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The winds of change, and the winds of reaction, appear to be blowing strongly in the U.S. These winds are being generated by the officials of the political and appointed branches of the apparatus, with strong supporting roles by the institutionalized consultation and influencing elements of the unofficial apparatus, each wrapped in the legalities of rule of law narratives that suit them in general, that can be used as instruments with respect to their status in the apparatus (political(social/institutional) hierarchy to which they belong or serve, and which can be advanced to serve their interests as holders of particular places within those hierarchies.
None of this is new. Most political systems find ways of dressing this up in appropriately soothing terms which permit enough of a base for stability and the ordering of "play." Norms are both the objectives and pathways; the ordering of social relations especially with respect to the way in which distributions of power is managed, are the stuff of ideology. And ideology can be sourced in anything that a collective embraces for that purpose. These patterns are so old that academics with little else to do perhaps have sought to make a science of it, spiced from time to time, with the faith in judgments (or the hubris of judging) perfection (but that is a story for another day). What is discomfiting in the American context is that all of this activity is being undertaken for larger stakes--the organization and normative foundations of the political order that serve as the platform (playground) in which the machinations of these factional/status forces (sometimes as people and sometimes within other institutions) is ordered and the range and approach to "objectives" and "rule" (through law based on approaches to foundational interpretation can (re)set.
And so here the Americans find themselves--old school traditional progressives and their "progeny" reflecting notions of progress that requiring going back even farther in time not in the position of reactionaries to purported revolution; and old school traditionalists playing at revolution to overturn the present in the hope of recapturing a past that is, in its re-imagining, something entirely new. Much of this is being played out in the battles between the President and the Courts, and between the President and the (very) large sector of state dependent private enterprises--enterprises (whether or not for profit--whatever that means today) that have grown dependent (and perhaps quite fat) on institutionalized systems of governmental largess either in cash or through regulatory largess that they have come to view as a right (if only because its cancellation would adversely affect their economic viability). All of this is fair. History produces any number of variations on how an elite capturing a political apparatus then manages control of either threats or necessary parties through high spending institutionalized systems of payments. There is nothing wrong with these systems (from the quite successful efforts of the French monarchy to neuter the threats of their aristocracy through large subsidies and the dilution of their ranks with people more agreeable to the Crown, to systems of managing education through systems of research and other grants sugar coating regulatory oversight and (for a while now mutual) dependency. If this can be done in a way that aligns with the ruling ideology, its institutionalization (and the protection of the benefit of these transfers of wealth) can be better protected and serve, at its limit, as a means of reinforcing the ruling ideology as well.
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But the system appeared to invite greater and greater tolerance for challenge both from the progressive end and the traditionalist end, and what was once beyond the barrier of the basic political line of governmental ordering/function/norms appeared now ripe for challenge from both (all) sides. The result has been a growing instability among the ruling factions as their ability or willingness to control the boundaries of the manageable has appeared to slip. While this slippage could be plausibly denied certainly before 2016, it became nearly impossible to do so after 2020. One wind of the factional elements had their turn after 2020; with the election of President Trump in 2024, now the other faction seeks both to challenge the work of the predecessor ruling group and to drive their own transformative vision, not just normative but also in the way in which the apparatus is run and those who might claim a profitable dependence on it.
One has had to have been asleep since the end of January 2025 to have missed this squabbling and its intense manifestations. One front in the conflict is that between the Presidency and the organized28 May academy, seen by the current officeholder as inseparably linked to the rival camp, but also vulnerable because their power, and the nature of their relationship depends in some respects to both regulatory benefits Appropriately clothed in plausible and even compelling normative text, visual, and oral performances) The focus on the academic industry makes tremendous sense from a political and normative perspective for the Trump Administration. The academy as currently populated and run, and their relationships within and around the state apparatus pose a substantial challenge to the Trump Administration's "Golden Age" agenda. And in some respects they are also an unavoidable target serving as the leading forces of many of the initiatives and transformative agendas of the enemy apparatus embedded in and operating through the Administration of President Biden. But the Academy is also the recipient of a substantial amount of subsidy in cash ad regulatory kind that appears to pit the government in the position of subsidizing the political and normative enemies of the current administration. And, of course, academic big wigs and high status factions within it have appeared to stumble badly enough that even their allies in social media and press organs found it difficult to protect them effectively.
The Administration of President Trump has appeared to adopt a multi-prong strategy against the academic industry that aligns with some of its broader transformational goals (I ought to make clear that for purposes of this essay I take no sides but am trying to understand them the way one might view the ritualized confrontations of sheep, or wolves, though I note that from a personal perspective I regret both in the context in which they were made). One part is regulatory. That aligns with the Administration's efforts to challenge the position, authority and conceits of the courts that have been solidified after 1945. For example and as reported in the New York Times, "Mr. Trump this month said the U.S. government would no longer grant Harvard the right to enroll international students. On Friday, a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order blocking Mr. Trump from moving forward with the action against Harvard and foreign students." (here). But of course the strategy can backfire discrediting the Administration as abusing its authority. But the other aligns with the Administration's migration policy while serving as a way to significantly undercut the profitability of the academic industry model (and its leadership role)--and that touches on the ability of the Administration to affect the rate and timing of foreign student admissions to universities.
To that end two recent initiatives might be worth considering, both originating in the State Department. The first is elaborated in the 28 May Announcement of a Visa Restriction Policy Targeting Foreign Nationals Who Censor Americans . The second is identified in the New Visa Policies Put America First, Not China of the same date. Both follow in full below. Both will be challenged in the courts of course--but that might well serve the Administration's strategy of discrediting the courts by encouraging them to appear to overstep--that is to overstep in the sense of its use to turn mass sentiment against a legitimate institutionalized judiciary by allowing them to be palliated as partisan.
The first appeared to be accompanied by a visa issuance pause which, working in tandem with the new visa restriction policy, appeared to aim to reduce the flow of foreign students into U.S. universities (at least). As reported on a Yale University website (and repeated in variation throughout the higher administrative reaches of university operations):
Multiple news outlets have reported that a cable, dated Tuesday, May 27th, and signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has ordered U.S. Embassies and Consulates to pause scheduling new visa interviews for F and J visa applicants. According to these reports the cable reads: “Effective immediately, in preparation for an expansion of required social media screening and vetting, consular sections should not add any additional student or exchange visitor (F, M, and J) visa appointment capacity until further guidance is issued [in a separate telegram], which we anticipate in the coming days.” (here)The second appeared to be aimed specifically at China. That aligns with the efforts to use challenge the ability of the Chinese State to seek capacity building from U.S. sources, directly anyway, through its Reform and Opening Up program encouraging students to seek an education abroad. It can be coupled with the discourse of the last several months (and earlier as well in different form in the Biden Administration) suggesting that all of these programs produce a security risk to the U.S.and a conduit for the acquisition and transfer of knowledge from the U.S. in ways that the Administration would suggest are unfair and damaging to the U.S. It suggests that students might be presumed to be state agents and that they will be scrutinized accordingly; special scrutiny is reserved for students who are Communist Party of China cadres, though no mention is made of the effect of membership in the Chinese Chinese United Front parties on admission.
It is too early to tell what effect all of this will have, or even if, as a tactic, is disappears once the Trump Administration's larger objectives appears to be satisfied. I expect we will see more before all of this plays out completely.
Free speech is among the most cherished rights we enjoy as Americans. This right, legally enshrined in our constitution, has set us apart as a beacon of freedom around the world. Even as we take action to reject censorship at home, we see troubling instances of foreign governments and foreign officials picking up the slack. In some instances, foreign officials have taken flagrant censorship actions against U.S. tech companies and U.S. citizens and residents when they have no authority to do so.
Today, I am announcing a new visa restriction policy that will apply to foreign nationals who are responsible for censorship of protected expression in the United States. It is unacceptable for foreign officials to issue or threaten arrest warrants on U.S. citizens or U.S. residents for social media posts on American platforms while physically present on U.S. soil. It is similarly unacceptable for foreign officials to demand that American tech platforms adopt global content moderation policies or engage in censorship activity that reaches beyond their authority and into the United States. We will not tolerate encroachments upon American sovereignty, especially when such encroachments undermine the exercise of our fundamental right to free speech.
This visa restriction policy is pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes the Secretary of State to render inadmissible any alien whose entry into the Unites States “would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.” Certain family members may also be covered by these restrictions.
Under President Trump’s leadership, the U.S. State Department will work with the Department of Homeland Security to aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields. We will also revise visa criteria to enhance scrutiny of all future visa applications from the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong.
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