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The current version of the Cuban Constitution was adopted in 1976 (the first after the 1959 Revolution) and last amended in 2002 (effective the next year). It is a constitution drafted in the fashion of the old Soviet constitutions of the post-Stalin era.
But much has changed in the period since the last amendments. Most well known of these changes was the retirement and then death of Fidel Castro Ruz, replaced first by his brother Raul Castro, and thereafter by Miguel Diaz-Canel, who in 2018 assumed the duties of the presidency (though Raul Castro retained his position as first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party) (e.g.,
here). Less well known have been the great ideological changes that have been developing over the course of the last decade. These have been driven by the PCC and its efforts to reform the political and economic principle sunder which the state is organized and operated.
These changes were memorialized in three key documents, the products of the 6th and 7th PCC Congresses. The first was the
Lineamientos de la política económica y social del partido y la Revolución (Partido Comunista de Cuba April 18, 2011) (Guidelines for the political economy and social policy of the party and the Revolution) As approved by the VIth Party Congress, the
Lineamientos consist of 313 Sections. Each provide suggestions for action that affects nearly every aspect of Cuban economic life, with consequential effects on social, cultural, educational and other sectors of activity that had been under the direction of the State (See, e.g.,
here). The second and third were products of the 7th PCC Congress. The first, was the
Conceptualización del modelo económico y social Cubano de desarrollo socialista (e.g.,
Larry Catá Backer Comment to the Conceptualización;
Flora Sapio Comment to the Conceptualización). The
Conceptualización serves to answer the question: what sort of theoretical model will guide the development of Socialism in Cuba. The
Conceptualización is of particular interest for its potential divergence from the construction of Chinese post-Soviet Socialist Market theory within the context of socialist modernization (generally, "
Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and Economy," that appears in the Connecticut Journal of International Law 32(1):1-47 (2017)). The second was the
Plan nacional de desarrollo económico y social hasta 2030: Propuesta de vision de la nación, ejes y sectores estratégicos in which the PCC posited that development can be better managed by rejecting the central role of markets, and substituting state planning in its place, taking an all around view of economic planning as inextricably bound up in social, political and cultural progress of a nation (e.g.,
The Algorithms of Ideology in Economic Planning).
The three documents framed substantial changes to the conceptualization and approaches to the operationalization of the Cuban political economy, at leats at the margins. The principal changes included a limited opening for the holding of private property (and its sale), the development of a limited private commercial sector (heavily managed by the state), and the possibility of aggregations of labor through cooperatives for approved economic activity. These changes have been implemented through a series of law, regulations and decisions under the direction of the PCC. The changes were at the margins in the sense that they reaffirmed the central role of the vanguard party, of central planning (and the rejection of market mechanisms for economic planning), and of the state sector as the primary engine of economic activity at home and abroad.
Now the PCC has proposed, through its state organs, to change the Cuban constitution to reflect these changes as well. The new constitution was overseen by a Commission chaired by Raúl Castro Ruz, which also included Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, José Ramón Machado Ventura. Most Western coverage has treated these changes as if they mattered, in
the sense of producing innovation in the political economy of Cuba,
But of course, that is not the case. Constitutional changes, in this
case, merely memorialize the innovations that were first developed by
the Communist Party and then implemented through quite complex sets of
legislative initiatives.
Cuba’s
current Soviet-era constitution only recognizes state, cooperative,
farmer, personal and joint venture property. . . . Ruling Communist
Party newspaper Granma published a summary of the new constitution on
Saturday, saying a draft it had seen included 224 articles, up from 137
previously. Details were not immediately available, and Reuters did not
see the draft. But Granma said it enshrined recognition of both the free
market and private property in Cuba’s new Magna Carta. (
Communist-run Cuba to recognize private property in new constitution).
Western in some respects is curious. It tends to read the changes from its own perspective, and to project its own desires and hopes into its coverage. Thus, for example, the Western press has emphasized the enshrinement of the recognition of free markets. But that may be misleading to the extent it implies any embrace of Western style free markets. Indeed, Cuba has made it clear that it continues to reject notions of Western style markets in favor of managed private sector activity.
The announcement and detailed description of the provisos of the daft constitution follow (Español), along with the
current state constitution. A summary of the proposed changes are discussed in English by
Reuters, the
BBC,
CTV News, the
Independent, and
Havana Times. To understand the new Constitution one has to know the
Conceptualización.
