Just Published: "Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and Economy"

I am happy to announce the publication of an article, "Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and Economy," that appears in the Connecticut Journal of International Law 32(1):1-47 (2017).

 The abstract (English, Castellano) and introduction follows; comments and engagement always welcome.


 

Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and Economy

Larry Catá Backer

ABSTRACT

Two theories of Marxist state organization have been developing recently, each pointing in quite distinct ways to the organization of society, the state, government and the role of the vanguard Party. The development of an Asian “Markets Marxism” Model is well understood. The recent emergence of a Latin American “Central Planning Marxism” Model is less well understood. This paper examines the characteristics of this emerging “Central Planning Marxism” mode by looking at its development in Cuba since 2011. The examination centers on the official theory produced from the 6th through the 7th Congresses of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). The 7th PCC Congress stands in stark contrast to its predecessor. A close examination of the development from the 6th to the 7th Congress may suggest the limits of reform in Cuba. These limits are structural as well as ideological. After a short introduction, Part II considers the structural constraints on reform as evidenced in the 7th Congress. process aspects of the 7th PCC Congress. Part III then considers the ideological constraints on reform that were produced in the 7th Congress and its substantive consequences of what now appears to be a sputtering of the reform trajectory from the 6th to the 7th PCC Congress. That exploration revolves around a close reading of the major ideological product of the 7th Congress, its Conceptualización which is intended to complement the Guidelines (Lineamientos) of the 6th PCC Congress, and provide the theoretical foundation for its further implementation of the reforms these Guidelines represented. Part IV then contrasts this emerging Model with the Asian “Markets Marxism” Model. The consequences for political economy, legitimacy and law are also discussed. Differences between the Asian Markets Marxism and the Cuban Central Planning Marxist Models may have profound implications for rule of law development and the structures of regulatory governance in administrative structures. Those differences suggest the difficulty of developing consensus for key concepts in law—from rule of law, to human rights and markets. An understanding of these quite distinct conceptual frameworks of understanding law, economics and politics will be essential as the leaders of these quite conceptually distinct systems seek to interact.



Dos teorías de la organización marxista del estado se desarrollan en los últimos años, cada una apuntando en formas muy distintas a la organización de la sociedad, el estado, el gobierno y el papel del partido de vanguardia. El desarrollo de un modelo asiático "marxismo mercador" se entiende bien. La reciente aparición de un modelo latinoamericano "Central de Planificación marxismo" es menos conocido. Este artículo examina las características de esta modalidad emergente "marxismo planificador" al ver su desarrollo en Cuba desde 2011. Los centros de examen sobre la teoría oficial producido a partir de la 6ª a través de los 7º Congresos del Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC). El 7º Congreso del PCC está en marcado contraste con su predecesor. Un examen detallado de la evolución del 6 al 7 ° Congreso puede sugerir los límites de la reforma en Cuba. Estos límites son estructurales, así como ideológico. Tras una breve introducción, la segunda parte considera las limitaciones estructurales de la reforma como se evidencia en el 7º Congreso. aspectos del proceso del 7º Congreso del PCC. En la Parte III se consideran las limitaciones ideológicas de la reforma que se produjeron en el 7º Congreso y sus consecuencias sustantivas de lo que ahora parece ser un chisporroteo de la trayectoria de la reforma del 6 al 7 ° Congreso. Esta exploración gira alrededor del producto ideológico más importante del 7º Congreso, su Conceptualización que está destinada a complementar las lineamientos del 6º Congreso del PCC, y proporcionar la base teórica para su ulterior aplicación de las reformas de las presentes directrices representadas. Parte IV contrasta este modelo emergente con el modelo asiático "marxismo mercador". También se discuten las consecuencias para la economía política, la legitimidad y el derecho. Las diferencias entre la teorías marxista asiático y latinoamericano tendrán profundas implicaciones para el desarrollo del estado de derecho y las estructuras de gobernanza regulatoria en las estructuras administrativas. Estas diferencias sugieren la dificultad de desarrollar un consenso para los conceptos clave en el proceso legislativo del estado de derecho, los derechos humanos y de los mercados. La comprensión de estos marcos conceptuales muy distintas de entender el derecho, la economía y la política será esencial, ya que los líderes de estos sistemas bastante conceptualmente distintas buscan interactuar.

Nothing is accidental in Communist Cuba, everything has a political purpose.[1]



I. Introduction



Two theories of Marxist state organization have been developing over the last five years, each pointing in quite distinct ways to the organization of society, the state, government and the role of the vanguard Party. The development of an Asian “Markets Marxism” Model is well understood.[2] Its driving force is centered on the ideological work of the Chinese Communist Party. This Model provides an ideological basis for the evolution of Marxist Leninist political, economic and social ordering that underlies the legitimacy of the state and colors its approach to law and constitutional order.[3] The recent emergence of a Latin American “Central Planning Marxism” Model is understood less. Its driving force, once centered in Europe and more particularly on the Soviet Union,[4] has now shifted to Latin America and more specifically to Cuba and reflects the ideological debates among the European Communist States leading up to the collapse of the Soviet system and its ideology after 1989.[5] The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) has recently sought to develop its own version of Marxist Leninist ideology to provide greater clarity in the ideological basis for the organization of the state, and the structures of its political and economic order. The characteristics of that Model, and its effects on the structures of law, regulatory governance and the state, stands in contrast both to the Markets Marxism of Asia and the Markets based regulatory model of the West, especially that of the United States. The object of this article is to examine this model “Central Planning Marxism” Model, a model with the potential to be influential in Latin America. The Central Planning Marxism Model supplies a set of premises and approaches—a language and outlook—that will fundamentally color the relationships between Cuba, China, and the United States.



The current expression of Latin-European Marxist Leninist theory was most recently the product of the PCC 7th Congress.[6] The 7th Congress of the PCC was held just weeks after the historic visit of the United States’ President Obama to celebrate the normalization of relations between the the United States and Cuba.[7] The official press of China described the 7th PCC Congress as a great success. “The 7th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) closed on Tuesday, setting the country on a path of profound economic and social reforms by 2021 amid a leadership transition.”[8] More importantly, it celebrated that success in terms that profoundly resonated in China—reform and opening up that preserves the socialist path and the vanguard role of the ruling party.[9] “Rafael Hernandez, Cuban political analyst and head of the Temas magazine, said the task is among the hardest challenges facing Cuba in the last 20 years. "We are not rushing towards a free market economy, nor is our government taking us there. This is a gradual process of transformation, economic diversification and development of a nationalist private sector," Hernandez told Xinhua.”[10] From this perspective, the great success of this Congress was ultimately capped by its transitional aspects. With echoes of Chinese weariness of cults of personality and entrenched leadership, the reports of the 7th PCC Congress focused on the ability of the vanguard Party to prepare for a succession of leadership—and survive. “‘This Seventh PCC Congress will be the last led by the historic generation,’ Castro said at the closing ceremony of the four-day party congress, where delegates gave his brother, revolutionary leader and former President Fidel Castro a standing ovation.”[11]



Yet, the 7th PCC Congress stands in plain contrast to its predecessor. The 6th PCC Congress appeared to usher in an era of at least limited opening up and the institutionalization of a private sector of sorts. It was preceded by unprecedented if well-orchestrated consultation among PCC cadres and the general population.[12] Its core documents, centering on the Lineamientos, were widely circulated within and beyond the national territory.[13] In its wake the state appeared on the verge of opening a small space for a movement away from the increasingly ancient European Marxist approach to macro-economic organization of the nation’s political economy.[14] The opening up to normalization of relations with the United States, and with it the further promise of more robust integration with globalized markets, suggested the possibility of accelerated change, even if it served to reaffirm the current political framework and the leadership of the emerging architecture of PCC political economy.[15]



The promise of the 6th PCC Congress might have been expected to be realized in the 7th PCC Congress, especially in the context of limited political opening up, of planning for a succession, and of a more robust embrace of a distinct macro-economic model which is more market oriented. Instead, the 7th PCC Congress appeared to slow the pace of reform and opening up and appeared much less certain of its scope and trajectory than it had a mere five years before. The tone was set by the First Secretary when he suggested that a slow and steady course, with little deviation, should be the guiding principle of the Congress.[16] The First Secretary was able to offer only four items[17]—(1) a review and report of the slow course of reform (Lineamientos) from the 6th Congress and a plan for its implementation, (2) a five year plan together with (3) a discussion draft of the governing framework for “sustainable and prosperous socialism”[18] going forward, 'Conceptualisation of the Cuban socio-economic socialist development model' ("Conceptualización),[19] and (4) an action plan for PCC for PCC engagement in these efforts.[20] Of these, two of the critical documents, the Implementation Plan for the Lineamientos going forward, and the Conceptualización were not finalized. With respect to the former, the 7th PCC Congress adopted a resolution approving the report and plan for implementation, and transmitting it to the National Assembly for approval and the PCC to implement.[21] A similar resolution was adopted for the Conceptualización.[22]



“The methodological approach to reform outlined by Castro and highlighted during the debate. . . throws cold water on hopes by some observers that the party gathering would speed up the process of change that began during the sixth congress of 2011.”[23] For sympathetic observers, the sense of anticlimax that marked a congress most notable for its lack of either transparency or popular engagement also pointed to substantial rifts between the leadership and PCC rank and file.[24] Still, the 7th PCC Congress in many respects appeared to disappoint.[25] Its members were permitted to criticize President Obama’s visit and the thrust of his statements (and indirectly of U.S. policy) during the course of the meeting.[26] Procedurally it appeared to mark a step back from the openness of the 6th Congress. And it offered little by way of political opening up, even an opening up ushering in more robust intra-Party democracy. Most importantly, the 7th PCC Congress appeared to fall far short of confronting the economic model reaffirmed in the 4th PCC Congress—a model of central planning and Soviet bureaucratic mechanisms substituting for any sort of markets based regulation of economic activity. Indeed, the 7th PCC Congress appears to test the value that can be derived from U.S. Cuba normalization,[27] and the influence of Asian Marxist theory beyond its regional home. Yet, it was also made clear that the 7th PCC Congress was meant as a starting point rather than an ending point of discussion.[28] The extent to which that actually happens remains to be seen.



Among the most significant product of the 7th Congress was in the area of ideological and theoretical development. It marks the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, of a concerted effort to develop a European Marxist Leninism, one that is substantially distinct from emerging Asian models. In this respect the work of the 7th Congress is both important and potentially consequential for the development of approaches to law and economy, especially in the developing world. Two theories of Marxist state organization are now developing; each pointing in quite distinct ways to the organization of society, the state, government and the role of the vanguard Party. Each also points to a different engagement with Leninism—which for Western individuals can be felt as different approaches to rule of law, to the nature and use of administrative discretion and to the understanding of human rights and markets. The development of an Asian “Markets Marxism” Model is well understood. The recent emergence of a Latin American “Central Planning Marxism” Model is less well understood.



This article focuses its examination on the construction and characteristics of an evolving “Central Planning Marxism” Model by considering its development in Cuba since 2011. The examination centers on the official theory produced from the 6th through the 7th Congresses of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). A close reading suggests the limits of reform in Cuba. These limits are structural as well as ideological. Structural limits are exacerbated by an entrenched nomenklatura that is fearful that ideological change will subvert the authority of the PCC and its political framework. Ideological limits are suggested by a political timidity that has been built into the operating culture of the PCC. Structural limits suggests the way in which Leninist theory has been developed with Cuban characteristics that embrace the bureaucratic element of the function of a vanguard party. It embraces the idea that the PCC itself can substitute its organs for the functioning of the market itself. Ideological limits suggest a very specific reading of Marxism, one that posits the idea that the moment of revolutionary political victory produces the formative stage of the establishment of a Communist society that must then be perfected through the instrumental deployment of the means of production by the vanguard Party in the construction of a communist economy founded on the work of a model revolutionary worker.



After this Introduction, Part II considers the structural and process aspects of the 7th PCC Congress. It sets the stage for the consideration of the most important ideological work of the PCC in a generation, the Conceptualización[29] and its ideological structures. Part III then considers the substantive consequences of the sputtering of the reform trajectory of the 7th PCC Congress that is the Conceptualización itself. It was meant to provide the ideological foundation for the great product of reform contained in the Guidelines (Lineamientos) of the 6th PCC Congress. Adopted in principle,[30] the Conceptualización serves to answer the question: what sort of theoretical model will guide the development of Socialism in Cuba. The Conceptualización is of particular interest for its potential divergence from the construction of Chinese post-Soviet Socialist Market theory within the context of socialist modernization.



Part IV then contrasts this emerging Model with the Asian “Markets Marxism” Model. The consequences for political economy, legitimacy and law are also discussed. The embrace of a “Central Planning Marxism” Model may suggest that the PCC is finding it hard to move even from soviet style central planning ideologies to Marxist market ideologies that have proven more successful in other states. It may also suggest not a dynamic evolution of European Marxism but instead a creeping paralysis that may be more dangerous to its long term authority than any machinations originating in its enemies. The paper ends with a brief consideration of options and likely movement over the short term moving forward. Both the deviation of form from the 6th PCC Congress as well as the thrust of the Conceptualización make it clear that the PCC is finding it hard to move even from Soviet style central planning ideologies to Marxist market ideologies that have proven more successful in other states. More importantly, the central focus of Cuban Central Planning Marxism moves from a focus on institutions to the re-engineering of individuals. It is to the creation of the model worker inserted in a model economy who then also performs as a model consumer, citizen and participant in sport and culture that central planning is ultimately directed. That may have consequences not merely for the trajectory of reform—ironically it may be easier to effect limited political reform than economic reform at this time—but also its scope. In particular, differences between the Asian Markets Marxism and the Cuban Central Planning Marxist Models has profound implications for rule of law development and the structures of regulatory governance in administrative structures. The PCC is suffering from a paralysis that may be more dangerous to its long-term authority than any machinations originating in its enemies.

[1] Osmel Ramirez Alvarez, Behind the Curtains of Cuba’s Communist Party Congress, Havana Times (April 20, 2016), http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=118256.


[2] See, e.g., Hu Angang, China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower (Brookings Institute Press, 2011); Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth 100-113 (MIT Press, 2007); Gary Sigley, Chinese Governmentalities: Government, Governance, and the Socialist Market Economy, 35 Econ. & Soc'y. 487 (2006).


[3] See Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. Int'l L.J. 331 (2012).


[4] See, e.g., Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2005) (1978).


[5] See, e.g., Peter Critchley, Marx, Market Socialism and Participatory Planning, 23-24 (2001) https://www.academia.edu/788645/Marx_Market_Socialism_and_Participatory_Planning?auto=download.


[6] Resolution on the Central Report to the 7th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Partido Comunista de Cuba (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.pcc.cu/cong7.php.


[7] See, e.g., José de Córdoba, Post-Obama Visit, Cuba’s Communist Party to Signal Next Steps, Wall St. J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 5:30 AM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/post-obama-visit-cubas-communist-party-to-signal-next-steps-1460712601.


[8] Raimundo Urrechaga, Spotlight: Cuba to embark on new reforms after Communist Party congress, Xinhua: Xinhuanet, (Apr. 20, 2016) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/20/c_135297508.htm.


[9] Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China, News of the Communist Party of China (Mar. 29, 2013) http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188087.html (“Reform and opening up” is a specific element of the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party. It references the framework through which “China, socialism and Marxism . . . develop themselves.”) (“The Party must carry out fundamental reform of the economic structure that hampers the development of the productive forces, and keep to and improve the socialist market economy; it must also carry out corresponding political restructuring and reform in other fields. The Party must adhere to the basic state policy of opening up and assimilate and exploit the achievements of all other cultures.”). (“Reform and opening up” is a specific element of the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party. It references the framework through which “China, socialism and Marxism . . . develop themselves.”) (“The Party must carry out fundamental reform of the economic structure that hampers the development of the productive forces, and keep to and improve the socialist market economy; it must also carry out corresponding political restructuring and reform in other fields. The Party must adhere to the basic state policy of opening up and assimilate and exploit the achievements of all other cultures.”).


[10] Urrechaga, supra note 8.


[11] Urrechaga, supra note 8, at 1.


[12] Urrechaga, supra note 8, at 2.


[13] VI Congreso del Partido Cominiosta de Cuba, Lineamientos de la política económica y social del partido y la Revolución (Apr. 18, 2011) https://www.scribd.com/doc/55084818/Folleto-Lineamientos-VI-Congreso-Partido-Comunista-de-Cuba.


[14] See Larry Catá Backer, Normalization With Cuban Characteristics: How Might Cuba Navigate Normalization to Avoid Political Instability and Enhance Economic Development? 9-10 (Coalition for Peace & Ethics No. 1, Discussion Paper, May 2016), http://www.thecpe.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/LASA5-2016.pdf.


[15] See, e.g., Juan Valdés Paz, Cuba-EEUU: Los desafíos de la normalización, Sin Permiso (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/cuba-eeuu-los-desafios-de-la-normalizacion.


[16] Raúl Castro Ruz, El desarrollo de la economía nacional, junto a la lucha por la paz y la firmeza ideológica, constituyen las principales misiones del Partido, Granma: Edición Especial , Apr. 16, 2016, at 9 [hereinafter Castro, Informe], http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/congreso%20pcc.pdf.


[17] See id. at 3.


[18] See id. at 3 (The term “sustainable and prosperous socialism" ought to be read against the much older and well developed concept of “socialist modernization” that has become the cornerstone of Chinese Marxist Leninist political economy); see also Full Text of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party of China, News of the Communist Party of China, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html; Conceptualización, infra note 19 (showing the Five Year Plan beginning at p. 17 of the document in which the Conceptualización is published, consisting of an introduction p. 17, guiding principles and thematic hubs for the elaboration of the plan Ibid, national vision for 2030 p. 18, strategic hubs p. 18, and a discussion of strategic economic sectors p. 25; see generally infra, Part III.


[19] Conceptualización del modelo económico y social Cubano de desarrollo socialista [Conceptualization of the Cuban Economic and Social Model of Socialist Development], VI Congreso del Parido Comunista de Cuba [Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba] [hereinafter the Conceptualización] http://www.thecpe.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Conceptualizacion-del-modelo-economico-PCC-Cuba-2016.pdf.


[20] Castro, Informe, supra, note 16 (“Trabajo del partido en cumplimiento de los Objetivos aprobados en la Primera Conferencia Nacional y de las Directrices del Primer Secretario del Comité Central.”).


[21] Fernando Lavín Carbonell, Resolución la implementación de los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social aprovados en el 6th Congreso y su actualización para el period 2016, Granma, (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.granma.cu/septimo-congreso-del-pcc/2016-04-19/resolucion-la-implementacion-de-los-lineamientos-de-la-politica-economica-y-social-aprobados-en-el-6to-congreso-y-su-actualizacion-para-el-periodo-2016;

Al presentar el proyecto de resolución, el miembro de la Comisión Permanente para la Implementación y de Desarrollo de los Lineamientos, Fernando Lavín Carbonell, subrayó que el 21 por ciento de los aprobados en el VI Congreso se han implementado totalmente, y el 78 por ciento se encuentra en diferentes fases, lo que ha implicado la aprobación de 130 políticas. Lavín Carbonell explicó que como resultado del proceso de actualización para la etapa 2016-2021, el 87,5 por ciento de los 313 lineamientos se mantienen, modifican o se integran entre sí, lo que unido a la incorporación de 50 nuevos totalizan 274 estructurados en 13 capítulos para dicho quinquenio.

Congreso del Partido adopta resolución sobre la implementación de los Lineamientos, CMBQ Radio Enciclopedia (Apr. 18, 2016, 4:15 PM), http://www.radioenciclopedia.cu/cuba-mundo/congreso-partido-adopta-resolucion-sobre-implementacion-lineamientos-20160418/.


[22] See, infra Section II.


[23] Mimi Whitefield, Cuba’s Communist Party Congress Wants Change, But Also More of the Same, The Miami Herald (Apr. 18, 2016, 6:34 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article72522672.html.


[24] See Marce Cameron, Cuban Communist Party to Launch Post-Congress Debate Among Divergent Visions, Green Left Weekly (May 8, 2016), https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/61736. See also, Associated Press, Cuba's Future Economic Model in Spotlight at Party Congress, Univision News (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/cubas-future-economic-model-in-spotlight-at-party-congress.


[25] See, e.g., Roberto Álvarez Quiñones, The 7th Congress: A Reality Check, Diario de Cuba (Apr. 21, 2016, 2:17 PM), http://www.diariodecuba.com/cuba/1461241072_21833.html.


[26] See, e.g., Cuba’s Communist Party Congress Approves New Reforms, Slams Obama Visit, Xinhua: Xinhuanet, (Apr. 18, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/19/c_135294032.htm (“Cuban leaders and media have become more critical of Obama after his visit to the island, with Fidel Castro accusing him of sweet-talking the people and many articles finding fault with his speech to Cubans. Many have portrayed his trip as an attempt to seduce an emerging private sector to become a strong political force in the country and persuade ordinary Cubans to abandon the country's socialist values for a free market economy.”).


[27] See Generally, Larry Catá Backer, Guest Post: On Cuban Normalization, Opinio Juris (Jan. 5, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/05/guest-post-cuban-normalization/.


[28] Oscar Sánchez Serra, El Congreso no se acabó, Granma: Edición Especial, May 14, 2016, at 32, http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/congreso%20pcc.pdf.


[29] Conceptualización, supra note 19.


[30] See Resolución sobre el Proyecto de Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista, Inter-Press Service en Cuba, Inter Pres Service en Cuba (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.ipscuba.net/archivo/resolucion-sobre-el-proyecto-de-conceptualizacion-del-modelo-economico-y-social-cubano-de-desarrollo-socialista-2/.