Domingo Amuchastegui Commentario (Commentary): "El Eslabon perdido de la Crisis en Cuba" [The Missing Link of the Crisis in Cuba] and the Central Contradiciton of Democratic Organization in its Leninist and Liberal Democratic Forms

 

There continues to be a lot of discussion about the ramifications of the 11 of July popular protests in Cuba and their aftermath.  Much of it, of course, is more about the feelings and perspectives of those who write.  That is a pity because in the process--a process that has its origins in the infatuation of the pre 1959 revolutionary movement and its charismatic leaders as a sort of metaphor for the cultural revolutions about to begin  among the Western intelligentsia and which continues to the present time--the reality of Cuba and its need for dispassionate analysis is lost  in its use as a sort of political-intellectual fetish. 

It is thus refreshing to come across the analysis of Domingo Amuchastegui who for many years served the post revolutionary Cuban state.  His essay, "El Eslabon perdido de la Crisis en Cuba" [The Missing Link of the Crisis in Cuba], nicely captures an insider's perspectives of the challenges and capabilities limitations of the Cuban establishment, as well as its opponents, to move beyond the societal explosions of 11 July 2021, to plausible movement  within the current historical context of Cuba. That forward movement, for  Amuchastegui, requires the creation of a uniquely Cuban expression of what for Chinese Leninism would be understood as mass line politics--of the creation of robust spaces within which societal segments could engage collectively with the issues facing the nation.  For that to happen, Amuchastegui suggests, the Cuban vanguard will have to change substantially. 

Amuchastegui, however, highlights something far more basic and far more important: the central contradictions of systems organized around collectives.  That central contradiction is this:  Collective organizations embed systems of collective tyranny; it is in the nature of collectives that its integrity is grounded in the need to discipline its members; but that discipline itself undermines the democratic character on which the legitimacy of the collective is organized.  For Leninist states that contradiction is focused on a tyranny of a minority--the leading social forces organized as a superior political force. For liberal democratic systems it is the tyranny of the majority--the incarnation of popular will expressed periodically (through elections) which invariably discriminate against "discrete and insular minorities" (Carolene Products, n. 4). Both systems seek to confront their central contradictions but necessarily in very different ways.  Contemporary Leninist systems respond through the structural devices of engagement--implementing principles of "mass line ("from the people to the people"), democratic centralism, and now structures of consultative democracy. Liberal democratic systems work from the other direction, developing increasingly elaborate structures of managerialism to tame and harness the principle of mass democracy now within systemic cages of regulation and oversight by courts, legislatures, and accountability systems that analyze behaviors against a democratic ideal. Each is imperfect, and each struggles against am moving target--time passes, people die and others grow to take their place, social conditions change, as do tastes and the way interpretive communities see the world around them.  What separates Leninism from liberal democracy, in this context, what differentiates minority and majority tyranny, is expressed in the differences between the emphasis on consultation (contemporary Leninism) and accountability (contemporary liberal democracy). It is the inability to confront these central contradictions successfully in each historical era that proves fatal to these systems, or that produces profound transformation.

Cuba sits uncomfortably between the two--a Leninist system committed to the principles of guided majoritarianism. The central contradiction is both compounded and made doubly difficult to overcome--at least conceptually and in ways that preserve the system's legitimacy. Moving back and forth between one pole and the other, if only within tightly and narrowly conceived boundaries has proven successful at putting off  the moment when contradiction can no longer be avoided.  That moment appears to be arriving. But Cuba's leadership collective, like that of the United States, are all prisoners of the logic of the institutions whose trajectories now augment the profundity of contradiction. The question for both is whether they might confront contradiction in ways that preserve the fundamental forms of their political organization. That remains to be seen.

The essay in the original Spanish is republished here with permission, along with my translation, along with my brief comment (in English and Spanish). 

 

Domingo Amuchastegui has had a long and distinguished career. He has served as Cuba's Chargé d'Affaires in Guatemala, was Department Head of Socialist Countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department Head of the Organization Department at the Tricontinental Organization (1960s-70s), Chief Analyst in the Intelligence Directorate and "Liberación", and a Professor of Contemporary History and Regional Conflicts at the Universidad Pedagógica and the Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales (Cuba). He is the author of Historia Contemporánea de Asia y Africa (4 volumes), Palestina: Dimensiones de un Conflicto, Angola in the XX Century (1988)and the co-author of Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition he has written hundred of articles and essays for Cuba News, Cuba Standard, and various Cuban publications. He participated in fact-finding missions throughout Africa, Asia and Chile, served as Chief analyst during Fidel Castro's visit to Chile and adviser to the Angolan Government (1986-1988). He has resided in the United States since 1994.

 

 My comment:

Lo que me gusto mas que todo y el núcleo de lo que viene después:

“el término Revolución es usado y abusado hasta la saciedad, ignorando que desde los años 70 una dinámica de revolución se agota (las grandes transformaciones se han completado hacia fines de los 60) y sobreviene entonces lo que comenzó a denominarse como institucionalización, la que mal que bien identifica hasta hoy el funcionamiento institucional del país (Partido, Constitución, Poder Popular y su Asamblea Nacional, planes económicos, congresos, presupuesto y otros, en medida considerable copiando el modelo soviético). "

Estoy de acuerdo, el problema es politico. Pero la política de desrumba en la fatalidades de una ideología que nunca pudo liberarse del problema Leninista—la transformación de un partido de revolucionarios profesionales en un colectivo por los cual se puede gobernar en acuerdo con la base fundamental de la ideología—el establecimiento de una sociedad comunista bajo el liderazgo de las fuerzas sociales avanzadas. En la Union Soviética, como analizó Trotsky, ese problema fracaso con la contrarrevolución Estalinista. En China la atentan y no se sabe si podrán avanzar el proyecto. En Cuba el egoísmo de los históricos y el sentido que la revolución y lo que vino después estaba encarnado (como Dios en el cuerpo de Jesus) en las personalidades que giraron de Mexico en esa lancha ahora famosa. Las consecuencias de desarrollaron cómo escribiste—inevitable y una lastima por el gasto social y la perdidas que ha sufrido esa isla. El desarrollo del Leninism pudiera seguir otro camino, pero ahora creo que quizás es tarde. Usted lo ha notado en varias formas. Pero el institucionalizo ahora ya tan establecido es un impedimento y requiere rectificación para aliviar el ahogo que ahora es la burocracia cubana. Cuba para sobrevivir mas o menos en el estado político en que se encuentra tendrá que reinventarse desde el momento revolucionario—o es decir desde el punto en cuanto los militares dominaron una sociedad cuyas normas era tabula rasa. Quizás la nueva generación lo intenta, pero la solución ya require mas que las temas burocráticas introducidos en el gran teatro de los congresos. Como dices usted:

Hoy se impone la necesidad de expresar esa diversidad en instituciones, asociaciones, medios de información y sus expresiones políticas capaces de ventilar sus consensos, inquietudes, desacuerdos y oposición a todos los niveles, desde la Asamblea Nacional hasta la presidencia, desde la formación del gobierno hasta ejercicios legislativos con derecho al veto de las mayorías. 

Eso sí se puede hacer bajo un regimen Leninista, pero requiere un Leninismo as a punto de las realidades contemporáneos. Y creo que por el momento Cuba no tiene los intelectuales interesados o capadles (quizás) de construirlo con autioridada. Lástima.

What I liked most of all and the core of what comes next:

“The term Revolution is used and abused ad nauseam, ignoring that since the 70s a dynamic of revolution is exhausted (the great transformations have been completed towards the end of the 60s) and then what began to be called institutionalization, which Bad that good identifies until today the institutional functioning of the country (Party, Constitution, People's Power and its National Assembly, economic plans, congresses, budget and others, to a considerable extent copying the Soviet model). "

 I agree, the problem is political. But politics unravels in the fatalities of an ideology that could never free itself from the Leninist problem — the transformation of a party of professional revolutionaries into a collective by which it can be governed in accordance with the fundamental basis of ideology — the establishment of a communist society under the leadership of advanced social forces. In the Soviet Union, as Trotsky analyzed, that problem failed with the Stalinist counterrevolution. In China they attack it and it is not known if they will be able to advance the project. In Cuba, the selfishness of the historical people and the sense that the revolution and what came after was incarnated (like God in the body of Jesus) in the personalities that traveled from Mexico in that now famous boat. The consequences developed as you wrote — inevitable and a shame for the social cost and other losses that island has suffered. The development of Leninism could go another way, but now I think it may be too late. You have noticed it in various ways. But the institutionalization now so established is an impediment and requires rectification to alleviate the suffocation that is now the Cuban bureaucracy. To survive more or less in the political state in which it finds itself, Cuba will have to reinvent itself from the revolutionary moment — or that is to say, from the point when the military dominated a society whose norms were tabula rasa. Perhaps the new generation tries, but the solution already requires more than the bureaucratic issues introduced in the great theater of congresses. As you say:

Today there is a need to express this diversity in institutions, associations, information media and their political expressions capable of airing their consensus, concerns, disagreements and opposition at all levels, from the National Assembly to the presidency, from the formation of the government. up to legislative exercises with the right to veto the majority.

This can be done under a Leninist regime, but it requires a Leninism that is close to contemporary realities. And I think that for the moment Cuba does not have the intellectuals interested or capable (perhaps) of building it authoritatively. Pity.
_________

EL ESLABON PERDIDO DE LA CRISIS EN CUBA

Por Domingo Amuchastegui

El estallido social del 11 de Julio ha tenido entre sus muchas consecuencias que el Partido/Estado emprendiera un grupo de medidas económicas de alguna trascendencia, pero conservando intacto en lo esencial el modelo estatista-absolutista. No es ocioso recordar que de este modelo afirmó Fidel Castro en famosa entrevista con uno de los editors de la famosa revista norteamericana The Atlantic: “El modelo cubano ya no funciona más ni siquiera para nosotros.” (Cita tomada por la BBC, 9/9/2010). Ciertamente, una reflexión bien crítica que, lamentablemente, no se tradujo en hechos.

Un componente no menos importante de las acciones emprendidas ha sido el maratón de reuniones y debates encabezados por el Presidente Díaz-Canel con numerosos sectores (religiosos, juveniles, vecinales de barrios marginales, estudiantiles, campesinos, obreros, economistas y periodistas). Ha sido una suerte de catársis colectiva en que los tonos críticos se han expresado en medida considerable. Es como si, de repente, la dirigencia cubana “descubriera” una abultada agenda de problemas no resueltos e ignorados durante décadas (como es el caso de los barrios marginales). Cabe preguntarse ¿Hará falta otro 11 de Julio para profundizar el ritmo y alcance de las reformas?

Más allá de profundizar el ritmo y alcance de las reformas, y que es imprescindible abordar, es la dimensión política de la crisis, la que representa el eslabón perdido para una efectiva superación del estado de crisis acumulada. En la neolengua oficial prevaleciente, el término Revolución es usado y abusado hasta la saciedad, ignorando que desde los años 70 una dinámica de revolución se agota (las grandes transformaciones se han completado hacia fines de los 60) y sobreviene entonces lo que comenzó a denominarse como institucionalización, la que mal que bien identifica hasta hoy el funcionamiento institucional del país (Partido, Constitución, Poder Popular y su Asamblea Nacional, planes económicos, congresos, presupuesto y otros, en medida considerable copiando el modelo soviético).

Desde entonces se perfila la actual estructura de Partido/Estado, el estatismo-absolutista, que culmina proclamándose el Partido como fuerza superior de la sociedad y Partido de la Nación, como si este partido politico -más allá de sus méritos y respaldo popular- fuera capaz de encarnar una rectoría por encima de la Nación, el Estado, el Gobierno, con un ejercicio verticalista e inapelable del poder hasta sus más mínimos detalles. Aquello del rey francés Luis XIV de que “El Estado soy yo,” se empequeñecíe ante el enunciado de “Partido de la Nación.”

Por otra parte, el grado de homogenización económico-social -donde casi todo el mundo era empleado del Estado- de los inicios de los 70, podia tal vez permitirse enunciados tan absolutistas y que nada tenían que ver ya con la noción de “Partido de vanguardia.”Aclaro: el enunciado “de vanguardia” entraña un nivel de competencia con respecto a otros competidores y actores; sin esto la condición de vanguardia se suplanta por la de poder absoluto. Pero aún esa homogenización no era capaz de conciliar desencantos, creciente hostilidad y oposición al modelo dominante.

Ya desde los tiempos tempranos de las primeras emigraciones masivas (Camarioca-Vuelos de La Libertad), se comenzaba a advertir en el deseo masivo de marchar al exilio o emigrar una importante modificación relacionada con la composición social de los que se marchaban del país. En 1969, el Ministro del Interior, Comandante Sergio Del Valle, ya apuntaba a semejante modificación alertando -en una reunión a puertas cerradas- en el sentido de que la mayoría de los que marchaban ya no eran burgueses o sus servidores, sino mucha gente trabajadora. El planteamiento Del Valle preocupó momentáneamente, pero, eventualmente fue ignorado. Luego vendrían el Mariel (1980) y el llamado Maleconazo (1994), con sus secuelas migratorias de decenas de miles de cubanos.

Esa homogenización o uniformidad económico-social quedó atrás hace décadas. Comenzó con la entrada del dólar de exiliados y emigrados -además de sus múltiples influencias en términos culturales y politicos- y ha continuado hasta nuestros dias, donde ya cerca de un millón de cubanos se vinculan al emergente sector privado y donde la población rural se libera paulatinamente de los mecanismos estatales. Más aún con la aparición de la industria turística y la todavía muy modesta e incomplete Inversión Extranjera (IE). Es elemental concluir que en estas circunstancias, la sociedad cubana está muy distante de aquella de los comienzos de los 70.

No es ocioso recordar que en las primeras elecciones de los 70, se registraba un 98% de participación y aprobación. Las elecciones del 2018 aportaban algunas cifras elocuentes: de 8 millones 926 mil 575 votaron 7 millones 399 881 para un 82.90%. Entonces votaron por el listado oficial orientado por la consigna de “Votar por todos los candidatos escogidos, los 605, votó un 60.44% . Votaron selectivamente (contrariando la consigna oficial, sino que lo hicieron selectivamente fue un 19.56%. Y no votó (contrariando los repetidos llmados) un total de 18.10%. Estas tendencias estadísticas ya mostraban importantes variaciones en el comportamiento del electorado, tanto entre los que votaron y de la creciente abstención y votos negativos. Cifras éstas que aconsejaban algunas importantes e imperiosas modificaciones del sistema electoral, pero que, una vez más, eran desestimadas. Cualquiera puede especular que resultados pueden esperarse para el 2023, pero no resulta disparatado imaginar que los resultados serán mucho menos favorables. ¿Se llegará a una coyuntura -como predijera el entonces miembro del Buró Político, Lezcano, a comienzos de los 90- de “gobernar en minoría”?

Y si aquello que aprendimos los más mayorcitos sobre “base y superestructura” le asiste no poca razón, ante una sociedad multiestructural ya en fase inicial, no es posible continuar aferrados a un modelo económico probadamente inoperante y mucho menos a una superestructura política, instituciones y legislación que en muy poco se corresponde con semejante base de hoy.

A semejante diversidad económico-social tiene necesariamente que corresponder una diversidad política que debe expresarse en una diversidad política, institucional y legislativa. Esta realidad fue ignorada y sofocada en el momento de proceder a adoptar una nueva constitución, que de nueva tiene muy poco y que es copia casi exacta a la de 1992 (remedo de la de 1976), rechazando todas las propuestas que se hicieron por muchos ciudadanos, por ejemplo, en la necesidad de un reordenamiento integral de los mecanismos electorales de elección indirecta, “dedazos” y ausencia de diversidad de candidatos, olvidándose aquello que, en un momento dado, razonara el propio Fidel Castro en los preparativos de la primera de constitución de que sería muy aburrido eso de votar por candidatos únicos.

Hoy se impone la necesidad de expesar esa diversidad en instituciones, asociaciones, medios de información y sus expresiones políticas capaces de ventilar sus consensos, inquietudes, desacuerdos y oposición a todos los niveles, desde la Asamblea Nacional hasta la presidencia, desde la formación del gobierno hasta ejercicios legislativos con derecho al veto de las mayorías. No propongo -entiéndase bien- una vuelta al relajo de las instituciones hasta 1952, ni tampoco que se me tilde de “abogar por la democracia burguesa.” Los campesinos y cooperativistas, los pequeños y medianos propietarios, empresarios y profesionales, creyentes y no creyentes, podrán tener sus espacios politicos, parlamentarios y de asociación (no aquella ficción de los inicios de los 90) y que todo ello se exprese y discuta en la Asamblea Nacional y que la votaciones secretas sean eso y no a mano alzada. La gente revolucionaria y los propios militantes del Partido podrán expresarse sin temor a sanciones o represalias. Es muy saludable tener un “partido de herejes” (en el buen sentido del término) dentro de las filas del Partido Comunista o de cualquier partido y no obedientes y silentes miembros.

Granma puede seguir siendo un órgano oficial, la TV o Cubadebate (que nada debate) y otro órgano oficiales -todo lo aburrido y monótonos que quieran-, pero los “herejes” tienen todo el derecho a sus espacios dentro de esos órganos oficiales o medios informativos propios, y no limitados sólo a blogs o redes sociales en los cuales escuchar informaciones y criterios alternativos. Y que prevalezca el mejor, el más eficiente, el más persuasivo, con los mejores argumentos.

Para concluir, es este el eslabón perdido, el que, esencialmente, falta en la experiencia de Cuba, que salve las realizaciones esenciales, so pena de perderlo todo a corto o mediano plazo.

_________

THE MISSING LINK OF THE CRISIS IN CUBA
By Domingo Amuchastegui

The social explosion of July 11 has had among its many consequences that the Party / State undertook a number of related economic measures of some significance, whole at the same time keeping essentially intact the statist-absolutist model. It is not in this context it not without some use to recall what Fidel Castro affirmed about this model in a famous interview with one of the editors of the well-known American magazine The Atlantic: "The Cuban model no longer works even for us." (Quote taken by the BBC, 9/9/2010). Certainly, a very critical reflection that, unfortunately, did not translate into action [then or now].

A no less important component of the actions undertaken [after 11 July 2021] has been the marathon of meetings and debates led by President Díaz-Canel with numerous sectors (religious, youth, residents of marginal neighborhoods, students, peasants, workers, economists and journalists). It has been a sort of exercise in collective catharsis which was expressed in to a considerable extent in critical tones. It is as if, suddenly, the Cuban leadership “discovered” a bulky agenda of unsolved problems that had been ignored for decades (such as the marginal neighborhoods). One wonders, will it take another July 11 to deepen the pace and scope of the reforms?

Beyond deepening the pace and scope of the reforms, which it is essential to address, the political dimension of the crisis represents the missing link the engagement with which is essential for any effective effort to overcome the state of crisis that has been accumulating. In the prevailing official newspeak, the term Revolution is used and abused ad nauseam, a practice that ignores the reality that since the 70s a dynamic of revolution has been exhausted (the great transformations having been completed towards the end of the 60s) to be followed by what began to be called as institutionalization, one which for better or worse identifies the institutional functioning of the country until today (Party, Constitution, People's Power and its National Assembly, economic plans, congresses, budget and others, to a considerable extent copying the Soviet model).

From that time, the current structure of the Party / State as an absolutist-statism, has emerged, which culminated in the proclaiming of the Party as the superior force of society and the Party of the Nation, as if this political party -beyond its merits and popular support- were capable of embodying a mastery above the Nation, the State, the Government, with a vertical and unappealable exercise of power down to its smallest details. That conceit of the French King Louis XIV that "I am the State," is dwarfed by the sentiment conveyed by the statement of "Party of the Nation."

On the other hand, the degree of socio-economic homogenization - where almost everyone was an employee of the State - from the early 1970s, could perhaps plausibly allow for such absolutist statements that no longer had anything to do with the notion of "Party of avant-garde. ” Let me be clear: the notion of a “vanguard” implies a level of competence with respect to challengers and actors; without this, the condition of the vanguard is supplanted by that of absolute power. But even this homogenization was not capable of reconciling discontents, growing hostility, and opposition to the dominant model.

Even from the early days of the first massive emigrations (Camarioca-Vuelos de la Libertad), an important modification related to the social composition of those who left the country began to be noticed in the massive desire to go into exile or emigrate. In 1969, the Minister of the Interior, Commander Sergio Del Valle, already pointed to such a shift by warning - in a closed-door meeting - of a sense that the majority of those who were leaving were no longer bourgeois or their servants, but many working people. Del Valle's approach caused momentary concern, but was eventually ignored. Then came the Mariel (1980) and the so-called Maleconazo (1994), with its migratory consequences of tens of thousands of Cubans.

This homogenization or socio-economic uniformity was discarded decades ago. It began with the entry of the dollars from exiles and emigrants - in addition to its multiple influences in cultural and political terms - and has continued to this day, one in which now close to a million Cubans are linked to the emerging private sector and through which the rural population being liberated gradually from the state apparatus. Even more so with the appearance of the tourist industry and the still very modest and incomplete Foreign Investment (IE) regime. It is elementary to conclude that in these circumstances, Cuban society is very distant from that of the early 1970s.

It is usefully remembered that in the first elections of the 70s, 98% of participation and approval were registered. In comparison, the 2018 elections provided some eloquent figures: out of 8 million 926 thousand 575, 82.90% or 7 million 399 881 voted. The official list of 605, for which voters were to be guided by the slogan "Vote for all chosen candidates” received a vote of 60.44%. Moreover, 19.56% of the people voted selectively (contrary to the official slogan). And a total of 18.10% did not vote (contrary to repeated calls). These statistical trends already showed important variations in the behavior of the electorate, both among those who voted and the growing abstention and negative votes. These trends counseled important and imperative modifications of the electoral system, but which, once again, were rejected. Anyone can speculate what results can be expected by 2023, but it is not crazy to imagine that the results will be much less favorable Will there be a situation - as predicted by the then member of the Political Bureau, Lezcano, in the early 1990s - of "ruling in the minority"?

And if what the oldest among us learned about "base and superstructure" assists them with no little reason, in the face of a multistructural society already in the initial phase, it is not possible to continue clinging to a proven inoperative economic model and much less to a political superstructure, institutions and legislation that hardly corresponds to such a base of today.

Such economic-social diversity must necessarily correspond to a political diversity that must be expressed in political, institutional and legislative diversity. This reality was ignored and stifled at the time of proceeding to adopt a new constitution, which again has very little and is an almost exact copy of the 1992 one (imitation of the 1976 one), rejecting all the proposals that were made by many citizens. These included, for example, the need for a comprehensive reordering of the electoral mechanisms of indirect election, of the practice of “dedazos” [anointing] and of the absence of a diversity of candidates, the persistence of which requires forgetting that, at in the preparations for the first of constitution Fidel Castro himself reasoned that it would be very boring to vote for single candidates.

Today there is a need to expand this diversity wityhin institutions, associations, information media and their political expressions capable of airing their consensus, concerns, disagreements and opposition at all levels, from the National Assembly to the presidency, from the formation of the government. up to legislative exercises with the right to veto the majority. I am not proposing - understand it correctly - a return to the shenanigans of state institutions through 1952, nor should I be accused of “advocating bourgeois democracy." Peasants and cooperatives, small and medium owners, businessmen and professionals, believers and non-believers, ought to have their political, parliamentary and association spaces (not that fiction from the early 90s) and that all of these groups ought to be able to debate and express themselves in the National Assembly and that the secret votes ought to be that and not undertaken by a show of hands. Revolutionary people and Party members themselves should be able to express themselves without fear of sanctions or reprisals. It is very healthy to have a "party of heretics" (in the positive sense of the term) within the ranks of the Communist Party or any party and neither obedient nor silenced members.

Granma could continue to be an official organ, the TV or Cubadebate (which does not debate anything) and another official organ -as boring and monotonous as they want-, but the "heretics" have full rights to their spaces within those official organs or in their own information media, and not limited only to blogs or social networks in which to listen to alternative information and criteria. And let the best, the most efficient, the most persuasive, with the best arguments prevail.

To conclude, this is the missing link, the one that is essentially missing in the Cuban experience, which may save Cuba’s essential achievements, on pain of losing everything in the short or medium term.