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| © Larry Catá Backer, Village new Yiwu, China (September 2024) |
I was recently asked to participate interview with a Chinese press organ. They were kind enough to provide the questions in advance. The questions were quite interesting and touched on important current issues in a sensitive way.
I have provided the text of my written responses below in the original ENGLISH and in a crude CHINESE translation.
Prof. Backer (白 轲) interview
Interview by 朱润宇 (Runyu Zhu) for
The Paper (Shanghai)
30 August 2024:
1, You shared on X [Comprehensively understand the guidance of the "Decision"] and "Continue to advance socialism with Chinese characteristics of Deng Xiaoping", two important Chinese articles published by Qiushi Magazine. How do you interpret its main message and timing at home and abroad from your perspective?
This is an excellent question and I am delighted you noticed the connection between the two key articles. For a very long time, the General Secretary in his speeches and writings has stressed two important points with respect to the Era of Reform and Opening Up.
The first point was the historical importance of Reform and Opening Up in charting the Chinese socialist path. This is the path on which China remains in theory and in practice. The Era of Reform and Opening Up produced key theoretical elements that remain important today—the principle of socialist modernization and the centrality of the development of productive forces under the guidance of the Communist Party in a people centered way are two key elements. To those ends, it was necessary to start with the most pressing problems, the problem of economic modernization. This challenge, one inherited from the Late Qing, remained a roadblock to more comprehensive development.
This second important point stressed by the General Secretary is that the basis for meeting the challenges facing the nation must be attuned with the times. This insight aligns with another important set of principles that became prominent during the Era of Reform and Opening Up—the concepts of emancipating the mind and truth from facts were also key concepts that continue to be emphasized. The first as a reminder that theory that does not continuously develop tends to decay; the second a reminder that theory disconnected from practice tends to become irrelevant.
The historical article underscores these points. All theory is applied in specific ways in its time and place. For theory to be relevant it must correctly align its general principles to the conditions under which it is meant to be applied. That alignment, in turn is always assessed against the ultimate objective of this dialectical exercise. In this case the objective has remained the same since the founding of the People’s Republic—to establish a communist society in China following the socialist path under the guidance and leadership of an organized vanguard of leading forces,
This brings one to the guidance produced by the General Secretary for a better understanding of the thrust of the Decision/Resolution of the 3rd Plenum. The General Secretary and the Communist Party as a body, has now stressed that the nation has entered a new era of historical development. That forward movement changed the fundamental current challenge facing the nation from one centered on the development of economic productive forces to one focused on the uneven distribution of that development. That change in challenge required a fundamental change in the way in which the critical issue of the development of productive forces would be undertaken. To those ends it was necessary first to further develop the concept of productive forces to suit the times. And in that process also to change its focus from one in which traditional economic production was emphasized to one that took a more comprehensive view of the scope of the nation’s productive forces to include social, institutional and cultural forces.
From that it was a natural step to align this more contemporary view of productive forces with the concept of innovation. New quality development is the phrase that is used to describe a complex aggregation of objectives that are designed to coordinate a re-orientation in the way in which a nation approaches its development. It focuses of course on new forms of economic development, and on the modernization of traditional economic sectors. But it also focuses on wider context elaborated in the General Secretary’s "four urgent needs" (迫切需要; Pòqiè xūyào)[1] emphasized in his explanation of the 3rd Plenum Resolution/Decision. These suggest a high level of coordination of all of the nation’s productive forces in ways that align the old project of Reform and Opening Up with its new era characteristics as the nation seeks to engage with the general contradiction of current times. The third of these urgent needs may be particularly relevant--the urgent need to better adapt to the changes in the main contradictions in Chinese society.
With this as foundation it is possible to better approach the question of the interpretation of the main message and timing of the General Secretary’s Guidance and the essay on the historical importance of the Era of Reform and Opening Up.
First, development remains a key issue both for China and for the global community. The focus on new quality innovation as a key element of socialist (Chinese) modernization brings development back into central focus. That is important not just for China, as the discussion above suggests, It is also now a critical global issue. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has again emphasized development as a key issue to which institutional resources are devoted. The 1986 UN Resolution on the Right to Development has become an important element in the discussions around sustainability and human rights at a global level. The 3rd Plenum Decision provides a potentially important Chinese perspective on those discussions at a theoretical and practical level.
Second, the technological revolutions of the last decades, as well as the large changes in institutional management of economic, social, and cultural production make management of innovation an inevitable object of institutional rationalization. That rationalization is already well underway in other parts of the world. The European Union has its AI Law; the United States its own markets driven and State assisted approaches. It would have been impossible for China to avoid seeking to put its own stamp on the challenges of innovation. Because technological innovation has now acquired a life of its own practically everywhere on Earth, one must either seek to manage and coordinate its application to human social relations or that will happen by other means.
2, The arrest of Telegram founder Pavel Durov has energized both critics of Big Tech and ardent libertarians, who fear a fresh crackdown on free speech. It is easy to see the arrest, carried out by French prosecutors on Saturday, could be seen as a new front in global regulators’ and governments war on social media and free speech. Meanwhile, South Korea to ask Telegram, other social media firms to help tackle digital sex crimes. How do you see the global debate, and its implications for social and economic governance from a perspective of law and globalization?
This question will produce a much shorter answer than the previous one. Indeed the arrest of Mr. Durov, like other high profile projections of the State police power was meant both to respond to criminal allegations in a particular case but also to send messages to any number of different groups. These messages would be heard in different ways depending on who was listening—legislators, consumers, media producers, and the like. One of the messages touches on the debates on free speech. Another on the duty of media platforms to manage the spaces they provide for the production and consumption of speech, and the third speaks to the quality of that speech in those places as potential means of destabilizing a society politically, socially and culturally.
It is interesting to note that almost at the same time as Mr. Durov was being arrested, Mr., Zuckerberg, was sending an equally high profile letter to certain members of the U.S. Congress, one paragraph of which expressed regret for complying with the Biden Administration’s requests for suppressing or managing certain content on the social media platforms his companies operated. Yet Facebook also has a set of regulatory standards and a quasi-judicial review body. And Twitter (now X) approaches things differently.
One can see that the issue is complicated, The complicates are compounded because the virtual spaces of these platforms do not always neatly align with political, social, cultural or religious borders. These virtual spaces, like the physical spaces they mimic, also provide places for the operation of informal economies and societies, and for criminal enterprises. They serve as a new front in the projection of political power and can be used by State and other actors in conflict with rivals. And, of course, it is far too late to believe that one can suppress or eliminate these forms of social relations without tremendous consequence, much of it not positive.
That brings us to law and governance. Unless it is enacted as ornament or aspiration, law is only as effective as the willingness of the State to enforce it and the population to be guided by it. That alignment remans imperfect even in the best of times and in the best managed political spaces. Governance, to the extent that t brings in other techniques of social management, augments but does not deviate from the basic proposition. All of this is upended where there is no consensus, even within polities, about the basic values that are meant to be furthered in and through these platforms. At the international level there certainly has been much talk and some action, but these reflect deep division and also the fundamental problem of regulation that will suppress the “bad” however a polity seeks to define that term, without also obliterating the good, which every society now finds too irresistible to abandon. In the meantime there is a furious competition (mostly online ironically enough) to shape the narratives and perception universe within which it is even possible to talk about the issues. That is also a work in progress.
3, EURASIA GROUP'S 2024 TOP RISKS REPORT warned earlier this year that The US presidential election will worsen the country's political division, testing American democracy (its legitimacy and functionality) to a degree the nation hasn't experienced in 150 years and undermining US credibility on the global stage. Have you observed any new reasons in 2024 season to concern? As a well-known legal scholar, have you noticed any new vision and actions from either Democratic Party or Republican Party to tackle the problem (or unavoidable)?
It is true that many people appear to enjoy or have given into a variety of states of hysteria about the functioning or lack of functioning of the American Republic. And some members of the various groups that together constitute the American political elites have found that the cultivation of a heightened form of political hysteria in the American new era has value. At the same time that cultivation of hysteria ought to be put in context. The American Republic is built to some extent with this sort of political mania in mind. This is hardly the first or only time that the Republic has indulged in these behaviors. And it is not clear that they harm, rather than embarrass, the Republic in the long term.
But perception tends toward reality. And the perception of instability through the strategic cultivation of hysteria by members of both leading political parties ought not to be taken lightly. As your question suggests, perception hurts American credibility and thus also its ability to protect its interests and to anticipate effectively in global areas. Nonetheless, people and institutions have been using the bad behaviors of all political stakeholders instrumentally for almost the entire history of the Republic. And again one might be wise to start by asking oneself: (1) is what ways do the current sets of behaviors differ from those in the past and (2) to what extent is the amplitude of bad behavior by stakeholders significantly increase the risk of internal destabilization or (perhaps more important) the appearance of internal instability with substantial external effects. I might suggest that developments on the ground abroad have more direct impact than the current state of pre-election political theater. Credibility, indeed, may be more a product of the actions of officials that impact relationships abroad than by the antics of political figures within or beyond the expectations of the contemporary American political culture.
First, the strategic elements in the narratives of hysteria ought not to be underestimated. First, the nation’s enemies have an incentive to exaggerate the effects of the current political passions for their own ends. This happens all the time and can be deployed against all states. Thus it is necessary to separate the discourse of hysteria as a political tool from the more research oriented question of the extent and character of its expression. That is particularly important when one considers the narratives of ratings.
Second, there is some power in the sense that the current political situation has exaggerated the strategic use of hysteria in ways that may be destabilizing. Actors in both political parties have been both praised and criticized for resorting to the mechanisms of law—civil and criminal—in ways that align with political objectives. This is not unique in form but perhaps more intense than in the recent past.
Third, the underlying political issues ought not to be dismissed. The American polity is, in its own way, confronting critical issues at the core of its political-economic model in ways that have not been undertaken in some time. The discussion is neither elegant nor managed, But that, in a sense, is precisely the way that some might argue the political discussion in the Republic is meant to take place. Whether it becomes destabilizing remains to be seen, Right now it is distracting, from a global perspective, in some ways that might raise concerns.
4, The documented surge in violent threats, harassment, and physical attacks targeting elected and civic officials (also around the globe) has reached a tipping point, especially after the attempted assassination of Former President Donald Trump at his rally. There are also discussions about History Repeat Itself, with memories of the violent events of January 6, 2021. do you think the US society has a consensus on the urgency of the problem? do you think it is necessary to amend or adjust the current system and law to effectively avoid worsening situation of “Weaponized Words and Deeds”?
I am not sure the American Republic is anywhere near any such tipping point in terms of stability. I have suggested, in answer to the prior question, that in Chinese socialist terms, the America polity has reached the end of an era of historical development and is, in its own way, seeking to identify the full context of the emerging general contradiction and the theoretical path forward to meet the challenge of that contradiction. Perhaps social justice is a nice way of framing what is emerging. Perhaps some other term will emerge.
It is worth noting that word have been weaponized in the Republic since the time of its founding. The question isn’t weaponization so much as whether the polity continues to follow the rules respecting the use of those weapons. Or, perhaps, whether those rules are changing. Sadly, as well, the nation has witnessed political violence for a long time. Again, historical perspective is useful in gauging the effects.
5, A general Hostility to Beijing in Washington and a high level of suspicion in Beijing over DC hinder attempt to re-establish a close relationship between US and China like before. What is your ideal model for the two global powers to co-exist in the next decade to come?
Thank you for this question. It is one that I think about often. I am an outsider to politics and an academic. Perhaps that makes my opinion less valuable than that of someone more deeply involved in State affairs. Having said that, it may be possible to see the glimmerings of what may emerge in the actions of both States since the early 2010s, something that I have written about in a little more detail elsewhere. It would be based on a recognition of the differences in the two political-economic models, a respect for that difference within the home territories of each and an effort to find common ground beyond conceptual difference in their working relations elsewhere in the world. It would be based on an understanding that all states are free to cultivate and maintain their production chains in and among their respective communities of States and other actors. And it would be based on a greater commitment to finding multilateral solutions to common problems where possible. But fundamentally it must be based on the effort in practice to talk to each other—and perhaps that requires acceptance of the realities that agreement will not always be possible and that more substantive discussions outside public spotlights may sometimes be helpful.
Perhaps there is a more helpful way of understanding the current situation: what appears to be emerging from a singular, converging, and unitary vision of a global order is instead a set of ordering systems built around a core power and arranged like spokes from a wheel, all connected to the center through these spokes and connected to each other along the rims. The emerging global system is then tied to the way these wheels are used. In the bast possible case, each of the wheels supports a frame which can then be propelled forward in a coordinated way as the wheels spin. The ideal of the global cart supported and guided by two great wheels is appealing. It touches both on the Chinese narrative of win-win and on the US narrative of a rules based multilateral legal and economic order. The danger lies where there is little desire to attach the wheels to the global cart or where one wheel spins in one direction and the other in an opposite direction. Even more dangerous is the situation where a wheel spins itself off the frame that supports the cart. The hope of many is that the wheels will serve their purpose, remain true to themselves, and cooperate, drawing strength from the construction of their own wheel systems and interacting through the global cart that they carry forward. Whether this is possible remains unclear; the alternatives, though, ought to be unpalatable to all parties.
Prof. Backer （白 轲）采访
采访人：朱润宇 （Runyu Zhu）
澎湃新闻 （上海）
2024 年 8 月 30 日：
1、您分享了《求是》杂志发表的两篇重要中文文章【全面领会《决定》的指导】和《继续推进邓小平中国特色社会主义》两篇重要文章。您如何从您的角度解读它在国内外的主要信息和时机？
这是一个很好的问题，我很高兴您注意到这两篇关键文章之间的联系。长期以来，总书记在讲话和著作中强调了改革开放时代的两个重要要点。
第一点是改革开放在规划中国社会主义道路方面的历史重要性。这是中国在理论和实践中始终走的道路。改革开放时代产生了今天仍然重要的关键理论要素——社会主义现代化建设原则和在共产党以人民为中心的指导下发展生产力的中心是两个关键要素。为了实现这些目标，有必要从最紧迫的问题开始，即经济现代化问题。这一挑战是从晚清继承下来的，但仍然是更全面发展的障碍。
总书记同志强调的第二个重要观点是，应对国家面临的挑战的基础必须与时俱进。这一见解与改革开放时期突出的另一套重要原则相吻合——解放思想、实事求是也是继续强调的关键理念。第一个是为了提醒我们，不不断发展的理论往往会衰败;第二个提醒我们，与实践脱节的理论往往会变得无关紧要。
历史文章强调了这些观点。所有理论都在其时间和地点以特定的方式应用。要使理论具有相关性，它必须正确地将其一般原则与它所要应用的条件保持一致。 反过来，这种一致性总是根据这种辩证练习的最终目标来评估的。在这种情况下，自中华人民共和国成立以来，其目标始终如一——在有组织的领导力量先锋队的指导和领导下，在中国建立一个走社会主义道路的共产主义社会。
这就引出了总书记制定的指南，以便更好地理解三中全会决定/决议的主旨。总书记和共产党作为一个机构现在强调，国家已经进入了历史发展的新时代。这一前进运动将国家当前面临的根本挑战从以经济生产力发展为中心转变为以发展分配不均为重点。这种挑战的变化要求对生产力发展这一关键问题的处理方式进行根本性的改变。为此，首先必须进一步发展适应时代的生产力概念。在这个过程中，也将其重点从强调传统经济生产转变为更全面地看待国家生产力的范围，包括社会、制度和文化力量。
从那时起，将这种更现代的生产力观与创新的概念保持一致是自然而然的一步。 新质量发展是一个短语，用于描述复杂的目标聚合，这些目标旨在协调一个国家发展方式的重新定位。 当然，它侧重于新的经济发展形式和传统经济部门的现代化。但它也关注了总书记的“四个紧急需求”（迫切需要;Pòqiè xūyào） 在他对第三次全体会议决议/决定的解释中强调。这些都表明，在国家寻求应对当前时代的普遍矛盾时，改革开放的旧工程与新时代特征相一致，国家所有生产力都处于高度协调状态。这些迫切需求中的第三个可能特别相关——更好地适应中国社会主要矛盾变化的迫切需要。
以此为基础，可以更好地解读总书记总书记同志的指导意见和时间问题，以及关于改革开放时代历史意义的文章。
首先，发展仍然是中国和国际社会的关键问题。注重新的质量创新是社会主义（中国）现代化的关键要素
首先，发展仍然是中国和国际社会的关键问题。将新的质量创新作为社会主义（中国）现代化的关键要素，使发展重新成为中心焦点。正如上面的讨论所表明的那样，这不仅对中国很重要，而且现在也是一个关键的全球问题。人权事务高级专员办事处再次强调发展是机构资源投入的关键问题。1986 年联合国关于发展权的决议已成为全球层面围绕可持续性和人权的讨论的重要组成部分。三中全会决定在理论和实践层面为这些讨论提供了潜在的重要中国视角。
其次，过去几十年的技术革命，以及经济、社会和文化生产制度管理的巨大变化，使创新管理成为制度合理化的必然对象。这种合理化已经在世界其他地区顺利进行。欧盟有自己的 AI 法;美国 自己的市场驱动和国家协助的方法。中国不可能避免寻求在创新挑战上留下自己的印记。因为技术创新现在几乎在地球上的任何地方都获得了自己的生命，所以人们必须寻求管理和协调其在人类社会关系中的应用，或者这将通过其他方式实现。
2、Telegram 创始人帕维尔·杜罗夫 （Pavel Durov） 的被捕激发了大型科技公司的批评者和狂热的自由意志主义者，他们担心言论自由会受到新的镇压。很容易看出，法国检察官周六实施的逮捕可以被视为全球监管机构和政府对社交媒体和言论自由的战争的新战线。与此同时，韩国要求 Telegram 和其他社交媒体公司帮助打击数字性犯罪。您如何从法律和全球化的角度看待全球辩论及其对社会和经济治理的影响？
这个问题将产生比前一个短得多的答案。事实上，逮捕杜罗夫先生，就像其他高调地展示国家警察权力一样，既是为了回应特定案件中的刑事指控，也是为了向任何数量的不同团体传递信息。这些信息会以不同的方式被听到，这取决于谁在听——立法者、消费者、媒体制作人等。其中一条信息涉及关于言论自由的辩论。另一个是关于媒体平台管理它们为言论生产和消费提供的空间的责任，第三个是关于这些地方的言论质量，作为在政治、社会和文化上破坏社会稳定的潜在手段。
有趣的是，几乎在杜罗夫先生被捕的同时，扎克伯格先生正在向美国国会的某些议员发送一封同样高调的信，其中一段对遵守拜登政府的要求表示遗憾，即压制或管理其公司运营的社交媒体平台上的某些内容。然而，Facebook 也有一套监管标准和一个准司法审查机构。而 Twitter（现在的 X）处理事情的方式不同。
人们可以看到这个问题很复杂，复杂之所以复杂，是因为这些平台的虚拟空间并不总是与政治、社会、文化或宗教边界完全一致。这些虚拟空间，就像它们模仿的物理空间一样，也为非正规经济和社会的运作以及犯罪企业提供了场所。它们充当政治权力投射的新战线，可供国家和与竞争对手发生冲突的其他行为者使用。当然，现在相信一个人可以压制或消除这些形式的社会关系而不会产生巨大的后果还为时已晚，其中大部分不是积极的。
这就把我们带到了法律和治理。除非它被颁布为装饰品或愿望，否则法律的有效性取决于国家执行它的意愿和人民受其指导的意愿。即使在最好的时代和管理最好的政治空间中，这种对齐也是不完美的。治理，在某种程度上引入了其他社会管理技术，它增强了但不偏离了基本命题。所有这一切都被颠覆了，因为即使在政体内部，也没有就这些平台中和通过这些平台进一步推进的基本价值观达成共识。在国际层面上，当然有很多讨论和一些行动，但这些反映了深刻的分歧，也反映了监管的根本问题，它将压制“坏”，然而，政体试图定义这个词，同时又不抹杀好，现在每个社会都觉得好太不可抗拒了，不能放弃。与此同时，一场激烈的竞争（主要是在线的，具有讽刺意味的是）来塑造叙事和感知世界，甚至可以在其中谈论这些问题。这也是一项正在进行的工作。
3、欧亚集团的 2024 年主要风险报告今年早些时候警告说，美国总统大选将加剧该国的政治分裂，将美国民主（其合法性和功能性）考验到该国 150 年来从未经历过的程度，并破坏美国在全球舞台上的信誉。在 2024 赛季中，您是否观察到任何值得关注的新原因？ 作为一名著名的法律学者，您是否注意到民主党或共和党为解决这个问题（或不可避免）而采取的任何新愿景和行动？
的确，许多人似乎对美利坚共和国的运作或缺乏运作感到或已经陷入各种歇斯底里的状态。共同构成美国政治精英的各个群体的一些成员发现，在美国新时代培养一种高度的政治歇斯底里是有价值的。同时，应该把歇斯底里的培养放在上下文中。美利坚共和国在某种程度上就是考虑到这种政治狂热而建立的。这并不是共和国第一次或唯一一次沉迷于这些行为。而且，从长远来看，他们是否伤害了共和国，而不是让共和国感到尴尬，目前尚不清楚。
但感知倾向于现实。而两个主要政党的成员通过战略性地培养歇斯底里而给人带来的不稳定感，也不应该掉以轻心。正如你的问题所暗示的那样，认知会损害美国的信誉，从而也会损害其保护自身利益和在全球地区有效预测的能力。尽管如此，人们和机构几乎在整个共和国历史中一直在利用所有政治利益相关者的不良行为。同样，明智的做法是先问自己：（1） 当前的行为与过去有什么不同，以及 （2） 利益相关者不良行为的幅度在多大程度上显着增加了内部不稳定的风险，或者（也许更重要的是）内部不稳定的出现具有实质性的外部影响。我可能会认为，国外的事态发展比目前的选举前政治舞台更具有直接影响。事实上，可信度可能更多地是影响海外关系的官员行动的产物，而不是当代美国政治文化预期之内或之外的政治人物的滑稽行为。
首先，歇斯底里叙事中的战略元素不应被低估。首先，这个国家的敌人有动机夸大当前政治激情对他们自己目的的影响。这种情况一直发生，并且可以针对所有状态进行部署。因此，有必要将歇斯底里作为一种政治工具的话语与其表达的程度和特征的更研究性的问题区分开来。当人们考虑评级的叙述时，这一点尤其重要。
其次，从某种意义上说，当前的政治局势以可能破坏稳定的方式夸大了歇斯底里的战略使用，这具有一定的力量。两个政党的行为者都因以符合政治目标的方式诉诸法律机制（民事和刑事）而受到赞扬和批评。这在形式上并不独特，但可能比最近的过去更强烈。
第三，不应忽视潜在的政治问题。 美国政体正在以自己的方式面对作为其政治经济模式核心的关键问题，这是一段时间以来从未采取过的方式。讨论既不优雅也不精心管理，但从某种意义上说，这正是一些人可能认为共和国的政治讨论注定要进行的方式。 它是否会破坏稳定还有待观察，目前从全球角度来看，它在某些方面可能会分散注意力，这可能会引起担忧。
4，针对民选和公民官员（也在全球范围内）的暴力威胁、骚扰和人身攻击的记录激增已经达到了一个临界点，尤其是在前总统唐纳德·特朗普在集会上被暗杀未遂之后。还有关于历史重演的讨论，以及对 2021 年 1 月 6 日暴力事件的回忆。您认为美国社会对问题的紧迫性有共识吗？您认为有必要修改或调整现行的制度和法律，以有效避免“武器化言行”的恶化吗？
我不确定美利坚合众国在稳定性方面是否接近任何这样的临界点。 在回答前一个问题时，我已经提出，用中国社会主义的术语来说，美国政体已经走到了一个历史发展时代的终点，并且正在以自己的方式寻求确定正在出现的一般矛盾的全部背景和应对该矛盾挑战的理论前进道路。也许社会正义是构建正在出现的事物的一种很好的方式。 也许会出现其他术语。
值得注意的是，自共和国成立以来，这个词就被武器化了。问题不在于武器化，而在于政体是否继续遵守关于使用这些武器的规则。或者，也许，这些规则是否正在改变。同样可悲的是，这个国家长期以来一直目睹政治暴力。 同样，历史视角在衡量影响时很有用。
5、华盛顿对北京的普遍敌意和北京对华盛顿特区的高度怀疑阻碍了美中重建密切关系的尝试。对于这两个全球大国在未来十年共存，您理想的模式是什么？
谢谢你的这个问题。这是我经常思考的问题。 我是政治的局外人，也是一名学者。 也许这使得我的观点不如一个更深入地参与国家事务的人的观点有价值。话虽如此，我们或许可以看到自 2010 年代初以来两国行动中可能出现的微光，我在其他地方已经写过更详细的文章。它将基于对两种政治经济模式差异的认识，尊重彼此本国领土内的差异，并努力在世界其他地方的工作关系中寻找超越概念差异的共同点。这将基于这样一种理解，即所有国家都可以自由地在各自的国家和其他行为体社区内和之间培养和维护其生产链。这将基于在可能的情况下为共同问题寻找多边解决方案的更大承诺。但从根本上说，它必须基于实践中相互对话的努力——也许这需要接受这样一个现实：达成一致并不总是可能的，而且在公众聚光灯之外进行更实质性的讨论有时可能会有所帮助。
也许有一种更有助于理解当前形势的方法：看似从单一、趋同和统一的全球秩序愿景中浮现出来的，其实是一套围绕核心力量建立的秩序体系，它们像车轮的辐条一样排列，通过辐条与中心相连，沿着轮辋相互连接。新兴的全球体系与这些车轮的使用方式息息相关。在最可能的情况下，每个车轮都支撑着一个框架，然后随着车轮的旋转，框架可以以协调的方式向前推进。由两个巨轮支撑和引导的全球大车的理想很有吸引力。它既涉及中国的双赢叙事，也涉及美国的基于规则的多边法律和经济秩序叙事。危险在于，人们很少想把车轮装到全球大车上，或者一个车轮朝一个方向旋转，另一个朝相反方向旋转。更危险的情况是车轮从支撑大车的框架上脱落。许多人希望这些车轮能够发挥它们的作用，忠于自己，相互合作，从它们自己的车轮系统建设中汲取力量，并通过它们所推动的全球车轮进行互动。这是否可能仍不清楚；然而，替代方案应该是各方都难以接受的。
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