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It is always important to see what may be coming up for public consumption from the faculty of 中央民族大学法学 (Law School of Minzu University of China) especially since 强世功 (Jiang Shigong) joined the university and serves as well on the Standing Committee of the University's CPC Committee.
The essay follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation. It is worth a careful read. The essay is an excellent example of its type; and that type is an important element of discursive construction in contemporary building and maintaining of appropriate cognitive cages that advantage those collectives who make use of them. It is of course then up to the reader to decide the way and extent to which that management of cognition is to be received, understood, countered, or internalized--or not.
In this case, the essay suggests the selective sensitivity to discursive trends in the West, and especially among that portion of the American (and global) elites pushed out by their competitor elite communities in the United States (with some connection to their European counterparts). It is selective in the sense that it appears to augment the discursive power of the currently defeated faction of elites, using them as a shield for demonizing and then generalizing the threat tp the power and influence of a currently defeated (electorally anyway) American elite faction and then, quite masterfully generalizing this for a global audience. In the process, and ironically, the rhetoric of that defeated faction, once so irritating because of its harping on human rights in ways that were significantly at variance with principles of Socialist Human Rights and then projected inwards into nonconforming states, is then embraced as a sort of touchstone for measuring liberal democratic values and its consequences for a world order that everyone has had a hand in dismantling over the last 15 years. That is fair, of course--and the nature of the instrumentalization of discourse in the construction of a narrative meant to set the stage and manage mass opinion. Still, it ought not go unnoticed. As for the judging, I leave that to the reader.
My brief observations follow.
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1. My original and initial temptation was to ignore the hysterical turns of phrase. But then I thought that Tian Felong had it right. It is in precisely amplifying the hysteria--rhetorically anyway--that he nicely captured the essence of the tone of the internal American elite discourse. He amplifies it, of course; I would not have been able to resist either were I him; in the service of the discourse he seeks to extract from it. And then he globalizes hysteria into a pattern of action. The underlying idea--the United States must be crazy (or at least its leaders), a crazy that is displayed in their discourse. But still, it is worth thinking about the nature of hysteria as the trope of choice among the elite faction (and their allies) who lost the last general elections and who, as a consequence, have retreated to a stock set of rhetorical tropes (to amplify the "emotion" of text) to incite an equal measure of emoting among their readers; and to the courts. In that sense Tian Feilong is a faithful observer of the American discursive scene, as well as an astute user of that hysteria to reinforce the larger point. That, of course, id matched by the hysteria of the winning faction. Yet the discourse of the personal, and of factional fighting, sometimes quite personal, as Ms Pelosi and Mr Biden will attest with respect to their own half century friendship, might not be as easy to transpose into the analytics of longer term changes than the essay suggests.
2. That larger point is not so much about the rise of the East as it appears to be about the fall of the West. Yet, that is not quite it either. The essay suggests the measure of decline even more than suggesting is appearance. That is to say, that the core element of the essay, and its great contribution to the discourse, is not so much related to its conclusion about the decline of West or the rise of the East--a point that has been circulating in East and Southeast Asian forms for at least a generation in one form or another--but rather to the way that one ought to measure rising and falling powers. In this case, the measure is General Secretary Xi's structures and principles of Chinese Socialist Internationalism (which I have considered elsewhere). In this way, if one starts from a set of premises which one already embraces and measures the conduct of another actor against them when that actor has deliberately rejected them, then surely the outcome is a foregone conclusion. Nice! from a discursive perspective. But more managerial and less helpful as a conceptual matter--other than to crystalize the forms and content of the conceptual cage that the author assumes ought to be built for global internationalism. Fair enough, but worth a bit of a debate.
3. Tian starts with the argument--long a favorite of defeated liberal democratic elite factions--that Mr. Trump is a powerful archetype of dangerous exceptionalism, and that this exceptionalism ought to be measured by the deviations of Mr. Trumps actions and polices (such as they are) against an idealized standard of American global systemicity that represents an amalgam of the convergence vision of the Americans from 1945, more or less crystalized on the eve of the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, and the exposure of the fragility of financial systems in 2008. That is fair, one can suppose; Mr. Trump has not been a champion of the rules based multilateral order, and certainly not of its critical dependence on globally interlinked techno-bureaucracies. But then Mr. Trump campaigned both in 2016 and in 2024, precisely on a platform that was aligned to Chinese values and visions (though with American characteristics and in support of American rather than Chinese power) with respect to sovereign prerogatives and win-win strategies. Nonetheless where the Chinese were elegant in the way in which they went about this; Mr. Trump appears more crude and certainly uninterested in making any sort of case for whatever emerged (phenomenologically from action and experience) as the new ideological reality--both internationally and internally it seems. Those values posited the corruption and obsolescence of the system constructed from out of the ashes of the last world war and that it was time for a change (in China's favor and its Socialist vision form the perspective of a Marxist-Leninist starting point) in favor of the apex power, the United States. What appears to be exceptionalism from the perspective of the defeated indigenous elites and the essay could be seen as a necessary rectification by Mr. Trump and his faction. And certainty Chinese Marxist-Leninism understand both the power and value of rectification in a dialectical process of self (and collective) revolution.
4. The bit about the consequence--that this represent a regressive phenomenon reducing or returning the United States to its feral state is a very nice turn of phrase--and an effective trope. But it is also possible to suggest that this is not the only possible analytic turn (though clearly one well placed within the cognitive cage within the analysis is undertaken in this case). Again, it depends on starting points and the way in which one constructs the measure against which these sorts of judgments are made and addressed. Certainly, the Americans have been no slouches in doing precisely the same thing with respect to the turn of development of Chinese Marxist-Leninism in recent decades. Americans have suggested the regression of the Chinese Marxist-Leninist project in ways that echo those of Tian Feilong--but turnabout is fair play I suppose--especially where contests for narrative management is at stake. And, indeed, the Americans have employed some of the same techniques. At that point the value of that discourse is to extract the measure of judgment. That gives one a better sense of the position and agenda of those who use it, provides a distillation of premises that one can consider for oneself, and suggests the possibility that the application of different measures might produce a different analysis. It is in the revealing of that measure that Tian Feilong's essay is at its most interesting, and that, in an ironic way, suggests a sort of right reactionary turn in the conception of the forward movement of global relations to which China, like the United States, has contributed greatly.
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6. What, then, is it that one is measuring here--that is also quite simple. One is measuring the behavior of the United States against the emerging conceptual cages of Chinese Socialist (Communist) Internationalism in China's New Era. That is, to understand the nature of the judgment, and the characterization of the direction that passes for forward movement, one must understand the carefully and increasingly influential narratives of the Chinese approach to the global order and in its role in it (eg Brief Reflections on the Potential Importance of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会) in Six Key Issue Areas). One gets a summary sense of its key elements in the January address of Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang at Davos (Davos Discourse 4: The Chinese Path--Address by Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang's at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2025). And, of course, the United States represents, in whatever form its post global arrangements are settled, all of what must be overcome to achieve the Chinese vision, at least that is the discourse. And while it is right--given the strategic competition of these hegemons--to adopt this discursive line to manage the behaviors of subaltern states and the masses (along with the apparatus of transmission of appropriate ways of thinking for those who do not manage but must react appropriately).
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8. Given that, each of these j'accuse! elements degenerates into the usual disagreements among hegemons eager to protect their interests while both strenuously work (not without local opposition) to reshape themselves and their relations with their portions of a global order. What is left of the old globalization, then, is the structures within which states might order and align their relationships without the burden of convergence which was so irritating to states, especially those for whom convergence required substantial (capacity building controlled) changes. Yet on one core respect Tian Feilong is correct--all of the six j'accuse! elements do suggest the amplitude of the determination of the administration of Mr. Trump to challenge, abandon, oppose, or mold key elements of what remains of the forms and operation of the old architecture of global convergence. Perhaps from all of this some form of global management will emerge that aligns with whatever it is that at least apex states can live with. And it is also true that there is no going back--and certainly the Chinese side has been quite clear about that proposition in advancing its own model. The Chinese side characterizes its approach as a fix; but as Tian Feilong might have indirectly suggested, the "fix" is as important a set of changes ot the global order as is that which Tian Feilong ascribes to the United States.
9. By the time we get here, what becomes clear is that the "rise of the East and decline of the West" trope is powerful but also powerfully distracting. To understand the concept of rising and falling, one needs converge in direction. And there is no such consensus in direction at the moment. It follows that rising and falling becomes a signalling of relative ability to amass followings of dependent states and to mold the cognitive cages within their masses might be better managed to the greater glory of "East" or "West". And the distraction is the consideration of the various elements that make up the new fractured global orders and the means to their fulfillment. It is through that conceptual or at least analytical door that American and Chinese frameworks, and the actions undertaken by each toward their fulfillment, might be better judged. It is in this way that Tian Feilong's excellent closing paragraph makes more sense, in more than one sense; the two statements work together quite well:
特朗普的世界历史意义不可低估。同时，中国式现代化、中华民族伟大复兴、中华民族共同体建设与人类命运共同体构建将因此更加凸显其文明、道德、公平与普遍性意义及稳健光明的实践前景。 [Trump's world historical significance cannot be underestimated. At the same time, China's modernization, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the construction of the Chinese nation community and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind will further highlight their civilizational, moral, fair and universal significance and their steady and bright practical prospects.]
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田飞龙：特朗普或可称为世界历史“东升西降”的第一推动力
田飞龙
田飞龙
中央民族大学法学院副院长，海峡两岸关系法学研究会理事
2025-02-09 14:48:10 字号：A- A A+ 来源：观察者网 阅读 88402
【文/观察者网专栏作者 田飞龙】
特朗普是美国总统的例外，是“基于规则的国际秩序”的例外，也是西方自由主义联盟体系的例外。特朗普的政治信仰是美国的保守主义，是美国的历史与价值特性，是美国的本土文化与政治传统，也是美国对一切“非美国”的凌驾与优先。
特朗普主义是美国文化与政治的一种“返祖”现象，是对美国立国精神中的“反联邦党人”传统的某种精神回归，是对美国的世界帝国规范体系的道德解构和霸权行动逻辑的重构。特朗普的“交易艺术”是以传统帝国的“实力任性”取代世界帝国的“规范汲取”。
这是某种意义上的“原初美国”，但不是我们当代通常理解和见识的“规范美国”。这样的美国一点也不美，而是国际政治丛林中的一只“恶虎”。特朗普2.0版的这种“恶虎”形象初步展现。在基本逻辑上，特朗普主义需要区分国内政治和国际政治，存在国内政治正义性与国际政治非正义性的共存和交织，由此折射出特朗普主义的多种复杂面。
在国内政治层面，特朗普采取的是服务“美国优先”及清理清算民主党政府遗产的一系列改革措施，以马斯克的“政府效率部”为主要执行机构，开展大刀阔斧的政治清算和机构精简工作，以最大限度建立绝对忠诚于特朗普的政府团队和高效率的执行体系。这一层面的改革措施在美国民主政治与大众民意方面具有合法性和正当性，但与美国宪法及具体法治体系存在一定的冲突和矛盾，因此相关的司法纠纷少不了。
但特朗普对联邦最高法院的早期“包装”或可支持其部分改革措施。这一层面的改革与南美阿根廷的米莱主义有一定的相似性和协同性，是西方古典自由主义经济思想和政治哲学的政策化，都带有右翼保守主义色彩，与哈耶克思想路线存在契合点。
在国际政治层面，特朗普展现出一系列的非正义操作，影响重大而深远，主要包括：
第一，领土扩张主义，主要包括对格陵兰岛、加拿大、巴拿马运河、加沙地区的主权与直接控制权的诉求。这些诉求完全不符合《联合国宪章》及西方各国共同秉持的国际法基本原则，是特朗普对国际法的蔑视、背离以及对美国早期“西进运动”的想象和模仿，是传统帝国主义势力范围的逻辑回归。
第二，新门罗主义，主要体现在对加拿大、墨西哥的关税战以及对拉美事务的普遍干预，其主要行动目标是排除所谓的中国威胁和中国势力。如鲁比奥近期的拉美穿梭外交强迫巴拿马退出“一带一路”倡议以及呼吁整合拉美国家抵制所谓“中国共产党”的渗透影响。这是对传统门罗主义的回归，即绝不允许非美洲国家干预美洲事务。新门罗主义将美洲作为美国的小院高墙，完全不符合全球化与人类命运共同体的现实及国际法的基本规范。
第三，俄乌战争的妥协主义，主要是指特朗普在俄乌战争问题上持有不同于拜登主义的立场和策略，试图通过施加多方面影响“结束”战争。这表面上有助于欧洲和平，但对于北约、欧盟以及乌克兰如何承受战争已有的代价以及媾和的代价？特朗普和平方案到底是不是欧洲可持续安全架构的稳妥方案？对俄妥协是否会结构性损害乌克兰主权与领土完整？欧盟是否会为特朗普方案买单？这些都包含了巨大的不确定性风险，甚至会留下未来的战争隐患。“顿巴斯妥协”是特朗普的诺贝尔和平奖垫脚石还是欧洲未来冲突的新导火索，尚不明朗。
第四，巴以战争的帝国殖民主义，主要体现在特朗普一边倒地站在以色列内塔尼亚胡的立场上。其提出的“清空接管”加沙的计划完全是一种践踏国际法原则与联合国决议的帝国殖民行为，其强制清理和安置加沙居民的计划涉嫌“种族灭绝”，遭到联合国及绝大多数国际社会成员的反对与谴责，甚至其西方盟友也压倒性地表示反对。特朗普的“实力任性”外交过度偏离国际法和外交专业性，不仅成为笑话，也不可能具备操作性。
2025年2月4日，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在美国华盛顿白宫东厅与以色列总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡举行联合新闻发布会上发表讲话称，美国将接管加沙地带。路透社 [U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a joint news conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the East Room of the White House in Washington, U.S., February 4, 2025, saying the United States will take over the Gaza Strip. Reuters]
第五，对华贸易战特别是关税大战的冒进主义，主要体现在特朗普上台之后迅速宣布了对华加征10%关税并保留继续上调的预期，对中国的正当贸易权益和发展利益进行霸权侵害，以此作为施压手段，为其后续访华胁迫做铺垫。但中国不是1985年广场协议时的日本，不是1991年的苏联，不是容易拿捏的身旁小弟（加拿大、墨西哥），而是在国家体制与国际法上坚定挺立的世界大国，故中国迅速做出了综合性反制措施，坚决回击特朗普的霸凌，维护自身合法权益和国际法原则。
第六，以总体上的贸易保护主义、贸易霸凌主义、经济民族主义及对盟友的普遍勒索主义措施破坏全球化基本制度原则和产业链完整性。这是以美国的单纯国家利益凌驾于国际法和全球化共同利益之上，不仅破坏撕裂了全球化的基本规则体系，也破坏撕裂了美西方自身的阵营体系，造成了美国与世界及人类社会的对立。
特朗普主义并不是特别精致、规范、灵巧和富有文明内涵的政治哲学，而是“本土美国”对“全球美国”的政治文化批判及传统回归。
这是一个疲惫而恶劣的美国，是一个仅服务于美国自身利益而与人类利益、盟友利益相对立的美国，是一个内部软实力与硬实力自我脱钩的美国。经过“特朗普-马斯克”的某种具有“美国中兴”性质的内外改革，美国或许会在具体利益与民族国家重建上焕发生机，但将严重丧失全球主义的软实力地位，快速收缩到民族主义和新门罗主义的范畴，同时美国将不择手段地依靠超强实力攫取一切可见的外部利益，自我塑造为非普遍性的、带有传统帝国色彩及一定程度丛林法则底蕴的新帝国。
这是世界历史的新动态和新进程。美国的“逆全球化”与“非普遍化”不仅标志着自由主义国际秩序的终结，还标志着全球化与人类和平发展基本轨道的消解与转轨，留下的是国际政治的“重新丛林化”、西方体系的结构性瓦解和非西方世界的决定性崛起。特朗普是旧美国和旧西方的终结者，满足于美国优先的一切现实主义目标和利益，但他绝不是任何意义上的全球化与人类命运共同体的缔造者与立法者。
当然，这一进程不会一帆风顺和波澜不惊，特朗普对“规范美国”、“规范西方”与“规范全球”的价值和政治撕裂，必然会激发各阶层群体的波动、反弹和斗争，美国自身的精神内战和“深层政府”的惊恐反击必然会日益深化和升级，甚至“特朗普美国”的所谓新政是否能够持续还需要持续观察和审慎评估。但无论如何，特朗普还是打开了美国乃至世界历史的“潘多拉之盒”，为美国和世界的大变局提供了契机和可能性。
特朗普的意义是重大的，但并不伟大，客观上他或可称为世界历史“东升西降”的第一人和第一推动力。他的交易伦理、非正义性以及对美帝国与人类共同命运的特定而偏执的理解与实践，客观上为人类探索非西方现代化、全球化路径及文明新形态开辟了广阔空间。
特朗普的世界历史意义不可低估。同时，中国式现代化、中华民族伟大复兴、中华民族共同体建设与人类命运共同体构建将因此更加凸显其文明、道德、公平与普遍性意义及稳健光明的实践前景。
Tian Feilong: Trump may be called the first driving force of the "rise of the East and the decline of the West" in world history
Tian Feilong
Tian Feilong
Vice Dean of the School of Law of Minzu University of China, Director of the Cross-Strait Relations Law Research Association
2025-02-09 14:48:10 Font size: A- A A+ Source: Observer.com Reading 88402
[Text/Observer.com columnist Tian Feilong]
Trump is an exception to the US president, an exception to the "rules-based international order", and an exception to the Western liberal alliance system. Trump's political belief is American conservatism, the historical and value characteristics of the United States, the native culture and political tradition of the United States, and the United States' supremacy and priority over all "non-Americans".
Trumpism is a "regressive" phenomenon in American culture and politics, a spiritual return to the "anti-federalist" tradition in the spirit of the founding of the United States, and a moral deconstruction of the United States' world imperial norms system and a reconstruction of the logic of hegemonic action. Trump's "art of the deal" is to replace the "normative absorption" of the world empire with the "power willfulness" of the traditional empire.
This is the "original America" in a sense, but not the "normative America" that we usually understand and see in contemporary times. Such an America is not beautiful at all, but a "tiger" in the jungle of international politics. The image of this "tiger" of Trump 2.0 is initially revealed. In basic logic, Trumpism needs to distinguish between domestic politics and international politics. There is the coexistence and interweaving of domestic political justice and international political injustice, which reflects the various complex aspects of Trumpism.
At the domestic political level, Trump has taken a series of reform measures to serve "America First" and clean up the legacy of the Democratic government. With Musk's "Government Efficiency Department" as the main executive agency, he has carried out drastic political liquidation and institutional streamlining to maximize the establishment of a government team and an efficient execution system that is absolutely loyal to Trump. The reform measures at this level are legitimate and justified in terms of American democratic politics and public opinion, but there are certain conflicts and contradictions with the US Constitution and the specific rule of law system, so related judicial disputes are inevitable.
However, Trump's early "packaging" of the Federal Supreme Court may support some of his reform measures. This level of reform has certain similarities and synergies with the Mille Doctrine in Argentina in South America. It is the policyization of Western classical liberal economic thought and political philosophy, both of which have a right-wing conservative color and are consistent with Hayek's ideological line.
At the international political level, Trump has demonstrated a series of unjust operations with significant and far-reaching impacts, mainly including:
First, territorial expansionism, mainly including the claims for sovereignty and direct control over Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, and the Gaza Strip. These claims are completely inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the basic principles of international law commonly upheld by Western countries. They are Trump's contempt and deviation from international law, as well as his imagination and imitation of the early "westward movement" of the United States, and a logical return to the traditional imperialist sphere of influence.
Second, the new Monroe Doctrine, mainly reflected in the tariff war against Canada and Mexico and the general intervention in Latin American affairs, its main action goal is to exclude the so-called Chinese threat and Chinese influence. For example, Rubio's recent shuttle diplomacy in Latin America forced Panama to withdraw from the "Belt and Road" initiative and called for the integration of Latin American countries to resist the infiltration influence of the so-called "Chinese Communist Party". This is a return to the traditional Monroe Doctrine, that is, non-American countries are never allowed to interfere in American affairs. The new Monroe Doctrine regards America as a small courtyard with high walls in the United States, which is completely inconsistent with the reality of globalization and the community of human destiny and the basic norms of international law.
Third, the compromise doctrine of the Russian-Ukrainian war mainly refers to Trump's position and strategy on the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war that is different from Biden's doctrine, trying to "end" the war by exerting multi-faceted influence. This is apparently conducive to European peace, but how can NATO, the EU and Ukraine bear the existing costs of the war and the costs of peace? Is Trump's peace plan a safe solution for Europe's sustainable security architecture? Will compromise with Russia structurally damage Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity? Will the EU pay for Trump's plan? These all contain huge uncertainties and risks, and may even leave hidden dangers of future wars. It is not clear whether the "Donbass Compromise" is a stepping stone for Trump's Nobel Peace Prize or a new fuse for future conflicts in Europe.
Fourth, the imperial colonialism of the Israeli-Palestinian war is mainly reflected in Trump's one-sided stance on Israel's Netanyahu. His plan to "clear and take over" Gaza is a complete act of imperial colonialism that tramples on the principles of international law and UN resolutions. His plan to forcibly clear and resettle Gaza residents is suspected of "genocide" and has been opposed and condemned by the United Nations and the vast majority of members of the international community. Even his Western allies have overwhelmingly expressed opposition. Trump's "powerful and willful" diplomacy deviates too much from international law and diplomatic professionalism, and has not only become a joke, but is also impossible to operate.
2025年2月4日，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在美国华盛顿白宫东厅与以色列总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡举行联合新闻发布会上发表讲话称，美国将接管加沙地带。路透社 [U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a joint news conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the East Room of the White House in Washington, U.S., February 4, 2025, saying the United States will take over the Gaza Strip. Reuters]
Fifth, the adventurism of the trade war with China, especially the tariff war, is mainly reflected in the fact that Trump quickly announced a 10% tariff increase on China after taking office and retained the expectation of further increases, hegemonically infringing on China's legitimate trade rights and development interests, using this as a means of pressure to pave the way for his subsequent visit to China. But China is not Japan during the Plaza Accord in 1985, nor is it the Soviet Union in 1991, nor is it an easily manipulated younger brother (Canada, Mexico), but a world power that stands firm in the national system and international law. Therefore, China quickly took comprehensive countermeasures to resolutely fight back against Trump's bullying and safeguard its legitimate rights and interests and the principles of international law.
Sixth, the overall trade protectionism, trade bullying, economic nationalism and general extortion measures against allies undermine the basic institutional principles of globalization and the integrity of the industrial chain. This is to put the pure national interests of the United States above international law and the common interests of globalization, which not only destroys and tears apart the basic rules system of globalization, but also destroys and tears apart the camp system of the United States and the West, causing the United States to confront the world and human society.
Trumpism is not a particularly sophisticated, standardized, clever and civilized political philosophy, but a political and cultural criticism and traditional return of "local America" to "global America".
This is a tired and bad America, an America that only serves its own interests and is opposed to the interests of mankind and its allies, and an America that has self-decoupled its internal soft power from its hard power. After the internal and external reforms of "Trump-Musk" with the nature of "American rejuvenation", the United States may be revitalized in specific interests and the reconstruction of the nation-state, but it will seriously lose its soft power status of globalism and quickly shrink to the scope of nationalism and the new Monroe Doctrine. At the same time, the United States will rely on its super strength to seize all visible external interests by any means, and shape itself into a non-universal new empire with traditional imperial colors and a certain degree of jungle law.
This is a new dynamic and new process in world history. The "anti-globalization" and "non-universalization" of the United States not only mark the end of the liberal international order, but also mark the dissolution and transition of the basic track of globalization and human peaceful development. What is left is the "re-jungleization" of international politics, the structural collapse of the Western system, and the decisive rise of the non-Western world. Trump is the terminator of the old United States and the old West, satisfied with all the realistic goals and interests of the United States first, but he is by no means the creator and legislator of globalization and the community of human destiny in any sense.
Of course, this process will not be smooth and uneventful. Trump's value and political divisions on "regulating the United States", "regulating the West" and "regulating the world" will inevitably trigger fluctuations, backlashes and struggles among all classes of people. The United States' own spiritual civil war and the panic counterattack of the "deep government" will inevitably deepen and escalate. Even whether the so-called new policy of "Trump America" can continue requires continuous observation and prudent evaluation. But in any case, Trump has opened the "Pandora's Box" of American and even world history, providing opportunities and possibilities for major changes in the United States and the world.
Trump's significance is significant, but not great. Objectively, he can be called the first person and the first driving force of the "rise of the East and the decline of the West" in world history. His transaction ethics, injustice, and specific and paranoid understanding and practice of the common destiny of the American empire and mankind have objectively opened up broad space for mankind to explore non-Western modernization, globalization paths and new forms of civilization.
Trump's world historical significance cannot be underestimated. At the same time, China's modernization, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the construction of the Chinese nation community and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind will further highlight their civilizational, moral, fair and universal significance and their steady and bright practical prospects.
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