At the same time, political citizenship is concentrated in and exercised through the cadres of the Communist Party in its leadership role, while state officials serve in the administrative role described for them through the State Constitution. Larry Catá, Backer, "The Party as Polity, the Communist Party, and the Chinese Constitutional State: A Theory of State-Party Constitutionalism," Penn State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-2009.
For Westerners, the mechanics of Party discipline, like the role of the CCP itself, within China, is difficult to properly understand, for lack of legitimating institutional analogies from which to draw. And the actual process of discipline is not analogous to the process systems that are at the heart of Western practice. A Financial Times story from a few years ago illustrates these points well. Tom Mitchell, "The case of the Chinese mayor who wasn’t there," Financial Times, Aug. 12, 2009.
On the first weekend in June, residents in one of China’s richest cities were subjected to an Orwellian charade. The mayor of Shenzhen, in southern Guangdong province, had gone missing on a Friday, with no explanation provided for his absence at official events.In neighbouring Hong Kong, the Chinese special administrative region where press freedoms are still protected, media outlets reported that Xu Zongheng was the target of a corruption probe. The official Xinhua news agency finally issued a single-sentence dispatch on Monday confirming Mr Xu’s detention for “serious violations of discipline”. An “acting mayor” was soon appointed and nothing more was said of the matter.For almost four full days, everyone in Shenzhen turned a blind eye. Government officials who knew the mayor was in trouble spoke no evil. Local journalists and editors who were in the loop wrote no evil. It is one thing to praise the naked emperor’s fine clothes – and quite another to pretend he is there when he just ain’t.* * * *In China, senior government and Communist party officials vanish all the time without causing so much as a ripple in the domestic media.Like so many cadres before him, Mr Xu disappeared into the jaws of the Chinese Communist party’s disciplinary inspection commission. The powerful commission’s so-called shuang-gui (or “twin regulation”) powers allow it to detain party officials indefinitely. In theory, officials caught up in this extra-judicial twilight zone are merely making themselves available to party investigators and can be released later without stain. In reality, the commission’s targets are routinely handed over to government prosecutors months or even years later, all but gift-wrapped for summary show trials and sentencing.In a more famous example of shuang-gui in action, in 2003 the head of Bank of China’s Hong Kong subsidiary disappeared for two years before resurfacing in a courtroom in Changchun, a city in the country’s far north-east. There he was convicted for a corruption spree that had allegedly begun nine years earlier in Shanghai. When it comes to “renditioning” suspects from one jurisdiction to another, the disciplinary inspection commission appears to be as accomplished as the CIA.
A CPC official on Tuesday for the first time explained a Chinese anti-corruption term, translated as "double designations", which is used to question Party members being investigated for violating Party discipline.
Gan Yisheng, secretary-general of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC said at a press conference that "double designations" means Party members are requested to attend questioning sessions at a designated place and for a designated duration.
Gan said there are stringent regulations governing "double designation" procedures which must be pre-approved. Corporal punishment is banned and Party member's dignity must be respected throughout the questioning.
During "double designations", the relevant Party members are still regarded as a comrade, as they have not proven to have violated laws, he said. (From CPC Official Explains "Double Designations", CRI English,.com, Sept. 26, 2009).
There are few studies of the practice in the West. Among the best is Flora Sapio, "Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China," China Information 2008 22: 7 (DOI: 10.1177/0920203X07087720) (online version). Professor Sapio ultimately argues that "Shuanggui is nothing new: it is just solitary confinement under a different name. Therefore it could be labeled as a “neotraditional” practice the regime is unable to suppress. Coupled with other factors, shuanggui could eventually cause the regime to collapse. . . . The standardization of Party norms on detention has not changed the nature of shuanggui, which remains a form of extralegal detention and should therefore be abolished." (Ibid., 24-25). She notes only two studies of the practice undertaken in the West: Graham Young, “Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions since the 11th Congress,” The China Quarterly, no. 97 (1984): 24–52; Chang I-Huai, “An Analysis of the CCP’s Role in Mainland China’s State Supervisory Systems,” Issues & Studies 34, no. 1 (1998): 38–78. (cited in Sapio, supra, at page26 note 3).
The place of Shaunggui within the Chinese legal system, and the political and constitutional implications of its character as extra-legal, provides a base from which one can consider the relationship between law, legal process, the state and the Party apparatus under the umbrella of the Chinese constitutional system. If, indeed, Shuang gui exists outside the law, then its legitimacy and methods are subject to question within the framework of the law system developed through the National People's Congress system and Western (and some internal) criticism might be considered important. But is it possible to consider Shuanggui as within the legal system, even if beyond the reach of the legal process and rule systems derived from actions of the National People's Congress and the state constitution? More precisely, if lawfulness can derive from sources outside or beyond the state constitution, might those serve as a basis for understanding the normative framework within which Shuanggui can exist within the structure of Chinese constitutionalism? The source of that constitutional authority, and its democratic institutionalization, might be found within the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party itself. But reliance on the CCP Constitution would also have to rest on the idea that the CCP constitution itself forms a part of the constitutional structure of China. And if that is the case, then shuanggui cannot be understood without an understanding of the construction of Chinese constitutionalism, that is, of the relationship between State and Party Constitution in the formation of the Chinese constitutional system--not grounded in a single document constituting a state apparatus, but instead based on a dual set of constituting actions: one directed to the formation of the state apparatus and the other to the constitution of the political superstructure of the nation. Within this context, the debate about Shuanggui and its application can take on a substantially distinct character.
This post begins to look more closely at the issue of Shuang gui in the context of the Chinese State-Party constitutional system. We start with the simplest formal description of Shuang gui from within. This was prepared by my research assistant Gao Shan. It can be read usefully within the descriptive framework of Professor Sapio's work cited above. Future posts will begin exploring the concepts, their application within the Party and the issues of Party discipline in the context of state operation. The object will be to move from description of mechanics, to its conventional justification, and finally to the central issue--the legitimacy of Chinese constitutionalism reflected in the issues of the legitimacy of Shuanggui itself. I will suggest, ultimately, that it is quite plausible to understand shuanggui as legitimate and falling within the legal limits of Chinese constitutionalism, but only when one understands Chinese constitutionalism in its systemic context. In this context, shuanggui can be understood as essential for the performance by the Chinese Communist Party of its Constitutional obligations according to the premises of its own constitution (and thus subject to law under the State Constitution). Once the legitimacy of shaunggui is thus properly understood, one can move from the false issue of its legitimacy (and that of the current system) to the far more important one of the appropriate construction of shuanggui and its implementation as a device of Party discipline in light of Chinese constitutional principles
- Basic concepts: what is Shuang gui and Liang zhi
- What is Shuang gui?
- How it created?
- What is Liang zhi?
- The connection between Shuang gui and Liangzhi
- What is Shuang gui?
- Shuang gui, an efficient way against officers’ violation of discipline
- How CCDI or CDI conduct an Shuang gui investigation?
- Who is the suspect?
- Preliminary verification
- Filling the case, a graduated system
- Designated place: interrogation premise
- The punishment decision
- Who is the suspect?
- Transfer of the case
- Cases from prosecutor, police to CDI
- Cases from CDI to PP or police
- Specification about the court
- Rumors of a Xiamen Yuanhua case
- Cases from prosecutor, police to CDI
- CCDI: Central Commission of Discipline Investigation, zhongyang ji wei 中央纪委
- CDI: Commission of Discipline Investigation, Ji wei 纪委
- MOS: Ministry of Supervision of the People’s Republic of China
- CPC: Communist Party of China
- NPC: National People’s Congress
- PSD: Public Security Department
- SPP: Supreme People’s Procuratorate of People’s Republic of China
- PC: People’s Court
- PP: People’s Procuratorate
Shuang gui, 双规 a Chinese anti-corruption term, translated as “double designations”i, which is used to question Party members being investigated for violating Party discipline. The plain meaning of the words, according to Gan Yisheng, the secretary-general of the CCDI, suggests that Party members are requested to attend questioning sessions at a designated place and for a designated duration.
In general, Shang gui is what people called the rule of Article 28, section 3 of Regulations of CPC on Discipline Regulations. Under this provision:
2. How was it created?• Any person or institutes who know the matters of the case shall bear the duty of providing evidence. According to the procedural of the regulations, the investigation group has the power to adopt the following measures:(3) Requiring relevant person answering questions and clarifying issues at
designated duration and designated place.
3. What is Liangzhi?
Under section 3 of article 20 of Law of PRC on Administrative Supervision:
In investigating violations of the rules of administrative discipline, a supervisory organ may adopt the following measures in light of actual conditions and needs:
(3) to order the persons suspected of violating the rules of administrative discipline to explain and clarify questions relevant to the matters under investigation at a designated time and place; however, no such persons may be taken into custody or detained in disguised form;
4. The connection between Shuang gui and Liangzhi
1. Powerful Implementer CCDI and its structure
CCDI was the implementer of Shuang gui, they are responsible for receiving the complaints, filling the case, conducting investigation and making punishment decision. In some level, their function is like the combination of the police station and the prosecutor.
The following diagram of CPC structure shows the authority and construction of CCDI in relation with other CPC’s organization.
[in charge of the general administratio n of the department]
Response the research and explain CDI policy
Educate party members and officials against the violation of discipline and evils of corruption
Party’s integrity office
In charge of the CPC’s democratic meetings and study group regarding to the discussion of discipline
Incorporated with the branches of MOS and worked together against the malpractice in the working places.
Operation office 1,2, 3
Investigation of CPC member in gov, enterprises and other organizations
Duties of Archive
Receive the complaints from the public
HR department of CDI
Reviewing and exam the investigation
Conduct the general inspection in its district
General inspection office
In charge of general inspection tasks and responsible for the election of county’s special inspector
III. How CCDI or CDI conduct an investigation?
- 1) Suspect who may subject to the punishment of suspension or who is likely to flee, fabricate, destroy evidence or other conducts that obstacle the investigation;
- 2) Suspect who is held the position above the county or section level.
2. Preliminary verification
In practice, the central CPC only has a very general rule about the transfer. In fact, each province may have its own detailed rules regarding to the procedural of transferring. Here I provide the rules of Shan dong province as an example to talk about the procedural of transfer.
2. Cases from CDI to PP or police
4. Rumors of a Xiamen Yuanhua case
i CPC official explains "double designations" http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/26/eng20060926_306561.html
ii The Central Organizations of the CPC
iii This can be proved by checking the website of CCDI and its branches.
iviv The Central Committee of Discipline Inspection http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Commission_for_Discipline_Inspection_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China
v Chart of the Central Organizations of the CPC
vi Document of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection), no. 7, 5 June 1998
vii Article 10 of CPC’s disciplinary inspection working regulation
viii Article 28 of CPC’s disciplinary inspection working regulation
ix Opinions on CCDI regarding to further strengthening the standard of investigation 中共中央关于进一步加强规 范办案工作的意见
x The measurements on strengthening cooperation between Shan dong CDI, Department of Organization of Shan dong, PC of Shan dong, PP, PSD and Shandong Auditing office for investing discipline and law violation cases (trial)
xi Article 6 of No. 8 Shan dong
xii Article 10 of No. 8 Shan dong xiii Article 11 of No. 8 Shan dong xiv Article 9 of No. 8 Shan dong xv Article 12 of No.8 Shan dong