Analogies are the expression of a certain sort of analysis, one the purpose of which is not knowledge in itself, but the inculcation of the order necessary for the constitution of systems of knowledge, in the sense of a capacity for knowing or understanding objects and their relations. Analogies are then, perhaps, the building blocks for systems building, the basic blocks of which are objects identified, and then arranged in relation to one another on the basis of the effects they have on each other, or by reason of their "essence." There is nothing natural about this--analogy assumes relational autonomy--the process of analogy in system building and rationalization is one of volitional juxtaposition--but not just volitional, rather strategic juxtaposition in furtherance of whatever it is that is meant to be furthered.
The starting point is the (not unreasonable) premise that things can be compared and ordered in a way that can be replicated across otherwise incomparable things.--at least from the vantage point of those observing or affected--humans mostly. What is being compared, of course, is not the thing itself, but rather the relationship among things, which, it is supposed, can then be extracted from the relationships among other things--sometimes quite unrelated things, to reinforce the illusion that through these discernment of ordering relationships, a sort of rationalized relationship can be discerned, refined, and projected onto every thing. The analogy, then, is not about comparison, but about the correspondence of relationships that can be replicated--and thus replicated, can serve as the basis for coding an ordered reality that can then be projected about onto the world of things and their inter-actions. One does not engage in analogy to compare, but to order; and one does not order by analogy, is not to shape relationships and things to suit the categorical or behavior or normative premise at the heart of the "correctness"--the appropriateness-- of the comparison from the Greek analogos: ανα (according to) λόγος (in this case perhaps reason built into the naming of the thing, relationship etc.).
So here is a juxtaposition that is the detritus of analogy: the 83rd anniversary of the Battle of Midway is to the Ukrainian drone attack on the Russian air fleet, as the allied determination to achieve total victory against Japanese territorial ambitions during the mid 20th century Pacific War is to the determination to achieve victory against Russian territorial ambitions against Ukraine (for starters).
An odd juxtaposition and an even odder analogy one might think. But that oddity does not come from the facticity of the events clumped together though separated by time, space, actors, circumstances and the like. What they share--the way they can be conjoined and related to reinforce the premises that make analogy work and juxtaposed objects/events appear natural (within a collective meaning making order)--are the (1) drive to total victory (to undo the aggression) AND (2) the determination to (eventually) convert former enemies into allies (the U.S. and Japan), or at least (more or less) non-belligerent neighbors (Egypt and Israel).
It is clear that the Trump administration understands the second part of the premises that contribute to the power of the analogy. But it is apparent that this same administration is oblivious to its first part: that one cannot get to peace (in these analogous circumstances) without victory. And there is both analogy and juxtaposition.
Mr. Trump invited analogy through his Administration's well constructed memorial on the 83rd anniversary of the American victory at Midway Island (Presidential Message on the 83rd Anniversary of the Battle of Midway), an important step on the road to total victory for the Allies in the Pacific Theater of the 1933-1945 segment of the great 20th century global war that started roughly in 1914 and ended probably most accurately in 1989.
At dawn on June 4, 1942, the U.S. Navy struck back. Despite facing a larger enemy force and suffering heavy losses, the U.S. fleet under the command of Admirals Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance fought with unmatched resolve. In the course of twenty-four hours, they sank four Japanese aircraft carriers, destroyed a heavy cruiser, and crushed Japanese hopes of advancing deeper into the eastern Pacific—paving the way for our Nation’s acceptance of Japan’s unconditional surrender and the end of World War II in 1945. Today, former enemies stand united as allies. The United States and Japan have forged an enduring partnership built on the shared values of freedom, sovereignty, and an abiding commitment to peace across the Indo-Pacific.
And yet, upon the Ukrainian great victory (judged by the standards of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 2014-? eg here, here, and here), the same office that spoke both about steps toward total victory and then the forging of a new long term relationship has this to say:
President Trump said Russia planned to retaliate against Ukraine for its surprise attack over the weekend, after speaking to President Vladimir V. Putin on the phone for more than an hour on Wednesday. “President Putin did say, and very strongly, that he will have to respond to the recent attack on the airfields,” Mr. Trump said in a statement on social media. He described their exchange as a “good conversation, but not a conversation that will lead to immediate Peace.” The post briefly disappeared from the site without explanation, then reappeared. (Trump says Putin plans to retaliate for Ukraine’s airfield drone attack.)
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Indeed the American response, now months old at least appears to be to punish or harvest (U.S. Is Redirecting Critical Antidrone Technology From Ukraine to U.S. Forces) in the service of a peace (cessation of combat) in conformity to a script in which the lesser power was not invited to participate but is expected to conform--for humanitarian reasons of course as they are defined and applied to suit the times (eg here). Indeed, what seems to have captured the imagination is not the victory, but its consequences to big expensive and unprotected air forces--the those of the US (see, e.g., here). In this case, of course, it is as likely that the Trump Administrations (like the Biden Administration before it) is peeved at the Ukrainians for failing to play their role (as prescribed for them by their political superiors in the form of global "leading states") and will likely provide aid to the Russians (a higher status state) in the form of withholding aid from Ukraine (there are limits to what can be done in public to ensure conformity with the "script" in the heads of those who lead--whether in Moscow, Washington, Beijing, or Brussels. Perhaps, indeed, the Americans view the Russian effort as the sort of Reconquista they can get behind, on piece at a time, with interludes of peace followed by interludes of re-piecing together some sort of vision of a Russian imperial enterprise, which drawing on its own reconstructed mythos projects something new, preferably on the territories of other states--that is the analogy and juxtaposition that leading states and their officials seem to be buying. . . today.
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Or perhaps the Trump Administration is not oblivious but again, like the Biden Administration before his (an irony if ever there was one), Mr. Trump and his team prefer a different analogy--one in which the object is not total victory but ceasefire; and the aim is not permanent but at least temporary peace. This is an analogy (embraced by many) that is premised on the fundamental insight that where peace is elusive without substantial defeat of one party and victory of another (that is where the conditions of total victory are abhorrent or perhaps too costly (materially or psychologically) to bear) then one must prepare for continuous war until one side or another is exhausted or circumstances otherwise change. That is the Israel-Palestine analogy. That analogy is based, perhaps on another presumption--that only first tier states are permitted the luxury of total victory, and the possibility of transforming enemies into allies; for all others manged violence until, Cold War style, one of the belligerents spends itself (psychically and materially) into non-existence--though the more fundamental analogy is the Spanish Reconquista, an effort at war that started in 711 and ended officially from the Christian side on 2 January 1492, though from the perspective of collectives like ISIS continues to the present day. The talk, of course, is all about avoiding endless or unprofitable war through ceasefire leading to something that is not war (even if it is not peace--the endlessly cyclical war-pause strategy used in the Middle East (a nice euphemism that covers a multitude of suns. . . .) which is now fit as well for Ukrainians and perhaps for the same reasons.
And thus the potency of analogy and jusxtapositioning. What is being created from facts on the ground are the structures of premises evidenced by the "certainty" of the meaning and arrangement of signified connections. These are made more compelling by their own phenomenology--or in the language of the warrior/merchant, by creating facts on the ground and obliterating the inconvenient or contrary. Fair enough one can suppose; every generation draws on its re-imagined past to reconstruct itself as somehow closer to or walking along a path that ends or points to a perfectible future, which is itsef a construct of the unfinished business of the present. In this quicksand all sorts of creatures--physical, normative, virtual, and discursive--can run around huckstering their own rationalizations. When a sufficiently important segment of a collective then embraces whatever it is they will into existence in their own minds, then reality again reigns on at least that portion of the world and certainly within the minds of its believers. Fides et Ratio reconciled to the post-modern age and its own ironies.
The interpretation of sources is a vital task for theology; but another still more delicate and demanding task is the understanding of revealed truth, or the articulation of the intellectus fidei. The intellectus fidei, as I have noted, demands the contribution of a philosophy of being which first of all would enable dogmatic theology to perform its functions appropriately.(Fides et Ratio ¶ 97)
Russia and Ukraine will eventually cease to hold center stage--the semiotics of that conflict, and its template, however, will have lasting impact.To those ends, the coding of analogy and juxtaposition as a phenomenology of constructed rationalization of what "ought to be" or how "what is" is judged will continue to play a decisive role for human collectives.
Today marks the 83rd anniversary of America’s seminal victory at the Battle of Midway—a watershed moment in World War II that set the Allied Forces on the path to ultimate triumph over forces of evil.
After the shocking attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Imperial Japan surged across the Pacific—dealing Allied forces a series of defeats from the fall of the Philippines, to the capture of Hong Kong and Singapore, to devastating air raids over Australia. With the U.S. Navy still reeling from the surprise attack, Japan’s ruthless push for regional dominance seemed unstoppable.
By the summer of 1942, Japan set its sights on Midway Island—a tiny American outpost with massive strategic value, just over 1,000 miles from Hawaii. The Japanese plan was clear: lure what remained of the battered U.S. Pacific Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, destroy it, and capture Midway, from where they would launch further offensives across the Pacific.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew our Armed Forces had to act decisively. He tasked Admiral Chester Nimitz, a submariner and newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, with launching a full-scale effort to restore the Navy’s remaining ships to fighting condition. With vital intelligence from American codebreakers, the Allies stayed one step ahead, anticipating the major elements of Japan’s strategy.
At dawn on June 4, 1942, the U.S. Navy struck back. Despite facing a larger enemy force and suffering heavy losses, the U.S. fleet under the command of Admirals Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance fought with unmatched resolve. In the course of twenty-four hours, they sank four Japanese aircraft carriers, destroyed a heavy cruiser, and crushed Japanese hopes of advancing deeper into the eastern Pacific—paving the way for our Nation’s acceptance of Japan’s unconditional surrender and the end of World War II in 1945.
Today, former enemies stand united as allies. The United States and Japan have forged an enduring partnership built on the shared values of freedom, sovereignty, and an abiding commitment to peace across the Indo-Pacific. Together, we are advancing the causes of safety, security, prosperity, and liberty—all while confronting threats from China and North Korea.
The epic Battle of Midway stands to this day as a glorious reminder that, even in the face of long odds, perilous danger, and tremendous uncertainty, no challenge is too great for the strength of the American spirit. As our Nation commemorates this legendary battle, we honor the grit of our servicemen, we pay tribute to the sacrifice of our veterans, and we vow to carry forward the legacy of the fallen heroes who secured victory over tyranny in the Pacific 80 years ago.
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