 |
| Pix credit here |
There is a certain rhythm to Cuban desperation, and a certain cycle to the relations between Cuba and foreign enterprises that from time to time are willing to take the risk that investment in Cuba will pay off in some positive way. That rhythm, like a marriage of badly paired partners, starts with attraction (sometimes encouraged by home states), then high intensity courting, then the marriage and intensely crazy early relationship, where the parties get to know each other, and then disaster, when the foreign enterprises learned to their horror that they married a gold digger who now has their claws on their assets. Hilarity follows--over and over. The 2025 version goes something like this:
Pix credit here Las autoridades cubanas han comunicado a varias empresas extranjeras que no van a poder repatriar las divisas que tienen en cuentas bancarias en el país, que en algunos casos ascienden a varios millones de dólares, según ha podido saber EFE. El anuncio ha generado un fuerte malestar entre las compañías afectadas, que en algunos casos se han quejado a sus respectivos Gobiernos, según fuentes empresariales y diplomáticas con conocimiento de la situación que pidieron permanecer en el anonimato.
[Cuban authorities have informed several foreign companies that they will not be able to repatriate the foreign currency they hold in bank accounts in the country, which in some cases amounts to several million dollars, according to EFE. The announcement has generated strong discontent among the affected companies, which in some cases have complained to their respective governments, according to business and diplomatic sources with knowledge of the situation who requested anonymity.] (Gobierno bloquea la repatriación de divisas a empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país; original reporting by EFE here).
 |
| Pix credit here |
In a sense this is funds capture in the interests of the State. The Cuba State has not appropriated the funds--that sort of direct and crude method appears to have become something like a relic of the Cuban 20th century past). Instead, the Cuban authorities have effectively sealed off the country (again) in the sense that all funds generated in Cuba must stay in Cuba or may be spent beyond it only with the approval of the State. These enterprises, in effect, become something like a State controlled enterprise, but only with respect to those matters (and funds) of interest to the State. But more than that, of course. Foreign enterprises are already heavily regulated and monitored in Cuba in any case. And they are also insulated form any sort of deep penetration into the Cuban economy. What changes (again) now is that the enterprise is now more closely aligned with State financial objectives. They have been to some extent in the past but may now be understood as instruments in the service of the State. The quid pro quo is that these foreign enterprises may keep a bit of what they produce. Perhaps a new conceptual category is now in order--not state owned or state controlled enterprises, but something else. Perhaps, indeed, foreign enterprises operating within Cuban Caribbean Marxist-Leninist ordering are best understood as an indirect instrument of foreign states, the activities of which might be further understood to manifest a form of foreign relaitons int he form of economic operaitonal aid, the form and management of which must align with the interests of the client state. Private forms become merely a convenient means of effectuating public purpose by the home state.
Yet for all of the delights of trying to understand (and of course either laud or criticize) a small country under stress doing what it can to appropriate what it can without inviting severe consequences, the actions by the Cuban State has undergone a remarkable transformation. A decade ago, these actions (like its variations in the past) would have brought some condemnation and lots of lecturing about the nature of markets, the need to protect the integrity of foreign investment, and the role of a rules based international order to srt all that out. Today, the action was so unremarkable that it required some work to discover any press interest beyond the Cuban diaspora community (and of course the enterprises affected). The reason reflects the time. Today one watches as the old convergence globalization has been swallowed by fractured systems of hub and spoke win-win arrangements centered on sovereignty and the "patriation" (and repatriation of national interests, including in the form of its economic activities or those of its instruments. This is an emerging order in which national security has become far more broadly understood than it was at the end of the last century; it is an emerging order in which sanctions and security are sometimes melded together by forms of action; it is a world order in which sovereignty is more broadly understood and in which the projection of foreign interests into a state may, under increasingly broad circumstances be understood as not just aggressive but invasive; it is an emerging order in which the foreign element in national life (economic, political, social, and cultural) must be more thoroughly supervised and managed. It is in this environment that the Cuban State actions appear well within the established norms--with one exception: generally subaltern states need the consent or approval (active or passive) of their higher ranked patron. Perhaps that consent was obtained; it would be curious to know which of Cuba's possible patrons had the laboring oar on this one. In a sense, the new apex powers have only themselves to blame; and who can blame Cuba, either for the turn to the instrumentalization of enterprises, or for the effective capture of value added in the service of the national economy. In today's environment that may just be merely a variation of the initiatives of the great powers.
The reporting by OnCuba follows.
 |
| Pix credit here (Cuba's Credit and Commerce Bank building) |
Gobierno bloquea la repatriación de divisas a empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país
A cambio, las autoridades cubanas están ofreciendo a los afectados la posibilidad de abrir en la isla un nuevo tipo de cuentas bancarias en divisas, con las que teóricamente sí podrían operar sin limitaciones.
Las autoridades cubanas han comunicado a varias empresas extranjeras que no van a poder repatriar las divisas que tienen en cuentas bancarias en el país, que en algunos casos ascienden a varios millones de dólares, según ha podido saber EFE.
El anuncio ha generado un fuerte malestar entre las compañías afectadas, que en algunos casos se han quejado a sus respectivos Gobiernos, según fuentes empresariales y diplomáticas con conocimiento de la situación que pidieron permanecer en el anonimato.
“Estamos en total desacuerdo. No es el dinero del Gobierno (cubano), sino dinero de las empresas”, se quejó a EFE un empresario, que denuncia que su cuenta ha sido “congelada” y sólo puede usar esos fondos para operaciones dentro del país.
A cambio, las autoridades cubanas están ofreciendo a los afectados —en una serie de encuentros individuales que denominan “entrevistas”— la posibilidad de abrir en la isla un nuevo tipo de cuentas bancarias en divisas.
Se trata de una modalidad piloto y muy restringida —aunque algunas voces creen que su uso podría ampliarse a empresas mixtas— con la que teóricamente estas compañías sí podrían operar sin limitaciones, porque estos apuntes contables tendrán respaldo monetario.
No obstante, estas cuentas admitirán solamente capital nuevo, pues no se puede traspasar el de las cuentas previas: sólo se aceptarán transferencias del exterior.
Algunas empresas extranjeras que atraen inversión a la isla ya están empezando a abrir y operar este tipo de cuentas, de las que al parecer ya disfrutan empresas de GAESA, el conglomerado empresarial de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) que controla sectores estratégicos de la economía nacional, del turismo a las telecomunicaciones, y tiene establecimientos de comercio minorista, bancos, gasolineras e inmobiliarias, entre otros.
Entre las empresas extranjeras afectadas hay quienes ven esta medida como un paso doloroso, pero necesario. Alegan que las restricciones ya eran un hecho desde hace años y confían en que con las nuevas cuentas puedan realizar operaciones internacionales o repatriar beneficios.
Muchos empresarios, no obstante, han recibido la oferta cargados de escepticismo por el mal recuerdo de experiencias previas, como el extinto peso convertible (CUC) o la virtual Moneda Libremente Convertible (MLC), y dudan de que las condiciones actuales de esas nuevas cuentas se vayan a mantener en el futuro dada la situación de crisis en el país.
Falta de liquidez
La ventaja teórica de estas nuevas cuentas es que serían en principio inmunes a los graves problemas de liquidez de los bancos cubanos, un sector completamente estatalizado tras el triunfo de la revolución en 1959.
El sistema financiero cubano se encuentra actualmente atravesado por múltiples dificultades, desde los distintos tipos de cambio paralelos a la descapitalización y la falta de liquidez, tanto en pesos cubanos —racionada desde agosto pasado— como en divisas, con diversos grados discrecionales de limitaciones.
Las causas, como las de la grave crisis económica en que se encuentra sumida la isla desde hace más de cinco años, hay que buscarlas en la combinación de la pandemia, el endurecimiento de las sanciones estadounidenses —entre las que destaca su inclusión en la lista de países patrocinadores del terrorismo— y la aplicación de fallidas políticas económicas y monetarias.
El acceso a divisas está fuertemente limitado desde al menos el año pasado debido a que el Estado atraviesa grandes dificultades financieras y está recurriendo a los fondos en el sistema bancario para adquirir bienes básicos en el extranjero.
El Estado cubano detenta el monopolio del comercio exterior y en la actualidad importa alrededor del 80 % de lo que se consume en la isla, con prioridad en combustible y alimentos, porque la producción nacional se ha derrumbado.
En este contexto, las autoridades cubanas han iniciado procesos de bancarización —para reducir la circulación de efectivo— y de dolarización —de trámites administrativos y servicios estatales— a fin de captar un mayor volumen de divisas de la economía y poder afrontar pagos en el exterior.
* * *
Government Blocks Repatriation of Foreign Currency to Foreign Companies Established in the Country
In exchange, Cuban authorities are offering those affected the possibility of opening a new type of foreign currency bank account on the island, with which they could theoretically operate without limitations.
Cuban authorities have informed several foreign companies that they will not be able to repatriate the foreign currency they hold in bank accounts in the country, which in some cases amounts to several million dollars, according to EFE.
The announcement has generated strong discontent among the affected companies, which in some cases have complained to their respective governments, according to business and diplomatic sources with knowledge of the situation who requested anonymity.
"We totally disagree. It's not the (Cuban) government's money, but the companies' money," one businessman complained to EFE, claiming that his account has been "frozen" and that he can only use those funds for operations within the country.
In exchange, Cuban authorities are offering those affected—in a series of individual meetings they call "interviews"—the opportunity to open a new type of foreign currency bank account on the island.
This is a very restricted pilot program—although some believe its use could be expanded to include joint ventures—with which these companies could theoretically operate without limitations, as these accounting entries will be backed by monetary funds.
However, these accounts will only accept new capital, as capital from previous accounts cannot be transferred: only transfers from abroad will be accepted.
Some foreign companies that attract investment to the island are already beginning to open and operate these types of accounts. Companies belonging to GAESA, the business conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which controls strategic sectors of the national economy, from tourism to telecommunications, and has retail establishments, banks, gas stations, and real estate agencies, among others, already operate these accounts.
Among the affected foreign companies, some see this measure as a painful but necessary step. They argue that the restrictions have been in place for years and are confident that the new accounts will allow them to conduct international transactions or repatriate profits.
Many business owners, however, have received the offer with skepticism due to bad memories of previous experiences, such as the defunct convertible peso (CUC) or the virtual Freely Convertible Currency (MLC), and they doubt that the current conditions of these new accounts will be maintained in the future given the country's crisis. Lack of Liquidity
The theoretical advantage of these new accounts is that they would, in principle, be immune to the serious liquidity problems of Cuban banks, a sector that was completely state-owned since the triumph of the revolution in 1959.
The Cuban financial system is currently experiencing multiple difficulties, from disparate parallel exchange rates to undercapitalization and a lack of liquidity, both in Cuban pesos—rationed since last August—and in foreign currency, with varying degrees of discretionary limitations.
The causes, such as those of the severe economic crisis that the island has been mired in for more than five years, must be found in the combination of the pandemic, the tightening of US sanctions—most notably its inclusion on the list of state sponsors of terrorism—and the implementation of failed economic and monetary policies.
Access to foreign currency has been severely limited since at least last year because the state is experiencing significant financial difficulties and is resorting to funds in the banking system to purchase basic goods abroad.
The Cuban state holds a monopoly on foreign trade and currently imports around 80% of what is consumed on the island, with priority given to fuel and food, because domestic production has collapsed.
In this context, Cuban authorities have initiated processes of banking integration—to reduce the circulation of cash—and dollarization—of administrative procedures and state services—in order to attract a greater volume of foreign currency from the economy and be able to handle payments abroad.
No comments:
Post a Comment