The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report
to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine
Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior
Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues.
CECC
tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political
and academic elites in the United States about issues touching on China
and the official American line developed in connection with those
issues. As such it is an important source of information about the way
official and academic sectors think about China. As one can imagine many
of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chinese policies
and institutions (for some analysis see CECC).
CECC publishes annual reports. It has just published in Annual Report for 2025. The Press Release provides an excellent summary:
December 10, 2025
WASHINGTON, D.C.—U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) and U.S. Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ), Chair and Cochair of the bipartisan and bicameral Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), today released the Commission’s 2025 Annual Report reviewing human rights conditions and legal developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as mandated by Title III of Public Law 106–286.
The full report and an executive summary are available on the CECC’s website.
“This year’s report lays bare how the Chinese Communist Party keeps breaking its word—to its own people and to the world,” said CECC Chair Senator Dan Sullivan. “Beijing signs human rights conventions, promises autonomy for Hong Kong and Tibet, and pledges to play by global trade rules, then jails dissidents, runs forced-labor factories and illegal fishing fleets, and even dispatches agents to stalk and threaten people on American soil. This report doesn’t just catalogue those abuses; it gives Congress, the administration, and our allies a blueprint to stand with victims of atrocities, defend our workers and supply chains—including our fishing and seafood industries—from slave labor, and make sure the Chinese Communist Party, not American families, pays the price for Beijing’s broken promises. I am honored to work with Representative Smith on the CECC and continue the important work of Secretary of State Rubio, who served on this commission as Chair or Ranking Member for nine years while he was in the Senate.”
“Sadly, the People’s Republic of China under the Communist Party has proven time and again that it seeks hegemony in order to impose the same tyranny it afflicts its own citizens with upon the rest of the world," said CECC Cochair Representative Chris Smith. "China is not a responsible member of the community of nations, for it is run by the Communist Party for the benefit of the Communist Party—a Party State which does not honor the treaties to which it is a State Party. The PRC is thus more than simply a strategic rival to the United States and the rest of the free world, as it is a systemic rival which seeks to undo the stable international order to which the United States has been guarantor since the end of the Second World War. How can a predatory, mercantilist nation that utilizes forced labor, steals intellectual property and massively subsidizes state-owned enterprises be a member of the World Trade Organization or any rules-based order? The answer is that it cannot be, so long as the Communist Party maintains its monopoly on power.”
The 2025 Annual Report frames the PRC’s human rights record under the theme “Promises Made, Promises Broken.” It shows how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invokes the language of “rule of law” while practicing “rule by law”—using courts, police, and regulations as political weapons to preserve one-party rule at home and bend rules abroad. It documents how Beijing signs treaties and pledges on human rights, labor, trade, and maritime conduct, then ignores those obligations in practice, turning coerced labor and state-directed subsidies into tools of economic coercion and exporting censorship and surveillance technologies that undermine freedom far beyond China’s borders. As in previous years, the report’s 18 chapters provide a detailed account of abuses inside the PRC and in areas under its control, and trace how those broken promises distort global markets, weaken international norms, and ultimately threaten the security and prosperity of the American people and our allies.
Among its major findings, the 2025 report documents:
- Expansion of state-imposed forced labor. Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continue to expand coercive labor schemes involving Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including transfers from traditional rural livelihoods into industrial work and confiscation of land for state-run cooperatives and developers.
- Systematic repression of religious and ethnic communities. The CCP tightens control over all major faiths, promotes the “sinicization” of religion, and suppresses Muslim, Tibetan Buddhist, Christian, Falun Gong, and other communities through mosque “rectifications,” colonial-style boarding schools, intrusive surveillance, and persecution of groups labeled as “cults.”
- Criminalization of dissent and civil society. Authorities arbitrarily detain human rights lawyers, labor organizers, journalists, women’s rights advocates, and others under vague offenses such as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” or “separatism,” often using torture, incommunicado detention, and extralegal “black jails.”
- Technology-enhanced human rights abuses. The report details how AI tools, mass data platforms, satellite internet infrastructure, and censorship technologies are embedded with CCP policies and propaganda and exported abroad, enabling other governments to replicate China’s model of digital repression.
- Erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy and rule of law. National security laws continue to be weaponized to imprison pro-democracy leaders, shutter civil society, and chill press freedom, in violation of obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law.
- China’s overseas human rights abuses. A distinctive contribution of this year’s report is the chapter “Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally,” which documents the PRC’s efforts to project repression beyond its borders. The Commission details a spectrum of tactics: harassment of diaspora communities and rights advocates, bounties and threats against overseas activists, covert “overseas police” service stations, and law-enforcement cases in the United States involving unregistered PRC agents. The chapter also highlights attempts to influence democratic processes and human rights norms by cultivating foreign politicians and political aides, spreading disinformation about U.S. elections, leveraging Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices, and working inside the U.N. system to blunt scrutiny of abuses. Taken together, the report argues, these practices show that Beijing’s human rights violations are part of a global strategy to intimidate and censor people on U.S. soil, tilt politics and policy in the PRC’s favor, and erode universal human rights standards.
- Political Prisoner Database. The report again draws extensively on the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD), which now contains 11,262 records of political and religious prisoners in China; 2,755 of these are “active detentions”—cases in which individuals are known or believed to be currently detained, imprisoned, or under coercive controls. The PPD supports congressional and executive advocacy and helps ensure that individual prisoners are not forgotten.
PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND LEGISLATION
The 2025 Annual Report includes a broad set of recommendations for Congress and the executive branch. The Chairs highlighted several priority areas—forced labor, unjustly detained Americans in China, forced organ harvesting, and transnational repression—where the report calls for concrete action and major legislative initiatives.
Key recommendations include:
- Confronting forced labor and tainted supply chains. Strengthen enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, close loopholes in small-parcel and transshipment trade, and end U.S. imports of PRC seafood caught or processed with forced labor—including on illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) PRC fishing fleets as well as in processing plants that rely on North Korean and transferred Uyghur workers—so that American families, including servicemembers and children in school meal programs, are not unknowingly buying products made with slavery.
- Freeing unjustly detained Americans in China. Treat the PRC’s arbitrary prosecutions and “exit bans” as a form of hostage-taking; improve transparency in travel advisories; and deepen coordination with allies through a wrongful-detention working group so that Americans are not used as political bargaining chips.
- Ending forced organ harvesting. Expand State Department reporting on organ trafficking, restrict “organ tourism,” impose visa bans and sanctions on perpetrators, and end U.S. funding and partnerships with PRC institutions implicated in unethical transplant practices.
- Countering transnational repression and malign influence. Develop a whole-of-government strategy against PRC transnational repression, improve support for victims in diaspora communities, increase transparency around foreign interference in U.S. politics, and coordinate with allies on sanctions and law-enforcement tools to deter intimidation, digital harassment, and covert influence operations.
The report also spotlights priority bipartisan legislation that would implement these recommendations and that the Chairs have championed in Congress, including:
- The FISH Act (S. 688) – to target illegal, unreported, and unregulated PRC fishing fleets and forced labor in the PRC seafood industry.
- The Transnational Repression Policy Act (S. 2525 / H.R. 4829) – to build out U.S. authorities, reporting, and coordination to confront transnational repression on U.S. soil and globally.
- The Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act (S. 2560 / H.R. 4830)– to expand sanctions and restrict federal procurement of PRC seafood and other goods linked to atrocity crimes.
- The Nelson Wells Jr. and Dawn Michelle Hunt Unjustly Detained in Communist China Act (H.R. 5491) – to enhance tools for securing the release of unjustly detained Americans.
- The Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act (H.R. 1503) – to expand reporting and authorities to disrupt forced organ harvesting and organ tourism.
- The Hong Kong Judicial Sanctions Act (S. 1755 / H.R. 733) – to seek targeted sanctions on judges and prosecutors responsible for undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy and rule of law and jailing political prisoners.
Beyond these priorities, the 2025 Annual Report makes detailed recommendations on defending human rights in Hong Kong and Tibet, confronting malign PRC influence operations, defeating the export of digital authoritarianism, evaluating U.S. human rights diplomacy, and building a robust public diplomacy strategy that exposes abuses while supporting open access to information.
Senator Sullivan and Representative Smith commended the professional work of the CECC’s research staff in producing the 2025 Annual Report and reiterated that the United States must hold the PRC to the promises it has made—to its own citizens and to the world.
MEDIA CONTACT:
Rita Cheng
(202) 308-6062
A summary of the "Key Findings" from the Executive Summary follows below. They provide the categorical focus framework within which the U.S. constructs China. Key areas of analysis include: (1) freedom of expression; (2) civil society; (3) freedom of religion; (4) criminal justice; (5) access to justice; (5) governance; (6) ethnic minority rights; (7) status of women; (8) population control; (9) human trafficking; (10) worker rights; (11) public health; (12) environment; (13) business and human rights; (14) North Korean refugees in China; (15) technology enhanced authoritarianism; (16) Tibet; (17) Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; (18) Hong Kong and Macao; and (19) human rights violations in the U.S. and globally. It is not clear how this will resonate with the Trump Administration, whose transactional approach to China appears, at best, to use these as bargaining chips for the augmentation of the advantages to the United States in its America First reframing of trade and foreign relations. Something that is less helpful is the discursive detachment of the Chinese State from the Chinese Communist Party. The reasons are important for the internal debate and management of public opinion in the United States. And as a piece of propaganda it is as useful as Chinese efforts directed against the U.S. Those effects ought to be studied with some interest on both sides of the Pacific.
2 0 2 5 A N N U A L R E P O R T— E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 13
K E Y F I N D I N G S
against the Church of Almighty God, launching consec-
utive campaigns to eradicate the religious group.
■ In at least two cases this past year, authorities detained
Taiwanese citizens for participation in religious activi-
ties associated with supposed xiejiao.
Criminal Justice
■ The criminal justice system remained a political instru-
ment used for maintaining social order in furtherance
of the Chinese Communist Party’s autocratic rule. In
addition to combating criminal conduct, the govern-
ment also targeted individuals who pursue universal
human rights, such as exercising free speech and seeking
remedies within the legal system.
■ Government officials arbitrarily detained political activ-
ists, religious practitioners, ethnic minorities, and rights
advocates, including through extralegal means such as
“black jails” and psychiatric facilities, or through crimi-
nal prosecution under offenses such as “picking quarrels
and provoking trouble” or crimes endangering state
security. Some detainees, particularly those held incom-
municado, reported being mistreated or tortured. After
entering the formal legal process, defendants sometimes
faced prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and
delayed sentencing.
■ Legal mechanisms such as administrative detention,
“residential surveillance at a designated location”
(RSDL), and “retention in custody” were frequently
employed with minimal oversight. Amendments to the
PRC Supervision Law in late 2024 further expanded
state power, introducing new coercive measures and
extending permissible detention periods.
Governance and Rule of Law
■ The Chinese Communist Party continued to advance
a governance model that prioritizes political security
and social stability at the expense of individual rights.
The Party’s early intervention strategy in addressing
social problems led to overzealous enforcement and an
expansion of surveillance within a climate of ongoing
suppression of citizens’ access to justice—likely contrib-
uting to the very anti-social behaviors the government
sought to contain. The Party’s uncontested power also
perpetuated a lack of transparency and public oversight,
hampering institutional reforms and enabling persistent
systemic corruption.
■ The Party framed governance around risk preven-
tion, using stability maintenance measures that
draw from the “Fengqiao Experience” policy, a way
to exert granular social and political control through
neighborhood committees and other grassroots-level
organizations. In implementing the policy, author-
ities expanded early intervention tactics, targeting
individuals based on vague behavioral markers using
techniques such as artificial intelligence analytics to
enable preemptive intervention.
■ Parallel to these security-driven measures, fiscal pressure
on local governments spurred aggressive revenue-gen-
eration tactics such as retroactive taxes, arbitrary fines,
and asset seizure. In some cases, authorities arbitrarily
detained business owners and conditioned their release
on the payment of money, a practice that some critics
likened to state-sanctioned extortion.
■ Policymakers issued a new five-year plan with the aim
of easing rural-to-urban migration restrictions so as to
facilitate labor mobility and urbanization. Challenges in
resource allocation, however, will likely continue, since
the plan does not emphasize the provision of public
services for new migrants in cities or for the elderly and
disabled residents who remain in rural areas.
■ In areas such as food and drug safety, authorities demon-
strated a degree of responsiveness following exposés
by state-run media, suggesting some space for public
discourse. Nevertheless, efforts by independent inves-
tigators were censored, underscoring the government’s
intolerance of unsanctioned scrutiny and its broader
resistance to bottom-up accountability.
Ethnic Minority Rights
■ During the Commission’s reporting year, authorities sup-
pressed the expression of Islamic beliefs in Hui religious
communities, including through actions aimed at “sini-
cizing” Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui
Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
■ In December 2024, hundreds of local Muslims gathered
in front of the municipal government building in Yuxi
municipality, Yunnan province to protest the deten-
tion of well-known imam Ma Yuwei and call for his
release. Ma’s detention and the ensuing protests followed
a period in which authorities detained other Hui imams
and targeted other Hui figures, and came in the wake
of a May 2023 demonstration involving thousands of
K E Y F I N D I N G S
against the Church of Almighty God, launching consec-
utive campaigns to eradicate the religious group.
■ In at least two cases this past year, authorities detained
Taiwanese citizens for participation in religious activi-
ties associated with supposed xiejiao.
Criminal Justice
■ The criminal justice system remained a political instru-
ment used for maintaining social order in furtherance
of the Chinese Communist Party’s autocratic rule. In
addition to combating criminal conduct, the govern-
ment also targeted individuals who pursue universal
human rights, such as exercising free speech and seeking
remedies within the legal system.
■ Government officials arbitrarily detained political activ-
ists, religious practitioners, ethnic minorities, and rights
advocates, including through extralegal means such as
“black jails” and psychiatric facilities, or through crimi-
nal prosecution under offenses such as “picking quarrels
and provoking trouble” or crimes endangering state
security. Some detainees, particularly those held incom-
municado, reported being mistreated or tortured. After
entering the formal legal process, defendants sometimes
faced prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and
delayed sentencing.
■ Legal mechanisms such as administrative detention,
“residential surveillance at a designated location”
(RSDL), and “retention in custody” were frequently
employed with minimal oversight. Amendments to the
PRC Supervision Law in late 2024 further expanded
state power, introducing new coercive measures and
extending permissible detention periods.
Governance and Rule of Law
■ The Chinese Communist Party continued to advance
a governance model that prioritizes political security
and social stability at the expense of individual rights.
The Party’s early intervention strategy in addressing
social problems led to overzealous enforcement and an
expansion of surveillance within a climate of ongoing
suppression of citizens’ access to justice—likely contrib-
uting to the very anti-social behaviors the government
sought to contain. The Party’s uncontested power also
perpetuated a lack of transparency and public oversight,
hampering institutional reforms and enabling persistent
systemic corruption.
■ The Party framed governance around risk preven-
tion, using stability maintenance measures that
draw from the “Fengqiao Experience” policy, a way
to exert granular social and political control through
neighborhood committees and other grassroots-level
organizations. In implementing the policy, author-
ities expanded early intervention tactics, targeting
individuals based on vague behavioral markers using
techniques such as artificial intelligence analytics to
enable preemptive intervention.
■ Parallel to these security-driven measures, fiscal pressure
on local governments spurred aggressive revenue-gen-
eration tactics such as retroactive taxes, arbitrary fines,
and asset seizure. In some cases, authorities arbitrarily
detained business owners and conditioned their release
on the payment of money, a practice that some critics
likened to state-sanctioned extortion.
■ Policymakers issued a new five-year plan with the aim
of easing rural-to-urban migration restrictions so as to
facilitate labor mobility and urbanization. Challenges in
resource allocation, however, will likely continue, since
the plan does not emphasize the provision of public
services for new migrants in cities or for the elderly and
disabled residents who remain in rural areas.
■ In areas such as food and drug safety, authorities demon-
strated a degree of responsiveness following exposés
by state-run media, suggesting some space for public
discourse. Nevertheless, efforts by independent inves-
tigators were censored, underscoring the government’s
intolerance of unsanctioned scrutiny and its broader
resistance to bottom-up accountability.
Ethnic Minority Rights
■ During the Commission’s reporting year, authorities sup-
pressed the expression of Islamic beliefs in Hui religious
communities, including through actions aimed at “sini-
cizing” Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui
Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
■ In December 2024, hundreds of local Muslims gathered
in front of the municipal government building in Yuxi
municipality, Yunnan province to protest the deten-
tion of well-known imam Ma Yuwei and call for his
release. Ma’s detention and the ensuing protests followed
a period in which authorities detained other Hui imams
and targeted other Hui figures, and came in the wake
of a May 2023 demonstration involving thousands of
14 C O N G R E S S I O N A L- E X E C U T I V E C O M M I S S I O N O N C H I N A
K E Y F I N D I N G S
residents of Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi, over the
planned demolition of a local mosque.
■ In January 2025, security personnel in Hohhot munic-
ipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, brought
veteran Mongol rights advocate Hada to a hospital,
where he was placed on a respirator in intensive care.
During his hospitalization, state security personnel
failed to provide information on Hada’s condition to
his wife, Xinna, and their son, Uiles. Hospital staff later
moved Hada from intensive care to another part of the
hospital, but police forbade them from disclosing where
they had transferred him within the hospital.
Status of Women
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, Chinese
political leaders implemented several legal measures
related to women’s rights in marriage and divorce. A
law delegating more power to rural village assemblies
sparked debate as to whether it is enough to guarantee
women equal land rights and social insurance benefits.
Additionally, online commentators spoke out against a
revised draft law aiming to make registering for mar-
riage easier and filing for divorce more difficult, citing
concerns about domestic violence victims within the
controversial 30-day “cooling-off” period.
■ The Commission observed reports of sexual violence
against women in China, along with varied responses
from PRC authorities. Netizens expressed concerns
about a lack of sufficient official response to the fol-
lowing cases: a Ph.D. student accused of drugging and
raping at least seven young women in China, a university
professor who sexually abused his student for two years,
the alleged trafficking of a rural woman suffering from
mental illness, and cases of sexual assault of young girls.
Such posts often faced official censorship.
■ Women in mainland China and Hong Kong faced dis-
crimination and harassment in the workplace. One
report revealed that one-third of women in Hong Kong
experienced workplace sexual harassment in the last
three years, while other reports showed widespread dis-
criminatory hiring practices based on female applicants’
fertility and family status. Some blame the CCP’s recent
pro-natal policies and rhetoric for employers’ reluctance
to hire married women of child-bearing age.
■ The Commission continued to monitor cases of offi-
cial harassment and arbitrary detention of women’s
rights activists, including He Fangmei, Sophia Huang
Xueqin, Zhang Zhan, and Li Qiaochu.
Population Control
■ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or “Party”) and
PRC government continued to implement population
planning policies that violate international standards
by seeking to control family size, including the applica-
tion of the three-child policy, which permits and seeks
to incentivize families to have up to but no more than
three children.
■ The National Bureau of Statistics of China’s 2024 data
revealed that, while the total number of births in China
increased for the first time in eight years, likely due to
the auspicious “Year of the Dragon,” the overall popu-
lation declined for the third consecutive year. Marriage
rates also fell to the lowest rate since public records
began in 1986.
■ PRC central authorities announced a variety of pro-na-
tal initiatives this year, including a survey to identify
family and childbearing attitudes, increased support
for infrastructure related to childrearing, and a pro-
posed national childcare subsidy. Local authorities also
attempted to boost birth rates through financial incen-
tives, pro-natal messaging, and calling young women to
ask about their family planning and menstrual cycles.
■ The Commission observed reports of the discrimina-
tory effects of centrally led family planning policies,
including the likely continuation of birth suppression of
Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
■ The legacy of the one-child policy (1980 to 2015) contin-
ues to have an impact on Chinese society, including the
continued sex ratio imbalance and increased socio-eco-
nomic precarity for China’s elderly population.
■ In September 2024, the PRC announced the end of
international adoptions originating in China, to which
the one-child policy era’s social engineering abuses
had often been linked. The sudden decision included
the halting of hundreds of cases of families who had
already been matched and had communicated with a
child and spurred particular concern for the thousands
of children remaining in Chinese orphanages, often
with disabilities.
K E Y F I N D I N G S
residents of Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi, over the
planned demolition of a local mosque.
■ In January 2025, security personnel in Hohhot munic-
ipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, brought
veteran Mongol rights advocate Hada to a hospital,
where he was placed on a respirator in intensive care.
During his hospitalization, state security personnel
failed to provide information on Hada’s condition to
his wife, Xinna, and their son, Uiles. Hospital staff later
moved Hada from intensive care to another part of the
hospital, but police forbade them from disclosing where
they had transferred him within the hospital.
Status of Women
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, Chinese
political leaders implemented several legal measures
related to women’s rights in marriage and divorce. A
law delegating more power to rural village assemblies
sparked debate as to whether it is enough to guarantee
women equal land rights and social insurance benefits.
Additionally, online commentators spoke out against a
revised draft law aiming to make registering for mar-
riage easier and filing for divorce more difficult, citing
concerns about domestic violence victims within the
controversial 30-day “cooling-off” period.
■ The Commission observed reports of sexual violence
against women in China, along with varied responses
from PRC authorities. Netizens expressed concerns
about a lack of sufficient official response to the fol-
lowing cases: a Ph.D. student accused of drugging and
raping at least seven young women in China, a university
professor who sexually abused his student for two years,
the alleged trafficking of a rural woman suffering from
mental illness, and cases of sexual assault of young girls.
Such posts often faced official censorship.
■ Women in mainland China and Hong Kong faced dis-
crimination and harassment in the workplace. One
report revealed that one-third of women in Hong Kong
experienced workplace sexual harassment in the last
three years, while other reports showed widespread dis-
criminatory hiring practices based on female applicants’
fertility and family status. Some blame the CCP’s recent
pro-natal policies and rhetoric for employers’ reluctance
to hire married women of child-bearing age.
■ The Commission continued to monitor cases of offi-
cial harassment and arbitrary detention of women’s
rights activists, including He Fangmei, Sophia Huang
Xueqin, Zhang Zhan, and Li Qiaochu.
Population Control
■ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or “Party”) and
PRC government continued to implement population
planning policies that violate international standards
by seeking to control family size, including the applica-
tion of the three-child policy, which permits and seeks
to incentivize families to have up to but no more than
three children.
■ The National Bureau of Statistics of China’s 2024 data
revealed that, while the total number of births in China
increased for the first time in eight years, likely due to
the auspicious “Year of the Dragon,” the overall popu-
lation declined for the third consecutive year. Marriage
rates also fell to the lowest rate since public records
began in 1986.
■ PRC central authorities announced a variety of pro-na-
tal initiatives this year, including a survey to identify
family and childbearing attitudes, increased support
for infrastructure related to childrearing, and a pro-
posed national childcare subsidy. Local authorities also
attempted to boost birth rates through financial incen-
tives, pro-natal messaging, and calling young women to
ask about their family planning and menstrual cycles.
■ The Commission observed reports of the discrimina-
tory effects of centrally led family planning policies,
including the likely continuation of birth suppression of
Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
■ The legacy of the one-child policy (1980 to 2015) contin-
ues to have an impact on Chinese society, including the
continued sex ratio imbalance and increased socio-eco-
nomic precarity for China’s elderly population.
■ In September 2024, the PRC announced the end of
international adoptions originating in China, to which
the one-child policy era’s social engineering abuses
had often been linked. The sudden decision included
the halting of hundreds of cases of families who had
already been matched and had communicated with a
child and spurred particular concern for the thousands
of children remaining in Chinese orphanages, often
with disabilities.
2 0 2 5 A N N U A L R E P O R T— E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 15
K E Y F I N D I N G S
Human Trafficking
■ The government of Brazil accused China’s BYD
Company Ltd. of employing at least 163 workers in
“slave-like conditions” at a construction site in Bahia.
The Brazilian government said that the workers were
“victims of international trafficking for the purpose
of labor exploitation.” Brazilian authorities identified
forced labor indicators including the withholding of the
workers’ passports and salaries.
■ The Commission continued to observe reports of forced
labor linked to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). In December 2024, Adrian Zenz and
I-Lin Lin of the Victims of Communism Memorial
Foundation asserted that the PRC government’s height-
ened agricultural production policies have resulted in
coercive forms of work that “constitute state-imposed
forced labor as defined by the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and operationalized in its updated
handbook on the measurement of forced labor.”
■ In February 2025, the Environmental Justice Foundation
(EJF) documented the presence of North Korean workers
on a fleet of Chinese tuna fishing vessels in the Indian
Ocean between March 2019 and June 2024. At least
five vessels showed indicators of forced labor, including
deception related to wages, withholding of documents,
physical and verbal abuse, and excessive overtime.
Worker Rights
■ Documented worker strikes and protests in China
decreased overall from 2023 to 2024; however, strikes
in the manufacturing sector increased. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has attempted to resolve wage
arrears, in part due to a desire to “maintain social har-
mony and stability.” Wage arrears were the cause of the
majority of worker strikes and protests in 2024.
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong
authorities continued to suppress labor rights activ-
ists. In Hong Kong, Carol Ng Man-yee and Winnie
Yu Wai-ming were sentenced to prison for “conspiracy
to commit subversion” under Hong Kong’s National
Security Law in November 2024. Mainland Chinese
labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing was released from
prison in March 2025, but human rights experts assert
that he may continue to face unlawful restrictions and
is at risk of re-detention. Similarly, in August 2024,
Chinese labor activist and women’s rights advocate Li
Qiaochu was released after serving a three-year, eight-
month prison sentence, and remains subject to two
years’ deprivation of political rights.
■ Due to fears of instability and social unrest, PRC offi-
cials have sought to provide more protection for delivery
workers, who have faced increasing pressure in the
expanding gig economy. Observers are skeptical that
these measures will directly benefit delivery workers.
■ Chinese workers continued to face poor working condi-
tions and were subject to excessive overtime practices.
Workers in Yunnan province’s coffee farms, who supply
coffee to Starbucks and Nestlé, as well as workers at
Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Ltd. (CATL),
faced excessive overtime practices.
■ The Commission continued to document cases of job
discrimination in China. Local procurators found that
women who applied to positions at over a dozen com-
panies in Nantong municipality, Jiangsu province, were
illegally administered pregnancy tests during pre-em-
ployment physicals. Concerns over age bias were raised
by representatives at the annual meetings of the National
People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference in March (Two Sessions), with
some calling for age limits to be formally eliminated in
the hiring process.
The Environment
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
Chinese Communist Party and government contin-
ued to state their intention to prioritize environmental
protection.
■ China continued to contribute to domestic and
cross-border pollution, which experts suggested may
contribute to “a vicious cycle of poverty and health
hazards.” Authors of a February 2025 study revealed
“the existence of unidentified exposure sources” of
lithium in Beijing municipality, resulting in higher
lithium levels in maternal and umbilical cord blood
samples of pregnant women in the city.
■ While food and water security reportedly remain a top
priority for the Party and government, PRC citizens
continued to face difficulty accessing these resources.
Local surface water monitoring stations located along
the Leishui River in Hunan province detected “abnormal
concentrations of thallium” in March 2025. In April 2025,
K E Y F I N D I N G S
Human Trafficking
■ The government of Brazil accused China’s BYD
Company Ltd. of employing at least 163 workers in
“slave-like conditions” at a construction site in Bahia.
The Brazilian government said that the workers were
“victims of international trafficking for the purpose
of labor exploitation.” Brazilian authorities identified
forced labor indicators including the withholding of the
workers’ passports and salaries.
■ The Commission continued to observe reports of forced
labor linked to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). In December 2024, Adrian Zenz and
I-Lin Lin of the Victims of Communism Memorial
Foundation asserted that the PRC government’s height-
ened agricultural production policies have resulted in
coercive forms of work that “constitute state-imposed
forced labor as defined by the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and operationalized in its updated
handbook on the measurement of forced labor.”
■ In February 2025, the Environmental Justice Foundation
(EJF) documented the presence of North Korean workers
on a fleet of Chinese tuna fishing vessels in the Indian
Ocean between March 2019 and June 2024. At least
five vessels showed indicators of forced labor, including
deception related to wages, withholding of documents,
physical and verbal abuse, and excessive overtime.
Worker Rights
■ Documented worker strikes and protests in China
decreased overall from 2023 to 2024; however, strikes
in the manufacturing sector increased. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has attempted to resolve wage
arrears, in part due to a desire to “maintain social har-
mony and stability.” Wage arrears were the cause of the
majority of worker strikes and protests in 2024.
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong
authorities continued to suppress labor rights activ-
ists. In Hong Kong, Carol Ng Man-yee and Winnie
Yu Wai-ming were sentenced to prison for “conspiracy
to commit subversion” under Hong Kong’s National
Security Law in November 2024. Mainland Chinese
labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing was released from
prison in March 2025, but human rights experts assert
that he may continue to face unlawful restrictions and
is at risk of re-detention. Similarly, in August 2024,
Chinese labor activist and women’s rights advocate Li
Qiaochu was released after serving a three-year, eight-
month prison sentence, and remains subject to two
years’ deprivation of political rights.
■ Due to fears of instability and social unrest, PRC offi-
cials have sought to provide more protection for delivery
workers, who have faced increasing pressure in the
expanding gig economy. Observers are skeptical that
these measures will directly benefit delivery workers.
■ Chinese workers continued to face poor working condi-
tions and were subject to excessive overtime practices.
Workers in Yunnan province’s coffee farms, who supply
coffee to Starbucks and Nestlé, as well as workers at
Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Ltd. (CATL),
faced excessive overtime practices.
■ The Commission continued to document cases of job
discrimination in China. Local procurators found that
women who applied to positions at over a dozen com-
panies in Nantong municipality, Jiangsu province, were
illegally administered pregnancy tests during pre-em-
ployment physicals. Concerns over age bias were raised
by representatives at the annual meetings of the National
People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference in March (Two Sessions), with
some calling for age limits to be formally eliminated in
the hiring process.
The Environment
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
Chinese Communist Party and government contin-
ued to state their intention to prioritize environmental
protection.
■ China continued to contribute to domestic and
cross-border pollution, which experts suggested may
contribute to “a vicious cycle of poverty and health
hazards.” Authors of a February 2025 study revealed
“the existence of unidentified exposure sources” of
lithium in Beijing municipality, resulting in higher
lithium levels in maternal and umbilical cord blood
samples of pregnant women in the city.
■ While food and water security reportedly remain a top
priority for the Party and government, PRC citizens
continued to face difficulty accessing these resources.
Local surface water monitoring stations located along
the Leishui River in Hunan province detected “abnormal
concentrations of thallium” in March 2025. In April 2025,
16 C O N G R E S S I O N A L- E X E C U T I V E C O M M I S S I O N O N C H I N A
K E Y F I N D I N G S
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region experienced
a severe drought, causing direct economic losses. More
than 16,000 hectares of crops were severely damaged and
83,000 people faced a shortage of drinking water.
■ Dams built by the PRC government, both in China
and abroad, continued to contribute to environmental
damage. The PRC government’s building of dams in
Tibet and along the Mekong River contributed to rapidly
changing water levels and destruction of agriculture.
A dam built in northwest China may have contributed
to forced relocations and forced labor programs in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
■ The Commission observed reports of environmen-
tal degradation tied to PRC-affiliated mines globally,
including in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Indonesia, Laos, Peru, Tajikistan, and Zambia.
■ PRC authorities sentenced 29-year-old Tibetan Tsongon
Tsering to eight months in prison for “disrupting social
order.” Tsongon Tsering had posted a video online
denouncing local officials for failing to adequately
address the environmental damage to the Tsaruma
River caused by illegal mining.
Business and Human Rights
■ Companies that do business in, source from, or work
with companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) are at risk of complicity in human rights
abuses committed by the Chinese Communist Party
and government. Reports of corporate involvement in
mass atrocities in the XUAR implicate the agricultural,
apparel, automotive, critical minerals, pharmaceutical,
shipbuilding, and tourism industries.
■ The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public
Law No. 117-78) Entity List consists of nearly 150 PRC-
based companies found to be complicit in rights abuses
in the XUAR. XUAR Communist Party Secretary Ma
Xingrui claimed in March 2025 that U.S. sanctions on
entities over forced labor had “become one of the biggest
challenges in the region’s development.” According to
Radio Free Asia, this was the first time such an admission
had been made by a representative of the Chinese govern-
ment, “proving that international sanctions do have bite.”
■ Reports from this past year link U.S. and Chinese com-
panies, including Apple, Google, Meta, and DeepSeek,
among others, in the Chinese government’s data collec-
tion, surveillance, and censorship efforts.
■ During the 2025 reporting year, the Commission
observed some U.S. companies downsizing, withdraw-
ing, or closing operations in China in part to address
U.S.-China geopolitical tensions and legal risks of
non-compliance with PRC laws.
■ Companies that operate in Hong Kong may find them-
selves implicated or at risk of complicity in sanctions
evasion. Information and communications technology
(ICT) companies may encounter difficulty navigating
Hong Kong’s regulatory changes and threats to privacy
and freedom of expression.
Technology and Human Rights
■ The PRC government expanded digital repression on
a global scale by exporting censorship technologies to
authoritarian governments, undermining human rights
by enabling these governments to silence dissent.
■ China’s expansion of satellite communications infra-
structure also raised concerns about the global spread
of digital authoritarianism, as its centralized satellite
internet model could enable other governments to adopt
PRC-style censorship, surveillance, and information
control and at the same time deepen PRC influence over
global digital governance.
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released a
report that analyzed internal Chinese documents about
the Safe Silk Road (SSR) platform, which collects infor-
mation from companies operating in the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) and expands the PRC government’s
surveillance and data collection practices.
■ The PRC government embedded the “core values of
Socialism” alongside “society’s morals and ethics” into
its development of artificial intelligence (AI) by man-
dating that a type of machine learning systems, known
as large language models (LLMs), align with the poli-
cies, propaganda, and principal tenets of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and by enforcing censorship
using data evaluation standards.
■ The PRC’s advancements in quantum computing and AI
surveillance could pose significant threats to human rights
by enabling mass censorship, undermining privacy, and
amplifying CCP narratives on human rights, ultimately
expanding the government’s ability to monitor, manipu-
late, and suppress dissent.
K E Y F I N D I N G S
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region experienced
a severe drought, causing direct economic losses. More
than 16,000 hectares of crops were severely damaged and
83,000 people faced a shortage of drinking water.
■ Dams built by the PRC government, both in China
and abroad, continued to contribute to environmental
damage. The PRC government’s building of dams in
Tibet and along the Mekong River contributed to rapidly
changing water levels and destruction of agriculture.
A dam built in northwest China may have contributed
to forced relocations and forced labor programs in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
■ The Commission observed reports of environmen-
tal degradation tied to PRC-affiliated mines globally,
including in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Indonesia, Laos, Peru, Tajikistan, and Zambia.
■ PRC authorities sentenced 29-year-old Tibetan Tsongon
Tsering to eight months in prison for “disrupting social
order.” Tsongon Tsering had posted a video online
denouncing local officials for failing to adequately
address the environmental damage to the Tsaruma
River caused by illegal mining.
Business and Human Rights
■ Companies that do business in, source from, or work
with companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) are at risk of complicity in human rights
abuses committed by the Chinese Communist Party
and government. Reports of corporate involvement in
mass atrocities in the XUAR implicate the agricultural,
apparel, automotive, critical minerals, pharmaceutical,
shipbuilding, and tourism industries.
■ The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public
Law No. 117-78) Entity List consists of nearly 150 PRC-
based companies found to be complicit in rights abuses
in the XUAR. XUAR Communist Party Secretary Ma
Xingrui claimed in March 2025 that U.S. sanctions on
entities over forced labor had “become one of the biggest
challenges in the region’s development.” According to
Radio Free Asia, this was the first time such an admission
had been made by a representative of the Chinese govern-
ment, “proving that international sanctions do have bite.”
■ Reports from this past year link U.S. and Chinese com-
panies, including Apple, Google, Meta, and DeepSeek,
among others, in the Chinese government’s data collec-
tion, surveillance, and censorship efforts.
■ During the 2025 reporting year, the Commission
observed some U.S. companies downsizing, withdraw-
ing, or closing operations in China in part to address
U.S.-China geopolitical tensions and legal risks of
non-compliance with PRC laws.
■ Companies that operate in Hong Kong may find them-
selves implicated or at risk of complicity in sanctions
evasion. Information and communications technology
(ICT) companies may encounter difficulty navigating
Hong Kong’s regulatory changes and threats to privacy
and freedom of expression.
Technology and Human Rights
■ The PRC government expanded digital repression on
a global scale by exporting censorship technologies to
authoritarian governments, undermining human rights
by enabling these governments to silence dissent.
■ China’s expansion of satellite communications infra-
structure also raised concerns about the global spread
of digital authoritarianism, as its centralized satellite
internet model could enable other governments to adopt
PRC-style censorship, surveillance, and information
control and at the same time deepen PRC influence over
global digital governance.
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released a
report that analyzed internal Chinese documents about
the Safe Silk Road (SSR) platform, which collects infor-
mation from companies operating in the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) and expands the PRC government’s
surveillance and data collection practices.
■ The PRC government embedded the “core values of
Socialism” alongside “society’s morals and ethics” into
its development of artificial intelligence (AI) by man-
dating that a type of machine learning systems, known
as large language models (LLMs), align with the poli-
cies, propaganda, and principal tenets of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and by enforcing censorship
using data evaluation standards.
■ The PRC’s advancements in quantum computing and AI
surveillance could pose significant threats to human rights
by enabling mass censorship, undermining privacy, and
amplifying CCP narratives on human rights, ultimately
expanding the government’s ability to monitor, manipu-
late, and suppress dissent.
2 0 2 5 A N N U A L R E P O R T— E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 17
K E Y F I N D I N G S
■ The operations of DeepSeek ref lected how PRC
authorities can use a Chinese AI startup to insert cen-
sorship, propaganda, and surveillance into emergent
AI technology.
Tibet
■ The Commission did not observe any interest from
People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming
formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama or his represen-
tatives. The last round of negotiations was held in January
2010. The Dalai Lama announced that a future reincarna-
tion of the Dalai Lama would be born “in the free world.”
■ The PRC continued to restrict and seek to control the
religious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom
practice Tibetan Buddhism, unduly limiting Tibetans’
freedom of religion and belief. The PRC continued to
assert control over the process of selection and rec-
ognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers,
including the Dalai Lama. The National Religious
Affairs Administration revised the Measures on the
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Temples, increasing
requirements on monasteries and nunneries to adhere to
Chinese Communist Party political doctrine and plac-
ing new bureaucratic demands on monastic leadership.
■ PRC authorities continued a program of mass expulsions
and demolitions, begun in 2016, at Larung Gar Buddhist
Academy, a major Tibetan Buddhist educational and
training center. In November and December 2024, sev-
eral hundred officials were stationed at the complex,
and authorities pressured monastic residents to leave,
ultimately expelling around 1,000 monks and nuns.
■ The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan
self-immolations occurring during the 2025 reporting
year, the third year since 2021 in which no self-immola-
tions were reported to have occurred. The Commission
has observed reports of 154 self-immolations since
2009 that were due to political or religious issues in
Tibetan areas.
■ PRC officials took steps this past year to further restrict
the space for independent Tibetan education, ordering
the temporary closure of at least one major non-state
Tibetan school and forcing hundreds of young Tibetan
novice monks to leave monastery-affiliated schools and
instead enroll at state-run residential schools.
■ In contravention of international human rights stan-
dards, PRC officials punished residents of Tibetan
areas for the exercise of their protected rights, includ-
ing expression of religious belief, protest against or
criticism of Party or government policy, and free
speech and assembly. Notable cases this past year
included those of Jampa Choephel, a monk sentenced
to one year and six months in prison for sharing a
speech by the Dalai Lama on social media; Sherab (or
Jamyang Legshe) and Gonpo Tsering, senior monks
sentenced to four and three years, respectively, for pro-
testing against construction of a hydroelectric dam;
and Gonpo Namgyal, a language rights advocate who
died due to torture in custody.
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum pub-
lished research by scholar Rian Thum showing that PRC
officials had perpetrated and continued to perpetrate
mass atrocity crimes against Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). Thum determined that all of the official pol-
icies in the XUAR that led to the findings of crimes
against humanity and genocide have continued.
■ Reports indicated that authorities in the XUAR had
recently expanded a system of forced labor that involved
Turkic and Muslim individuals, often transferring them
from traditional occupations in rural areas into indus-
trial work. In conjunction with forced labor programs
targeting rural Uyghurs, authorities have confiscated
land held by Uyghur farmers and transferred their land
use rights to state-run cooperatives and developers.
■ As in previous reporting years, XUAR authorities placed
restrictions on Muslims’ observance of Ramadan.
According to videos posted on Chinese social media
platforms, authorities forced residents of various loca-
tions in Aksu and Hotan prefectures to engage in forced
labor during the Ramadan period in March 2025 in
order to prevent them from fasting. In addition, author-
ities required residents of several towns in Peyziwat
(Jiashi) county, Kashgar prefecture, to film themselves
eating lunch during the Ramadan period in order to
prove that they were not fasting.
■ On February 27, 2025, Thai officials deported 40 Uyghur
asylum seekers to China, in spite of widespread interna-
tional concern over their safety and evidence that PRC
K E Y F I N D I N G S
■ The operations of DeepSeek ref lected how PRC
authorities can use a Chinese AI startup to insert cen-
sorship, propaganda, and surveillance into emergent
AI technology.
Tibet
■ The Commission did not observe any interest from
People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming
formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama or his represen-
tatives. The last round of negotiations was held in January
2010. The Dalai Lama announced that a future reincarna-
tion of the Dalai Lama would be born “in the free world.”
■ The PRC continued to restrict and seek to control the
religious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom
practice Tibetan Buddhism, unduly limiting Tibetans’
freedom of religion and belief. The PRC continued to
assert control over the process of selection and rec-
ognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers,
including the Dalai Lama. The National Religious
Affairs Administration revised the Measures on the
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Temples, increasing
requirements on monasteries and nunneries to adhere to
Chinese Communist Party political doctrine and plac-
ing new bureaucratic demands on monastic leadership.
■ PRC authorities continued a program of mass expulsions
and demolitions, begun in 2016, at Larung Gar Buddhist
Academy, a major Tibetan Buddhist educational and
training center. In November and December 2024, sev-
eral hundred officials were stationed at the complex,
and authorities pressured monastic residents to leave,
ultimately expelling around 1,000 monks and nuns.
■ The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan
self-immolations occurring during the 2025 reporting
year, the third year since 2021 in which no self-immola-
tions were reported to have occurred. The Commission
has observed reports of 154 self-immolations since
2009 that were due to political or religious issues in
Tibetan areas.
■ PRC officials took steps this past year to further restrict
the space for independent Tibetan education, ordering
the temporary closure of at least one major non-state
Tibetan school and forcing hundreds of young Tibetan
novice monks to leave monastery-affiliated schools and
instead enroll at state-run residential schools.
■ In contravention of international human rights stan-
dards, PRC officials punished residents of Tibetan
areas for the exercise of their protected rights, includ-
ing expression of religious belief, protest against or
criticism of Party or government policy, and free
speech and assembly. Notable cases this past year
included those of Jampa Choephel, a monk sentenced
to one year and six months in prison for sharing a
speech by the Dalai Lama on social media; Sherab (or
Jamyang Legshe) and Gonpo Tsering, senior monks
sentenced to four and three years, respectively, for pro-
testing against construction of a hydroelectric dam;
and Gonpo Namgyal, a language rights advocate who
died due to torture in custody.
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
■ During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum pub-
lished research by scholar Rian Thum showing that PRC
officials had perpetrated and continued to perpetrate
mass atrocity crimes against Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). Thum determined that all of the official pol-
icies in the XUAR that led to the findings of crimes
against humanity and genocide have continued.
■ Reports indicated that authorities in the XUAR had
recently expanded a system of forced labor that involved
Turkic and Muslim individuals, often transferring them
from traditional occupations in rural areas into indus-
trial work. In conjunction with forced labor programs
targeting rural Uyghurs, authorities have confiscated
land held by Uyghur farmers and transferred their land
use rights to state-run cooperatives and developers.
■ As in previous reporting years, XUAR authorities placed
restrictions on Muslims’ observance of Ramadan.
According to videos posted on Chinese social media
platforms, authorities forced residents of various loca-
tions in Aksu and Hotan prefectures to engage in forced
labor during the Ramadan period in March 2025 in
order to prevent them from fasting. In addition, author-
ities required residents of several towns in Peyziwat
(Jiashi) county, Kashgar prefecture, to film themselves
eating lunch during the Ramadan period in order to
prove that they were not fasting.
■ On February 27, 2025, Thai officials deported 40 Uyghur
asylum seekers to China, in spite of widespread interna-
tional concern over their safety and evidence that PRC
18 C O N G R E S S I O N A L- E X E C U T I V E C O M M I S S I O N O N C H I N A
K E Y F I N D I N G S
authorities had imprisoned or tortured 20 Uyghurs who
were similarly deported from Cambodia to China in
2009. The men were among 500 Uyghurs who fled the
XUAR to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries
around a decade ago in hopes of reaching Türkiye. In
November 2024, Radio Free Asia reported that 16 of the
Uyghurs deported from Cambodia in 2009 were sen-
tenced to lengthy prison terms, and two of the deportees
died in prison.
■ In February 2024, Chinese officials sent 22-year-old
Abdureqip Rahman, an ethnic Uyghur, to Kucha (Kuche)
county, Aksu prefecture, XUAR, from Cambodia, where
he had fled in hopes of ultimately seeking asylum in the
United States. In spite of U.N. officials’ attempts to assist
him, in January 2024, Abdureqip Rahman was first held
in custody by Cambodian authorities and then transferred
to the custody of PRC authorities in Cambodia, before
being sent to Kucha on February 1. Abdureqip Rahman’s
whereabouts remained unknown as of December 2024.
■ Authorities in the XUAR used surveillance technology
and other methods to maintain control over Turkic and
Muslim residents. Methods used included an online
security operation in the summer of 2024; require-
ments in Kashgar and Hotan prefectures for Uyghurs
to promptly report the arrival of guests to their home to
the police; a winter security campaign in the runup to
the Spring Festival in early 2025; and the re-detention
of Uyghurs who had previously been detained, includ-
ing businessmen, philanthropists, and people who had
traveled abroad.
Hong Kong and Macau
■ Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, Hong Kong
authorities have used national security laws to suppress
and prevent all forms of political dissent. In 2024, 47
pro-democracy activists were convicted of subversion
for organizing an unofficial primary election. A law
passed in March 2024, the Safeguarding National Security
Ordinance, introduced harsher penalties for offenses such
as sedition and expanded the scope of punishable activ-
ities. By early 2025, hundreds had been arrested under
national security charges, with many serving prison sen-
tences. High-profile cases included the ongoing trial of
publisher Jimmy Lai, charged with collusion with foreign
forces, and the sentencing of former Stand News editors
for publishing content critical of the government.
■ More civil society organizations disbanded amid legal
and political pressure. The Democratic Party, once
Hong Kong’s largest opposition party, began dissolution
procedures after being approached by representatives
allegedly linked to the PRC government. A religious
group focusing on political engagement likewise
announced disbandment, saying that it could no longer
carry out its mission in the current social environment.
■ Government control over the social work profession
tightened, as the Legislative Council changed the law to
consolidate control by government appointees and to
disqualify social workers convicted of national security
offenses, some of whom were present at protests in 2019
monitoring police conduct.
■ Media restrictions continued, as journalists were
deterred from advocating for press freedom by the
threat of job termination. The Hong Kong government
also denied entry to foreign journalists, a practice that
could be regularized, as a law was passed that requires
airlines to submit preboarding passenger information
for screening purposes.
■ Hong Kong authorities increasingly restricted the flow of
information, including through censorship, with extra-
territorial effect, as shown in their attempt to block the
overseas publication Flow HK. A new law taking effect
in 2026 will give police broad powers over designated
private tech companies, raising concerns about privacy,
corporate autonomy, and the government’s access to
data, including data stored overseas.
■ The Macau government implemented extensive secu-
rity measures for a visit by PRC leader Xi Jinping in
December 2024, and reports of consequent disruptions
were censored. In addition to celebrating the 25th anni-
versary of Macau’s reunification with China, Xi also
inaugurated the new chief executive, Sam Hou Fai,
who was elected in an uncontested election and whose
judicial rulings in his former capacity as a top judge con-
tributed to the restrictions on fundamental freedoms.
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally
■ The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a mul-
tifaceted campaign of transnational repression against
members of the Chinese diaspora and critics of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to intimidate indi-
viduals and stifle dissent. The Commission observed
the use of tactics ranging from verbal and online
K E Y F I N D I N G S
authorities had imprisoned or tortured 20 Uyghurs who
were similarly deported from Cambodia to China in
2009. The men were among 500 Uyghurs who fled the
XUAR to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries
around a decade ago in hopes of reaching Türkiye. In
November 2024, Radio Free Asia reported that 16 of the
Uyghurs deported from Cambodia in 2009 were sen-
tenced to lengthy prison terms, and two of the deportees
died in prison.
■ In February 2024, Chinese officials sent 22-year-old
Abdureqip Rahman, an ethnic Uyghur, to Kucha (Kuche)
county, Aksu prefecture, XUAR, from Cambodia, where
he had fled in hopes of ultimately seeking asylum in the
United States. In spite of U.N. officials’ attempts to assist
him, in January 2024, Abdureqip Rahman was first held
in custody by Cambodian authorities and then transferred
to the custody of PRC authorities in Cambodia, before
being sent to Kucha on February 1. Abdureqip Rahman’s
whereabouts remained unknown as of December 2024.
■ Authorities in the XUAR used surveillance technology
and other methods to maintain control over Turkic and
Muslim residents. Methods used included an online
security operation in the summer of 2024; require-
ments in Kashgar and Hotan prefectures for Uyghurs
to promptly report the arrival of guests to their home to
the police; a winter security campaign in the runup to
the Spring Festival in early 2025; and the re-detention
of Uyghurs who had previously been detained, includ-
ing businessmen, philanthropists, and people who had
traveled abroad.
Hong Kong and Macau
■ Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, Hong Kong
authorities have used national security laws to suppress
and prevent all forms of political dissent. In 2024, 47
pro-democracy activists were convicted of subversion
for organizing an unofficial primary election. A law
passed in March 2024, the Safeguarding National Security
Ordinance, introduced harsher penalties for offenses such
as sedition and expanded the scope of punishable activ-
ities. By early 2025, hundreds had been arrested under
national security charges, with many serving prison sen-
tences. High-profile cases included the ongoing trial of
publisher Jimmy Lai, charged with collusion with foreign
forces, and the sentencing of former Stand News editors
for publishing content critical of the government.
■ More civil society organizations disbanded amid legal
and political pressure. The Democratic Party, once
Hong Kong’s largest opposition party, began dissolution
procedures after being approached by representatives
allegedly linked to the PRC government. A religious
group focusing on political engagement likewise
announced disbandment, saying that it could no longer
carry out its mission in the current social environment.
■ Government control over the social work profession
tightened, as the Legislative Council changed the law to
consolidate control by government appointees and to
disqualify social workers convicted of national security
offenses, some of whom were present at protests in 2019
monitoring police conduct.
■ Media restrictions continued, as journalists were
deterred from advocating for press freedom by the
threat of job termination. The Hong Kong government
also denied entry to foreign journalists, a practice that
could be regularized, as a law was passed that requires
airlines to submit preboarding passenger information
for screening purposes.
■ Hong Kong authorities increasingly restricted the flow of
information, including through censorship, with extra-
territorial effect, as shown in their attempt to block the
overseas publication Flow HK. A new law taking effect
in 2026 will give police broad powers over designated
private tech companies, raising concerns about privacy,
corporate autonomy, and the government’s access to
data, including data stored overseas.
■ The Macau government implemented extensive secu-
rity measures for a visit by PRC leader Xi Jinping in
December 2024, and reports of consequent disruptions
were censored. In addition to celebrating the 25th anni-
versary of Macau’s reunification with China, Xi also
inaugurated the new chief executive, Sam Hou Fai,
who was elected in an uncontested election and whose
judicial rulings in his former capacity as a top judge con-
tributed to the restrictions on fundamental freedoms.
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally
■ The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a mul-
tifaceted campaign of transnational repression against
members of the Chinese diaspora and critics of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to intimidate indi-
viduals and stifle dissent. The Commission observed
the use of tactics ranging from verbal and online
2 0 2 5 A N N U A L R E P O R T— E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 19
K E Y F I N D I N G S
harassment to lawfare, as well as physical intimidation
such as through overseas police “service stations.” Cases
of transnational repression this reporting year include
the issuance of HK$1,000,000 (US$129,000) bounties on
six overseas activists, passport cancellations for activists
with existing bounties, threats against Uyghurs attend-
ing an international conference, and harassment of
Falun Gong practitioners.
■ U.S. federal authorities prosecuted various perpetra-
tors of PRC-led transnational repression, including
two prominent leaders in U.S.-based pro-democracy
groups, as well as 12 Chinese nationals responsible
for a vast cyber-hacking campaign targeting critics
of the CCP. Outcomes varied, with three individuals
sentenced for acting as illegal agents of the PRC, while
a separate jury acquitted a man accused of spying on
Chinese diaspora members.
■ Despite advocacy groups and governments calling for
their protection, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur refu-
gees back to China in February 2025. The repatriated
men faced possible torture and long-term imprisonment
upon their return, according to U.N. officials. The Thai
government later claimed that their decision to deport
was due to potential retaliation from the PRC.
■ The PRC continued to exert malign influence abroad by
attempting to target foreign politicians and governments,
influence democratic processes abroad, and shape public
opinion about the CCP and PRC government. Notable
examples include the use of Hong Kong Economic and
Trade Offices to spread propaganda and promote CCP
policies, covertly gaining access to high-level figures in the
U.K. government, spreading disinformation among voters
about the U.S. elections, and influencing sub-national
politics in the U.S. through political aides.
■ PRC authorities continued to make efforts to subvert
processes and procedures within the U.N. system in
order to deny China’s human rights abuse, challenge
the universality of international human rights norms,
and obfuscate obligations made in international treaties
and covenants the PRC signed and ratified. Reports this
past year revealed “an extensive campaign to subvert the
work of the U.N. Human Rights Council” through groups
linked to the PRC government. Additionally, despite offi-
cial calls from governments in the Universal Periodic
Review process and elsewhere for the PRC to improve its
record on human rights, PRC diplomats rejected many
such recommendations, warning against “political forces
aiming at containing and vilifying China.”
K E Y F I N D I N G S
harassment to lawfare, as well as physical intimidation
such as through overseas police “service stations.” Cases
of transnational repression this reporting year include
the issuance of HK$1,000,000 (US$129,000) bounties on
six overseas activists, passport cancellations for activists
with existing bounties, threats against Uyghurs attend-
ing an international conference, and harassment of
Falun Gong practitioners.
■ U.S. federal authorities prosecuted various perpetra-
tors of PRC-led transnational repression, including
two prominent leaders in U.S.-based pro-democracy
groups, as well as 12 Chinese nationals responsible
for a vast cyber-hacking campaign targeting critics
of the CCP. Outcomes varied, with three individuals
sentenced for acting as illegal agents of the PRC, while
a separate jury acquitted a man accused of spying on
Chinese diaspora members.
■ Despite advocacy groups and governments calling for
their protection, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur refu-
gees back to China in February 2025. The repatriated
men faced possible torture and long-term imprisonment
upon their return, according to U.N. officials. The Thai
government later claimed that their decision to deport
was due to potential retaliation from the PRC.
■ The PRC continued to exert malign influence abroad by
attempting to target foreign politicians and governments,
influence democratic processes abroad, and shape public
opinion about the CCP and PRC government. Notable
examples include the use of Hong Kong Economic and
Trade Offices to spread propaganda and promote CCP
policies, covertly gaining access to high-level figures in the
U.K. government, spreading disinformation among voters
about the U.S. elections, and influencing sub-national
politics in the U.S. through political aides.
■ PRC authorities continued to make efforts to subvert
processes and procedures within the U.N. system in
order to deny China’s human rights abuse, challenge
the universality of international human rights norms,
and obfuscate obligations made in international treaties
and covenants the PRC signed and ratified. Reports this
past year revealed “an extensive campaign to subvert the
work of the U.N. Human Rights Council” through groups
linked to the PRC government. Additionally, despite offi-
cial calls from governments in the Universal Periodic
Review process and elsewhere for the PRC to improve its
record on human rights, PRC diplomats rejected many
such recommendations, warning against “political forces
aiming at containing and vilifying China.”
No comments:
Post a Comment