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Turgul Keskin and Mahesh Ranjan Debata has recently published a quite interesting essay in Firstpost. Entitled 'How Turkey is taking a strategic turn from Turkism to Islamism,' the essay suggests a maturing of a transformation in the Turkish elite narrative that might irretrievably detach the Turkish Republic from the fundamentals of the vision of its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, replacing that vision with something that is meant to re-imagine a post modern Ottomanism in its pre-modern sense--one this is both imperialist and religiously centered. In the process there appears to be the sense that the dar al Islam functions best when it is managed by and through relatively co-equal imperial architectures more or less managing their internal rivalries to produce synergies useful in confronting the dar al harb, the house of disbelief (dar al-Kufr). It s to the reconstitution of the old categories and its older values and outlooks that the modern Turkish Republic now appears as a marvelous example of a post modern Ottomanism that may well align with the times and may reshape narratives of political relations among states on more ancient foundations now re-constituted for a world in which that language is overlaid on the increasingly irrelevant language of the secular universalist globalism of a world order increasingly challenged by the contradictions of its identitarian constructs.
As has become the more common currency of these efforts in the current era of historical circumstances, Keskin and Debata note that the focus is on the development of an orthodox narrative in which a language is developed to relate a story that weaves together a way of rationalizing the world and making it seem natural. The story is that being crafted is that of a unified Turkestan a geography has has been many things over the last several thousand years but that, at least for the moment, is the home of those who last moved into the region and made it their own. It is for the purpose of giving them a name that unites them, and using that name to suggest its significance--a shared history, ethnicity and religion. And it is to the ends of solidifying the naturalness of this narrative through the deployment of a language built for that purpose and taught to its children, that Keskin and Debata focus. Turkestan is not a new word, but it is being used to contemporary ends (for a brief historical summary see here, which also notes: "For Turkiye, the term “Turkestan”
reflects a desire to reconnect with Turkic-speaking peoples and revive a
shared historical and cultural consciousness. This vision, along with
the concept of the “Turkic World,” has been embraced by both the state
and the public since the early 1990s." Ibid.). Much of this is built around the solidarity of ethnicity, as it has been constructed among the peoples of this region.
Yet, for Keskin and Debata, the more interesting element of solidarity is not ethnicity but religion. It is not enough for Tukestan to be bound by ethnicity--that binding is cemented by religion. In a way that appears to mimic the efforts of other ethnic peoples to define themselves by reference to religion--formally in the case of Malaysia, and socially in the case of Spain (at least before the 20th century). Ethnic solidarity, then, is not a good in itself, but an instrument.
The introduction of “Turkestan” in textbooks underscores Turkey’s efforts to assert cultural and historical connections with Turkic-speaking nations while positioning itself as a leader in the Muslim world. . . This cultural diplomacy, however, is intertwined with a broader strategy to promote Islamist ideologies, challenging the secular governance structures prevalent in Central Asia as well as around the world, from Africa to South America. (Keskin and Debata, supra).
To those ends, the Turkish Republic has borrowed tools from a variety of sources which focus on the use of informal mechanisms: "soft power tools, such as the Yunus Emre Institute, Turkish Maarif Foundation, and TİKA, play a significant role in this agenda." (Keskin and Debata, supra). The agenda is ambitious, if only because of the secularist predilection of States in Turkestan (other then perhaps the Turkish Republic itself or at least its leading political collectives).
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Nonetheless it is one way of getting the attention of regional competitors, principally China and Russia. "Turkey’s engagement with Islamist elements in Central Asia has also
sparked concerns about regional radicalisation. Since the 1980s, radical
Islamism has grown, particularly among Uzbeks and Uyghurs. Reports
suggest that Turkey has recruited Islamist elements in Central Asia,
utilising its intelligence networks to advance strategic goals. This
approach underscores Turkey’s ambition to position itself as a leader of
the global Islamic community." (Keskin and Debata, supra). That is precisely the point--and the project of a post-modern Ottomanization: ethnic solidarity is a means to a greater ends--the vanguard leadership of Turkish elites within the dar al Islam--and its extension. That also requires reducing the threats to that hegemony. With respect to islamism, for example, Turkish policy toward Israel, for example, can be understood, form this perspective, as a religious rather than a more secular or Western set of academic geopolitical concerns. With respect to ethno-hierarchies and Turkish leadership, Kurdish aspirations foul post-modern imperial ambitions, especially those that appear to envelop the Ottoman homeland (after the 13th century anyway) in Anatolia. And that, perhaps, is the most significant and powerful insight that the essay draws (among many powerful insights). Yet for Western analysts--tied strongly to their own secularist worldviews, the possibility of this sort of analysis is easy to dismiss. And so it is; until it is not. And that moment is closer than they might understand.
Tugrul Keskin is a moderator of the Global China Academic Network. He previously served as a professor and director of the Centre for Global Governance at Shanghai University in China. Mahesh Ranjan Debata teaches at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
Turkey’s decision to replace the term “Central Asia” with “Turkestan” in school textbooks in mid-October this year marks a strategic and ideological shift aligned with Ankara’s broader geopolitical and religious goals. This change is more than a semantic adjustment—it reflects a deliberate effort to reshape regional perceptions and strengthen ties with countries like Russia, China, and the “Central Asian” nations while fostering a shared heritage among Muslim Turkic peoples.
However, this approach diverges from the secular pan-Turkism of nationalist figures like Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, and Hüseyin Nihal Atsız. Instead, it adopts a pan-Islamist vision influenced by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Historically, pan-Turkism focused on uniting Turkic peoples based on shared ethnic and linguistic ties rooted in a secular and nationalist framework. Turkey’s current policies, however, signify a departure from the abovementioned principles. Under Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), political Islam and pan-Islamism have become integral to both domestic and foreign policies. This shift emerged from internal power consolidations, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt, which allowed the AKP to purge secularists and Gülenists, further embedding its Islamist vision.
Turkey’s geopolitical realignment initially prioritised alliances with Arab nations aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Ikhwan in Syria, Egypt, Qatar, Libya, Tunisia, Somalia, Algeria, etc. However, regional tensions and shifting dynamics led Ankara to pivot toward Central and Southeast Asia. In these regions, Turkey leverages cultural and religious ties to promote governance models inspired by Sharia and pan-Islamist ideals.
The introduction of “Turkestan” in textbooks underscores Turkey’s efforts to assert cultural and historical connections with Turkic-speaking nations while positioning itself as a leader in the Muslim world. The term evokes unity and solidarity among Turkic peoples, a sentiment Ankara seeks to foster through initiatives like the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). This cultural diplomacy, however, is intertwined with a broader strategy to promote Islamist ideologies, challenging the secular governance structures prevalent in Central Asia as well as around the world, from Africa to South America.
Turkey’s soft power tools, such as the Yunus Emre Institute, Turkish Maarif Foundation, and TİKA, play a significant role in this agenda. These organisations advance Turkish culture and education while subtly promoting Islamist narratives. Programs highlighting shared Turkic and Islamic heritage aim to build a collective identity that resonates with Central Asian populations. Scholarships and academic exchanges further align future leaders with Ankara’s ideological vision, while investments in infrastructure and energy projects deepen its influence.
Turkey’s engagement with Islamist elements in Central Asia has also sparked concerns about regional radicalisation. Since the 1980s, radical Islamism has grown, particularly among Uzbeks and Uyghurs. Reports suggest that Turkey has recruited Islamist elements in Central Asia, utilising its intelligence networks to advance strategic goals. This approach underscores Turkey’s ambition to position itself as a leader of the global Islamic community.
Central Asia’s strategic importance, due to its location and resources, makes it a contested region. Turkey emphasises shared cultural and religious ties, distinguishing its approach from the transactional strategies of Russia and China. Russia’s influence remains strong through frameworks like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), while China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to dominate economically. Turkey positions itself as a cultural ally rather than a hegemonic power, but its influence is limited by the entrenched roles of Russia and China, as well as the diverse priorities of Central Asian states.
The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) is central to Turkey’s strategy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The OTS strengthens regional connectivity by promoting cultural, economic, and political collaboration, mainly through initiatives like the Middle Corridor, which links Central Asia to Europe via Turkey. This positions Turkey as a critical actor in trade and energy.
However, Turkey needs help in realising its ambitions. The entrenched influence of Russia and China, the secular governance preferences of Central Asian states, and Turkey’s domestic political and economic vulnerabilities constrain its ability to dominate the region. While Turkey’s pan-Islamist agenda aligns with its ideological goals, navigating the complexities of Central Asia’s geopolitical landscape will require balancing competing priorities and addressing internal limitations.
However, opportunities also exist. Central Asian nations increasingly seek to diversify their partnerships, creating openings for Turkey to strengthen its presence. Turkey can carve out a unique role in the region by promoting a distinct soft power model rooted in shared heritage and pragmatic cooperation.
Turkey’s decision to replace “Central Asia” with “Turkestan” reflects a broader strategy to redefine its regional and global role. By fostering a shared Turkic identity and promoting Islamist governance, Turkey seeks to strengthen its influence in Central Asia and beyond. While this approach leverages cultural and historical connections, it also faces significant geopolitical and ideological challenges. The success of Turkey’s initiatives will depend on its ability to navigate these complexities and sustain its engagement with the region.
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