The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: Tourists and Tourism

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Varadero beachfront)

The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack in Cuba is slowly but now quite perceptively shaping the contours of U.S.-Cuba relations going forward.  Even as the "rest of the West" moves toward engagement following the approach developed by the European Union and the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) (see here and here), the United States has re-framed its engagement along its traditional lines to to emphasize efforts to support the private sector and challenge the public sector (including the governmental apparatus).  

Almost invariably, and recently, the U.S. seems to draw attention to the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack as it continues to develop its policy approaches and objectives. So it is that one can more clearly see the way that the evolution of the investigation of the Affair is now more directly impacting strategic decisions on the extent of U.S. engagement. 

At the center of this are two now related currents: first the expansion of the scope of the investigations to include children and non-diplomatic personnel from the U.S. and Canada that appear to have been victims of the attacks (e.g., here); and the second is the resulting reaction by the State Department to warn against travel to Cuba.  

Democracy Part 41: The E.U. in Cuba: Reflections From the Cuban Independent Sector

In a recent post I considered the emerging state of E.U.-Cuban relations (The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)).  These centered around the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) negotiations for which were launched in April 2014 and concluded on 11 March 2016.To celebrate this new stage of E.U.-Cuban relations and to move the implementation of the PDCA forward the EU's Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, paid an official visit to Cuba in early January 2018 for "talks aimed at implementing the PDCA.  It is likely that on the agenda will be the structuring of the Joint Council established by PDCA to oversee the fulfillment of the agreement (PDCA art. 81) and the Joint Committee (Art. 82) charged with the actual implementation of the PDCA (Art. 82)." (The EU to the Rescue). That visit and the PDCA itself, were undertaken within the analytical structure of the EU's 2016 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, in which Cuba was described as "a one-party democracy, in which elections take place at municipal, provincial and national level. At municipal level, candidates can be proposed by the voters and delegates are selected by all voters in the constituency" (Ibid., 261) but on in which "candidates that do not represent mainstream party or mass organisation positions will not become candidates for provincial or national delegates." (Ibid.).

This E.U. initiative produced little interest in the United States, as its press and elites are busy either obsessing about other events deemed more interesting (to them), or in the context of U.S.-Cuban relations on the melodrama that has been the drawn out Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack. And yet both the visit and more importantly the potential and challenges of the PDCA for the E.U., Cuba and the U.S. are worth careful study and response by the U.S. This is especially the case as the U.S. and Cuba retreat again into ancient patterns of bilateral relations. That reversion provides a space in which the European Union might develop a "common template" for relations with the Cuban state in a way that the U.S. will find increasingly difficult to oppose or bend to its own interests. And, indeed,  template setting is precisely the role that the E.U., in the person of Ms. Mogherini, seeks for itself in Cuba (see, e.g., here). The Cuban State gave prominence to her remarks: "“Regardless of the changes in policy in Washington, the message I am bringing here is that Cuba's friendship and relationship with the EU is here to stay. It’s solid, it’s stable and it’s reliable,” stated Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" cite HERE).  She noted  that the PDCA "is a solid instrument to further support the social and economic modernization of Cuba and provide new opportunities to increase trade and investment, and find common solutions to global challenges, she stated." (Id.). 

That template and its trajectory for modernization has raised some concern among elements of the Cuban independent sector.  And ironically those concerns center on the very project that the E.U. prides itself on advancing elsewhere, the democratization of society. This post suggests the contours of reaction within Cuba from other than the official sector (here, here, and here).  To that end it reproduces an essay, La democracia que ve Europa en Cuba, written by René Gómez Manzano, (whose bio appears below and whose work has appeared form time to time on this blog) along with my brief comments and the section in the EU Human Rights and Democracy Report that discusses Cuba. The essay appeared recently in CubaNet (in the original Spanish with my English translation).  The reactions suggests the difficulty of reconciling democratic visions within the context of contests for trade and influence.  More importantly, it suggests the difficulty of speaking coherently about a concept that is proving to be quite malleable in the emerging age. 

The Emerging Pattern of Anti-Corruption Approaches in Domestic Law--The Case of Argentina and Perú

(Corrupción en ascenso en América Latina y el Caribe)

The political context in which corruption is understood and managed has seen a fundamental transformation from the first steps to redefine the political response to corruption by the U.S. and its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the 1970s, to the embrace of global normative political anti-corruption rules in the form of the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention and the UN Corruption Convention. And, indeed, it may well be the multilateralism and consensus inherent in the rise of international frameworks for anti-corruption standards and structures that might be an important element in further development. "The UK Bribery Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the US started a trend that has spread across the globe, including Latin America, to crack down on corruption. Anti-bribery laws and enforcement efforts attract business from multinational companies that may be less inclined to do business in countries deemed unsafe. . . . .Perhaps part of the growth of local anti-corruption efforts stems from the apparent cooperation of foreign and Latin American authorities to root out corruption." (Anti-corruption trends across Latin America).

Yet Transparency International Reported in October 2017 that its Latin American and Caribbean survey indicated that 

Almost two thirds of people that we surveyed for the latest Global Corruption Barometer, People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean, said that corruption had risen in the 12 months prior to when they were questioned (62 per cent).

More than half said that their government is failing to address corruption (53 per cent). And one in three people who had used a public service in the last 12 months said they had to pay a bribe (29 per cent). We talked to more than 22,000 people in 20 countries.

It’s no surprise then that across the region people regularly take to the streets to protest corruption. We’ve seen it in Brazil, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. We’ve seen it in Mexico and Honduras. In fact seven in ten citizens stand ready and willing to get involved in the fight against corruption (70 per cent).

Yet despite this, few bribe payers said that they had actually reported this to the authorities (9 per cent), and of those who do, almost one third said that they suffered negative retaliation as a result (28 per cent). (Corruption on the rise in Latin America and the Caribbean).

 (Corrupción en ascenso en América Latina y el Caribe)

For all that, change appears to be coming to Latin America.  This post looks to two--the adoption of new anti-corruption statutes in Argentina and Perú. Argentina enacted Law 27.401, which will enter into force in March 2018. Parú enacted into force Law 30424. The texts of the new statutes follow (Spanish) along with commentary (English) for the Argentine statute (Jorge and Basch: In Argentina, a new statute on corporate criminal liability for corruption) and Perú (Sandra Orihuela: Amid Odebrecht fallout, Peru enacts world-class anti-bribery law) both published in The FCPA Blog. These efforts join similar initiatives in Mexico (2017),  Columbia (2016), Chile (2013),  Brazil (2013), Uruguay (1998).  Argentina is particularly interesting because in addition to its new statute, it has sought to apply the system of governance through administrative discretion manifested in systems for the management of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion (Jorge and Basch: Argentina introduces deferred prosecution agreements, standards for compliance programs). This has application potentially in China as well (my thoughts here).  Other states are still a work in progress, though they have been moving toward embracing international standards: e.g., Paraguay.

Instituting a Cuban Internet Task Force "to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba"

(Estados Unidos mantiene a internet y las redes sociales como un campo de batalla contra Cuba. Foto: Tomada de Internet; Pix Granma)

The U.S. State Department has created a Cuban Internet Task Force.  

As directed in the June 16, 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” the Department of State is convening a Cuba Internet Task Force composed of U.S. government and non-governmental representatives to promote the free and unregulated flow of information in Cuba. The task force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access and independent media in Cuba.

The first open meeting is scheduled for 7 February2018 in Washington D.C., at the Harry S. Truman Building. Information for those wishing to attend will be provided in a Federal Registry Notice.

For the Americans, this is not just an initiative in line with the resetting of U.S.-Cuban relations initiated by President Trump--it also preserved an important vestige of President Obama's program for opening relations tied to greater internet access for all Cubans and the encouragement of open cyberspace. (For discussion of the internet directive see Implementing the "New" Cuba Policy: Considering the "National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba"). The policy speaks to amplifying "efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel. " (“Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” §2(d)). More specifically, §3(i) of the Policy directs  that:

(i) The Secretary of State shall convene a task force, composed of relevant departments and agencies, including the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and appropriate non-governmental organizations and private-sector entities, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through Federal Government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.

For the Cubans, this is another indication of the continued importance of an American project to destabilize the Cuban government as currently constituted (and thus the picture above as part of Cuban Communist Party Press coverage of the Cuban Internet Task Force). Cubans see this initiative as a successor to the projection of U.S. views through Radio Martí. They are particularly challenged by a  policy that deliberately seeks to avoid interactions with the state and reach the Cuban people directly.   

Reporing from Reuters and the reporting (in Spanish) from the Cuban Communist press organ) is included.

"America First" Explained at the Davos World Economic Forum: Text of President Trump's Address And White House Background Briefing

Founded by Klaus Schwab in 1971, the World Economic Forum’s original mission was to introduce successful American management techniques to European firms. The annual global gathering—now known to most simply as “Davos”—has grown into a four-day conference that hosts about 3,000 of the world’s elite in business, government, and civil society. (President Trump to Davos: ‘America Is Open for Business’)

So begins the U.S. Administration's description of the World Economic Forum, which President Trump Addressed on January 26, 2018.  That description (along with the image chosen for it, reproduced above) was itself a window of the world view that infuses current U.S. approaches to globalization and global trade.  

For much of the tenure of the 45th President, there has been much criticism and little explanation of the emerging U.S. approaches to global trade and the principles on which it will be operationalized.  There is a growing chasm between business and the intelligentsia, however, on its potential. 

What follows are the Remarks by President Trump and President Berset of the Swiss Confederation Before Bilateral Meeting, posted to the White House Website, and the Full text: Trump Davos speech transcript  that was reproduced by Politico. Also included is the Background Briefing given by a "Senior Administration Official" and also posted to the White House Website. All are worth considering carefully.  They suggest a development of the new American position on trade that appears to affirm that the American Administration has come to believe that the U.S: has entered into a new historical stage and is developing U.S. principles and engagement for this "New Era" of global engagement.

New Draft Posted: "The Ideal and Practice of Chinese Comprehensive Constitutionalism in the 'New Era'"

(Pîx © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Bronze Cowerie Container With Sacrificial Ceremony Scene (Dian Container)  Western Han Dynasty 202 BC - 8 AD; National Museum of China, Beijing )

I am happy to post for comments and reactions the draft of a recently completed article: "The Ideal and Practice of Chinese Comprehensive Constitutionalism in the 'New Era'.” It will eventually appear in Volume 33(2) of the Connecticut Journal of International Law.  My thanks to Ryan Hoyler and the editorial staff of CJIL who all continue to be a pleasure to work with.

The Article considers the evolution of Chinese Constitutionalism in the wake of the last, 19th,  Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  While many in the West used the opportunity of the Congress to engage in high level speculation about the politics embedded within the event (see, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, and here), few might have appreciated the significance of the 19th Congress for its contribution to the development of a Marxist-Leninist Constitutionalism with distinctly Chinese characteristics. That development is important not merely for its internal effects but for what it might offer to other states as a model of legitimating constitutionalism (and the construction of constitutional states) that varies in fundamental respects from the forms and expression of constitutionalism and the construction of constitutional states in the West. 

And, indeed, to some extent, the emerging structures of Chinese constitutionalism appear tailored not merely to best express Chinese notions of legitimacy in the structuring of a political order, but also to offer alternatives to states which have wrestled with the transposition of Western notions and practices over the course of the last half century or more. More importantly is the comprehensive nature of that objective.  Chinese constitutionalism appears to be just one element of a multi-prong effort to provide the world community with an alternative to political, economic, societal and cultural orderings that is meant to challenge the dominance of Western versions.  This "all-around" approach is not a secret.  Xi Jinping revealed its contours quite openly in his Report to the 19th CPC Congress in October 2017 (Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era). And thus the reference in the title of the drat article to both the elements of comprehensiveness and to the "New Era". 

The Abstract and Introduction follow.  Comments and engagement most welcome. 

Daisuke Takahashi: "”Tokyo Olympic Sustainable Sourcing Code and its Grievance Mechanism in a Japanese Legal Context” "

Daisuke Takahashi, Partner Attorney, Shinwa Sohgoh Law Offices and Vice Chair, CSR Project Team, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, is one of the leading voices in the area of Japanese corporate social responsibility (including sustainability and business and human rights). It has been my great pleasure to post some of his work before:  Daisuke Takahashi on the Japan Federation of Bar Association's Guidance on Human Rights Due Diligence Plus JFBA Model Clause in Supplier Contract (2016); and Daisuke Takahashi on "Japanese Lawyers' Engagement to Avoid the 'Lost in Translation' Effect on Business and Human Rights" (2015).

Mr. Takahashi made a quite important presentation at the last U.N. Forum for Business and Human Rights, held in Geneva in late November 2017. Organized by the Global Compact Network Japan, the

Institute of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO -EY Japan and Climate Change and Sustainability Services, the session was entitled Taking stock and reiterating commitment to remedy: Embedding respect for human rights in the Tokyo Olympics. It considered the challenges facing Japan as it seeks to embed corporate responsibility to respect human rights (along with a refinement of the state duty to protect human rights being developed through a Japanese National Action Plan) into the preparations for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics.

Mr. Tahahashi had very kindly given me permission to share his presentation slides, which follow below. The excellent and quite useful presentation material is provided below. Links are also provided to the Taking stock and reiterating commitment to remedy session description, the  Tokyo 2020 Sustainable Sourcing Code, and the Tokyo 2020's outline of the Grievance Mechanism (also reproduced below in provisional translation). These are all worth careful study and engagement. 

Just Published: "The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 50(4):827-888 (2017)

I am happy to announce the publication of "The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy," which appears in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 50(4):827-888 (2017).  The article considers the way that classical conceptions of the state owned enterprise, and the regulatory structures created around them, have been changing in the context of globalization and the rise of business and human rights governance regimes. The analysis is built around the 2016 Report of the U.N. Working Group for Business and Human Rights and offers a set of ten challenges and recommendations for further development.  The recommendations and challenges suggest the ways in which issues of corporate personality, of sovereign immunity, and asset partitioning will be central to the development of the SOE as an object of law and governance within and among states. 

The Abstract, Table of Contents and the Introduction follow.  The article can be accessed here.

Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) Webinar Series for 2018

 I am happy to pass along information about the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) Webinar Series for 2018. Carmelo Mesa, Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies University of Pittsburgh, will open the series with a Webinair entitled, "Social Welfare in Cuba.  The Webinar Series can be accessed HERE.

Constitutional Reform Comes to the Chinese State Constitution and Changes to China's Global Trade Relationships

The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party announced a program of potentially significant development of its constitutional model.  The changes required adjustment of the two great instruments of Chinese political legitimacy--first, the constitution of the vanguard Party, the holder of political leadership, and second, from that the modification of the constitution of the administrative state to conform its organization and operation, to ensure that the principles through which it is operated, conforms to that of the political constitution of the vanguard party. 

The amendment to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party were announced with the closing of the 19th CPC Congress--"Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China" (October 24, 2017). Those amendments decisively affirmed the determination of Chinese constitutionalism to forge its own normative path, yet one that continues to conform to global expectations of legitimacy enhancing constitutionalism. 

It is now time for the coordinated amendment to the State constitution This post and those that follow will consider the path to those amendments in light of the political constitution of the Chinese Communist Party within the grounding normative structures of global constitutionalism. Also below the Communique of the 2nd Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC.

Joel Slawotsky: "Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New National Security Strategy"

Joel Slawotsky, of the Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, and the Law and Business Schools of the College of Management, Rishon LeZion, Israel has guest blogged for "Law at the End of the Day"  on issues relating to corporate liability under international law  (e.g., "Rethinking Financial Crimes and Violations of International Law", Jan. 9, 2013; "Corporate Liability Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Latest Twist" April 26, 2014) and on issues of multilateral trade and finance (Joel Slawotsky Reports From Chinese University of Hong Kong: Asia FDI Forum II--China's Three-Prong Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Tracks; Joel Slawotsky--Essay "On the potential shift from the present-day architects to new architects on the definition of international law" (March 16, 2017)). He has also recently also served as Guest Editor of the Sovereign Wealth Fund special issue of Qatar University International Review of Law (IRL) (2015).

He has very kindly produced a marvelously insightful essay: "Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New National Security Strategy."  In the essay he considers the ramifications of the shifts and developments of U.S. policy as just recently delivered through the National Security Strategy of the United States (4 Dec. 2017) (hereafter the "NSS")(for my own thoughts, see here, and here).  He provides an important perspective on on what NSS might reveal of the direction of U.S. strategic thinking under the current administration. An excellent analysis of principled realism and of the emerging strategic relationships among China, Russia and the U.S.

The essay follows below.

And the Response From Cuba on Senator Rubio's Hearings on the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: "Cuba es un país seguro, pacífico y saludable" ("Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country")

(Pix Credit here)

The Cuban authorities have quickly responded to the hearings conducted by Senator Rubio, "Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight," in his role as chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues (Reporting on that here). It comes as no surprise that the Cuban authorities took the opportunity not merely to denounce the hearings, and Senator Rubio, but also to make their case that they were neither involved in any purported attack nor that the attacks in fact took place.  Josefina Vidal, the director General of the Cuban Foreign Ministry's U.S. desk denounced the hearings as irresponsible.

(Video of Statement  Josefina Vidal (Spanish))

The Cuban social media machinery also emphasized that Cuban experts continue to be skeptical.  They also emphasized the conclusions of an unpublished FBI report that has to date failed to find a proof of attack. On that point they encourage readers to take the position of Senator Flake against that of Senator Rubio. The emphasis, and the media position of the Cuban government, published in Spanish and English is that "Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country." Indeed the Cuban response was careful to deploy as well their parade of experts to counter the testimony adduced during the Rubio hearings.  In the process Cuba seeks to lay out its public case against the American accuasations (Cinco incongruencias de los supuestos ataques sónicos), including the listing of 10 conclusions of Cuban experts.

(Pix credit:Marco Rubio se queda sordo con Cuba).

This Post includes the responses in English and Spanish as reported in official and media sources cited above (in English and Spanish). We have reached a point in the public battle over control of the narrative of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack where both sides have now put forward allthe evidence they are willing to share, and both sides have more finely tuned their line. It is now time for more action.  And from the indications by Senator Rubio's committee that action will come from the investigative committee of the U.S. Department of State.  The story continues.

Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack--Summary of Senator Rubio's Position and Statements of Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues

On January 9, 2018, Senator Marco Rubio chaired a meeting of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues entitled "Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight."  It was live broadcast ( Foreign Relations here, and C-Span here). Recording of the hearing here.   Some of the background and the run up to the hearings may be found here. The public portion of the hearings permitted the members to stake out their positions--from skepticism to conviction that something, of some kind, occurred an that the Cuban state might in some way be involved.

This post includes a summary of the case that Senator Rubio sought to make in the Hearings and  also includes, without comment, the written submissions of the three witnesses called to testify: (1) Mr. Francisco Palmieri, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Affairs; (2) Mr. Todd Brown, Diplomatic Security Assistant Director, International Programs; and (3) Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, Medical Director, Bureau Of Medical Services.

The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack--Injured Canadian Children and Spats Within the Republican Party in Congress

One of the most interesting aspects of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack has been the pace of its development.  It has tended to show up ion news cycles at several weeks intervals, to lie dormant between short sharp bursts of public attention. In November 2017, I suggested the economic effects of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attacks--its intermeshing with economic policy and political objectives beyond  a determination of culpability for injury to the individuals affected (The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: Collateral Effects and Costs on Cuban Efforts to Rejoin the International Financial Community; and here). In December the media coverage again revived and amplified the Soviet connection and contemporary Cuban foreign policy (the trajectory of which works against U.S. interests) (The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: Collateral Effects and Costs on Cuban Efforts to Rejoin the International Financial Community).  

But then the beginning of 2018 was marked by change (as has not been unusual over the course of the history of the post 1959 governmental system in Cuba.  I noted the visit of E.U. officials seeking to implement a new trade and cooperation arrangement with Cuba  that appeared to take up the renewal of relations where those of the United States veered off in early 20'17 (The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)).  This appeared to provide cover for the recent efforts by Cuban authorities to pull back from "reform and opening up" as they tighten control over to contain the size of the private sector (Under Cover of the Sonic Weapons Attack: The Cuban Private Sector as Collateral Damage as Cuba Retreats Toward Central Planning).

But Congress has also become involved in the Affair--and in the process raised the political profile, shifting emphasis from the administrative bureaucracies of the Executive branch to the political sensibilities of Congress (The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: And now the U.S. Congress Becomes Interested in a Public Sort of Way).  

This post picks up two strands of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attacks through which the Affair is currently being carried forward (Marie-Danielle Smith, Canadian children were among those affected by sonic attacks in Cuba, documents suggest, National Post 4 Jan. 2018).  The first touches on the medical evidence of injury and the second amplifying political activity in Congress (Francisco Ordoñez, Rubio calls Cuba sonic attacks a “documented fact” after GOP colleague questions evidence, Miami Herald 7 Jan. 2018).   The Associated Press report includes link to a recording of what some U.S. embassy workers heard in Havana.

Just Published: "Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development and Governance," Wake Forest Law Review 52(4):735-780 (2017)

I am happy to announce the publication of "Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development and Governance," which appears in the Wake Forest Law Review 52(4):735-780 (2017).  The article considers sovereigns wealth funds in a new environment in which what had been a relatively straightforward device has become enmeshed in complex webs of finance, regional politics, and global production.  It considers the ways that emerging forms of SWF forms could be used by African states to enhance their autonomy and development. 

The Abstract and Introduction follow.  The article can be accessed here and here.

Interpretation and Fracture As the Orishas Speak Part II: The Full 2018 Letter of the Yoruba Association of Cuba (Letra del Año para el 2018 de la Asociación Yoruba de Cuba)

(Pix CiberCuba Jan 3, 2018)

For the last six years I have written of the annual letter of the Cuban Council of the High Priests of Ifá (Consejo Cubano De Sacerdotes Mayores De Ifá), the practitioners of traditional religion brought over from West Africa with the slave trade and now naturalized as a powerful indigenous religion throughout the Caribbean and growing in the United States. (e.g., 2016, 2015; 2014; 2013; 2012).

The annual letter is usually received in two parts. Immediately after the New Year the oracular portions of the Annual Letter are distributed (Adelanto). These include the bare oracular pronouncements received during the ceremonies undertaken at the start of the year.  Those oracular pronouncement are then amplified by a more extensive set of interpretations--including predictions, advice and ritual suggestions in an amplified letter delivered a few days later.

In that respect this year was no different. The Full 2018 Annual Letter with its predictions and guidance follows (and here). But this year was also different in one important respect. This year a group of priests have contested the predictions (not the oracles) of the association of priests who came together to draw them up.  (Polémica entre los santeros cubanos por predicciones "manipuladas" para el 2018, CiberCuba 3 Jan. 2018). This is a dispute about interpretation that in may ways mirrors those of the religious controversies  within Christianity, Islam and Eastern religions.  Interpretation becomes more important where the oracle is pointed toward criticism or prediction about consequences to powerful social actors--the state, great officials, members of the higher rungs of society, and within the fundamental social relationships through which society is organized. It is here that oracular wisdom can be put to more profane use, and where the politics (as well as the semiotics) of interpretation becomes  a matter of politics, and social power.  My brief comments and the news reporting of the interpretive schism follows.

The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)

(Pix credit: Marc Frank for Reuters)

Even as the United States retreated from direct economic connections with Cuba, the European Union sought to step into the space left by the American action.  That strategic initiative, the  Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) took final form accelerated in the wake of the prior U.S. Administration's policy of opening up.

Negotiations for the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) were launched in April 2014 and concluded on 11 March 2016. After the approval by the Council of the European Union, it was officially signed on 12 December 2016. In parallel, the agreement was submitted to the EU Member States' national parliaments and the Cuban National Assembly for ratification. The European Parliament gave its consent on 5 July 2017. Most parts of the agreement start to be provisionally applied as of 1 November 2017. (here)

The Europeans view this as the marker of a new and more intensely profitable relationship with the Cuban state--though one not without its costs to Cuba. PDCA is the successor policy to the EU's Common Position which was repealed 12 December 2016 (repeal of the Common Position).

And now the EU's Federica Mogherini is on an official visit to Cuba for talks aimed at implementing the PDCA.  It is likely that on the agenda will be the structuring of the Joint Council established by PDCA to oversee the fulfillment of the agreement (PDCA art. 81) and the Joint Committee (Art. 82) charged with the actual implementation of the PDCA (Art. 82).

This post includes current reporting on the visit by Marc Frank for Reuters and an analysis of the PDCA. Most interesting is the possibility that in return for stronger ties the EU might have waived the application of its strong business and human rights measures to EU Cuba bilateral relations. The E.U. appears to be willing to pay for its influence--from supporting the realization of Ciba's sector driven 2030 Economic Plan, to the E.U.'s help in avoiding or weakening the effects of the Cuban Embargo.  The Background Brief on the PDCA (CPE Background Brief 1/2018) may be downloaded HERE.

Just Published: "Commentary on the New Charity Undertakings Law: Socialist Modernization through Collective Organizations " The China Nonprofit Review 9(2):273 – 309

I am happy to report the publication of my article: "Commentary on the New Charity Undertakings Law: Socialist Modernization through Collective Organizations."  It appears in the The China Nonprofit Review, Volume 9, Issue 2, pages 273 – 309 (2017). The article considers the new Charity Undertakings Law for its conformity to the Basic Line of the Chinese Communist Party (or in more Western terms, for its conformity to the fundamental political normative principles of the Chinese state).  I thought it useful to consider the conformity of lawmaking within its own system's principles as a necessary foundation for any comparative analysis.

The abstract and introduction follow.  In keeping with Brill Journal Self Archiving Rights policy, I can only provide access to the submitted version of the article: HERE. 

The Orishas Speak: The 2018 Letter of the Yoruba Association of Cuba (Letra del Año para el 2018 de la Asociación Yoruba de Cuba)

(Pix CiberCuba Jan 1, 2018)

In most states, the priestly role has been transformed.  But it is useful, as one examines the priestly role in modern western states, to consider a more traditional relationship between the priest and the state.  One of the more interesting manifestations of the role of religion within political life is that of the priests of the practitioners of the old religions of Africa as re-established in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Marxist-Leninist Cuba.  (here)

For the last six years I have written of the annual letter of the Cuban Council of the High Priests of Ifá (Consejo Cubano De Sacerdotes Mayores De Ifá), the practitioners of traditional religion brought over from West Africa with the slave trade and now naturalized as a powerful indigenous religion throughout the Caribbean and growing in the United States. (e.g., 2017, 2016, 2015; 2014; 2013; 2012).

La Letra del Año comenzó a emitirse en Cuba a finales del siglo XIX, sin poder precisar la fecha exacta. Por datos y documentos se revela que babalawos procedentes de las diferentes ramas religiosas existentes en el país comenzaron a reunirse para efectuar con todo rigor las ceremonias establecidas, que concluían el primero de enero con la apertura de la Letra del Año. (EcuRed, Letra del Año) (The Annual Letter was first produced sometime near the end of the 19th century.  Existing evidence suggests that the Babalawos of the different branches of the faith in the nation started to gather together  to invoke with all rigor the appropriate ceremonies that concluded on the 1st of January) with the opening of the Letter of the Year).

2018 marks the third year of an important change, in which many of the most important branches of the faith came together to produce a unified letter. ("El documento, que copiamos íntegramente a continuación, incluye el signo y el orisha regentes, además de la oración profética. El documento se ha elaborado conjuntamente entre la Asociación Yoruba de Cuba y la Comisión Organizadora para la letra del Año Miguel Febles Padrón." (here)) The object of the annual letter is to provide guidance for the nation and its people.  More specifically it is meant to provide guidance for faith practitioners otherwise unable to receive more specific guidance within their own branch.

Probablemente uno de los acontecimientos más importantes y que une tanto a religiosos como ateos en Cuba es la salida, en los primeros días de enero, de la Letra del Año, interpretación del oráculo de Ifá con las predicciones para el año que comienza.El cuerpo de la Letra del Año lo conforman recomendaciones, sugerencias, advertencias, etc, para pasar tener un año provechoso y sin grandes percances. Casi todas las áreas quedan cubiertas entonces, desde la salud hasta la familia, sin dejar de pasar por acontecimientos de índole política y medioambiental. (CiberCuba, Letra del Año) [In all likelihood, one of the most important events that unites both religious and atheists in Cuba is the delivery, in the first days of January, of the Letter of the Year, interpretation of the oracle of Ifá with the predictions for the coming year. The body of the Letter of the Year is made up of recommendations, suggestions, warnings, etc., to have a successful year and avoid major mishaps. Almost all areas are covered then, from health to the family, without avoiding events of a political and environmental nature]

The Advance (Adelanto) Preliminary Letter for 2018 (also HERE) follows along with a brief reflection. It is the bare bones of the divination; the recommendations and more precise interpretations will follow.   The full letter will be forwarded in the next several days.