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The elaboration of the Americas First policy of the United States continues at a fairly quick pace. On 21 February, issued an Executive Order that focused on the quality and character of inbound foreign investment in the United States. Entitled "America First Investment Policy" (FR citation here), seeks to comprehensively re-frame the structures and operation of the regulation of inbound foreign investment and to exploit it in ways that align private and public interest along nationals security frameworks. That requires both the creaton of walls and the exploitation of opportunity.
The PRC is also increasingly exploiting United States capital to develop and modernize its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which poses significant risk to the United States homeland and Armed Forces of the United States around the world. Related actions include the development and deployment of dual-use technologies, weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and malicious cyber‑enabled actions against the United States and its people.
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The justification is not surprising except for its breadth and development. What had been fractured reactions now serve as the basis for positive actin and provide a structure for the projection of national security both inward and outward around and through investment markets.
Investment at all costs is not always in the national interest, however. Certain foreign adversaries, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), systematically direct and facilitate investment in United States companies and assets to obtain cutting-edge technologies, intellectual property, and leverage in strategic industries. The PRC pursues these strategies in diverse ways, both visible and concealed, and often through partner companies or investment funds in third countries.
The target (at least the official target identified in the Executive Order, appears to be the People's Republic of China.
Economic security is national security. The PRC does not allow United States companies to take over their critical infrastructure, and the United States should not allow the PRC to take over United States critical infrastructure. PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of United States technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports, and shipping terminals.Nonetheless, the rules and certainly its conceptual baselines are applicable universally. There is a mimesis here as well. That mimesis is presented as reciprocity, but it is better characterized as dialectical mimesis--the replication of action designed as a sort of communication that leads to changes in the positions of both parties.
The object is to "reduce the exploitation of public and private sector capital, technology, and technical knowledge by foreign adversaries such as the PRC." (E.O. §1(e). To those ends, the "United States will establish new rules to stop United States companies and investors from investing in industries that advance the PRC’s national Military-Civil Fusion strategy and stop PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets, allowing only those investments that serve American interests." (Ibid.).
Investments with be three tracked. Fort favored investments a fast track; for disfavored investment the opposite, and as a bonus for investment over $1 billion environmental review will be expedited.
(c) The United States will create an expedited “fast-track” process, based on objective standards, to facilitate greater investment from specified allied and partner sources in United States businesses involved with United States advanced technology and other important areas. This process will allow for increased foreign investment subject to appropriate security provisions, including requirements that the specified foreign investors avoid partnering with United States foreign adversaries.
(d) My Administration will also expedite environmental reviews for any investment over $1 billion in the United States.
It is not clear yet what any of this means in operation, but the thrust and direction of that regulatory architecture is clear enough. In the end, a corp of techno-administrators, under the direction of the President and his advisors, of course, will exercise substantial discretion at all levels of review and assessment. Section 3(a) vests broad regulatory authority in identified agencies. Regulatory details, of course, will make all the difference in the way these regulations are actualized, and perhaps extended beyond China.
The text of the "America First Investment Policy" follows below. The convergence with China's New Era policies continues apace. It makes sense in a way--the two apex powers, like the largest competitors in a field of market activity (in this case the market for political authority) will tend to resemble each other more and more as their rivals are eliminated and the need for the stabilization of relations between them and the care and management of their dependent states and production chains begins to produce a dialectical iterative nemesis that eventually aligns action, adjusted of course, fr the discourse and practices of the political-economic model which serves as the cognitive cages of each. This is not only necessary, but also deeply embedded in the systemic thinking of the times. At some point the apex hegemons must align their ways of doing things if only because they must deeply intertwine their practices in order to rationalize both their internal and external relations within a stable and orderly system of power. There will be conflicts at the edges--but as long as the hegemons are content to divide things between them, then it is natural tat they adopt a common language and approach to the systems which both impose each in their own spheres. . . . at least until the time comes when either or both decide that it is time to eliminate the other; either is weakened, another surges forward, or the whole system collapses from its accumulating contradictions. But that is for the long term. It may be useful to note, that convergence does not mean identity. Neither is the United States inching toward Marxist-Leninism nor is China lurching towards liberal democracy. Each remains itself--what is changing is the semiotics of those objects, Marxist-Leninism and liberal democracy, within the conceptual cages of which both states continue to comfortably reside, even as each reshapes the signification of the systems that bind them.
There is much more to this than the FDI element--a subject for a later post. Nonetheless, this is the basic postulate of political semiotics. For the rest--revolution, transformation, submission, or resistance. Nonetheless, within post-global imperial systems less interested (for the most past) in territory than in control, the issue of sovereignty will be often serve as the cloaking discursive trope beneath which power relations are sorted.
America First Investment Policy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SUBJECT: America First Investment Policy
By
the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Principles and Objectives.
America’s investment policy is critical to our national and economic
security. Welcoming foreign investment and strengthening the United
States’ world-leading private and public capital markets will be a key
part of America’s Golden Age. The United States has the world’s most
attractive assets, in technology and across our economy, and we will
make it easier for our overseas allies to support United States jobs,
United States innovators, and United States economic growth with their
capital.
Investment by United States allies and
partners can create hundreds of thousands of jobs and significant wealth
for the United States. Our Nation is committed to maintaining the
strong, open investment environment that benefits our economy and our
people, while enhancing our ability to protect the United States from
new and evolving threats that can accompany foreign investment.
Investment at all costs is not always in the national interest,
however. Certain foreign adversaries, including the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), systematically direct and facilitate investment in
United States companies and assets to obtain cutting-edge technologies,
intellectual property, and leverage in strategic industries. The PRC
pursues these strategies in diverse ways, both visible and concealed,
and often through partner companies or investment funds in third
countries.
Economic security is national security.
The PRC does not allow United States companies to take over their
critical infrastructure, and the United States should not allow the PRC
to take over United States critical infrastructure. PRC-affiliated
investors are targeting the crown jewels of United States technology,
food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports, and
shipping terminals.
The PRC is also increasingly
exploiting United States capital to develop and modernize its military,
intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which poses significant
risk to the United States homeland and Armed Forces of the United States
around the world. Related actions include the development
and deployment of dual-use technologies, weapons of mass destruction,
advanced conventional weapons, and malicious cyber‑enabled actions
against the United States and its people. Through its national
Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the PRC increases the size of its
military-industrial complex by compelling civilian Chinese companies and
research institutions to support its military and intelligence
activities.
Those Chinese companies also raise capital
by: selling to American investors securities that trade on American and
foreign public exchanges; lobbying United States index providers and
funds to include these securities in market offerings; and engaging in
other acts to ensure access to United States capital and accompanying
intangible benefits. In this way, the PRC exploits United States
investors to finance and advance the development and modernization of
its military.
Sec. 2. Policy.
(a) It is the policy of the United States to preserve an open
investment environment to help ensure that artificial intelligence and
other emerging technologies of the future are built, created, and grown
right here in the United States. Investment in our economy from our
allies and partners, some of whom have tremendous sovereign wealth
funds, supports the national interest. My Administration will make the
United States the world’s greatest destination for investment dollars,
to the benefit of all of us.
(b) Yet for investment
in United States businesses involved in critical technology, critical
infrastructure, personal data, and other sensitive areas, restrictions
on foreign investors’ access to United States assets will ease in
proportion to their verifiable distance and independence from the
predatory investment and technology-acquisition practices of the PRC and
other foreign adversaries or threat actors.
(c) The
United States will create an expedited “fast-track” process, based on
objective standards, to facilitate greater investment from specified
allied and partner sources in United States businesses involved with
United States advanced technology and other important areas. This
process will allow for increased foreign investment subject to
appropriate security provisions, including requirements that the
specified foreign investors avoid partnering with United States foreign
adversaries.
(d) My Administration will also
expedite environmental reviews for any investment over $1 billion in the
United States.
(e) The United States will reduce the
exploitation of public and private sector capital, technology, and
technical knowledge by foreign adversaries such as the PRC. The United
States will establish new rules to stop United States companies and
investors from investing in industries that advance the PRC’s national
Military-Civil Fusion strategy and stop PRC-affiliated persons from
buying up critical American businesses and assets, allowing only those
investments that serve American interests.
(f) The
United States will use all necessary legal instruments, including the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), to
restrict PRC-affiliated persons from investing in United States
technology, critical infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, energy,
raw materials, or other strategic sectors. My Administration will
protect United States farmland and real estate near sensitive
facilities. It will also seek, including in consultation with the
Congress, to strengthen CFIUS authority over “greenfield” investments,
to restrict foreign adversary access to United States talent and
operations in sensitive technologies (especially artificial
intelligence), and to expand the remit of “emerging and foundational”
technologies addressable by CFIUS.
(g) To reduce
uncertainty for investors, reduce administrative burden, and increase
Government efficiency, my Administration will cease the use of overly
bureaucratic, complex, and open-ended “mitigation” agreements for
United States investments from foreign adversary countries. In general,
mitigation agreements should consist of concrete actions that companies
can complete within a specific time, rather than perpetual and
expensive compliance obligations. More administrative resources, in
turn, will be directed toward facilitating investments from key partner
countries.
(h) The United States will continue to
welcome and encourage passive investments from all foreign persons.
These include non-controlling stakes and shares with no voting, board,
or other governance rights and that do not confer any managerial
influence, substantive decisionmaking, or non-public access to
technologies or technical information, products, or services. This will
allow our cutting-edge businesses to continue to benefit from foreign
investment capital, while ensuring protection of our national security.
(i) The United States will also use all necessary legal
instruments to further deter United States persons from investing in the
PRC’s military-industrial sector. These may include the imposition of
sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
through the blocking of assets or through other actions, including
actions pursuant to Executive Order 13959 of November 12, 2020
(Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance
Communist Chinese Military Companies), as amended by Executive Order
13974 of January 13, 2021 (Amending Executive Order 13959 — Addressing
the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese
Military Companies) and Executive Order 14032 of June 3, 2021
(Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Certain
Companies of the People’s Republic of China), and actions pursuant to
Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023 (Addressing United States
Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in
Countries of Concern). Executive Order 14105 is under review by my
Administration, pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of January 20,
2025 (America First Trade Policy), to examine whether it includes
sufficient controls to address national security threats.
(j) This review will build on measures taken under my authority in
2020 and 2021 and consider new or expanded restrictions on United States
outbound investment in the PRC in sectors such as semiconductors,
artificial intelligence, quantum, biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace,
advanced manufacturing, directed energy, and other areas implicated by
the PRC’s national Military-Civil Fusion strategy. Covered sectors
should be reviewed and updated regularly, including by the Office of
Science and Technology Policy. As part of the review, my Administration
will consider applying restrictions on investment types including
private equity, venture capital, greenfield investments, corporate
expansions, and investments in publicly traded securities, from sources
including pension funds, university endowments, and other
limited-partner investors. It is past time for American universities to
stop supporting foreign adversaries with their investment decisions,
much as they should stop granting university access to supporters of
terrorism.
(k) To further reduce incentives for United
States persons to invest in our foreign adversaries, we will review
whether to suspend or terminate the 1984 United States-The People’s
Republic of China Income Tax Convention. That tax treaty, along with
the PRC’s admission to the World Trade Organization and the related
undertaking by the United States to accord unconditional Most Favored
Nation treatment to goods and services of the PRC, led to the
deindustrialization of the United States and the technological
modernization of the PRC military. We will seek to reverse both those
trends. United States investors will invest in the future of America,
not the future of the PRC.
(l) To protect the savings
of United States investors and channel them into American growth and
prosperity, my Administration will also:
(i)
determine if adequate financial auditing standards are upheld for
companies covered by the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act;
(ii) review the variable interest entity and subsidiary
structures used by foreign-adversary companies to trade on United States
exchanges, which limit the ownership rights and protections for United
States investors, as well as allegations of fraudulent behavior by these
companies; and
(iii) restore the highest fiduciary
standards as required by the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974,
seeking to ensure that foreign adversary companies are ineligible for
pension plan contributions.
Sec. 3. Implementation.
The policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum shall be
implemented, to the extent permitted by law and available
appropriations, and subject to internal programmatic and budgetary
processes, as follows:
(a) With respect to sections
2(a) through 2(k) of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the
heads of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) as deemed
appropriate by the Secretary of the Treasury, and with respect to the
authorities of CFIUS in coordination with the members thereof, shall
take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations,
to support all powers granted to the President by IEEPA, section 721 of
the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and other statutes to
carry out the purposes of this memorandum.
(b) With
respect to section 2(d) of this memorandum, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, in consultation with the heads of other
agencies as appropriate, shall carry out the purposes of this
memorandum.
(c) With respect to section 2(l)(i) of
this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury shall engage as
appropriate with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board; with respect to section 2(l)(ii) of
this memorandum, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall provide a written
recommendation on the risk posed to United States investors based on the
auditability, corporate oversight, and evidence of criminal or civil
fraudulent behavior for all foreign adversary companies currently listed
on domestic exchanges; and with respect to section 2(l)(iii) of this
memorandum, the Secretary of Labor shall publish updated fiduciary
standards under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for
investments in public market securities of foreign adversary companies.
Sec. 4. Definition.
For purposes of this memorandum, the term “foreign adversaries”
includes the PRC, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and the Macau Special Administrative Region; the Republic of Cuba; the
Islamic Republic of Iran; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the
Russian Federation; and the regime of Venezuelan politician Nicolás
Maduro.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i.) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii.) the functions of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or
legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be
implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the
availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is
not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the
United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers,
employees, or agents, or any other person.
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