US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is "Flying Down to Rio" to Dance the Carioca with an "An Americas First Foreign Policy" (With text of Secretary Rubio's Essay, State Dept. Press Briefing of Trip, and Brief Reflections)

 

Pix credit Flying Down to Rio (1933)

For many in Latin America, the United States occupies an interesting place.  Ir has been an inspiration as well as a morality tale; it has been an overbearing neighbor, a mortal enemy, as well as a sometimes much needed friend; it has been the alien in the transplantation of conflicts between the  cognitive cages of the European South (and its Spanish imperium) and the the North (and its first British overseas Empire (excluding Ireland)), as well as between Europeans and indigenous peoples in the Western Hemisphere in the post-imperial spaces that became much of the Americas. The relationship has been intimate and complicated--and emotional. It has also been strategic and volatile. a mixture of mutual disdain and admiration, one the perspective of which changes depending on race, class, ethnicity, education, and the pathways of cultural ties. But whatever the trajectories of drama, it is hard for either to escape the attention of the other for long--even after or perhaps because of long periods of inattention as other places and adventures diverted appeal and attention--on all sides. The United States was notorious was interventionism in the politics of Latin America and deep economic ties; Latin America, and especially its intellectuals and elites were equally notorious for the politics and policy of a cultivated anti-American intellectualism and efforts to sometimes (and to mixes results).  Perhaps the essence of the relationship was nicely summarized in a famous line from Brokeback Mountain: "I wish I knew how to quit you."

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And so things have gotten interesting enough again for the United States to turn its attention back to Latin America. To that end, Marco Rubio, the new Secretary of State for the Trump Administration 2nd Term, has chosen to make his first trip abroad to Latin America with a focus on Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic. 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio will travel to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic from February 1-6 to advance President Trump’s America First foreign policy. Secretary Rubio’s engagements with senior officials and business leaders will promote regional cooperation on our core, shared interests: stopping illegal and large-scale migration, fighting the scourge of transnational criminal organizations and drug traffickers, countering China, and deepening economic partnerships to enhance prosperity in our hemisphere. (Secretary Rubio’s Travel)

The trip is meant to underline the new template for relations--at least as it will be formulated on the side of the United States.  And in the process it better illuminates how the United States will continue to evolve its part of the emerging post-global imperial system alongside of and in competition with that of the Chinese post-global imperium (for related theoretical consideration, consider Pomper, 'The History and Theory of Empire, (2005) 44(4) History and Empire 1-27). These terms are not meant in the pejorative. It is true that earlier versions of imperium, ones closely aligned with the emergence of the characteristics of the modernist state--territory in which  a settled population can be managed by a government constituted to that ends and engaged in relations with other like political communities. In the post modern, the imperial project (however one wants to name it) references hierarchically rationalized relations among states organized in interlinked communities of various forms of dependence around a hub apex state. The ordering principle is not territory but pathways: supply chains, resource chains, migration pathways, communications, and the like. Control or management of these pathways  are the objects of these hierarchical relations, in which territory and traditional national characteristics (race, religion, ethnicity and the like) recede into the background.

In the run up to the trip, Secretary Rubio, quite rightly, sought to describe both the essence of the trip and the normative agendas that trip is meant to further--again at least from the U.S. side.  In the process, Secretary Rubio achieves two goals: (1) to begin to describe the America First policy in the form of effects and expectations from the US hub; and (2) to suggest to rival imperial centers (and especially the only equally potent apex power) those spaces in which US interest may trigger responses if threatened.  The essay, which was published in the Wall Street Journal ("An Americas First Foreign Policy" 30 January) along with the posting to the State Department Website of an "On-the-Record Briefing on Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s First Trip to the Western Hemisphere." Both of these follow below.  These recall the lyrics of the most famous tune from the 1933 "Flying Down to Rio"--and the Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers dance number to go along with it--perhaps a metaphor for the trip. My quite brief thoughts after the lyrics.

Say! Have you seen the Carioca? It's not a foxtrot or a polka,
It has a little bit of new rhythm, a blue rhythm that sighs.
It has a metre that is tricky, a bit of wicked, wackiwicky,
But when you dance it, with a new love,
There'll be true love in her eyes.

You'll dream of the new Carioca, it's theme is a kiss and a sigh
You'll dream of the new carioca, When music and lights are gone and we're saying "Goodbye".

Bridge:
Two heads together, they say, are better than one.
Two heads together, that's how the dance is begun;
Two arms around you and lips that sigh, "I am yours and your are mine."
While the Carioca carries you away.
Mine, while, we Carioca till the break of day, and you are mine.

Now that you've done the Carioca, You'll never care to do the polka.
And then you realize the blue hula and bamboola are through.
Tomorrow morning you'll discover, you're just a Carioca lover;
And when you dance it, with each new love,
There'll be true love just for you. Chorus
Carioca Vincent Youmans, Gus Kahn (written 1933), Enric Madriguera (#1 in 1934),
Harry Sosnik (#2 in 1934), Castillian Troubadors (#4 in 1934)

Flying Down to Rio, Carioca (Fred Astarire/Ginger Rogers dancing1933) 

1. The notion of a special relationship between the United States and Latin America--one which has undergone substantial definitional gyrations over the course of the last two centuries--appears to be back on the table. For the moment that interest is discursive, but the tropes in Mr Rubio's essay and in the "On-the-Record Briefing," has suggested its new contours. To some undefined extent, America First means the Americas are first in the range of interests of the U.S. metropolis. As Mr. Rubio put it in his essay, "this means paying closer attention to our own neighborhood—the Western Hemisphere" ("An Americas First Foreign Policy"). 

It’s no accident that my first trip abroad as secretary of state, to Central America on Friday, will keep me in the hemisphere. This is rare among secretaries of state over the past century. For many reasons, U.S. foreign policy has long focused on other regions while overlooking our own. As a result, we’ve let problems fester, missed opportunities and neglected partners. That ends now. ("An Americas First Foreign Policy").

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2. And that closer association with Latin American partners focuses on those actions and inaction that have created problems and dangers for the United States, problems which reflect challenges in the problematic States that require correction for win-win solutions.  Among the first of these issues and challenges is migration. And the way in which U.S. Latin-American relations will be structured will, at least for the present, be understood as a function of the challenge of migration. "President Trump’s foreign-policy agenda begins close to home. Among his top priorities is securing our borders and reversing the disastrous invasion abetted by the last administration. Diplomacy’s role in this effort is central." (Ibid.)

3. This ought not to come as a surprise. One has had  four years to prepare for this; unless of course one chose not to believe what was coming from either the oratory of Mr. Trump or the actions taken during Mr. Trump's first administration. More interesting, though, is the way that the challenge of migration serves to fix the template of relations  down the Latin American spoke from the U.S. hub. That template is based on cooperation grounded in mutual interest and deals. The essence of this system is a simple binary--cooperating states that adhere to their deals will be rewarded, others will be subject to nudging using the power of tariffs, sanctions, and diplomatic availability.

Some countries are cooperating with us enthusiastically—others, less so. The former will be rewarded. As for the latter, Mr. Trump has already shown that he is more than willing to use America’s considerable leverage to protect our interests. Just ask Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro. ("An Americas First Foreign Policy")

4. And the reward: prosperity and security under the guidance and leadership of the United States. 

We see a prosperous region rife with opportunities. We can strengthen trade ties, create partnerships to control migration, and enhance our hemisphere’s security.El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic—the countries I will visit on this trip—all stand to benefit tremendously from greater cooperation with the U.S. (Ibid.).

5. Security and prosperity, on one important level, is assessed against  the extent of Chinese involvement in local economies, government, politics, and social collectives. "These nations were neglected by past administrations that prioritized the global over the local and pursued policies that accelerated China’s economic development, often at our neighbors’ expense." (Ibid.). But that assessment is not merely negative, it offers a positive aspect as well--one grounded in the pivot back to the tighter alignment of Latin American economies within U.S. supply chains. Here the United States itself admits its own obligations downstream, a U.S. Latin American "Americas First" policy world only if the relationship is reciprocal with respect to economic and security activities. "We can reverse this. Covid exposed the fragility of America’s dependence on far-flung supply chains. Relocating our critical supply chains to the Western Hemisphere would clear a path for our neighbors’ economic growth and safeguard Americans’ own economic security."  (Ibid.).

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6. And this prosperity has substantial positive win-wins for both the U.S. and its Latin American partners.  For Latin America the focus of the "win" is in increasing jobs and accelerated growth rates; for the United States a reduction in migratory pressure from States  whose economies are growing. Of course is this an old song with a new melody. There were substantial echoes of this in portions of the Latin America policies of the Obama Administration (most recently) in which the focus was on prosperity rather than in the more brutal repatriation campaigns. The problems, from the Latin American perspectives remain the same--(1) quality of jobs; (2) the staying power of these policies (the perennial issue of U.S. fickleness and distraction); and (3) investment in capacity building, tech transfer and self-sufficiency. Beyond that, of course, are the old--ancient really--issues of Latin America regional integration, sovereign sensitivity, and the fractures within societies in Latin American states.  Moreover, migration has sometimes been said to have a net positive effect for home states especially with respect to (1) skills training in the host states; (2)  flows of money from migrants back to family in the host state (remittances); and (3) the development of pathways for developing economic supply chains grounded in migrant communities in the host state. More importantly, none of this addresses migrant issues within Latin America, which then spills over into migrant flows into the US. And so on. But solving migration is a hoped for result of the visit; the objective of the trip, though is far broader--to develop and apply a new template in the relationships of the U.S. with its partners.

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7. Yet there are points of substantial convergence of interests, including the interests of the big "elephant" in the room--Mexico--in central America and the specters of relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela but perhaps mostly Mexico, the dominant state in the region and the one with respect to which relations with the US. are most complicated and dynamic.  The critical convergence point are the great non-state actors that have substantially eroded the internal sovereignty of  some Latin American states in ways that might be thought to be more decisive than anything coming from the United States.  Here the convergence of interest also suggests an alignment of objectives.

"Drug cartels—now correctly categorized, thanks to the president, as foreign terrorist organizations—are taking over our communities, sowing violence and poisoning our families with fentanyl. Illegitimate regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are intentionally amplifying the chaos. All the while, the Chinese Communist Party uses diplomatic and economic leverage—such as at the Panama Canal—to oppose the U.S. and turn sovereign nations into vassal states." ("An Americas First Foreign Policy")

All of this, of course makes sense in the way it is articulated to the United States.  However what Latin American partners hear (given their own histories and cognitive cages) may not be what the U.S. thinks it is saying. Those cleavages may pose greater obstacles to U.S.-Latin American cooperation than anything the Chinese can try to do to upset or displace that relationship. Security based cooperation can be heard by US partners as a means of military extraterritorial interventionism that might be less palatable than the home grown erosion of effective state control over its own territory at the hands of cartels and other international criminal elements. Interventionism in Venezuela and Cuba may suggest a return to the more ancient forms of imperialism that Latin America also find unpalatable even if they have no love for the governments of those states. Perception and cognitive cages are potent obstacles to arriving at a common language from which the possibilities of the win-win might be realized. 

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8. On the other hand. Secretary Rubio has the glimmerings of a discursive trope that, if it handled well, might produce some positive effect: "Making America great again also means helping our neighbors achieve greatness. The threats Mr. Trump was elected to stop are threats to the nations of our hemisphere as well" ("An Americas First Foreign Policy"). This is the sort of shared values win-win that China has also sought to development through the discourse of the Belt & Road Initiative.  And in that sense, it indicates a convergence among apex powers in ordering their spheres of operation, while at the same time offering a high level of autonomy within frameworks that require cooperation but in ways that might also serve the interests of states along the spokes. 

This is an approach to foreign policy based on concrete shared interests, not vague platitudes or utopian ideologies. It is representative of the approach the State Department will be taking to all its international dealings. We will extend our hand to all nations of goodwill, in the confident expectation that they will recognize what we can do together. ("An Americas First Foreign Policy")

 9. All too soon to tell.  And yet it may be important to remember that this time there may be at least a small alignment between discursive tropes and action (however strongly one might disagree with the form of action chosen). Even as Secretary Rubio begins his voyage to Central American States, Mr. Trump "is set to impose tariffs on goods from Canada, Mexico and China on Saturday, placing pressure on three top U.S. trade partners while risking price increases for essential products like gasoline and groceries. The policy is expected to slap a 25% tariff on all products from Canada and Mexico, as well as a 10% tariff on goods from China. Hours before the tariffs were set to take effect, leaders in Canada and Mexico vowed to respond, indicating the possibility of a trade war." (Trump set to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China). This, too, appears to be the emerging modalities of post global imperial communication--indirect signalling and direct action that touches not on territorial sovereignty but on the markers of loyalty, solidarity and mutual obligations within production, political, social, and cultural chains. All of this might also clear the air discursively, and perhaps make more unavoidable the clarification of power relations among interlinked groups of actors arranged in all sorts of hierarchies--political, ideological, social, cultural--shaken and stirred both by history and the preferred perception of history.

But at least assuming the discourse is aligned with actions taken, suggests something less disagreeable than the unfortunate term "America First" suggests.  On the other hand, what clearly emerges in a system of rationalizing relationships based on rewards and punishments in which all of the instruments of inter-governmental relations may be strategically deployed. That this approach is not unique to the United States also suggests that the trajectories of moving further away from the old premises of universalizing convergence around multilateral rules based orders in which power flows up to inter-governmental institutions managed through a global techno-bureaucracy may now be far more difficult to resist. All States will be dancing the Carioca now.

Legal Dimensions of China's Presence in Latin America: Conference Agenda (10-12 February 2025, Barcelona)

 

 

I am delighted to pass along the Conference agenda for what I expect to be a quite exciting event:  Legal Dimensions of China's Presence in Latin America (more about the project HERE). It takes place on the campus of the faculty of Law at the University of Barcelona. Great thanks to an old friend and the Dean of the Law Faculty Andreu Olesti and Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado, Executive Director of the Andrés Bello Foundation, China Latin America Research Center (Bogotá, Columbia) and to the supporters of this event. Special shout out to the incredible organizers and project leads: Dr. Monika Prusinowska (UB) & Dr. Daniel Sprick (UoC)

The Conference Agenda (with authors and titles of presentations, along with the Participant bio pages follow below.

OEIGWG Updates: 10th session elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises

 

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My friend and colleague, the extraordinary Linda Wood has provided really quite useful resources for those of us who are interested in following the continuing work of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) which holds the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises  on which they have been working for the last decade.

This project is particularly important as parallel and quite different efforts to develop legal regimes for business compliance with expectations relating to human rights and sustainability have been ongoing in the European Union, the U.S. (sanctions based) and China (environmental and governance ESG regimes). The E.U. effort is the one most closely aligned this this effort but its current efforts at simplification of a complex system of layered compliance  based structures is undergoing a simplification that may substantially alter the application of those rules (discussed in President Ursula von der Leyen's Remarks at Davos HERE, including links to the relevant EU documents). 

And, as I have suggested before, the project encapsulates the frustration of some frm the stakeholder community about what for them was a near fatal set of flaws in the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, accompanied by a strategic decision to support them as a wedge toward this law based project,  and the conviction by others that the old Nor,s Project (see here) was indeed the better course and that a Treaty Project developed under cover of the UNGPs might succeed where the Norms project failed. (see eg here, here, and here). This is beside the critical point that while the text of a decade's work may serve best as a framework of some sort, it might serve less well as statutory text (other than as a invitation for that to let loose their techno-bureaucracies to create substance from the aggregated directives that, however supportive one wants to be, is in essence what the project reduces itself too (here on the Zero Draft as law)). And the treaty projects supporters would naturally disagree most strongly, as they have and for the reasons advanced since the project got underway in 2014, and reflected as well in the criticisms of the choices represented in the UNGP criticized almost from the time of the UNGP's endorsement. Of course these sorts of ideas  take one out of the conversation, especially among those who are convinced otherwise and are driving the project. Fair enough--the treaty, at its core and a specifically framed legal project, is an ideologically driven political project, even if the core normative values may be more widely shared (here). For those who support it, the Treaty project may be the best contemporary expression of the premises and objectives  represented in its text.

My sense is that given the commitment of the BHR intelligentsia and the interwoven collectives of civil society and public techno-bureaucracies, a legal project like this treaty project is inevitable and must run its course.  It plays into much broader streams of development of advanced political and social relations that are driven toward the sort of public policy fulfilling premise around which all social relations must be bent, and that bending must be guided and led by interlocking public and private techno-bureaucracies wielding managerial authority through increasingly complex and interlocking regulatory frameworks. All of this, of course is prelude to what can only be perfected through technology--the construction of big data, generative descriptive and predictive programs that will be substituted for the human techno-bureaucrats to manage a system with an endless thirst for data, real time analytics and nuanced nudging  techniques. And it is in this sense that I watch developments with great interest as each of these actors play their roles within a larger performative space to the development of which theirs is a critical contribution--assuming, of course, that they can fend off the oppositional forces and their countermeasures; and assuming as well that they are not sooner rather than later absorbed within the larger big-data analytics techno-revolution in managing humans. 

The draft report on the tenth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights may be accessed HERE.

Report on the tenth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights may be accessed HERE.

The OEIGWG Chair-Rapporteur 2025 Roadmap updated 27 January 2025 follows below.

The dates of the intersessional thematic consultation have changed due to funding. The letter to that effect from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights follows below. The issue appears to be the unsettled state of funding.

Links to recordings; 1st Meeting; 2nd Meeting; 3rd meeting; 4th meeting; 5th meeting; 6th meeting; 7th meeting; 8th meeting; 9th meeting (no recording available); 10th meeting 

More information available one the OEIGWG website HERE.

 

US Mission to the United Nations: Remarks at Holocaust Memorial Ceremony 2025 at the United Nations and the UN Statement Prepared for the 2025 Event

 

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The United Nations as designated 27 January as International Holocaust Remembrance Day (IHRD). Within a more complicated context for the living, one full of ironies and reversals, and as a means engaging in acts of memory, posted below please find the (1) UN Statement on the 2025 observance; (2) the US Mission to the United Nations Remarks at Holocaust Memorial Ceremony 2025; and (3) a most interesting and perhaps provocative (in its neutral sense of provoking thought) essay by Jan Gerber recently posted to Telos Insights. Each in its own way recalls the cognitive cages of memory and the pathways to remembering.

春节快乐！恭喜发财

Davos Discourse 3: Europe between Between Eagle, Bear, and Dragon and No Place to Go--Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum

 

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This new engagement with countries across the world is not only an economic necessity – but a message to the world. It is Europe's response to rising global competition. We want more cooperation with all who are open for it. And this of course includes our closest partners. I think, of course, of the United States of America.* * * A lot is at stake for both sides. So our first priority will be to engage early, discuss common interests, and be ready to negotiate. We will be pragmatic, but we will always stand by our principles to protect our interests and uphold our values – that is the European way. (Remarks of Ursula von der Leyen)

Ursula von der Leyen is no stranger to the WEF; nor has she been reluctant to strongly describe a vision for Europe and European leadership that leverages both its culture and practices as they have emerged after 1945. In 2024, von der Leyen offered trust in a techno-bureaucracy guiding a rationalized process embedding normatively infused values. This techno-bureaucracy interlinked with apparatus of political, social and economic collectives within an accountability based system of oversight and compliance grounded in the objective of realizing public policy (President von der Leyen establishes fourteen Project Groups to deliver on political priorities). Its signature product of the last several years was the construction of a layered set of comprehensive regulatory systems which are now in the process of "simplification" and alignment. 

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The EU plans to re-open the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Taxonomy, opening the door for all three to be revised. Speaking at a press conference on a different topic earlier this month, Ursula von der Leyen said the European Commission would propose an omnibus legislation in a bid to “reduce bureaucracy [and] reduce reporting burdens”.  An omnibus is a rarely-used instrument that uses a single piece of legislation to amend multiple EU laws. (here; Budapest Declaration 11-2024 here; von der Leyen Political Guidelines here)

Of course simplification has becme more than that--it has become a vehicle for the rethinking and perhaps substantive revision of these regulations as well (see, here). 

It is this project--the European vision for ordering itself and at least that potion of the world (or its pathways to production)--which now appears challenged internally by key stakeholders, and externally by a trio of threats. The first is that of the United States which has embarked far more aggressively on a different path toward the management of economic and social relations. That was made clear by Mr. Trump at Davos, and elsewhere). The second is that of the Chinese whose own Marxist-Leninist world view threatens the breadth of the influence of Europe and its normative projects both on the European periphery and along its production chains. And the third is  the threat that Russia poses to and as Europe, a point stressed from the Ukrainian perspective by President Zelenskyy at Davos).

It is to the exposition and defense of the European project--as it is to be further developed under her leadership--that President von der  Leyen spoke to in her Davos remarks (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum), the text of which follows below with my brief reflections.

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1. von der Leyen starts with a bit of nostalgia for what was within grasp and is now lost, perhaps irrevocably. 

 The first quarter of the century has come to an end. And it has brought about a sea-change in global affairs. This century started with great expectations. 25 years ago, the era of hyperglobalisation was nearing its peak. As supply chains went global, hundreds of millions of people were being lifted out of poverty, especially in India and China. * * * The global economy reaped the dividends. And here in Davos, world leaders discussed how global cooperation, and technology could help the fight against poverty and disease. It was the promise of a more integrated and cooperative world. 25 years on, has this promise been fulfilled? Yes, the world today is still nearly as connected as ever. But it has also started fracturing along new lines.  * * * The cooperative world order we imagined 25 years ago has not turned into reality. Instead, we have entered a new era of harsh geostrategic competition.(Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum)

It is this idea, once nearly realized, as serves as the lodestar of the European project--and that project's burden. It is a burden that situates the European uniquely between the eagle, the dragon, and the bear.

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2. What is the nature of that burden, and the unique perspective that Europe might bring to the table? Ursula von der Leyen suggests both. The burden is a consequence of fracture--and from fracture a turning away from the convergence based rules based and normatively congruent system of economic and social relations. In place of state based labor  and functional specialization within an increasingly singular global system of production, the break up of that system in to at least two major subsystems  created the context in which retreat from the ideal of the vision for a one world order at the turn of the century. "As this competition intensifies, we will likely continue to see frequent use of economic tools, such as sanctions, export controls, and tariffs, that are intended to safeguard economic and national security."  (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).  The irony, of course, is the Europe itself has been no slouch when it comes to deploying these tools. But that is the point--that current conditions make such use of these instruments compelling suggests the contours of the problem which is left for Europe to solve--or at least to show the way forward, to bring the global community back to its golden age. "Because it is in no one's interest, to break the bonds in the global economy. Rather we need to modernise the rules to sustain our ability to produce mutual gain for our citizens." (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).  And there is a the first point--what Mr. Trump in his remarks described as the fundamental characteristics of a new golden age, Presidentvon der Leyen described as the end of that golden age.

3. What then, as Mr. Lenin once asked of what becomes a class of professional revolutionaries, what is to be done? Like the Chinese are attempting with their own vision for the future as a forward movement wrapped in the Chinese path forward, President von der Leyen offers Europe up as the shining example of a return to the ideal state once nearly within the global grasp.  Nonetheless, the Europe that offers itself up is also a work in progress toward the ideal. More importantly, that offering of oneself as the template for the future also requires that Europe liberate itself so that it might offer itself up as something that is not an appendage of, or in the thrall of the eagle, the dragon, and the bear.

For us Europeans, the race begins at home. Europe has a unique social market economy. We have the second largest economy and the biggest trading sector in the world. * * * Our capacity to invent and create is underappreciated – Europe's global share of patent applications is on par with the US and China. But the world is changing. So must we. In the last 25 years, Europe has relied on the rising tide of global trade to drive its growth. It has relied on cheap energy from Russia. And Europe has too often outsourced its own security. But those days are gone. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

 4. Nonetheless, to preserve Europe, to guarantee its autonomy, and to protect its role as a center for global innovation in all spheres, the European trajectory must also change. The focus is on efficiency, which can then be used to leverage and project out European values, and the European regulatory approach as basis for a return to a golden age of proper convergence. 

This is why I asked Mario Draghi to deliver a report on European Competitiveness. And on that basis, next week the European Commission is presenting our roadmap, which will drive our work for the next five years. The focus will be to increase productivity by closing the innovation gap. A joint plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to overcome skills and labour shortages and cut red tape. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

But can this work, in the sense of achieving efficiencies without sacrificing the core of European values and its delivery through its emerging systems of interlocking compliance based techno-bureaucracies?

5. President von der Leyen's three step plan for reform and revitalization suggests both the possibilities and the structural debilitation that has moved Europe into an unwanted dependency. 

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First, Europe needs a deep and liquid Capital Markets Union. European household savings reach almost EUR 1.4 trillion, compared with just over EUR 800 billion in the US. But European companies struggle to tap into that and raise the funding they need because our domestic capital market is fragmented.* * * Second, we must make business much easier all across Europe. Too much of our top talent is leaving the EU because it is easier to grow their companies elsewhere. And too many firms are holding back investment in Europe because of unnecessary red tape. * * * The third foundation is energy. Before the start of Putin's war, Europe got 45% of its gas supply and 50% of its coal imports from Russia. Russia was also one of our largest oil suppliers. This energy appeared cheap, but it exposed us to blackmail. * * * Not only must we continue to diversify our energy supplies, and expand clean sources of generation from renewables and, in some countries, also from nuclear. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

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Foregrounded in this action plan for a Europe that reforms its apparatus but keeps safe the normative framework from from this apparatus arose was the Draghi Report, “The Future of European Competitiveness," a 400 or so page document detailing what might be understood as a hard turn in the seemingly organic evolution of increasingly tightly interwoven techno-bureaucracies within the public and private sectors around whose oversight state policy could drive the social relations of the masses through their economic (broadly understood) activities. " Draghi’s text is far more strategic and ambitious, addressing three key challenges for the European Union: closing the innovation gap with the United States, harmonizing decarbonization with competitiveness, and enhancing economic security by reducing dependencies." (CISIS). That was what Europe had vigorously offered as an alternative to the Chinese model, and as a challenge to the U.S. model, vigorously defended a year earlier.  Nonetheless, in some respects, President von der Leyen's remarks might be understood as a summary report and affirmation of Draghi's core proposals and the embrace of the insights on which it is based. It is in effect the cri du coeur of all states fearful of the consequences of being consigned to the level of second order powers in a fractured world--dependency and control. But President von der Leyen does not merely echos Mr. Draghi; she effectively concedes the point more brutally made in President Zelenskyy's own remarks.  And even more brutally--this is the state that a century or more of self-destructive behaviors has reduced  the  European condition--comfortably dependent on friend and foe. And that is the challenge--to find a pathway to drive global discourse between the bear (energy), the eagle (markets dependency), and the dragon (tributary status of a foreign vanguard). But can Europe preserve its own uniqueness in the process?

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6. And energy is the key, a point to which President von der Leyen devoted a substantial amount of space. European success in energy transition is the key to vindicating the European approach to a public policy based normative framework for arranging and managing their social relations.

This is our plan. And the next few years will be vital to stay in the race of clean and disruptive technologies. Europe has everything it needs to make this happen. We have a private sector with a long tradition of innovation. We have a top-class workforce. We have a huge Single Market of 450 million people and a unique social infrastructure to protect people from the great risks of life.  (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

It  is through the lens of energy that one can properly position what Europe has to offer for itself and as a model of others. "The coming years will be vital well beyond Europe. All continents will have to speed up the transition towards net zero, and deal with the growing burden of climate change. Its impact is impossible to ignore." (Ibid.). This is what is on offer as a new model of multilateralism--one not grounded on economic productivity, but in which economic productivity os a means through which welfare based public policy can be realized, energy transition is possible and collective efforts can be developed to meet common threats: "Likewise, all continents will have to grasp the opportunities of AI and manage its risks. On challenges like these, we are not in a race against each other, but in a race against time. Even in a moment of harsh competition, we need to join forces." (Ibid.)

7.   That leaves the role of leading force for global multilateralism ready for the taking. In that context Europe is marketed as a territorial and normative space that permits other, smaller states to avoid choosing between one of the two great apex powers. "And as great power competition intensifies, I see a growing appetite across the world to engage more closely with us." (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum). This is the Chinese offer packaged in the Belt & Road Initiative but in Europe's favor--and the market for influence points South. 

In the last two months only, we concluded new partnerships with Switzerland, Mercosur and Mexico. This means that 400 million Latin Americans will soon be engaged in a privileged partnership with Europe. These deals were in the making for years, if not decades. * * * It is how we diversify our own supply chains. And this is why Europe's offer is so attractive, all across the world. From our neighbours in Africa, who are working with us to develop local clean-tech value chains and clean fuels to the vast Asia-Pacific region. Hence, the first trip of my new Commission will be to India. Together with Prime Minister Modi we want to upgrade the strategic partnership with the largest country and democracy in the world. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

And the reason is bound up in European values--normative and structural. "So, why are they all happening today? It is not only because Europe is a large and attractive market. But because with Europe, what you see is what you get. We play by the rules. Our deals have no hidden strings attached. And while others are only interested in exporting and extracting, we want to see local industries flourish in partner countries." (Ibid.). 

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8. And what of the great competitors--the apex powers? China is a frenemy. On the one hand Europe "should also strive for mutual benefits in our conversation with China." (Ibid.). But at the same time 

Defensive trade measures are being adopted across the world, including in the Global South, as a response to Chinese market distortions. This is also why Europe has taken measures, for instance on electric cars. At the same time, I have always stressed that we are ready to continue our discussions. And we will continue to de-risk our economy. * * * 2025 marks 50 years of our Union's diplomatic relations with China. I see it as an opportunity to engage and deepen our relationship with China, and where possible, even to expand our trade and investment ties. It is time to pursue a more balanced relationship with China, in a spirit of fairness and reciprocity. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

There is little room for e return to the golden age except within the community of States willing to join the community of European believers.  Put differently, the path for European  prosperity and autonomy requires it to abandon convergence and to leverage energy and values as a means for restoring its place of independence from China and the United States. "This new engagement with countries across the world is not only an economic necessity – but a message to the world. It is Europe's response to rising global competition. We want more cooperation with all who are open for it." (Ibid.).

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9. And so we come the the United States. They are offered the same terms as China--cooperation to the extent that the U.S. is open to the European path. For the moment Europe appears intent on bending, bit it will not conform to the American path to its own golden age. "A lot is at stake for both sides. So our first priority will be to engage early, discuss common interests, and be ready to negotiate. We will be pragmatic, but we will always stand by our principles to protect our interests and uphold our values – that is the European way." (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum). The difference between China and the United States, for Europe, is the difference in the extent of the integration of their economies, and the value of production at stake in disruption.

The rules of engagement between global powers are changing. We should not take anything for granted. And while some in Europe may not like this new reality, we are ready to deal with it. Our values do not change. But to defend these values in a changing world, we must change the way we act. We must look for new opportunities wherever they arise. This is the moment to engage beyond blocs and taboos. And Europe is ready for change.  (Ibid., emphasis supplied).

The risk is telling. President von der Leyen ends her remarks the way that President Zelenskyy ended his: "Thank you very much, and long live Europe." (Ibid.).  And that more than anything may suggest not just the stakes  but the risks. This is a very different discourse than that of 2024.

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Davos Discourse 2: Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine--Searching for Europe and Ukraine Within it

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Europe deserves to be more than just a bystander, with its leaders reduced to posting on X after an agreement has already been made. Europe needs to shape the terms of those deals. (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,)

The World Economic Forum held annually at Davos, provides a stage on which those who manage the world in the name of whatever forms of democratic solidarity they embrace (or not) may perform for each other, and in that way signal principle, narrative, and objectives-based intentions. But it is also a lace where those performances serve to layer the ruling narratives through which the mechanisms of controlling apparatus may be framed, and those subject to them managed. 

In 2024, the Davos performances were particularly useful as the last full throated expression of the fractures and points of converge between what had then emerged as the ruling ideologies for global governance, and with it the management of the masses as instruments thereof before the start of hat might be significant transformations heralded by the start of Mr. Trump's 2nd term in the US Presidency, which, at the time, and certainly among this crowd, was thought improbable in January 2024. I chose three speeches to focus on: Mr. Milei of Argentina as the projection of the markets driven vision; Ms. Von der Leyen of the European Union for the emerging vision of tightly integrated managerial techno-bureaucracy directed toward the realization of public policy; and Mr. Li Qiang  of China for an elegant exposition of the Marxist-Leninist  vision for vanguard based hierarchically managed global systems. As such, and in retrospect, it marked a very nice historical moment capturing a time and a sensibility on the eve of its irrelevance. All three focused on trust but in three distinct forms: (1) Chinese Premier Li Qiang  offered trust in a vanguard state representing global leading forces dedicated to the realization of normatively identifiable objectives;  (2) EU Commission President Ursula von de Leyen offered trust in a techno-bureaucracy guiding a rationalized process embedding normatively infused values; and (3) Argentine President Milei offered an oracle of distrust in the form of a warning: trust no collective other than the capitalist collective. 

In 2025 the narrative performances in and as Davos has taken a much more interesting turn. Where, in retrospect, Davos 2024 crystalized a moment in timer that may be passing, Davos 2025 is that cold water splash that jolts one to seeing things differently, or that recalls and tries to hold on to dreams of the past. Mr. Trump's address provided a glimpse of a future that appears to offer a convergence of Chinese hub-spoke statist model and the leading role of a state-private capitalist collective all grounded in narratives of state integrity, rationalized order and win-win deal making (here). 

But where does that leave those States that are not either at the core of state leadership and involved in conflict with aggressive formerly imperial powers with an old school territory grounded expansionist agenda. Perhaps it was to that question--likely unconsciously on the mind--that Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine offered some thoughts. Ukraine represents the unhappy middle of an emerging order--too big to fail nicely within streams of post-global imperial production, value and supply chains (with control benefits for the center--either U.S, Chinese, or E.U. style). At the same time it is too small  to (not yet anyway) play a role as a middle power. That may come, but not with Russian and North Korean (plus only security services know who else) troops siting on largish chunks of Ukrainian territory and a host a greater powers incapable even of making good on promises consigned to a piece of paper of 1991 that have been devalued substantially since. 

The Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine follows below with some brief comments here:

 

1. The image that was used on the WEF forum for Mr. Zelenskyy's speech, above, perhaps best captured the moment of the remarks. To some large measure, Mr. Zelenskyy was speaking to himself. There was something of a closed loop--the person of Mr. Zelenskyy seeking to connect with the vanguard audience of patrons and potential patrons, while hovering to the side and overhead the virtual image of Mr. Zelenskyy capturing the nightmare of the president speaking to himself. That does not make the remarks any less necessary--but from a semiotic perspective it might suggest that the value of the remarks were in its performance rather than in its text. The the audience Mr. Zelenskyy's presence was a necessary as are, for example, the presence of colorfully dressed traditionally marginalized peoples and others at human rights related forums in Geneva. A necessary prop that, semiotically at least, serves as a decorative object adorning the audience, the signification of which is more closely aligned with the construction of their self-cognition than anything else. And so too the deals and positions (The Office of the President Held a Videoconference on Implementing Agreements Reached During Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Meetings in Davos) with respect to which their object must do as they can. It s not for nothing that traditionally leaders of territories about to be carved up by others are invited to out facing theatrical events and tend to be left in the waiting rooms when leading actors then meet to strike a deal. But who knows, may this time it is different.

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2. Still, the discursive elements of the address ought not to be undervalued.  Text tends to linger long after images corrode. And text tends to be a malleable commodity, the interpretation and application of which can be adjusted to suit the times. In this case, text, too, can be used to project onto other actors, not in the room, who might matter to those who are. And in that context, Mr. Zelenskyy tried to aim for the center of  what he might hope to be the center of the target of the question of Europe (and therefor of Ukraine's role in it--whatever it winds up being). 

I want to talk about the future of Europe with you – which basically means the future of most people here. Right now, all eyes are on Washington. But who’s actually watching Europe at the moment? That’s the key question for Europe. And it’s not just about ideas. It’s about people, first of all. It’s about how they’ll live in a world that’s constantly changing. * * * Most of the world’s now thinking – so, what’s going happen to their relationship with America? What will happen to alliances? To support? To trade? How does President Trump plan to end wars? But no-one is asking these kinds of questions about Europe. And we need to be honest about that. ( Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,)

That weak underbelly of being European had two potential benefits--the first is to prod Europe into some sort of autonomy and the second is to manage that autonomous thinking in ways that might benefit Ukraine.  Strategically it had a greater value--by situating his rhetoric on Europe he was able to continue his discursive campaign to embed Ukraine in and as Europe; on the European frontier certainly, but within Europe.  Reminding Europe that Ukraine is an internal European problem, then created th structures within which Ukraine can further its goals of political, social, and military integration in Europe. .

3. And then the challenge--how or should Europe adjust to a role as a second or third order subaltern in the emerging post-global bi-polar imperial system?

Ladies and gentlemen, Europe can’t afford to be second or third in line for its allies. If that happens, the world will start moving forward without Europe, and that’s a world that will not be comfortable or beneficial for all Europeans. Europe needs to compete for the top spot in priorities, alliances and technological development. ( Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,)

On the one hand, he targets European self-conceptions and pride. On the other hand he also olds up a mirror to an aggregation of States that collectively recall their past and may not understand their role in the future. To that end he speaks, though quite subtly, to Europe as a middle power--one facing another middle power which, like Europe, once defined and enforced a territorially based imperial order.  And then an appeal to ego--is collective Europe no higher on the hierarchy than Russia, or ought it to be and act as an amalgam at a higher rung. Put differently, Mr. Zelenskyy suggests that collective Europe might think of itself and act as something greater than the middle level powers that Russia, Iran, Brazil, South Africa and the Member States of the European Union represent. 

Even though Russia’s overall economic potential is way smaller than Europe’s, it produces several times more ammo and military equipment than all of Europe combined. * * *  Putin signed the new strategic deal with Iran. He already has the comprehensive treaty with North Korea. Whom do they make such deals against? Against you, against all of us. Against Europe, against America. We must not forget about it. It is not by chance. These are their strategic priorities, and our priorities must match the challenge – in politics, and in defence, and in economy. Such threats can only be countered together. ( Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,)

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4.  It is then that Mr. Zelenskyy drives home the point--a Europe that is augmented with Ukraine, and the source of a victory over what,consequently will be understood to be a lesser power, will open the doors (or keep them open) to participation at the highest levels of post-global political management of subalterns. "Next, right now, it’s not clear whether Europe will even have a seat at the table when the war against our country ends. We see how much influence China has on Russia and we are deeply grateful to Europe for all the support it’s given our country during this war. But will President Trump listen to Europe, or will he negotiate with Russia and China without Europe? Europe needs to learn how to fully take care of itself, so that the world can’t afford to ignore it." (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,). The point is actually quite interesting, if only for the intertwining, discursively, of the vision of a European trajectory toward middle tier power, and the suggestion that this trajectory can be softened if not reversed with the integration of Ukraine in Europe and the defeat of the challenge posed by Russia--to Europe. The point is emphasized through repetition later in the address: "Europe must have a seat at the table when deals about war and peace are made. And I’m not just talking about Ukraine here. This should be the standard." (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,).

5. To do that, Mr. Zelenskyy makes the same point that U.S. Presidents have mader since the Presidency of John F. Kennedy--that Europe can no longer afford to free ride on the Americans if it means to retain its place as a power in its own right. There is irony ere; and likely few interested in the point.  But there it is: "If it takes 5% of GDP to cover defence, then so be it, 5% it is. And there is no need to play with people’s emotions that defence should be compensated at the expense of medicine or pensions or something else – that is really not fair.We’ve already set-up models of cooperation for Ukraine’s defence that can make all of Europe stronger." (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,). But of course there is more to it than that.  One thought leaps out--third order states have very little wiggle room; as most of them have come to understand, one must be prepared to manage patron relations to survive.  The United States is now in play as it concerns Ukraine. In its place Europe provides an alternative--but that leaves open the question--what sort of compelling narrative is available to make that happen.  A strong Europe, and Ukraine within it, is as much protection for Ukraine as Ukraine suggests it is for Europe.

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6. Mr. Zelenskyy criticizes, and not subtly, the subaltern behaviors of leaders of certain smaller European States. "For example, the Prime Minister of Slovakia is not seeking access to the US gas but does not lose hope to enjoy US security umbrella." (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,). But Mr. Zelenskyy also criticizes the current European regulatory model, which he suggests, like Mr. Trump, will contribute to the comprehensive regulatory supremacy of the State bit at the cost of leadership status--a view quite hostile to the deeply held guiding premises of European elites. "Europe is often more focused on regulation than on freedom, but when smart regulation is needed, Brussels hesitates. We should ensure maximum tech development in Europe and together make all significant decisions – for the whole Europe." (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,). One hears echoes here of the much reviled European challenges to the emerging regulatory model--but at the same times its echoes in recently leaked positions of France and Germany with respect to the EU Omnibus (reported on here) and the Report by Mario Draghi on "The future of European competitiveness,"mentioned positively by the EU Commission President van de Leyen in her own Davos Remarks as an important signpost on the road to European regulatory efficiency.

7. And that brings Mr. Zelenskyy back to the principal point: "Europe deserves to be strong. And for this, Europe needs the EU and NATO. Is this possible without Ukraine and without a just end to Russia’s war against Ukraine? I’m certain the answer is ‘no’." (Special Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy,). There is no Europe, or at least any Europe worth worrying about without Ukraine, and there is no Ukraine without Europe. The path to that Union requires not just immediate European action on the Russian threat, but much longer term rethinking about Europe's sense of itself. That path is quite clear in its objectives but ambiguous in its fulfillment. "Europe must shape history for itself and its allies to remain not just relevant, but alive and great." Even if the intended audience listened, it is not clear what they heard.  There is another Europe possible (among many), and that one may neither include Ukraine and remind one more of Italy or Germany in the 15th century--an idea in search of itself. Or it may become the bright light of post-global administrative managerialism in the service of public policy at least within its sphere of influence. The question of Ukrainian relevance to the European project remains very much in play. 

 

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