En Cuba, por ejemplo, no puede hablarse en los mismos términos sobre la corrupción en los procesos de contratación entre el Estado y el sector privado, porque la mayor parte del sector productivo y comercial está bajo el control o es propiedad del mismo Estado. Tampoco son aplicables las teorías o enfoques que se utilizan para analizar la corrupción política en América Latina, porque estas en su mayoría parten del supuesto de que existen varios partidos políticos que se enfrentan periódicamente en procesos electorales y requieren fuentes de financiamiento privado para sostenerse y cubrir los costos de sus campañas. Ricardo A. Puerta, Corrupción en Cuba y como combatirla: Una propusta de auditoría social, Buenoa Aire: Fundación CADAL, 2004, at 8) [In Cuba, for example, one cannot use the same terms in speaking of corruption in ther processes of contracting between the state and the private sector, because the greater part of the productive and commercial sector is under the control of or is the property of the state. Also inapplicable are theories or approaches that are used to analyze political corruption in Latin America, because these, in large part are grounded in the assumptions of the existence of multiple political parties that periodically compete in elections and which require private financing sources to sustain their efforts and cover the costs of their campaigns.]
Corruption flourishes in many states, but in failed states it often does so on an unusually destructive scale. There is widespread petty or lubricating corruption as a matter of course, but escalating levels of venal corruption mark failed states: kickbacks on anything that can be put out to fake tender (medical supplies, textbooks, bridges, roads, and tourism concessions); unnecessarily wasteful construction projects arranged so as to maximize the rents that they generate; licenses for existing and nonexistent activities; and persistent and generalized extortion. In such situations, corrupt ruling elites mostly invest their gains overseas, not at home, making the economic failure of their states that much more acute. Or they dip directly into the coffers of the shrinking state to pay for external aggressions, lavish residences and palaces, extensive overseas travel, and privileges and perquisites that feed their greed. Military officers always benefit from these excessively corrupt regimes and imbibe ravenously from the same illicit troughs as civilian officials. (Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 1-25. Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institute, at 8).
Esteban Morales, PhD., has been “separated from the ranks” of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) for his publication of an article denouncing what he considers the counter-revolutionary corruption and bureaucracy that exists in the country. The Playa Municipal Committee of the PCC communicated its decision to the grassroots level of the Party.
The phenomenon of corruption within the State (almost everything belongs to the State here) has been recognized by the highest leadership of the Party, everyone in Cuba knows about it, and articles have even been published on it in the official government-party media.
At this moment Morales is preparing his appeal.
His Party membership card was stripped from him by his punishers, though communist commitment remains in Morales. (From Pedro Campos, Esteban Morales Booted from Cuba’s Communist Party, Havana Times, June 298, 2010).
When we closely observe Cuba's internal situation today, we can have no doubt that the counter-revolution, little by little, is taking positions at certain levels of the State and Government.
Without a doubt, it is becoming evident that there are people in positions of government and state who are girding themselves financially for when the Revolution falls, and others may have everything almost ready to transfer state-owned assets to private hands, as happened in the old USSR.
Fidel said that we ourselves could put an end to the Revolution and I tend to think that, among other concerns, the Commander in Chief was referring to the questions relative to corruption. Because this phenomenon, already present, has continued to appear in force. If not, see what has happened with the distribution of lands in usufruct in some municipalities around the country: fraud, illegalities, favoritism, bureaucratic slowness, etc.
In reality, corruption is a lot more dangerous than the so-called domestic dissidence. The latter is still isolated; it lacks an alternative program, has no real leaders, no masses. But corruption turns out to be the true counter-revolution, which can do the most damage because it is within the government and the state apparatus, which really manage the country's resources.
. . . . .
An entire underground economy that the State is unable to control and will be impossible to set aright as long as the big imbalances between supply and demand that today characterizes our economy exists.
This economy is, then, a form of counter-revolution that does have concealed leaders, offers alternatives to the State's offerings, and has masses that practice it. (From Esteban Morales, Corruption: The true counter-revolution?, Progreso Weekly, April 21, 2010).)
What was recently learned regarding the weaknesses of a group of functionaries at a very high level – having to do with favoritism, the buddy system, certain acts of corruption and carelessness in the handling of sensitive information, as well as some evidence of a struggle for power waged by those functionaries – was information that, lamentably, was passing into the hands of the Spanish intelligence services, even though those services were very careful not to enlist the officials' participation. Those are extremely serious matters.
In other words, matters as sensitive as the hunger and hope for power, favoritism, corruption and unseemly statements about the country's top leadership, which were already known by the foreign special services. A real “political merchandise” with extremely high added value in the hands of the enemies of the Revolution.
. . . .
Very recently, General Acevedo, director of the IACC (Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba) was removed, and what is making the rounds in unofficial circles about the reasons for his ouster is enough to keep people awake at nights.
There must be some truth in what they say, because this is a very small and familial country. The affair still has not had an exhaustive public explanation, as the people expect, because – if it's like the rumors say – the people's money and resources were squandered amid an economic situation that's quite critical to the country. So, either to vindicate Acevedo or to condemn him, you have to explain it to the people, the people the Revolution has created and formed, technically and scientifically, and who are prepared and with sufficient ability. In reality, I must say, as a hypothesis, that what happened in the IACC is not unique. It has been discovered in other places and there may still be companies where the same is happening, i.e., where the chiefs are receiving commissions and opening bank accounts in other countries. Which is a working theory valid enough to open other investigations so that such affairs will not catch us by surprise. (id.).
La temida “Dama Anticorrupción” del régimen cubano, Gladys Bejerano, reportó un retroceso en la lucha contra la malversación en La Habana, una de las principales prioridades del gobierno de Raúl Castro, que trata de reformar la tambaleante economía de la isla.
“Se incrementaron los hechos delictivos y de corrupción” en La Habana, informó la contralora general Bejerano, quien funge además como vicepresidenta del Consejo de Estado, según una información publicada el martes en el oficialista periódico Granma.
Bejerano comentó sobre las recientes auditorías hechas por su agencia a 132 entidades públicas en la capital. Solamente 73 recibieron una calificación de “aceptable”, lo que representa “un retroceso… cuando se compara con el anterior proceso”, de acuerdo con el Granma. Juan O. Tamayo, Régimen cubano reconoce aumento de corrupción
El Nuevo Herald (Miami, FL), June 22, 2011.
[The dreaded "Lady Corruption" Cuban regime, Gladys Bejerano, reported a setback in the fight against malfeasance in Havana, one of the main priorities of the government of Raul Castro, which seeks to reform the faltering economy of the island.
"There was an increase in criminal acts and corruption" in Havana, said the comptroller general Bejerano, who also serves as vice president of the State Council, according to a report published Tuesday in the official newspaper Granma.
Bejerano commented on the recent audit by the agency to 132 public entities in the capital. Only 73 were rated "acceptable," which represents "a step backwards ... when compared with the previous process," according to Granma.]