"The Subcommittee is aware that the IC continues to withhold valuable information from
the Subcommittee. For this reason, a final unclassified report cannot be issued at this time. In
addition, the Subcommittee plans to issue a classified report that explains why the Subcommittee finds the conclusions reached in the ICA dubious at best, and misleading at worst. It is not possible, in an unclassified format, to detail the full scale and scope of the Subcommittee’s investigation, as well as the findings that have resulted from this investigation. Nevertheless, it is the hope of the Subcommittee that this interim unclassified report will shed light on the need to better understand AHIs and the toll they have taken on the IC workforce. The Subcommittee will continue this investigation into the 119th Congress." ("Investigating the Intelligence Community’s Conclusions on Anomalous Health Incidents: Is the Intelligence Community Hiding the Real Reason for This Phenomenon?")
I have been writing about so-called Havana Syndrome since shortly after
it became a "thing" in 2017 (Cuba Sonic Weapons Affair). I have, from the first, suggested that the
issue was far less about either the weapons (or as the Cubans
euphemistically called them, the crickets when the issue caught the
attention of the old press in the West) or their injuries, than it was
about the autonomy of the security services of global players and their
engagement with the possibilities of technology now updated from the
crude Soviet weaponry of the 1960s. The problem with Havana Syndrome,
then, wasn't about the syndrome itself, but about the relationship of
collective global security apparatus to the political apparatus of state
to which they at least have a nominal obligation. I assumed,that
eventually something fit for consumption would be concocted as a
delightful cocktail of facts and surmises that might be "truthy" enough to
satisfy the press, serve as a basis for some sort of crude remedy for
the victims of this inter-apparatus dueling, and that would get the
political branches and their claques off the backs of the security
apparatus and their dependent vassals.
I had assumed that this might have been accomplished as a result of the decision ot leak this technology to the proxy armies maintained by security apparatus and their State masters as they would inevitably have been the most likely players to get careless--or mouthy. That indeed, would have been the better option to get rid of this fiasco of managing the sort of collateral damage that its users and developers were now more willing to tolerate. One could have blamed everything on rogue elements, paraded a few selected for sacrifice around, and then resolve to be more careful in the future. That, however, was not to be. For reasons that are well above my pay grade, and apparently far above the pay grade of the leading forces of the political branches in the United States, the security apparatus continues to believe that a mixture of gaslighting and obfuscation will still serve its purposes and get annoying people and institutions off their backs.
Perhaps they are right. That, at any rate, appears to be the substance of the conclusion reached by Interim Report by Chairman Rick Crawford of the Subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives. The Report, entitled, "Investigating the Intelligence Community’s Conclusions on Anomalous Health Incidents: Is the Intelligence Community Hiding the Real Reason for This Phenomenon?"is a tersely written none pages of frustration, one which neither Republican nor Democratic Administrations were at any pains to alleviate. Its contents suggest the problem:
UNCLASSIFIEDAnd I think that is where the Americans will wnd up: (1) acceptance of the reality that the security services, when it matters to them, and protected by the administrative apparatus of the political branches, will be protected against disclosures (for national security purposes) of any detail of the programs or strategies connected to this, or other security related weapons apparatus; (2) the best that one can hope for, and this has proven to be a difficult task, is to seek some sort of remedy for its collateral damage--at least when they are US nationals and more specifically when they are members of the governmental apparatus of the United States; (3) that remedy cannot and will not be connected in any material way to anything having to do with weapons and strategic deployments deemed essential to the missions or activities of the security services; and (4) independent research and advocacy will likely have to be well managed to avoid interfering with sensitive actions or technologies (though this will be more difficult as the science and information leakage increases).
3
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1
Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 4
AHI: A Real Existential Threat to the IC Workforce ............................................................... 5
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 5
The NIC’s Updated Assessment of AHI .................................................................................. 6
IC Experts Panel........................................................................................................................ 6
Interim Findings............................................................................................................................ 8
Finding 1: The ICA on AHIs lacked analytic integrity and was highly irregular,
hindering the Subcommittee’s trust in the IC’s process and conclusions............................ 8
Finding 2: The IC’s response to AHIs has likely impeded collection. .................................. 8
Finding 3: Congress’s oversight and investigation must continue with support from the
Trump Administration. ............................................................................................................ 8
Interim Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 9
Recommendation 1: Implement changes to the IC’s analytic process. ................................ 9
Recommendation 2: AHI collection needs to be prioritized. ................................................. 9
Recommendation 3: Codify and establish clear, effective medical care, particularly long-
term care, for AHI-affected U.S. Government employees and their families...................... 9
Beyond that there is little more than can or ought to be said.
The full Interim Report follows and may be accessed HERE. For commentary HERE.
Investigating the Intelligence Community’s Conclusions on Anomalous Health Incidents:
Is the Intelligence Community Hiding the Real Reason for This Phenomenon?
Interim Report by Chairman Rick Crawford of the
Subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
December 2024
UNCLASSIFIED
Executive Summary
In March 2023, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) issued an Intelligence Community
Assessment (ICA), titled “Updated Assessment of Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs),
” which
found that “it is ‘very unlikely’ a foreign adversary is responsible for the reported AHIs.”1
However, the Subcommittee has uncovered evidence that the ICA lacked analytic integrity and
was highly irregular in its formulation. It appears increasingly likely and the Chairman is
convinced that a foreign adversary is behind some AHIs.2 The Intelligence Community (IC) has
attempted to thwart the Subcommittee’s investigative efforts to uncover the truth at every turn.
Despite this, the Subcommittee has uncovered information illustrative of problems with the
ICA’s creation, review, and release. The Subcommittee recommends that the IC expeditiously
release a new ICA on AHIs in which all information collected by the IC is appropriately
considered.
Since initial reports in 2016, AHIs have been pervasively affecting U.S. government
officials, including White House staff, diplomats, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, and military personnel and their families, at home
and abroad.3 Over the years, numerous IC whistleblowers have come forward, often in fear of
retaliation, to inform the Subcommittee they believe the IC’s conclusions on AHIs were not
based on the available facts. These individuals, many of whom have sat for formal transcribed
interviews with Subcommittee staff, have provided the Subcommittee with extensive insight into
the nature of AHIs and their respective agencies’ responses to them. As a result, the
Subcommittee opened a formal investigation regarding the accuracy of the conclusions of the
ICA on AHIs.4 This unclassified report details the interim findings of this ongoing investigation.
The Subcommittee’s long history of oversight regarding the extensive vetting of IC
personnel before being hired and granted a security clearance—including psychological testing
and evaluations—leads the Subcommittee to conclude that AHIs are more than medical,
environmental, or social factors, as claimed by the IC. AHIs represent a genuine and compelling
danger to the IC workforce. This danger has not been fully realized by IC leadership. There is
evidence that the IC attempted to shape the 2023 AHI assessment to create a politically palatable
conclusion and to impede investigative efforts that would uncover this effort. This has resulted in
a degradation in trust between the IC workforce and their senior leadership.
The IC has not been a willful participant in Congress’s oversight of this subject, despite
the impact AHIs have had on IC personnel. Instead, the IC has hindered this Subcommittee’s
efforts to understand AHIs, their cause and effects, and how the IC reached their conclusions in
the ICA. It is likely that the Subcommittee could have completed its oversight and investigation
into AHIs had the IC more fully cooperated with requests for documents and records, as well as
1 Intelligence Community Assessment: Updated Assessment of Anomalous Health Incidents, ICA 2023-02286-B,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (Mar. 1, 2023).
2 See Scott Pelley, Havana Syndrome Mystery Continues as a Lead Military Investigator Says Bar for Proof Was Set
Impossibly High, CBS NEWS (Mar. 31, 2024).
3 ICA 2023-02286-B, supra note 1.
4 See Letter from Rick Crawford, Chairman, CIA Subcomm., H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, to Avril
Haines, Dir., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Feb. 8, 2024).
1
UNCLASSIFIED
made relevant IC personnel available for transcribed interviews. Because of this lack of
cooperation and the Subcommittee’s inability to access specific information, the Subcommittee
concludes there must be something IC leadership has sought to prevent Congress from
discovering. Specifically, the IC routinely delayed productions of requested information to the
Subcommittee, placed hurdles on who could testify to congressional investigators in transcribed
interviews, and provided productions so heavily redacted that the nature of the information
underneath was wholly obfuscated. These actions resulted in a subpoena issued to the National
Security Agency (NSA) in May 2024.5
The Subcommittee is aware that the IC continues to withhold valuable information from
the Subcommittee. For this reason, a final unclassified report cannot be issued at this time. In
addition, the Subcommittee plans to issue a classified report that explains why the Subcommittee
finds the conclusions reached in the ICA dubious at best, and misleading at worst. It is not
possible, in an unclassified format, to detail the full scale and scope of the Subcommittee’s
investigation, as well as the findings that have resulted from this investigation. Nevertheless, it is
the hope of the Subcommittee that this interim unclassified report will shed light on the need to
better understand AHIs and the toll they have taken on the IC workforce. The Subcommittee will
continue this investigation into the 119th Congress.
This investigation would not have been possible without the efforts, trust, and willingness
of whistleblowers to avail themselves to the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee thanks them for
their dedication. If you are a current or former member of the IC and would like to speak to
Subcommittee staff, please call 202-225-4121.
5 See Subpoena from Mike Turner, Chairman, H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, to Timothy Haugh, Dir.,
Nat’l Sec. Agency (May 14, 2024).
2
UNCLASSIFIED
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1
Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 4
AHI: A Real Existential Threat to the IC Workforce ............................................................... 5
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 5
The NIC’s Updated Assessment of AHI .................................................................................. 6
IC Experts Panel........................................................................................................................ 6
Interim Findings............................................................................................................................ 8
Finding 1: The ICA on AHIs lacked analytic integrity and was highly irregular,
hindering the Subcommittee’s trust in the IC’s process and conclusions. ........................... 8
Finding 2: The IC’s response to AHIs has likely impeded collection. .................................. 8
Finding 3: Congress’s oversight and investigation must continue with support from the
Trump Administration. ............................................................................................................ 8
Interim Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 9
Recommendation 1: Implement changes to the IC’s analytic process. ................................ 9
Recommendation 2: AHI collection needs to be prioritized. ................................................. 9
Recommendation 3: Codify and establish clear, effective medical care, particularly long-
term care, for AHI-affected U.S. Government employees and their families...................... 9
3
UNCLASSIFIED
Methodology
On February 8, 2024, Chairman Turner elevated the Subcommittee’s oversight initiative
on AHIs to a formal investigation, designating CIA Subcommittee Chairman Rick Crawford as
investigative lead. In a letter to Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines the same
day, the Subcommittee formally notified the IC of its investigation. Subcommittee Chairman
Crawford’s letter specified that the Subcommittee’s investigation will focus on: (1) the analytic
integrity and deliberative processes associated with the production and dissemination of
intelligence reporting concerning AHIs; (2) allegations of improper suppression of AHI-related
activities and information within and among the agencies and departments of the Executive
Branch and Congress; and (3) the assessed risks to the health of the IC workforce.
Pursuant to that mandate, the Subcommittee has thus far conducted the following
investigative activities:
• Conducted 48 interviews, including 11 transcribed interviews, of current and
former members of the CIA, FBI, ODNI, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
the U.S. military, as well as non-government individuals in the medical field and
academia who either experienced an AHI, witnessed aspects of the IC’s response
to AHIs, or both;
• Reviewed over 5,000 pages of records produced by the CIA, NSA, DIA, ODNI
and over 2,500 pages of records produced by a component of the Department of
Defense that is not part of the IC;
• Reviewed whistleblower-provided documents in excess of 3,400 pages;
• Conducted congressional delegation travel;
• Received briefings from the AHI teams at CIA, DIA, and FBI respectively;
• Engaged with DNI Haines, CIA Director William Burns, FBI Director
Christopher Wray, NSA Director General Timothy Haugh, former NSA Director
General Paul Nakasone, DIA Director Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse, and
former DIA Director Lieutenant General Scott Berrier; and
• Reviewed finished intelligence products issued related to AHI over the past seven
years.
Additionally, this investigation has reviewed the Subcommittee’s repository of documents,
interview notes, hearing transcripts, articles, and reports provided by the IC and IC Inspector
General dating back over seven years, since the Subcommittee’s oversight activities into AHIs
first began.
4
UNCLASSIFIED
AHI: A Real Existential Threat to the IC Workforce
Overview
Beginning in 2016, staff at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba began experiencing a
series of medical conditions including tinnitus, vertigo, head and ear pressure, nausea, and
cognitive difficulties.6 These conditions usually develop after the individual hears a loud,
unexplained sound, characterized as “strange grating noises.”7 A feeling of pressure in the ears
ensues, coming from a specific direction toward the victim, and lasts for approximately 30
seconds, or until the victim is able to remove themselves from the vicinity.8
The effect that AHIs have produced in the human body have been profound. The IC
Experts Panel on Anomalous Health Incidents describes AHIs as having the following
“distinguishing features:”
One distinguishing characteristic of reported AHIs was the acute onset of audio-
vestibular sensory phenomena, including sound and/or pressure, sometimes in just
one ear or one side of the head. In some cases, other individuals in close
proximity did not hear the sound as would be expected for a usual ambient sound
wave. Another feature was the rapid onset of acute signs and symptoms,
concurrent with or within seconds of the sensory phenomena. These acute signs
and symptoms were often connected with the inner ear and included vertigo, loss
of balance, or ear pain, as well as a sense of locality or directionality. They
occurred in a wide variety of combinations and varied among reports. Subacute
signs and symptoms—those that last hours to days after the acute event has
ended—included headache, nausea, persistent vertigo or other symptoms of
imbalance, a sense of fatigue, and difficulty with cognitive tasks. Acute or
subacute signs and symptoms were followed by chronic signs and symptoms that
lasted weeks, months, and even years in some individuals. These long-term signs
and symptoms included persistent new headache, worsening of migraine
headache, sleep disorders, imbalance, a sense of dizziness, tinnitus, and the loss of
high-level cognitive abilities in the memory and executive function domain.9
These events and their corresponding ailments have become known as AHIs—or
“Havana Syndrome.”10 AHIs have been reported domestically, as well as abroad, including in
Austria, China, Colombia, Georgia, Germany, India, Poland, Russia, and Vietnam.11 Those
6 Havana Syndrome: Better Patient Communication and Monitoring of Key DOD Tasks Needed to Better Ensure
Timely Treatment, GAO-24-106593, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, (July 2024); Anomalous Health
Incidents, U.S. MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM, https://health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/Warfighter-Brain-
Health/Brain-Health-Topics/Anomalous-Health-Incidents (last accessed Nov. 6, 2024).
7 Id.; Jerry L. Mothershead, Zygmunt F. Dembek, Todd A. Hann, Christopher G. Owens, and Aiguo Wu, Havana
Syndrome: Directed Attack or Cricket Noise?, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS (Jan. 16, 2023).
8 Id.
9 Anomalous Health Incidents: Analysis of Potential Causal Mechanisms, IC EXPERTS PANEL (Sep. 2022).
10 GAO-24-106593, supra note 6.
11 Id.
5
UNCLASSIFIED
affected by AHI primarily include federal employees, particularly those who work for the IC, as
well as their family members, including children.12 Estimates of the number of individuals
affected vary, but 334 people have qualified for AHI care in the Military Health System as of
January 2024.13
The NIC’s Updated Assessment of AHI
In March 2023, the NIC released an updated ICA on AHIs. This IC-coordinated ICA
“was written in response to senior U.S. policymaker interest and updates the IC’s previous
assessment on AHIs,” which had been published in January 2022.14 The updated ICA states, in
relevant part:
Since U.S. officials first reported AHIs in Havana, Cuba in late 2016, the IC has
sought to understand whether these events can be attributed to a foreign actor and
a deliberate external mechanism. The IC pursued three separate lines of inquiry:
the first encompassed work determining whether available data points to the
involvement of a foreign adversary in the incidents; the second focused on the
feasibility and existence of deliberate mechanisms that an adversary might use
against U.S. personnel to cause AHIs; and the third evaluated whether medical
analysis can help determine if an outside actor is involved in the broad range of
phenomena and symptoms associated with AHIs. Based on the results of these
three lines of inquiry, most IC agencies have concluded that it is “very unlikely” a
foreign adversary is responsible for the reported AHIs. IC agencies have varying
confidence levels, with two agencies at moderate-to-high confidence while three
are at moderate confidence. Two agencies judge it is “unlikely” an adversary was
responsible for AHIs and they do so with low confidence based on collection gaps
and their review of the same evidence.15
The Subcommittee’s investigation found that this assessment lacked the analytic integrity
and thoroughness necessary to be published. Further, the Subcommittee believes that the
available evidence does not support the ICA conclusions. The issue of AHIs should be
reinvestigated and a re-updated ICA should be issued. The Subcommittee encourages the NIC to
expedite these efforts.
IC Experts Panel
The U.S. Government created an IC Experts Panel, composed of experts from both inside
and outside the federal government with expertise in areas of science, medicine, and
engineering.16 The IC Experts Panel was granted access to more than 1,000 classified documents
on a range of relevant topics, including sensitive intelligence reporting, AHI incident reports, and
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 ICA 2023-02286-B, supra note 1.
15 Id.
16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Complementary Efforts on Anomalous Health Incidents
(unclassified on Feb. 1, 2022).
6
UNCLASSIFIED
trend analyses.17 In addition, they received dozens of briefings and engaged with affected
individuals who shared their experiences and medical records.18 The findings of the IC Experts
Panel varied greatly from those published in the ICA.
The IC Experts Panel issued six findings, which were declassified in February 2022:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The signs and symptoms of AHIs are genuine and compelling.
A subset of AHIs cannot be easily explained by known environmental or medical
conditions and could be due to external stimuli.
Pulsed electromagnetic energy, particularly in the radiofrequency range, plausibly
explains the core characteristics of reported AHIs, although information gaps
exist.
Ultrasound also plausibly explains the core characteristics, but only in close-
access scenarios and with information gaps.
Psychosocial factors alone cannot account for the core characteristics, although
they may cause some other incidents or contribute to long-term symptoms.
Ionizing radiation, chemical and biological agents, infrasound, audible sound,
ultrasound propagated over large distances, and bulk heating from
electromagnetic energy are all implausible explanations for the core
characteristics in the absence of other synergistic stimuli.19
The Subcommittee considers these findings more accurate, but fears the IC may have
used the same tactics—stonewalling, slow-walking, and cherry-picking of information—on the
IC Experts Panel that it weaponized against Congress.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
7
UNCLASSIFIED
Interim Findings
Finding 1: The ICA on AHIs lacked analytic integrity and was highly
irregular, hindering the Subcommittee’s trust in the IC’s process and
conclusions.
The Subcommittee found that the process resulting in the ICA, titled “Updated
Assessment on Anomalous Health Incidents,
” which is often used to portray a consensus
discounting foreign adversary involvement in AHIs, lacked analytic integrity and was highly
irregular in its formulation. The Subcommittee’s investigation has uncovered information
illustrative of problems with the ICA’s creation, review, and release. Some of these problems
may include a rush to convey a consensus amongst elements of the IC in an effort to control the
narrative with the American public, policymakers, foreign partners and adversaries, and IC
employees.
In addition, even within individual IC elements, there are conflicting assessments on key
aspects of the AHI problem. Rather than encouraging further intelligence collection and
following investigative leads to address conflicting positions, specific groups and individuals
within the IC impeded such efforts. Such conduct negatively impacted efforts to better
understand AHIs.
A failure to understand the true causes and effects of AHIs results in an ineffective
response to the challenges presented by AHIs and negatively impacts IC personnel. The
Subcommittee further concludes that the IC’s inconsistent approach has had detrimental effects
on IC personnel, trust in the IC by policymakers, the understanding of the American public, and
perceptions of the IC by both foreign allies and adversaries.
Finding 2: The IC’s response to AHIs has likely impeded collection.
The mishandling of the IC’s response to AHIs has hampered the IC’s ability to collect
against developing threats, delayed development of potential mitigations, and harmed the
credibility the IC has with its workforce. In addition, the Subcommittee believes the Biden
Administration’s failure to adequately prioritize collection on this threat has likely resulted in
lost opportunities.
Finding 3: Congress’s oversight and investigation must continue with support
from the Trump Administration.
The Biden Administration and IC leadership has sought to hinder the Subcommittee’s
investigation into AHIs to keep the truth about AHIs from Congress and, by extension, the
American public. This is unacceptable. This Subcommittee will continue its investigation into
AHIs into the 119th Congress. The Subcommittee will work with the Trump-Vance
Administration and new IC leadership to make all reasonable information and key personnel
available to congressional investigators.
8
UNCLASSIFIED
Interim Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Implement changes to the IC’s analytic process.
The shortcomings that contributed to identified failures in the ICA on AHIs are
staggering. The ability of IC leadership to control what analysts publish in an effort to send a
particular message—rather than convey the facts—is problematic. Intelligence assessments must
be free from political influence. The IC should publish a fact-based ICA that identifies the
potential cause and effects of AHIs, as well as any perpetrator(s).
Recommendation 2: AHI collection needs to be prioritized.
The next Administration should ensure that collection on AHI threats and their effects on
IC personnel are prioritized. The profound impact that this has had on the IC workforce demands
such prioritization.
Recommendation 3: Codify and establish clear, effective medical care,
particularly long-term care, for AHI-affected U.S. Government employees
and their families.
Effective systems for medical care, especially long-term care maintenance, are lacking
for U.S. Government employees, particularly non-military personnel. Rarely do these individuals
have options for long-term care available to military and former military (i.e., through the
Military Health System and Veterans Administration). In the case of AHIs, this has resulted in
injured intelligence officers having to seek complex medical assessments and treatments on their
own, then self-funding this expensive care. While some of those impacted have succeeded in
receiving federal support for ongoing medical care, including but not limited to workers’
compensation, significant gaps have been identified which have left some in need of care for
injuries received while serving the country.
9
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