Larry Catá Backer's comments on current issues in transnational law and policy. These essays focus on the constitution of regulatory communities (political, economic, and religious) as they manage their constituencies and the conflicts between them. The context is globalization. This is an academic field-free zone: expect to travel "without documents" through the sometimes strongly guarded boundaries of international relations, constitutional, international, comparative, and corporate law.
Sunday, July 03, 2022
Bingwan Xiong and Mateja Durovic on "The Enforcement of Mandatory Rules against Illegal Contracts" (European Chinese Law Research Hub)
The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub
(with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research
Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have
posted a discussion of a marvelous new paper by Bingwan Xiong (Associate Professor at School of Law, Renmin University of China) andMateja Durovic (Reader in Contract and Commercial Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law, Kings) on The Enforcement of Mandatory Rules against Illegal Contracts.
In our paper, we look into the case of the regulation of the lottery
tickets sales on credit. As per Article 18 of China’s Lottery
Regulation, no lottery may sell lottery tickets on open account or
credit. Such a deed may result in imposed suspension, confiscation plus
fines, and punishment on the person in charge as per Article 39. Armed
with the new jurisprudence that not all kinds of illegality shall render
contracts void and null, Chinese civil courts tend to uphold the
validity of lottery sales on credit. Though this saves the innocent
party from the loss because of the invalidation of the contract, the
problem is, without the following actions of administrative organs,
justice stops at the decision in court and the mandatory rules are not
equipped with administrative enforcement power.
We find that the major obstacle is information asymmetry between
courts and regulatory agencies: not only would the contracting parties
not expose the illegal deal in fear of punishment or losing their
interest. Also, the courts fail to actively transmit such information to
the responsible departments, despite the Supreme People’s Court of
China formally encouraging local courts to issue judicial proposals to
regulatory agencies.
I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE.
And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law
Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research
that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to
spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a
paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.
Lottery
Kiosk at Xuzhou Station. Under Chinese law, lotteries are considered
gambling and thus illegal -with two major exceptions: the China Welfare
Lottery and the China Sports Lottery. Photo by MNXANL licensed under Creative CommonsAttribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.
In the past, Chinese courts tended to directly invalidate illegal
contracts, thus possibly tolerate opportunistic behaviour sometimes.
Article 52(5) of the 1999 Contract Law provides that a contract is void
if it violates a mandatory rule prescribed by law or administrative
regulation. Empirical research shows that by April 2014, in 355 of 453
cases concerning Article 52(5) of the Contract Law, the contract was
ruled void.[1]
This practice underwent a change with the compilation of the Civil
Code, where Chinese scholars sought to establish better coordination
between the nature of private law and its attached public or regulatory
facet. Building on a 2009 judicial interpretation that introduced a
classification of mandatory rules, Article 153 of the new Civil Code
stipulates a doctrine of defining mandatory rules with different levels
of restrictions, with the aim of relieving the state’s restraint on the
transition of economy. In result, a violation of mandatory rules may now
render the contract involved void ab initio, voidable or still valid, depending on the significance of illegality defined by the law.
This change of jurisprudence successfully reversed the courts’ strong
stance on the invalidation of contracts, giving them much more
discretion in deciding the nature of mandatory rules and the effect on
contracts. The reform also aligns the treatment of illegal contracts
with the general trend in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, we argue
that across jurisdictions, this doctrine is merely targeted at the
connotation of mandatory rules and the theoretical effects on contracts.
Scholars and judges fail to equally emphasise the enforcement of the
law against the contractors after upholding the validity of their
illegal contracts. In other words, they end the debate within the realm
of private law and simply assume that thereafter competent regulatory
agencies would duly resolve the harm of illegality.
In our paper, we look into the case of the regulation of the lottery
tickets sales on credit. As per Article 18 of China’s Lottery
Regulation, no lottery may sell lottery tickets on open account or
credit. Such a deed may result in imposed suspension, confiscation plus
fines, and punishment on the person in charge as per Article 39. Armed
with the new jurisprudence that not all kinds of illegality shall render
contracts void and null, Chinese civil courts tend to uphold the
validity of lottery sales on credit. Though this saves the innocent
party from the loss because of the invalidation of the contract, the
problem is, without the following actions of administrative organs,
justice stops at the decision in court and the mandatory rules are not
equipped with administrative enforcement power.
We find that the major obstacle is information asymmetry between
courts and regulatory agencies: not only would the contracting parties
not expose the illegal deal in fear of punishment or losing their
interest. Also, the courts fail to actively transmit such information to
the responsible departments, despite the Supreme People’s Court of
China formally encouraging local courts to issue judicial proposals to
regulatory agencies.
Empirical studies show that judges seldom issue judicial proposals
about their cases to regulatory agencies due to their heavy workload,
worries of engaging in improper judicial interference and a lack of
rewarding incentives. As it encourages contracts and prevents
opportunistic behaviour, we suggest to uphold the current jurisprudence
about illegality, and further propose to establish a better systematic
interplay among courts and regulatory agencies. This might be achieved
through institutional reforms and technological solutions that help
forward information of illegal transactions so it can serve the ultimate
objective of enforcing the law.
[1]
Ye Mingyi 叶名怡 (2015) Empirical Research of Invalidation of Illegal
Contracts in China (我国违法合同无效制度的实证研究), Science of Law (法律科学) 6, 120.
Bingwan Xiong is Associate Professor at School of Law, Renmin
University of China. He is also Senior Research Fellow at Renmin
University Center for Civil and Commercial Law. He obtained his PhD
degree from Renmin University and LLM degree Harvard University. Email: bxiong@ruc.edu.cn.
Mateja Durovic is a Reader in Contract and Commercial Law, having
joined The Dickson Poon School of Law in July 2017. Prior to joining
King’s, he was Assistant Professor (2015‐2017) at the
School of Law, City University of Hong Kong. He holds a PhD and LLM
degrees from the European University Institute; LLM degree from the
University of Cambridge; and an LLB degree from the University of
Belgrade. Email: mateja.durovic@kcl.ac.uk
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