 |
| Pix Credit HERE |
Besiege Wèi to rescue Zhào (圍魏救趙, Wéi Wèi jiù Zhào) (三十六计) (Stefan H. Verstappen, Thirty Six Strategies (1999); Strategem No. 2, p. 11))
Duke Wen of Qinhad decided to invade Wei, so he called in the feudal nobles to lay out his plans for attack. However,he was interrupted by the laughter coming from one of the nobles named Kong Zichu. "May I ask the source of your amusement?"asked the duke."I was laughing at a man in my neighborhood and some gossip I heard," replied Kong. "It seems one day he was walking home with his wife when he spotted a lovely maiden gathering mulberry leaves by the roadside. No sooner did he escape his wife to go flirt with the girl when, upon turning around, he saw another man making love to his wife. I was just thinking about the story and I couldn't help but laugh. (Ibid., p. 14).)
Just yesterday I noted what appeared to be the emergence of a US two thrust strategy built on the emerging structures of liberal democratic variations of transnational governance (for a discussion of the trajectories of transnational polycentric governance see HERE). The focus of that emerging strategy was US responses to Chinese policy in Xinjiang and the instrument was the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), which developed a simultaneous projection of power leveraging "he distinction between the governance of the societal sphere (markets based and structured through private law arrangements), and the governmental or political sphere (the sphere of governmental authority grounded in political authority and expressed through traditional law and rulemaking by elected officials, courts and the administrative apparatus of states interlinked with their regional and international apparatus)." (see The US Two-Thrust Campaign; HERE).
The Two Thrust Strategy "first seeks to affect the societal sphere by putting pressure on market actors to evidence fidelity to national (and perhaps international) human rights values in accordance with a specific application, in their market transactions. In this case CECC chose a high value target-- the endorsement deals of NBA players that are deemed to enhance the ability of Chinese authorities to continue to augment their implementation of what to the US are objectionable policies in Xinjiang. . . Simultaneously CECC's leaders have introduced legislation, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) HR 1155 (117th Cong. 1st Sess. 2021), which" develops an authoritative national narrative based on US politicalprinciples (tied to international standards) and enhances a legal framework for decoupling trade disciplined by targeted sanctions (The US Two-Thrust Campaign).
On the anniversary of the Tiananmen events of 1989, the Two Thrust strategy is again applied to deepen the force the the strategy as it is projected internationally. That application was marked by two distinct actions--one focusing on narrative (and meaning) making; the other focused on targeted sanctions. The first took the form of the the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Statement by the Chairs on the 32nd Anniversary of the Violent Suppression of the Tiananmen Square Protests. It's most strategically relevant statement emphasized global unity.
 |
| Pix Credit HERE |
“Thirty-two years after the bloodshed, the Chinese government continues to brutally suppress the Chinese people’s ability to exercise their fundamental freedoms. The international community must come together to end the arbitrary detention and torture of prisoners of conscience, end the genocide in Xinjiang, end the repressive efforts to eviscerate Tibetan culture and the religious freedom of hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens, and end the systematic dismantling of freedoms guaranteed to the people of Hong Kong through international treaty. The spirit of Tiananmen is alive in China and everywhere freedom loving people gather. We remember this tragic anniversary and pledge to work for a future where the legacy of the Tiananmen generation can finally be realized in China and around the world.” (Statement by the Chairs on the 32nd Anniversary).
The second took the form of a revision of the sanctions regime against the People's Republic that effectively furthers the financial decoupling of the two imperial orders.But it did more than that, it aligned market consequences to deviations from normative expectations in ways that emphasized the incompatibility of the normative premises of US and Chinese socio-political orderings.
On June 3, 2021, the White House issued an Executive Order (EO) amending EO 13959 of November 12, 2020, which imposed restrictions on US persons transacting in publicly traded securities of companies identified by the US Department of Defense (DoD) as “Communist Chinese military companies” (CCMCs). The new EO, “Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China,” reformulates and recasts the prior EO, by providing important clarifications on the scope of the restrictions, revising the criteria for designating Chinese companies under the EO, and shifting responsibility for designations from the DoD to the US Treasury Department. (White House Issues Amended Executive Order).
Pix Credit HERE
The basis was national security and builds on the work of the last months of the Trump Administration. (for the discursive alignment of the two administrations on core conceptual frameworks, see HERE). The focus remains on:
the threat posed by the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its involvement in military, intelligence, and security research and development programs, and weapons and related equipment production under the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy. In addition, I find that the use of Chinese surveillance technology outside the PRC and the development or use of Chinese surveillance technology to facilitate repression or serious human rights abuse constitute unusual and extraordinary threats, which have their source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 to address those threats. (Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China ).
The Executive Order was particularly potent because of the scope of the list of enterprises now included in the EO Annex. The timing of the issuance of the EO was also meant to underline the normative claims to legitimacy of the US discourse grounded in liberal democratic values of political and civil rights and tied to access to markets.
By rewriting and expanding Trump's earlier order to include firms engaged in surveillance technology - which the Chinese has used against Muslim minorities like the Uyghurs and dissidents in Hong Kong - the Biden administration has strained already tense relations between Beijing and Washington. China reacted with fury. 'The U.S. government is stretching the concept of national security, abusing national power and using every possible means to suppress and restrict Chinese enterprises,' said Wang Wenbin, a spokesman at the Chinese foreign ministry, according to Reuters. 'We are firmly opposed to this,' Wang told reporters at a regular briefing on Friday, urging the United States to withdraw the list.
Pix Credit: Biden Strikes Another Blow at Beijing
Besiege Wèi to rescue Zhào (圍魏救趙, Wéi Wèi jiù Zhào). This was the core (perhaps inadvertently stumbled upon) strategy carried over from the Trump Administration. What makes it potentially far more effective is the mechanisms for its operationalization--the coordinated application of administrative (legal) and societal (market) measures that strikes at a discursive (at least externally) weak point. The focus on Tienanmen adds depth to the emphasis the day before on Xinjiang. Both are used to draw normative distinctions between systems--to emphasize their irreconcilable differences on normative grounds, and to pressure choices among stakeholders to choose sides. Where between the late 1990s and 2016 the effort had been to overcome difference on both sides, the move since 2016 appears now clear--to emphasize difference and to use that difference strategically to constitute and empower global spheres within which either of the two camps can serve as the center. The Americans are striking where China is most vulnerable (China's economic engagement in global production--the spouse who is left to be pursued by a lover after her husband leaves) at the moment when China sought to pursue a set of very pretty objects of desire (the maiden gathering mulberry leaves in the form of Chinese internationalism and discursive dominance). But in this strategy the incentives on both sides is a further decoupling and a greater precision in the definition of the borders between the two imperial systems--the borders of which will be marked by control of global chains of production rather than by the now antiquated markers of empire (race, territory, physical control, etc.). Understood in this way, and combined with the other activities of the US referenced before, Tienanmen, like Xinjian, each now serves as the great markers of the wall of separation that is more visibly being built. At the same time it suggests the resilience both of US normative counter strategies against the remarkable development of Chinese normative internationalism and its projection through the Belt & Road Initiative.
The full text of the CECC Chairs' Statement and of the Executive Order follow.
Statement by the Chairs on the 32nd Anniversary of the Violent Suppression of the Tiananmen Square Protests
(Washington)—Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and Representative James P. McGovern (D-MA), the Chair and Cochair, respectively, of the bipartisan and bicameral Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) issued the following statement commemorating the 32nd anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests and their violent suppression.
“Today we honor the courage and sacrifice of all those who gathered in the streets of Beijing and over 400 other cities during the Spring of 1989 calling for democracy, human rights, and an end to corruption. The violent suppression of these protests crushed peaceful demands for rights and reform and continues to complicate U.S.-China relations to this day.
“Because all discussion of the 1989 protests continue to be censored, and commemoration events prohibited—even now in formerly autonomous Hong Kong—we commit to commemorating this important event each year until everyone in China is able to do so freely and without restriction. We stand with the surviving family members of the victims, including the courageous Tiananmen Mothers, who are still seeking truth and justice despite great personal risk.
“Thirty-two years after the bloodshed, the Chinese government continues to brutally suppress the Chinese people’s ability to exercise their fundamental freedoms. The international community must come together to end the arbitrary detention and torture of prisoners of conscience, end the genocide in Xinjiang, end the repressive efforts to eviscerate Tibetan culture and the religious freedom of hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens, and end the systematic dismantling of freedoms guaranteed to the people of Hong Kong through international treaty.
“The spirit of Tiananmen is alive in China and everywhere freedom loving people gather. We remember this tragic anniversary and pledge to work for a future where the legacy of the Tiananmen generation can finally be realized in China and around the world.”
###
Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, find that additional steps are necessary to address the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 of November 12, 2020 (Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies), including the threat posed by the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its involvement in military, intelligence, and security research and development programs, and weapons and related equipment production under the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy. In addition, I find that the use of Chinese surveillance technology outside the PRC and the development or use of Chinese surveillance technology to facilitate repression or serious human rights abuse constitute unusual and extraordinary threats, which have their source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 to address those threats.
Accordingly, I hereby order as follows:
Section 1. Sections 1 through 5 of Executive Order 13959, as amended by Executive Order 13974 of January 13, 2021 (Amending Executive Order 13959 — Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies), are hereby replaced and superseded in their entirety to read as follows:
“Section 1. (a) The following activities by a United States person are prohibited: the purchase or sale of any publicly traded securities, or any publicly traded securities that are derivative of such securities or are designed to provide investment exposure to such securities, of any person listed in the Annex to this order or of any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, and, as the Secretary of the Treasury deems appropriate, the Secretary of Defense:
(i) to operate or have operated in the defense and related materiel sector or the surveillance technology sector of the economy of the PRC; or
(ii) to own or control, or to be owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, a person who operates or has operated in any sector described in subsection (a)(i) of this section, or a person who is listed in the Annex to this order or who has otherwise been determined to be subject to the prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section shall take effect:
(i) beginning at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on August 2, 2021, with respect to any person listed in the Annex to this order;
or
(ii) beginning at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on the date that is 60 days after the date of the determination in subsection (a) of this section with respect to any person not listed in the Annex to this order.
(c) The purchase or sale of publicly traded securities described in subsection (a) of this section made solely to effect the divestment, in whole or in part, of such securities by a United States person is permitted prior to:
(i) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 3, 2022, with respect to any person listed in the Annex to this order; or
(ii) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on the date that is 365 days after the date of the determination in subsection (a) of this section with respect to any person not listed in the Annex to this order.
(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of this order.Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(b) the term “person” means an individual or entity;
(c) the term “publicly traded securities” includes any “security,” as defined in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law 73–291 (as codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10)), denominated in any currency that trades on a securities exchange or through the method of trading that is commonly referred to as “over-the-counter,” in any jurisdiction; and
(d) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury. All executive departments and agencies (agencies) of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, and, as the Secretary of the Treasury deems appropriate, the Secretary of Defense, is hereby authorized to determine that circumstances no longer warrant the application of the prohibitions in section 1(a) of this order with respect to a person listed in the Annex to this order, and to take necessary action to give effect to that determination.”
Sec. 2. The Annex to Executive Order 13959 is replaced and superseded in its entirety by the Annex to this order.
Sec. 3. Section 6 of Executive Order 13959 is amended to replace “Sec. 6.” with “Sec. 7.”
Sec. 4. Executive Order 13974 is hereby revoked in its entirety. The Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of agencies shall take all necessary steps to rescind any orders or prohibitions issued prior to the date of this order implementing or enforcing Executive Order 13974 or the versions of sections 1 through 5 of Executive Order 13959 replaced and superseded by section 1 of this order.
Sec. 5. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 3, 2021.Annex
AERO ENGINE CORPORATION OF CHINA
AEROSPACE CH UAV CO., LTD
AEROSPACE COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS GROUP COMPANY LIMITED
AEROSUN CORPORATION
ANHUI GREATWALL MILITARY INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED
AVIATION INDUSTRY CORPORATION OF CHINA, LTD.
AVIC AVIATION HIGH-TECHNOLOGY COMPANY LIMITED
AVIC HEAVY MACHINERY COMPANY LIMITED
AVIC JONHON OPTRONIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
AVIC SHENYANG AIRCRAFT COMPANY LIMITED
AVIC XI’AN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY GROUP COMPANY LTD.
CHANGSHA JINGJIA MICROELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED
CHINA ACADEMY OF LAUNCH VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORATION LIMITED
CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
CHINA AEROSPACE TIMES ELECTRONICS CO., LTD
CHINA AVIONICS SYSTEMS COMPANY LIMITED
CHINA COMMUNICATIONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED
CHINA COMMUNICATIONS CONSTRUCTION GROUP (LIMITED)
CHINA ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
CHINA ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY GROUP CORPORATION
CHINA GENERAL NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION
CHINA MARINE INFORMATION ELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED
CHINA MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP CO., LTD.
CHINA MOBILE LIMITED
CHINA NATIONAL NUCLEAR CORPORATION
CHINA NATIONAL OFFSHORE OIL CORPORATION
CHINA NORTH INDUSTRIES GROUP CORPORATION LIMITED
CHINA NUCLEAR ENGINEERING CORPORATION LIMITED
CHINA RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION LIMITED
CHINA SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS CO., LTD.
CHINA SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED
CHINA SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY GROUP POWER COMPANY LIMITED
CHINA SOUTH INDUSTRIES GROUP CORPORATION
CHINA SPACESAT CO., LTD.
CHINA STATE SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION LIMITED
CHINA TELECOM CORPORATION LIMITED
CHINA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
CHINA UNICOM (HONG KONG) LIMITED
CHINA UNITED NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS GROUP CO., LTD.
CNOOC LIMITED
COSTAR GROUP CO., LTD.
CSSC OFFSHORE & MARINE ENGINEERING (GROUP) COMPANY LIMITED
FUJIAN TORCH ELECTRON TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
GUIZHOU SPACE APPLIANCE CO., LTD
HANGZHOU HIKVISION DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
HUAWEI INVESTMENT & HOLDING CO., LTD.
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
INNER MONGOLIA FIRST MACHINERY GROUP CO., LTD.
INSPUR GROUP CO., LTD.
JIANGXI HONGDU AVIATION INDUSTRY CO., LTD.
NANJING PANDA ELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED
NORTH NAVIGATION CONTROL TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
PANDA ELECTRONICS GROUP CO., LTD.
PROVEN GLORY CAPITAL LIMITED
PROVEN HONOUR CAPITAL LIMITED
SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
SHAANXI ZHONGTIAN ROCKET TECHNOLOGY COMPANY LIMITED
ZHONGHANG ELECTRONIC MEASURING INSTRUMENTS COMPANY LIMITED
No comments:
Post a Comment