that might be politically problematic but not legally wrong. Most intriguingly, it sometimes supersedes legal protections in service of Party control, as seen in special investigative procedures and detention powers. The recent establishment of the National Supervision Commission institutionalizes these dynamics in new ways.

Understanding this infrastructure helps explain several puzzling aspects of Chinese governance. Why do legal reforms often falter against Party discipline? How does the Party maintain control over its massive membership? The answer lies in how this disciplinary infrastructure shapes behavior through multiple, reinforcing mechanisms that formal law cannot replicate. By revealing the dual nature of the CCP’s power as both coercive and productive, this framework offers a new paradigm for understanding how modern authoritarian organizations maintain control.

Consider how this plays out in practice. When local officials implement policies, they’re motivated not just by legal requirements but by an internalized understanding of Party expectations, shaped through years of disciplinary training and oversight. Their behavior is guided by both formal rules and informal norms, enforced through a complex web of organizational practices that constitute the disciplinary infrastructure.

This analysis offers crucial insights for understanding the CCP’s resilience and the sophistication of its political control mechanisms. Rather than relying solely on coercion, the Party has developed an intricate disciplinary infrastructure that fundamentally reshapes member behavior through comprehensive oversight and systematic interventions. This helps explain why the CCP has maintained such effective control over its massive bureaucracy and why Western observers often underestimate its organizational capabilities.

For scholars of Chinese politics and law, this framework illuminates why conventional legal reform models based on Western experiences often fail to capture the reality of China’s party-state system. The Party’s disciplinary infrastructure operates beyond the bounds of formal legal institutions, creating a comprehensive environment for behavior modification that works simultaneously through political, organizational, and institutional channels. This explains both the durability of Party control and the limitations of viewing China’s governance solely through the lens of formal legal institutions.

These insights are particularly relevant as China continues to refine its governance model under Xi Jinping. The multifaceted nature of the Party’s disciplinary system demonstrates how modern authoritarian regimes can maintain control through complex institutional mechanisms that go far beyond the simple repression emphasized in traditional authoritarian regime theory. This analysis thus contributes not only to our understanding of the CCP’s intra-Party disciplinary regime but also to broader theoretical debates about authoritarian resilience and state capacity in contemporary authoritarian regimes.

Shuyu Chu, former China Law and Policy Fellow at Georgetown University (2021–2023), completed her PhD at the University of Hong Kong’s Faculty of Law. Her doctoral thesis, “Beyond Anti-Corruption: The Chinese Communist Party’s Disciplinary Infrastructure,” was ranked in the top 5% and awarded the HKU Dissertation Year Fellowship (2024) and nominated for the prestigious Li Ka Shing Prizes for Best PhD thesis. Drawing on unique access to internal Party materials, extensive empirical research, and an innovative application of Foucauldian theory, this groundbreaking study offers unprecedented insights into China’s disciplinary systems. It is now being developed into a book manuscript. She welcomes discussions with publishers interested in bringing this timely analysis to market. She can be reached at chushuyu@connect.hku.hk.