Larry Catá Backer's comments on current issues in transnational law and policy. These essays focus on the constitution of regulatory communities (political, economic, and religious) as they manage their constituencies and the conflicts between them. The context is globalization. This is an academic field-free zone: expect to travel "without documents" through the sometimes strongly guarded boundaries of international relations, constitutional, international, comparative, and corporate law.
Saturday, July 10, 2021
Matthew Erie on "Archipelagos of Chinese Law" (European Chinese Law Research Hub)
The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub
(with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research
Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have
posted a new paper by Matthew Erie (Associate Professor, Member of the Law Faculty, and Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford), Archipelagos of Chinese Law.
Marianne von Bloomberg explains:
Last month, the government of Sri Lanka put an end to heated debates
over establishing the Colombo City Port Economic Zone and passed the
bill. Funded by a Chinese enterprise, the project comes with a new
arbitration center - a controversial move to oust the jurisdiction of
Sri Lankan courts, and yet another manifestation of a particular logic
of outbound Chinese capital which Matthew Erie conceptualizes as
'Chinese law and development'. Enjoy the read and look forward to hearing your comments, criticism and ideas.
I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE.
And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law
Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research
that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to
spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a
paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.
On May 20, 2021, the Sri Lankan government passed the controversial Colombo Port City Economic Zone Bill
(Port City Bill), creating the country’s first special economic zone
(SEZ) for services-oriented industries. Parliament’s passing of the bill
occurred days after the Supreme Court ruled that several provisions of
the Port City Bill were unconstitutional,
requiring amendments. The heart of the controversy was the creation of a
commission of unelected members who would have broad powers over the
SEZ, an innovation that contravened the authority of regulators and, as
it has been argued,
violated Sri Lankan sovereignty as enshrined in its constitution. More
specifically, the SEZ is funded and developed by a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company,
which invested $1.4 billion to construct the SEZ in exchange for a
99-year lease from the Sri Lankan government. As a result of this
controversy, the Port City Bill was amended such that five of the seven
commission members have to be Sri Lankan.
Unaddressed by the Supreme Court, however, was a seemingly more
innocuous but nonetheless potentially far-reaching problem: the bill’s
dispute resolution provisions. The Port City Bill proposed to establish
an International Commercial Dispute Resolution Centre (ICDRC) that uses
arbitration to settle disputes within the SEZ, effectively ousting the
jurisdiction of Sri Lankan courts. This ouster is contentious given that
the courts have, in the past, held that legislation cannot oust its jurisdiction. Still, the ICDRC survived judicial scrutiny and was passed into law.
The Port City Bill and the ICDRC, in particular, exemplify a particular logic of outbound Chinese capital, one that, in my recent article
based on three years of fieldwork and nearly 150 interviews, I
summarize as “Chinese law and development” (CLD). Whereas previous
capital-exporting countries, and in particular, the U.S., have sought to
reform the legal system of host states, often in line with their own
experience of law, Chinese parties are mostly not interested in engaging
in the legal reform of host states. Rather, they have shown a greater
interest in creating institutions of transnational law, including
international arbitration centers—both within the People’s Republic of
China and outside its territory—that can avoid Chinese companies from
having to litigate in host state courts.
Taking a step back, “law and development” most generically refers to
the relationship between law and economic development in what used to be
called the “Third World,” and is particularly understood as technical
legal development assistance as provided by donor states to host ones.
The career of David Trubek at the University of Wisconsin Law School is
most commonly associated with the U.S. experience of law and
development, one that has undergone a series of waves. Chinese law and
development (CLD) is different from Trubek’s view of the notion. For the
most part, the Chinese government does not send out legal technicians
to advise foreign states on how to design legal institutions or draft
legislation, efforts under-girded by assumptions about the capacity of
law to stimulate economic growth.
Instead of popular accounts that envision China as hegemonic, and
roughly analogous to previous economic superpowers, China is emerging
into the world economy during a period of widespread anxiety about
Chinese influence, anxiety that takes the form of investment screening,
trade tariffs, and immigration blockades. Further, China’s own
experience with legal reform shows how law offered one set of norms,
among others (e.g., administrative directives, dictates of the Chinese
Communist Party, political campaigns, etc.) that facilitated (and
sometimes impeded) economic experimentation. CLD thus addresses how the
Chinese government and Chinese enterprises protect their assets,
investments, and personnel in challenging legal and regulatory
environments. To do so, CLD unzips the toolkit of such Chinese parties
to demonstrate the plurality of means by which they secure their
commercial and also geo-economic interests.
The co-creation of what elsewhere
I have called “exceptional zones” such as SEZs with their own dispute
resolution mechanisms that feature rules different from those of the
host jurisdiction is one such method. In addition to Sri Lanka, there
are other extraterritorial examples, such as that of the China-Africa Joint Arbitration Centre.
These jurisdictional archipelagos foster transnational law by allowing
parties to opt out of the national law of host states and choose
alternative law, which theoretically could be Chinese law. Hence, issues
of governing law in contracts that are the basis of disputes, as well
as language of arbitration, nationality of arbitrators, and related
procedural issues, loom large as these new legal hubs start to accept
cases. While these archipelagos are not unique to Chinese outbound
capital, Chinese parties seem to be particularly focused on their
promotion. More broadly, CLD raises important questions concerning how
exceptional zones impact legal development and access to justice in
emerging economies.
Matthew Erie’s paper ‘Chinese Law and Development’ was published in the Harvard International Law Journal earlier this year and is available for free here.
Matthew S. Erie is an Associate Professor, Member of the Law
Faculty, and Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies at the University of Oxford. He is also the Principal
Investigator of the “China, Law and Development” project (grant agreement No 803763), based at the University of Oxford. You can follow him on Twitter @MatthewErie or reach out to him at matthew.erie(at)law.ox.ac.uk.
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