(Pix © Larry Catá Backer)
This Blog Essay site devotes every February to a series of integrated but short essays on a single theme. For 2015 this site introduces a new theme: On a Constitutional Theory for China--From the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party to Political Theory.
This Post includes Part 16, CCP Leadership-Socialist Market Economy. It considers Paragraph 14 of the General Program.
Table of Contents
Part 16, Paragraph 14 of the General Program--CCP Leadership-Socialist Market Economy.
We have been reviewing the initial paragraphs of the CCP Constitution's General Program. The first two paragraphs of the General Program set out the outer framework of two critical aspects of Chinese constitutional theory. The five theories identified in paragraph 2 are the elaborated in paragraphs 3-7. Each, in turn, represents the “crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China” at each successive stage on the road toward communism. And the path itself makes clear that the process of successive crystallization is far from complete. Paragraph 3 elaborated on the place of classical Marxism-Leninism as the first stage of the path of socialism and serves as the foundation for Chinese political and constitutional theory. If the foundations of Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on European and received wisdom--the classical philosophy of Marxism-Leninism—the foundations of classical Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on Mai Zedong Thought.
Paragraph 4 considered Mao Zedong Thought as a necessary bridge between European theory and its transposition within the Chinese context, one that brings Marxism-Leninism forward from out of Europe into Asia, and places that forward evolution within the historical constraints of its time.It expressed the Leninist foundations of Chinese constitutional theory within notions of collective development and its role in establishing the socialist path toward which Mao Zedong Thought points, but which it does not in itself constitute. Paragraph 5 introduces the next stage in the development of Chinese constitutional and political Theory--Deng Xiaoping Theory. If Mao Zedong Thought provided a bridge from revolutionary to governing vanguard party, Deng Xiaoping theory provides the principles through which socialist modernization can be realized. Paragraph 6 introduces the succeeding layer of development of Chinese constitutional and political theory--the Important thought of Three Represents (Sange Daibiao). Paragraph 7 introduces the last of the current layers of theoretical development of Chinese political and constitutional theory--the scientific outlook on development. Paragraph 8 serves to sum up the initial paragraphs and as a bridge to the elaboration of the basic CCP line and working style in the paragraphs that follow. It is directed specifically to cadres and provides an easy conceptual framework within which they can understand their role in socialist modernization. Paragraph 9 the General Program moves from theory to action infused by theory. It considers the first of the three fundamental tasks of the CCP derived from its theory, that is the first operational element of the CCP line.
With Paragraph 10 we come to the first full expression of the CCP's basic line in the context of the current stage of development of China. The subsequent paragraphs amplify the basic line. Paragraph 11, the General Program begins the elaboration of the CCP's basic line, starting with economic development as the central task. Paragraph 12, we come to the second amplification of the CCP basic line--the four cardinal principles. Paragraph 13 we consider reform and opening up as an aspect of the CCP's basic line. These four paragraphs are meant to provide a declaration of the CCP's basic line--the product of the more general statements of principle and historical context of Paragraphs 1-9. provide guidance--and a more detailed elaboration of its more important elements.
The CCP's basic line goes to the substantive objectives of the party in fulfilling its role as the party in power. What what is the CCP's working style? How is it expected to act? Working style can be divided along two distinct but related lines. The first goes to the working style of CCP cadres, from the most junior to cadres to those serving in the most senior roles. Working style in this sense has been the subject of both the foundational paragraphs (¶¶ 1-8) and those establishing the CCP's line (¶¶ 9-13). In its second sense, working style goes to the working style of the CCP in its institutional manifestation; that is, it goes to the working style of a vanguard Leninist party within the context and subject to the constraints of its objectives (socialist modernization) and normative principles, its guidebook (¶ 2).
The foundation of the CCP's grounding working style is leadership. Paragraphs 14-19 elaborate the character and practice of the nature and practice of leadership by the CCP as an institutional actor. Paragraphs 14-19 construct the CCP's leadership obligations key specific general areas of activity; ¶ 14 (socialist market economy); ¶ 15 (socialist democracy); ¶ 16 (socialist culture); ¶ 17(harmonious socialist society); ¶ 18(socialist ecological progress); and ¶ 19 (People's Liberation Army). We consider each in turn.We start with ¶ 14.
[14] The Communist Party of China leads the people in developing the socialist market economy. It unwaveringly consolidates and develops the public sector of the economy and unswervingly encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sector. It gives play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources and works to set up a sound system of macroeconomic regulation. The Party works to balance urban and rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, relations between man and nature, and domestic development and opening to the outside world; adjust the economic structure, and transform the growth model. It is dedicated to promoting harmonized development of industrialization, IT application, urbanization and agricultural modernization, building a new socialist countryside, taking a new path of industrialization with Chinese characteristics, and making China an innovative country.The focus of the § 14 is the construction of the CCP's leadership role in developing the socialist market economy. Leadership is the core principle now brought forwqard from the basic theoretical principle of CCP legitimacy in ¶ 1 (CCP is the "core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics") to an operational level. To that end ¶ 14 appears first to define the socialist market economy itself, the contours of which are now well understood for the purpose of framing the CCP's leadership. The leadership role, then, provides the constraints within which the CCP may form policy and advance specific agendas in the service of socialist modernization in the economic sphere. Paragraph 14 elaborates these constraints within a well expressed net of principles.
[14] 中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义市场经济。毫不动摇地巩固和发展公有制经济,毫不动摇地鼓励、支持、引导非公有制经济发展。发挥市 场在资源配置中的基础性作用,建立完善的宏观调控体系。统筹城乡发展、区域发展、经济社会发展、人与自然和谐发展、国内发展和对外开放,调整经济结构,转 变经济发展方式。建设社会主义新农村,走中国特色新型工业化道路,建设创新型国家,建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会。
First, leadership in the socialist market economy requires balance. There is balance in leadership style between public sector and private sector activities . In each case the CCP must unwavering (毫不动摇) in its efforts. The CCP fails in its leadership role it does not maintain a balance among public and private sectors, it it devotes or privileges one over the other. The overall leadership of the CCP embraces all productive factors, whatever their character. As such, the CCP abdicates its leadership role by favoring one class or productive forces for another. The socialist market economy requires equal efforts directed toward all productive forces--including the productive force that is represented by the CCP itself.
Second, the thrust of those unwavering efforts are different with respect to the public and private sector economies. With respect to the public sector those efforts are directed toward consolidation and development (地巩固和发展). With respect to the private sector those efforts are directed toward encouragement, support and guidance (地鼓励、支持, 引导). Yet both efforts are united by a fundamental constraint--the acceptance of the basic role of market forces in the allocation of resources (发挥市 场在资源配置中的基础性作用).
Third, the balancing inherent in the leadership role extends to substantive policy areas. These areas reflect the current focus of policy-making for which the leadership of the CCP . This is necessary to prioritize and manage the legislative and administrative agendas of the state sector. And that prioritization itself reinforces the principles under which the CCP's working style may be manifested.
Fourth, the techniques of leadership emphasize regulation and not centralized planning (建立完善的宏观调控体系). And regulation is to be used in the service of harmonized development through the obligation of promoting a very specific list of policy priorities "Building a new socialist countryside, taking a new path of industrialization with Chinese characteristics, building an innovative country and a resource-saving and environment-friendly society" (建设社会主义新农村,走中国特色新型工业化道路,建设创新型国家,建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会。).
Fifth, the paragraph itself is written to provide the analytical style that should mark the approach of the CCP to the development of policy and assertion of its leadership role. This style moves from principles to theory to policy to operationalization. That is it moves from the most general to the most specific, and it moves from the most authoritative and constraining to the least constraining. It suggests a working style in which the greatest flexibility for leadership choices is possible at the operational level, and the least flexibility for leadership role flexibility is at at level fo basic principles.In a sense that insight reflects the organization fo the General Program itself, moving form foundational principles (¶¶ 1-2), to normative theory (¶¶ 3-8), to policy (¶¶ 9-13), to operationalization (¶¶ 9-1). That, in turn reflects the normative principles of democratic centralism to which we turn below.
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