I am delighted to pass along a message from the marvelous Tony Varona, Dean and Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law of an event that may be of interest:
I write with a reminder that our third annual Supreme Court Rapid Response Webinar will be tomorrow, Monday, at 10 am PT/1 pm ET on Friday’s decision in Trump v. CASA – the controversial and impactful birthright citizenship case. We have assembled some of the nation’s top experts in law and history – several who are members of our Minority Groups Section/Listserv – to discuss the case and its various effects on immigration law, federal courts, administrative law, the role of the judiciary, and other important topics. These annual Supreme Court Rapid Response Webinars have attracted thousands of participants from across the country, and attracted positive and useful media coverage to the webinars’ topics. Please join us, and share this message with interested colleagues and students who may not be on the listservs. All are welcome, and the webinar is free.
To access the webinar, please click here: https://lnkd.in/g9PWRuYT
The Supreme Court's slip opinion may be accessed HERE and may be accessed below. My own reflections follow later.
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
1
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
No. 24A884. Argued May 15, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025*
Plaintiffs (respondents here)—individuals, organizations, and States—
filed three separate suits to enjoin the implementation and enforce-
ment of President Trump’s Executive Order No. 14160. See Protecting
the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449.
The Executive Order identifies circumstances in which a person born
in the United States is not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” and is
thus not recognized as an American citizen. The plaintiffs allege that
the Executive Order violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause, §1, and §201 of the Nationality Act of 1940. In each case, the
District Court entered a “universal injunction”—an injunction barring
executive officials from applying the Executive Order to anyone, not
just the plaintiffs. And in each case, the Court of Appeals denied the
Government’s request to stay the sweeping relief. The Government
argues that the District Courts lacked equitable authority to impose
universal relief and has filed three nearly identical emergency appli-
cations seeking partial stays to limit the preliminary injunctions to the
plaintiffs in each case. The applications do not raise—and thus the
Court does not address—the question whether the Executive Order vi-
olates the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act. Instead, the issue
the Court decides is whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal
courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions.
——————
*Together with No. 24A885, Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Washington et al., and No. 24A886, Trump, President of the
United States, et al. v. New Jersey et al., also on applications for partial
stays.2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Syllabus
Held: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that
Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Govern-
ment’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below,
but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary
to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. Pp. 4–
26.
(a) The issue raised by these applications—whether Congress has
granted federal courts authority to universally enjoin the enforcement
of an executive order—plainly warrants this Court’s review. On mul-
tiple occasions, and across administrations, the Solicitor General has
asked the Court to consider the propriety of this expansive remedy. As
the number of universal injunctions has increased over the years, so
too has the importance of the issue. Pp. 4–5.
(b) The Government is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim
that the District Courts lacked authority to issue universal injunc-
tions. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (holding that for a stay
application to be granted, the applicant must make a strong showing
of likelihood of success on the merits). The issuance of a universal in-
junction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority, yet
Congress has granted federal courts no such power. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 endowed federal courts with jurisdiction over “all suits . . . in
equity,” §11, 1 Stat. 78, and still today, this statute “is what authorizes
the federal courts to issue equitable remedies,” S. Bray & E. Sherwin,
Remedies 442. This Court has held that the statutory grant encom-
passes only those sorts of equitable remedies “traditionally accorded
by courts of equity” at our country’s inception. Grupo Mexicano de De-
sarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 319.
Universal injunctions are not sufficiently “analogous” to any relief
available in the court of equity in England at the time of the founding.
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 318–319. Equity offered a mechanism
for the Crown “to secure justice where it would not be secured by the
ordinary and existing processes of law.” G. Adams, The Origin of Eng-
lish Equity, 16 Colum. L. Rev. 87, 91. This “judicial prerogative of the
King” thus extended to “those causes which the ordinary judges were
incapable of determining.” 1 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §31,
p. 27. Eventually, the Crown instituted the “practice of delegating the
cases” that “came before” the judicial prerogative “to the chancellor for
his sole decision.” Id., §34, at 28. The “general rule in Equity [was]
that all persons materially interested [in the suit] [were] to be made
parties to it.” J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings §72, p. 74
(Story). Injunctions were no exception; there were “sometimes suits to
restrain the actions of particular officers against particular plaintiffs.”
S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
Harv. L. Rev. 417, 425 (Bray, Multiple Chancellors). Of importanceCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
Syllabus
here, suits in equity were brought by and against individual parties,
and the Chancellor’s remedies were generally party specific. See Ive-
son v. Harris, 7 Ves. 251, 257, 32 Eng. Rep. 102, 104 (“[Y]ou cannot
have an injunction except against a party to the suit”). In sum, under
longstanding equity practice in England, there was no remedy “re-
motely like a national injunction.” Bray, Multiple Chancellors 425.
Nor did founding-era courts of equity in the United States chart a
different course. If anything, the approach traditionally taken by fed-
eral courts cuts against the existence of such a sweeping remedy. Con-
sider Scott v. Donald, where the plaintiff successfully challenged the
constitutionality of a law on which state officials had relied to confis-
cate alcohol that the plaintiff kept for personal use. See 165 U. S. 107,
109 (statement of case); id., at 111–112 (opinion of the Court). Alt-
hough the plaintiff sought an injunction barring enforcement of the
law against both himself and anyone “whose rights [were] infringed
and threatened” by it, the Court permitted only relief benefitting the
named plaintiff. Id., at 115–117. In the ensuing decades, the Court
consistently rebuffed requests for relief that extended beyond the par-
ties. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 123; Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447, 487–489.
The Court’s early refusals to grant relief to nonparties are consistent
with the party-specific principles that permeate the Court’s under-
standing of equity. “[N]either declaratory nor injunctive relief,” the
Court has said, “can directly interfere with enforcement of contested
statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal
plaintiffs.” Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931. In fact, uni-
versal injunctions were conspicuously nonexistent for most of the Na-
tion’s history. Their absence from 18th and 19th century equity prac-
tice settles the question of judicial authority.
While “equity is flexible,” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 322, the
Court’s precedent emphasizes that its “flexibility is confined within the
broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.” Ibid. Because the
universal injunction lacks a historical pedigree, it falls outside the
bounds of a federal court’s equitable authority under the Judiciary Act.
Pp. 5–11.
(c) Respondents’ counterarguments are unavailing. Pp. 11–21.
(1) In an effort to satisfy Grupo Mexicano’s historical test, re-
spondents claim that universal injunctions are the modern equivalent
of the decree resulting from a “bill of peace”—a form of group litigation
in the Court of Chancery. Respondents contend that the existence of
this historic equitable device means that federal courts have the equi-
table authority to issue universal injunctions under the Judiciary Act.
The analogy, however, does not work. True, “bills of peace allowed4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Syllabus
[courts of equity] to adjudicate the rights of members of dispersed
groups without formally joining them to a lawsuit through the usual
procedures.” Arizona v. Biden, 40 F. 4th 375, 397 (Sutton, C. J., con-
curring). Unlike universal injunctions, however, which reach anyone
affected by executive or legislative action, bills of peace involved a
“group [that] was small and cohesive.” Bray, Multiple Chancellors
426. And unlike universal injunctions, which bind only the parties to
the suit, decrees resulting from a bill of peace “would bind all members
of the group, whether they were present in the action or not.” 7A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1751,
at 10.
The bill of peace lives in modern form, but not as the universal in-
junction. It is instead analogous to the modern class action—which, in
federal court, is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. See ibid. Rule 23 requires numerosity (such that joinder is
impracticable), common questions of law or fact, typicality, and repre-
sentative parties who adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a). The requirements for a bill of peace were
virtually identical. See 7A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure
§1751, at 10 and n. 4. By forging a shortcut to relief that benefits par-
ties and nonparties alike, universal injunctions impermissibly circum-
vent Rule 23’s procedural protections. Pp. 12–15.
(2) Respondents contend that universal injunctions—or at least
these universal injunctions—are simply an application of the principle
that a court of equity may fashion a remedy that awards complete re-
lief. But “complete relief” is not synonymous with “universal relief.”
It is a narrower concept, long embraced in the equitable tradition, that
allows courts to “administer complete relief between the parties.” Kin-
ney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U. S. 488, 507 (emphasis added). To
be sure, party-specific injunctions sometimes “advantag[e] nonpar-
ties,” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S 667, 717 (THOMAS, J., concurring),
but they do so only incidentally.
Here, prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Order against the
child of an individual pregnant plaintiff will give that plaintiff com-
plete relief: Her child will not be denied citizenship. And extending
the injunction to cover everyone similarly situated would not render
her relief any more complete. So the individual and associational re-
spondents are wrong to characterize the universal injunction as simply
an application of the complete-relief principle. The inquiry is more
complicated for the state respondents, because the relevant injunction
does not purport to directly benefit nonparties. Instead, the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts decided that a universal in-
junction was necessary to provide the States themselves complete re-Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
5
Syllabus
lief. As the States see it, their harms—financial injuries and the ad-
ministrative burdens flowing from citizen-dependent benefits pro-
grams—cannot be remedied without a blanket ban on the enforcement
of the Executive Order. Children often move across state lines or are
born outside their parents’ State of residence. Given the cross-border
flow, the States say, a “patchwork injunction” would prove unworkable
for the provision of certain federally funded benefits. The Government
retorts that even if the injunction is designed to benefit only the States,
it is “more burdensome than necessary to redress” their asserted
harms, see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702, and that nar-
rower relief is appropriate. The Court declines to take up these argu-
ments in the first instance. The lower courts should determine
whether a narrower injunction is appropriate, so we leave it to them
to consider these and any related arguments. Pp. 15–19.
(3) Respondents defend universal injunctions as a matter of pol-
icy; the Government advances policy arguments running the other
way. As with most questions of law, the policy pros and cons are beside
the point. Under the Court’s well-established precedent, see Grupo
Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 319, because universal injunctions lack a
founding-era forebear, federal courts lack authority to issue them. Pp.
19–21.
(d) To obtain interim relief, the Government must show that it is
likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. Nken, 556 U. S., at
434–435. When a federal court enters a universal injunction against
the Government, it “improper[ly] intru[des]” on “a coordinate branch
of the Government” and prevents the Government from enforcing its
policies against nonparties. INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of
Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, 510 U. S. 1301, 1306 (O’Con-
nor, J., in chambers); see also Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303
(ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (“ ‘[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a
court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its peo-
ple, it suffers a form of irreparable injury’ ” (alteration in original)).
The Court’s practice also demonstrates that an applicant need not
show it will prevail on the underlying merits when it seeks a stay on a
threshold issue. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Saenz, 603 U. S. ___; OPM v.
AFGE, 604 U. S. ___. The Government here is likely to suffer irrepa-
rable harm from the District Courts’ entry of injunctions that likely
exceed the authority conferred by the Judiciary Act. And the balance
of equities does not counsel against awarding the Government interim
relief: A partial stay will cause no harm to respondents because they
will remain protected by the preliminary injunctions to the extent nec-
essary and appropriate to afford them complete relief. Pp. 24–26.
(e) When a court concludes that the Executive Branch has acted un-
lawfully, the answer is not for the court to exceed its power, too. The6 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Syllabus
Government’s applications for partial stays of the preliminary injunc-
tions are granted, but only to the extent that the injunctions are
broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with
standing to sue. P. 26.
Applications for partial stays granted.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KA-
VANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed
a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
Opinion of the Court
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24A884
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A885
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A886
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States has filed three emergency applications
challenging the scope of a federal court’s authority to enjoin
Government officials from enforcing an executive order.
Traditionally, courts issued injunctions prohibiting execu-
tive officials from enforcing a challenged law or policy only
against the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. The injunctions before
us today reflect a more recent development: district courts
asserting the power to prohibit enforcement of a law or pol-
icy against anyone. These injunctions—known as “univer-
sal injunctions”—likely exceed the equitable authority that2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Congress has granted to federal courts.1 We therefore grant
the Government’s applications to partially stay the injunc-
tions entered below.
I
The applications before us concern three overlapping,
universal preliminary injunctions entered by three differ-
ent District Courts. See 763 F. Supp. 3d 723 (Md. 2025),
appeal pending, No. 25–1153 (CA4); 765 F. Supp. 3d 1142
(WD Wash. 2025), appeal pending, No. 25–807 (CA9); Doe
v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d 266 (Mass. 2025), appeal pend-
ing, No. 25–1170 (CA1). The plaintiffs—individuals, organ-
izations, and States—sought to enjoin the implementation
and enforcement of President Trump’s Executive Order No.
14160.2 See Protecting the Meaning and Value of American
Citizenship, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (2025). The Executive Order
identifies circumstances in which a person born in the
United States is not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof ” and
——————
1 Such injunctions are sometimes called “nationwide injunctions,” re-
flecting their use by a single district court to bar the enforcement of a
law anywhere in the Nation. But the term “universal” better captures
how these injunctions work. Even a traditional, parties-only injunction
can apply beyond the jurisdiction of the issuing court. Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U. S. 280, 289 (1952) (When “exercising its equity pow-
ers,” a district court “may command persons properly before it to cease
or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction”). The difference be-
tween a traditional injunction and a universal injunction is not so much
where it applies, but whom it protects: A universal injunction prohibits
the Government from enforcing the law against anyone, anywhere. H.
Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunc-
tions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 335,
338 (2018).
2 The Government does not dispute—nor could it—that the individual
plaintiffs have standing to sue. But it argues that the States lack third-
party standing because their claims rest exclusively on the rights of in-
dividuals. Application for Partial Stay of Injunction in No. 24A884,
pp. 28–32. It also challenges the District Courts’ authority to grant relief
to the organizations’ members who are not identified in the complaints.
See id., at 22. We do not address these arguments.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
Opinion of the Court
is thus not recognized as an American citizen. See ibid.
Specifically, it sets forth the “policy of the United States” to
no longer issue or accept documentation of citizenship in
two scenarios: “(1) when [a] person’s mother was unlawfully
present in the United States and the person’s father was
not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at
the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when [a] person’s
mother’s presence in the United States was lawful but tem-
porary, and the person’s father was not a United States cit-
izen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said per-
son’s birth.” Ibid. The Executive Order also provides for a
30-day ramp-up period. During that time, the order directs
executive agencies to develop and issue public guidance re-
garding the order’s implementation. See id., at 8449–8450.
The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the Executive Order
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause,
§1, as well as §201 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
1138 (codified at 8 U. S. C. §1401). In each case, the District
Court concluded that the Executive Order is likely unlawful
and entered a universal preliminary injunction barring var-
ious executive officials from applying the policy to anyone
in the country. And in each case, the Court of Appeals de-
nied the Government’s request to stay the sweeping relief.
See 2025 WL 654902 (CA4, Feb. 28, 2025); 2025 WL 553485
(CA9, Feb. 19, 2025); 131 F. 4th 27 (CA1 2025).
The Government has now filed three nearly identical ap-
plications seeking to partially stay the universal prelimi-
nary injunctions and limit them to the parties. See Appli-
cation for Partial Stay of Injunction in No. 24A884;
Application for Partial Stay of Injunction in No. 24A885;
Application for Partial Stay of Injunction in No. 24A886.3
The applications do not raise—and thus we do not ad-
dress—the question whether the Executive Order violates
——————
3 Because the applications are materially identical, we cite only the ap-
plication in No. 24A884 throughout the rest of the opinion.4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act. The issue before
us is one of remedy: whether, under the Judiciary Act of
1789, federal courts have equitable authority to issue uni-
versal injunctions.
II
The question whether Congress has granted federal
courts the authority to universally enjoin the enforcement
of an executive or legislative policy plainly warrants our re-
view, as Members of this Court have repeatedly empha-
sized. See, e.g., McHenry v. Texas Top Cop Shop, 604 U. S.
___, ___ (2025) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay)
(slip op., at 1) (“I would . . . take this case now to resolve
definitively the question whether a district court may issue
universal injunctive relief ”); Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2024) (GORSUCH, J., joined by THOMAS and ALITO,
JJ., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 7–8) (“[T]he pro-
priety of universal injunctive relief [is] a question of great
significance that has been in need of the Court’s attention
for some time”); Griffin v. HM Florida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S.
___, ___ (2023) (statement of KAVANAUGH, J., joined by
BARRETT, J., except as to footnote 1, respecting denial of ap-
plication for stay) (slip op., at 3) (Universal injunctions pre-
sent “an important question that could warrant our review
in the future”); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 713 (2018)
(THOMAS, J., concurring) (“If [universal injunctions’] popu-
larity continues, this Court must address their legality”).
On multiple occasions, and across administrations, the So-
licitor General has asked us to consider the propriety of this
expansive remedy. See, e.g., Application for Stay of Injunc-
tion in McHenry v. Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., O. T. 2024,
No. 24A653 (Biden administration); Brief for Petitioners in
Trump v. Hawaii, O. T. 2017, No. 17–965 (first Trump ad-
ministration).
It is easy to see why. By the end of the Biden administra-
tion, we had reached “a state of affairs where almost everyCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
5
Opinion of the Court
major presidential act [was] immediately frozen by a fed-
eral district court.” W. Baude & S. Bray, Comment, Proper
Parties, Proper Relief, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 174 (2023).
The trend has continued: During the first 100 days of the
second Trump administration, district courts issued ap-
proximately 25 universal injunctions. Congressional Re-
search Service, J. Lampe, Nationwide Injunctions in the
First Hundred Days of the Second Trump Administration 1
(May 16, 2025). As the number of universal injunctions has
increased, so too has the importance of the issue.
III
A
The Government is likely to succeed on the merits of its
argument regarding the scope of relief. See Nken v. Holder,
556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009) (holding that for a stay application
to be granted, the applicant must make “‘a strong showing
that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits’”). A universal
injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable
authority, yet Congress has granted federal courts no such
power.4
The Judiciary Act of 1789 endowed federal courts with
jurisdiction over “all suits . . . in equity,” §11, 1 Stat. 78, and
still today, this statute “is what authorizes the federal
courts to issue equitable remedies,” S. Bray & E. Sherwin,
Remedies 442 (4th ed. 2024). Though flexible, this equita-
ble authority is not freewheeling. We have held that the
statutory grant encompasses only those sorts of equitable
remedies “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at our
country’s inception. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 319 (1999); see
also, e.g., Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430 (1869) (“The eq-
uity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same
——————
4 Our decision rests solely on the statutory authority that federal
courts possess under the Judiciary Act of 1789. We express no view on
the Government’s argument that Article III forecloses universal relief.6 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses”).5
We must therefore ask whether universal injunctions are
sufficiently “analogous” to the relief issued “‘by the High
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judici-
ary Act.’” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 318–319 (quoting
A. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
660 (1928)).
The answer is no: Neither the universal injunction nor
any analogous form of relief was available in the High
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the founding.
Equity offered a mechanism for the Crown “to secure justice
where it would not be secured by the ordinary and existing
processes of law.” G. Adams, The Origin of English Equity,
16 Colum. L. Rev. 87, 91 (1916). This “judicial prerogative
of the King” thus extended to “those causes which the ordi-
nary judges were incapable of determining.” 1 J. Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence §31, p. 27 (1881). Eventually, the
Crown instituted the “practice of delegating the cases” that
“came before” the judicial prerogative “to the chancellor for
his sole decision.” Id., §34, at 28. This “became the common
mode of dealing with such controversies.” Ibid.
Of importance here, suits in equity were brought by and
against individual parties. Indeed, the “general rule in Eq-
uity [was] that all persons materially interested [in the
suit] [were] to be made parties to it.” J. Story, Commen-
taries on Equity Pleadings §72, p. 74 (2d ed. 1840) (Story).
Injunctions were no exception; there were “sometimes suits
——————
5 See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 105 (1945) (“[T]he
federal courts [have] no power that they would not have had in any event
when courts were given ‘cognizance,’ by the first Judiciary Act, of suits
‘in equity’ ”); Boyle v. Zacharie & Turner, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (1832) (“[T]he
settled doctrine of this court is, that the remedies in equity are to be ad-
ministered, not according to the state practice, but according to the prac-
tice of courts of equity in the parent country”).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
7
Opinion of the Court
to restrain the actions of particular officers against partic-
ular plaintiffs.” S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming
the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 425 (2017)
(Bray, Multiple Chancellors) (emphasis added). And in cer-
tain cases, the “Attorney General could be a defendant.”
Ibid. The Chancellor’s remedies were also typically party
specific. “As a general rule, an injunction” could not bind
one who was not a “party to the cause.” F. Calvert, Suits in
Equity 120 (2d ed. 1847); see also Iveson v. Harris, 7 Ves.
251, 257, 32 Eng. Rep. 102, 104 (1802) (“[Y]ou cannot have
an injunction except against a party to the suit”). Suffice it
to say, then, under longstanding equity practice in Eng-
land, there was no remedy “remotely like a national injunc-
tion.” Bray, Multiple Chancellors 425.
Nor did founding-era courts of equity in the United States
chart a different course. See 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
dence §41, at 33–34. If anything, the approach traditionally
taken by federal courts cuts against the existence of such a
sweeping remedy. Consider Scott v. Donald, where the
plaintiff successfully challenged the constitutionality of a
law on which state officials had relied to confiscate alcohol
that the plaintiff kept for personal use. See 165 U. S. 107,
109 (1897) (statement of case); id., at 111–112 (opinion of
the Court). Although the plaintiff sought an injunction bar-
ring enforcement of the law against both himself and any-
one else “whose rights [were] infringed and threatened” by
it, this Court permitted only a narrower decree between
“the parties named as plaintiff and defendants in the bill.”
Id., at 115–117.6
——————
6 Though the principal dissent claims otherwise, we do not treat Scott
as “dispositive.” Post, at 28 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Under Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308
(1999), the lack of a historical analogue is dispositive. Scott simply illus-
trates that as late as 1897, this Court adhered to a party-specific view of
relief. And while the principal dissent relies on Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466, 518 (1898), as a counterexample to Scott, see post, at 28 (opinion of8 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
In the ensuing decades, we consistently rebuffed requests
for relief that extended beyond the parties. See, e.g., Per-
kins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 123 (1940) (“The
benefits of [the court’s] injunction” improperly extended “to
bidders throughout the Nation who were not parties to any
proceeding, who were not before the court[,] and who had
sought no relief ”); cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487–489 (1923)
(concluding that the Court lacked authority to issue “pre-
ventive relief ” that would apply to people who “suffe[r] in
some indefinite way in common with people generally”);
Bray, Multiple Chancellors 433 (explaining that the Froth-
ingham analysis “intertwines concepts of equity, remedies,
and the judicial power”). As Justice Nelson put it while rid-
ing circuit, “[t]here is scarcely a suit at law, or in equity, . . .
in which a general statute is interpreted, that does not in-
volve a question in which other parties are interested.” Cut-
ting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas. 1079, 1080 (No. 3,519) (CC SDNY
1865). But to allow all persons subject to the statute to be
treated as parties to a lawsuit “would confound the estab-
lished order of judicial proceedings.” Ibid.
Our early refusals to grant relief to nonparties are con-
sistent with the party-specific principles that permeate our
understanding of equity. “[N]either declaratory nor injunc-
tive relief,” we have said, “can directly interfere with en-
forcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with
respect to the particular federal plaintiffs.” Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975); see also Gregory v. Stet-
son, 133 U. S. 579, 586 (1890) (“It is an elementary principle
——————
SOTOMAYOR, J.), it is unclear why. Even supporters of the universal in-
junction recognize that “the decree [that Smyth] affirmed did not reach
beyond the parties.” M. Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” In-
junction, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 939 (2020); Smyth, 169 U. S., at 476–477
(statement of case) (quoting circuit court order that enjoined state offi-
cials from enforcing the statute “against said railroad companies” (em-
phasis added)).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
9
Opinion of the Court
that a court cannot adjudicate directly upon a person’s right
without having him either actually or constructively before
it. This principle is fundamental”); Baude, 137 Harv.
L. Rev., at 168 (noting the “party-specific understanding of
what equitable remedies do”).
In fact, universal injunctions were not a feature of federal-
court litigation until sometime in the 20th century. See
Bray, Multiple Chancellors 448–452 (discussing various ra-
tionales for the birth of the universal injunction); see also
Application in No. 24A884, at 17–18. The D. C. Circuit is-
sued what some regard as the first universal injunction in
1963. See Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F. 2d 518, 535 (en-
joining the Secretary of Labor “with respect to the entire
[electric motors and generators] industry,” not just the
named plaintiffs to the lawsuit).7 Yet such injunctions re-
mained rare until the turn of the 21st century, when their
use gradually accelerated. See Bray, Multiple Chancellors
439–443 (referencing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968),
and Harlem Valley Transp. Assn. v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp.
1057 (SDNY 1973)). One study identified approximately
127 universal injunctions issued between 1963 and 2023.
——————
7 There is some dispute about whether Wirtz was the first universal
injunction. Professor Mila Sohoni points to other possible 20th-century
examples, including West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624
(1943), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), and Lewis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913). See M. Sohoni, 133 Harv.
L. Rev., at 943; Brief for Professor Mila Sohoni as Amica Curiae 3; see
also post, at 21 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). But see M. Morley, Disaggre-
gating the History of Nationwide Injunctions: A Response to Professor
Sohoni, 72 Ala. L. Rev. 239, 252–256 (2020) (disputing these examples).
Regardless, under any account, universal injunctions postdated the
founding by more than a century—and under Grupo Mexicano, equitable
authority exercised under the Judiciary Act must derive from founding-
era practice. 527 U. S., at 319. It also bears emphasis that none of these
cases addresses the propriety of universal relief. Like a “drive-by-juris-
dictional rulin[g],” implicit acquiescence to a broad remedy “ha[s] no
precedential effect.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
83, 91 (1998).10 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
See District Court Reform: Nationwide Injunctions, 137
Harv. L. Rev. 1701, 1705 (2024). Ninety-six of them—over
three quarters—were issued during the administrations of
President George W. Bush, President Obama, President
Trump, and President Biden. Ibid.
The bottom line? The universal injunction was conspicu-
ously nonexistent for most of our Nation’s history. Its ab-
sence from 18th- and 19th-century equity practice settles
the question of judicial authority.8 See Grupo Mexicano,
527 U. S., at 318–319. That the absence continued into the
20th century renders any claim of historical pedigree still
more implausible. Even during the “deluge of constitu-
tional litigation that occurred in the wake of Ex parte
Young, throughout the Lochner Era, and at the dawn of the
New Deal,” universal injunctions were nowhere to be found.
M. Morley, Disaggregating the History of Nationwide In-
junctions: A Response to Professor Sohoni, 72 Ala. L. Rev.
239, 252 (2020) (footnotes omitted). Had federal courts be-
lieved themselves to possess the tool, surely they would not
have let it lay idle.
Faced with this timeline, the principal dissent accuses us
of “misunderstand[ing] the nature of equity” as being
“fr[ozen] in amber . . . at the time of the Judiciary Act.”
Post, at 29 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Not so. We said it
before, see supra, at 5, and say it again: “[E]quity is flexi-
ble.” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 322. At the same time,
its “flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of
——————
8 The principal dissent faults us for failing to identify a single founding-
era case in which this Court held that universal injunctions exceed a fed-
eral court’s equitable authority. See post, at 29 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR,
J.). But this absence only bolsters our case. That this Court had no oc-
casion to reject the universal injunction as inconsistent with traditional
equity practice merely demonstrates that no party even bothered to ask
for such a sweeping remedy—because no court would have entertained
the request. Cf. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 332 (“[E]quitable powers
conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create
remedies previously unknown to equity jurisprudence”).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
11
Opinion of the Court
traditional equitable relief.”9 Ibid. A modern device need
not have an exact historical match, but under Grupo Mexi-
cano, it must have a founding-era antecedent. And neither
the universal injunction nor a sufficiently comparable pre-
decessor was available from a court of equity at the time of
our country’s inception. See id., at 333. Because the uni-
versal injunction lacks a historical pedigree, it falls outside
the bounds of a federal court’s equitable authority under
the Judiciary Act.10 See id., at 318–319.
B
Respondents raise several counterarguments, which the
principal dissent echoes. First, they insist that the univer-
sal injunction has a sufficient historical analogue: a decree
resulting from a bill of peace. Second, they maintain that
——————
9 Notwithstanding Grupo Mexicano, the principal dissent invokes Ex
parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), as support for the proposition that
equity can encompass remedies that have “no analogue in the relief ex-
ercised in the English Court of Chancery,” because Ex parte Young per-
mits plaintiffs to “obtain plaintiff-protective injunctions against Govern-
ment officials,” and the English Court of Chancery “could not enjoin the
Crown or English officers,” post, at 30 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). But
contrary to the principal dissent’s suggestion, Ex parte Young does not
say—either explicitly or implicitly—that courts may devise novel reme-
dies that have no background in traditional equitable practice. Histori-
cally, a court of equity could issue an antisuit injunction to prevent an
officer from engaging in tortious conduct. Ex parte Young justifies its
holding by reference to a long line of cases authorizing suits against state
officials in certain circumstances. See 209 U. S., at 150–152 (citing, e.g.,
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824); Governor of Geor-
gia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828); and Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203
(1873)). Support for the principal dissent’s approach is found not in
Ex parte Young, but in Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent in Grupo Mex-
icano, which eschews the governing historical approach in favor of “[a]
dynamic equity jurisprudence.” 527 U. S., at 337 (opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
10 Nothing we say today resolves the distinct question whether the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act authorizes federal courts to vacate federal
agency action. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2) (authorizing courts to “hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency action”).12 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
universal injunctions are consistent with the principle that
a court of equity may fashion complete relief for the parties.
Third, they argue that universal injunctions serve im-
portant policy objectives.
1
In an effort to satisfy Grupo Mexicano’s historical test,
respondents claim that universal injunctive relief does have
a founding-era forebear: the decree obtained on a “bill of
peace,” which was a form of group litigation permitted in
English courts. See Opposition to Application in No.
24A884 (CASA), pp. 30–31; see also Brief for Professor Mila
Sohoni as Amica Curiae 6–8. This bill allowed the Chan-
cellor to consolidate multiple suits that involved a “common
claim the plaintiff could have against multiple defendants”
or “some kind of common claim that multiple plaintiffs
could have against a single defendant.” Bray, Multiple
Chancellors 426; see How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 1 Vern.
22, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (1681) (suit by a lord against his ten-
ants collectively); Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Ca. 283, 22
Eng. Rep. 802 (1676), and Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Ca.
272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676) (suit by a parson against lead
miners in a parish, who named four of their members to de-
fend the suit in a representative capacity). Universal in-
junctions are analogous to this traditional equitable device,
respondents say, so federal courts have authority under the
Judiciary Act to issue them.
The analogy does not work. True, “bills of peace allowed
[courts of equity] to adjudicate the rights of members of dis-
persed groups without formally joining them to a lawsuit
through the usual procedures.” Arizona v. Biden, 40 F. 4th
375, 397 (CA6 2022) (Sutton, C. J., concurring); see Story
§§120–135 (discussing representative suits). Even so, their
use was confined to limited circumstances. See 7A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure §1751, p. 10, and n. 4 (4th ed. 2021) (citing Adair v.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
13
Opinion of the Court
New River Co., 11 Ves. 429, 32 Eng. Rep. 1154 (Ch. 1803)).
Unlike universal injunctions, which reach anyone affected
by legislative or executive action—no matter how large the
group or how tangential the effect—a bill of peace involved
a “group [that] was small and cohesive,” and the suit did
not “resolve a question of legal interpretation for the entire
realm.” Bray, Multiple Chancellors 426. And unlike uni-
versal injunctions, which bind only the parties to the suit,
decrees obtained on a bill of peace “would bind all members
of the group, whether they were present in the action or
not.” 7A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §1751, at
10; see Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1854)
(When “a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in
interest to represent the entire body . . . the decree binds all
of them the same as if all were before the court”); see also
Story §120 (“[I]n most, if not in all, cases of this sort, the
decree obtained upon such a Bill will ordinarily be held
binding upon all other persons standing in the same predic-
ament”). As Chief Judge Sutton aptly put it, “[t]he domes-
ticated animal known as a bill of peace looks nothing like
the dragon of nationwide injunctions.” Arizona, 40 F. 4th,
at 397 (concurring opinion).
The bill of peace lives in modern form, but not as the uni-
versal injunction. It evolved into the modern class action,
which is governed in federal court by Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 7A Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure §1751, at 10 (“It was the English bill of peace
that developed into what is now known as the class action”);
see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 41 (1940) (“The class suit
was an invention of equity”). And while Rule 23 is in some
ways “more restrictive of representative suits than the orig-
inal bills of peace,” Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F. 3d 451, 464
(CA8 2019) (Stras, J., concurring), it would still be recog-
nizable to an English Chancellor. Rule 23 requires numer-
osity (such that joinder is impracticable), common ques-
tions of law or fact, typicality, and representative parties14 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
who adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 23(a). The requirements for a bill of peace were
virtually identical. See 7A Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure §1751, at 10, and n. 4 (citing Adair, 11 Ves. 429,
32 Eng. Rep. 1154). None of these requirements is a pre-
requisite for a universal injunction.
Rule 23’s limits on class actions underscore a significant
problem with universal injunctions. A “‘properly conducted
class action,’” we have said, “can come about in federal
courts in just one way—through the procedure set out in
Rule 23.” Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U. S. 299, 315 (2011);
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
members only if ” Rule 23(a)’s requirements are satisfied
(emphasis added)). Yet by forging a shortcut to relief that
benefits parties and nonparties alike, universal injunctions
circumvent Rule 23’s procedural protections and allow
“‘courts to “create de facto class actions at will.”’” Smith,
564 U. S., at 315 (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880,
901 (2008)). Why bother with a Rule 23 class action when
the quick fix of a universal injunction is on the table? Cf.
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 330–331 (“Why go through
the trouble of complying with local attachment and garnish-
ment statutes when this all-purpose prejudgment injunc-
tion is available?”). The principal dissent’s suggestion that
these suits could have satisfied Rule 23’s requirements
simply proves that universal injunctions are a class-action
workaround. Post, at 25–26 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).
The taxpayer suit is a similarly inadequate historical
analogy. Contra, post, at 24–25. In a successful taxpayer
suit, a court would enjoin the collection of an unlawful tax
against “taxpayers joined as co-plaintiffs, or by one tax-
payer suing on behalf of himself and all others similarly sit-
uated.” 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §260, at 277. To
be sure, some state courts would occasionally “enjoin theCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
15
Opinion of the Court
enforcement and collection” of taxes against an “entire com-
munity,” even when a “single taxpayer su[ed] on his own
account.” Id., at 277–278. But the practice of extending
relief “with respect to any taxpayer” was not adopted by
state courts until the mid-19th century, and even then, not
all states were willing to provide such sweeping relief. See
Bray, Multiple Chancellors 427. This post-founding prac-
tice of some state courts thus sheds minimal light on federal
courts’ equitable authority under the Judiciary Act. What
is more, in Frothingham, we refused to allow a single tax-
payer to challenge a federal appropriations act. 262 U. S.,
at 486–487. That counsels against placing much, if any, re-
liance on taxpayer suits as justification for the modern uni-
versal injunction.
2
Respondents contend that universal injunctions—or at
least these universal injunctions—are consistent with the
principle that a court of equity may fashion a remedy that
awards complete relief. See Opposition to Application in
No. 24A884 (CASA), at 22–25; Opposition to Application in
No. 24A885 (Washington), pp. 28–32; Opposition to Appli-
cation in No. 24A886 (New Jersey), pp. 31–39. We agree
that the complete-relief principle has deep roots in equity.
But to the extent respondents argue that it justifies the
award of relief to nonparties, they are mistaken.11
——————
11 JUSTICE JACKSON, for her part, thinks the “premise” that universal
injunctions provide relief to nonparties is “suspect” because, in her view,
“[n]onparties may benefit from an injunction, but only the plaintiff gets
relief.” Post, at 8–9, n. 2 (dissenting opinion). The availability of con-
tempt proceedings suggests otherwise. Consider the civil contempt con-
text. Under “traditional principles of equity practice,” courts may “im-
pos[e] civil contempt sanctions to ‘coerce [a] defendant into compliance’
with an injunction.” Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. 554, 560 (2019)
(quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303–304 (1947)).
Generally, civil contempt proceedings occur between the original parties
to the lawsuit. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418,16 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
“Complete relief ” is not synonymous with “universal re-
lief.” It is a narrower concept: The equitable tradition has
long embraced the rule that courts generally “may admin-
ister complete relief between the parties.” Kinney-Coastal
Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U. S. 488, 507 (1928) (emphasis
added). While party-specific injunctions sometimes “ad-
vantag[e] nonparties,” Trump, 585 U. S., at 717 (THOMAS,
J., concurring), they do so only incidentally.
Consider an archetypal case: a nuisance in which one
neighbor sues another for blasting loud music at all hours
of the night. To afford the plaintiff complete relief, the court
has only one feasible option: order the defendant to turn her
music down—or better yet, off. That order will necessarily
benefit the defendant’s surrounding neighbors too; there is
no way “to peel off just the portion of the nuisance that
harmed the plaintiff.” Rodgers, 942 F. 3d, at 462 (Stras, J.,
concurring); see A. Woolhandler & C. Nelson, Does History
Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 702
(2004). But while the court’s injunction might have the
practical effect of benefiting nonparties, “that benefit [is]
merely incidental.” Trump, 585 U. S., at 717 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring); see also 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
§1349, pp. 380–381 (1883).12 As a matter of law, the injunc-
——————
444–445 (1911). But a federal court’s “power in civil contempt proceed-
ings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief ” to “effect
compliance with its decree.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336
U. S. 187, 193–194 (1949). And “[w]hen an order grants relief for a non-
party,” as is the case with universal injunctions,“the procedure for en-
forcing the order is the same as for a party.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71; see,
e.g., Zamecnik v. Indiana Prairie School Dist. No. 204, 636 F. 3d 874, 879
(CA7 2011). So a nonparty covered by a universal injunction is likely to
reap both the practical benefit and the formal relief of the injunction.
See M. Smith, Only Where Justified: Toward Limits and Explanatory
Requirements for Nationwide Injunctions, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2013,
2019 (2020).
12 There may be other injuries for which it is all but impossible forCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
17
Opinion of the Court
tion’s protection extends only to the suing plaintiff—as evi-
denced by the fact that only the plaintiff can enforce the
judgment against the defendant responsible for the nui-
sance. If the nuisance persists, and another neighbor wants
to shut it down, she must file her own suit.13
The individual and associational respondents are there-
fore wrong to characterize the universal injunction as
simply an application of the complete-relief principle. Un-
der this principle, the question is not whether an injunction
offers complete relief to everyone potentially affected by an
allegedly unlawful act; it is whether an injunction will offer
complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court. See Cali-
fano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive
relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” (em-
phasis added)). Here, prohibiting enforcement of the Exec-
utive Order against the child of an individual pregnant
plaintiff will give that plaintiff complete relief: Her child
will not be denied citizenship. Extending the injunction to
cover all other similarly situated individuals would not ren-
der her relief any more complete.
The complete-relief inquiry is more complicated for the
state respondents, because the relevant injunction does not
purport to directly benefit nonparties. Instead, the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts decided that a uni-
——————
courts to craft relief that is complete and benefits only the named plain-
tiffs. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996) (racially gerryman-
dered congressional maps).
13 The new plaintiff might be able to assert nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 331–332
(1979) (setting forth prerequisites for applying the doctrine). But non-
mutual offensive issue preclusion is unavailable against the United
States. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U. S. 154, 155 (1984). That uni-
versal injunctions end-run this rule is one of the Government’s objections
to them.18 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
versal injunction was necessary to provide the States them-
selves with complete relief. See 766 F. Supp. 3d, at 288.14
The States maintain that the District Court made the right
call. See Opposition to Application in No. 24A886 (New Jer-
sey), at 31–39.
As the States see it, their harms—financial injuries and
the administrative burdens flowing from citizen-dependent
benefits programs—cannot be remedied without a blanket
ban on the enforcement of the Executive Order. See, e.g.,
id., at 9–11. Children often move across state lines or are
born outside their parents’ State of residence. Id., at 31, 35.
Given the cross-border flow, the States say, a “patchwork
injunction” would prove unworkable, because it would re-
quire them to track and verify the immigration status of the
parents of every child, along with the birth State of every
child for whom they provide certain federally funded bene-
fits. Ibid.
The Government—unsurprisingly—sees matters differ-
ently. It retorts that even if the injunction is designed to
benefit only the States, it is “more burdensome than neces-
sary to redress” their asserted harms. Califano, 442 U. S.,
at 702. After all, to say that a court can award complete
relief is not to say that it should do so. Complete relief is
not a guarantee—it is the maximum a court can provide.
And in equity, “the broader and deeper the remedy the
plaintiff wants, the stronger the plaintiff ’s story needs to
be.” S. Bray & P. Miller, Getting into Equity, 97 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1763, 1797 (2022). In short, “[t]he essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to
do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329
——————
14 The District Court for the Western District of Washington acknowl-
edged the state respondents’ complete-relief argument but primarily
granted a universal injunction on the basis that the “extreme nature of
the equities . . . alone warrant[ed] nationwide relief.” 765 F. Supp. 3d
1142, 1153 (2025).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
19
(1944).
Leaning on these principles, the Government contends
that narrower relief is appropriate. For instance, the Dis-
trict Court could forbid the Government to apply the Exec-
utive Order within the respondent States, including to chil-
dren born elsewhere but living in those States. Application
in No. 24A884, at 23. Or, the Government says, the District
Court could direct the Government to “treat covered chil-
dren as eligible for purposes of federally funded welfare
benefits.” Ibid. It asks us to stay the injunction insofar as
it sweeps too broadly.
We decline to take up these arguments in the first in-
stance. The lower courts should determine whether a nar-
rower injunction is appropriate; we therefore leave it to
them to consider these and any related arguments.
3
Respondents also defend universal injunctions as a mat-
ter of policy. They argue that a universal injunction is
sometimes the only practical way to quickly protect groups
from unlawful government action. See Opposition to Appli-
cation in No. 24A884 (CASA), at 26–27; see also A. Frost,
In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
1065, 1090–1094 (2018) (suggesting that universal injunc-
tions are appropriate when not all interested individuals
can come quickly to court); post, at 37–39 (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting). Respondents also contend that universal in-
junctions are an appropriate remedy to preserve equal
treatment among individuals when the Executive Branch
adopts a facially unlawful policy. Opposition to Application
in No. 24A884 (CASA), at 25–27; cf. post, at 22
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). And they suggest that forcing
plaintiffs to proceed on an individual basis can result in con-
fusion or piecemeal litigation that imposes unnecessary
costs on courts and others. See Opposition to Application
in No. 24A885 (Washington), at 31–32; Frost, 93 N. Y. U.20 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
L. Rev., at 1098–1101; see also post, at 31 (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting). So, they insist, universal injunctions must be
permitted for the good of the system.
The Government advances policy arguments running the
other way. Echoing Chief Judge Sutton, the Government
asserts that avoiding a patchwork enforcement system is a
justification that “lacks a limiting principle and would
make nationwide injunctions the rule rather than the ex-
ception” for challenges to many kinds of federal law. Ari-
zona, 40 F. 4th, at 397 (concurring opinion). It stresses—as
the principal dissent also observes—that universal injunc-
tions incentivize forum shopping, since a successful chal-
lenge in one jurisdiction entails relief nationwide. See Ap-
plication in No. 24A884, at 19–20; see also post, at 22
(opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In a similar vein, the Govern-
ment observes that universal injunctions operate asymmet-
rically: A plaintiff must win just one suit to secure sweeping
relief. But to fend off such an injunction, the Government
must win everywhere. See Application in No. 24A884,
at 19–20; see also post, at 22–23 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.)
(acknowledging this concern).15 Moreover, the Government
contends, the practice of universal injunctions means that
highly consequential cases are often decided in a “fast
and furious” process of “ ‘rushed, high-stakes, [and] low-
information’” decisionmaking. Labrador, 601 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 12) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay).
When a district court issues a universal injunction, thereby
halting the enforcement of federal policy, the Government
says that it has little recourse but to proceed to the court of
appeals for an emergency stay. The loser in the court of
——————
15 The Government contrasts this with class actions. A judgment in a
Rule 23 class action (favorable or not) binds the whole class—so if the
defendant wins, it is protected from future suits. But because an adverse
ruling on a request for universal relief lacks this preclusive effect, plain-
tiffs can continue to file in different forums until they find a court willing
to award such relief.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
21
Opinion of the Court
appeals will then seek a stay from this Court. See Applica-
tion in No. 24A884, at 20. This process forces courts to re-
solve significant and difficult questions of law on a highly
expedited basis and without full briefing. See ibid.
16
The upshot: As with most disputed issues, there are ar-
guments on both sides. But as with most questions of law,
the policy pros and cons are beside the point. Under our
well-established precedent, the equitable relief available in
the federal courts is that “traditionally accorded by courts
of equity” at the time of our founding. Grupo Mexicano, 527
U. S., at 319. Nothing like a universal injunction was avail-
able at the founding, or for that matter, for more than a
century thereafter. Thus, under the Judiciary Act, federal
courts lack authority to issue them.
C
The principal dissent focuses on conventional legal ter-
rain, like the Judiciary Act of 1789 and our cases on equity.
JUSTICE JACKSON, however, chooses a startling line of at-
tack that is tethered neither to these sources nor, frankly,
to any doctrine whatsoever. Waving away attention to the
limits on judicial power as a “mind-numbingly technical
query,” post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), she offers a vision of
——————
16 Acknowledging these problems, the principal dissent admits that
“[t]here may be good reasons not to issue universal injunctions in the
typical case.” Post, at 23 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). This concession,
while welcome, is inconsistent with the position that the universal in-
junction is a “nothing to see here” extension of the kind of decree obtained
on a bill of peace. Neither the principal dissent nor respondents have
pointed to any evidence that such decrees presented any of the universal
injunction’s systemic problems or that they were reserved for situations
in which the defendant’s conduct was “patently unconstitutional” and
risked “exceptional” harm. Post, at 22–23. It is precisely because the
universal injunction is a new, potent remedy that it poses new, potent
risks. Our observation in Grupo Mexicano rings true here: “Even when
sitting as a court in equity, we have no authority to craft a ‘nuclear
weapon’ of the law.” 527 U. S., at 332.22 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
the judicial role that would make even the most ardent de-
fender of judicial supremacy blush. In her telling, the fun-
damental role of courts is to “order everyone (including the
Executive) to follow the law—full stop.” Post, at 2; see also
post, at 10 (“[T]he function of the courts—both in theory and
in practice—necessarily includes announcing what the law
requires in . . . suits for the benefit of all who are protected
by the Constitution, not merely doling out relief to injured
private parties”); see also post, at 11, n. 3, 15. And, she
warns, if courts lack the power to “require the Executive to
adhere to law universally,” post, at 15, courts will leave a
“gash in the basic tenets of our founding charter that could
turn out to be a mortal wound,” post, at 12.
Rhetoric aside, JUSTICE JACKSON’s position is difficult to
pin down. She might be arguing that universal injunctions
are appropriate—even required—whenever the defendant
is part of the Executive Branch. See, e.g., post, at 3, 10–12,
16–18. If so, her position goes far beyond the mainstream
defense of universal injunctions. See, e.g., Frost, 93
N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 1069 (“Nationwide injunctions come
with significant costs and should never be the default rem-
edy in cases challenging federal executive action”). As best
we can tell, though, her argument is more extreme still, be-
cause its logic does not depend on the entry of a universal
injunction: JUSTICE JACKSON appears to believe that the
reasoning behind any court order demands “universal ad-
herence,” at least where the Executive is concerned. Post,
at 2 (dissenting opinion). In her law-declaring vision of the
judicial function, a district court’s opinion is not just per-
suasive, but has the legal force of a judgment. But see Haa-
land v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 294 (2023) (“It is a federal
court’s judgment, not its opinion, that remedies an injury”).
Once a single district court deems executive conduct unlaw-
ful, it has stated what the law requires. And the Executive
must conform to that view, ceasing its enforcement of theCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
23
Opinion of the Court
law against anyone, anywhere.17
We will not dwell on JUSTICE JACKSON’s argument, which
is at odds with more than two centuries’ worth of precedent,
not to mention the Constitution itself. We observe only this:
JUSTICE JACKSON decries an imperial Executive while em-
bracing an imperial Judiciary.
No one disputes that the Executive has a duty to follow
the law. But the Judiciary does not have unbridled author-
ity to enforce this obligation—in fact, sometimes the law
prohibits the Judiciary from doing so. See, e.g., Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (concluding that James Mad-
ison had violated the law but holding that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus ordering him to
follow it). But see post, at 15 (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (“If
courts do not have the authority to require the Executive to
adhere to law universally, . . . compliance with law some-
times becomes a matter of Executive prerogative”). Observ-
ing the limits on judicial authority—including, as relevant
here, the boundaries of the Judiciary Act of 1789—is re-
quired by a judge’s oath to follow the law.
JUSTICE JACKSON skips over that part. Because analyz-
ing the governing statute involves boring “legalese,” post, at
3, she seeks to answer “a far more basic question of enor-
mous practical significance: May a federal court in the
——————
17 Think about what this position means. If a judge in the District of
Alaska holds that a criminal statute is unconstitutional, can the United
States prosecute a defendant under that statute in the District of Mary-
land? Perhaps JUSTICE JACKSON would instinctively say yes; it is hard to
imagine anyone saying no. But why, on JUSTICE JACKSON’s logic, does it
not violate the rule of law for the Executive to initiate a prosecution else-
where? See post, at 2 (dissenting opinion). Among its many problems,
JUSTICE JACKSON’s view is at odds with our system of divided judicial au-
thority. See, e.g., this Court’s Rule 10(a) (identifying conflict in the deci-
sions of the courts of appeals as grounds for granting certiorari). It is
also in considerable tension with the reality that district court opinions
lack precedential force even vis-à-vis other judges in the same judicial
district. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 709, n. 7 (2011).24 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
United States of America order the Executive to follow the
law?” Ibid. In other words, it is unecessary to consider
whether Congress has constrained the Judiciary; what mat-
ters is how the Judiciary may constrain the Executive.
JUSTICE JACKSON would do well to heed her own admoni-
tion: “[E]veryone, from the President on down, is bound by
law.” Ibid. That goes for judges too.
IV
Finally, the Government must show a likelihood that it
will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. Nken, 556 U. S.,
at 434–435. When a federal court enters a universal injunc-
tion against the Government, it “improper[ly] intru[des]” on
“a coordinate branch of the Government” and prevents the
Government from enforcing its policies against nonparties.
INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles
County Federation of Labor, 510 U. S. 1301, 1306 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., in chambers). That is enough to justify in-
terim relief.
The principal dissent disagrees, insisting that “it strains
credulity to treat the Executive Branch as irreparably
harmed” by these injunctions, even if they are overly broad.
Post, at 17 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see also Opposition
to Application in No. 24A884 (CASA), at 16–20. That is so,
the principal dissent argues, because the Executive Order
is unconstitutional. Thus, “the Executive Branch has no
right to enforce [it] against anyone.” Post, at 15.
The principal dissent’s analysis of the Executive Order is
premature because the birthright citizenship issue is not
before us.18 And because the birthright citizenship issue is
——————
18 The dissent worries that the Citizenship Clause challenge will never
reach this Court, because if the plaintiffs continue to prevail, they will
have no reason to petition for certiorari. And if the Government keeps
losing, it will “ha[ve] no incentive to file a petition here . . . because the
outcome of such an appeal would be preordained.” Post, at 42 (opinion of
SOTOMAYOR, J.). But at oral argument, the Solicitor General acknowl-
edged that challenges to the Executive Order are pending in multipleCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
25
Opinion of the Court
not before us, we take no position on whether the dissent’s
analysis is right. The dissent is wrong to say, however, that
a stay applicant cannot demonstrate irreparable harm from
a threshold error without also showing that, at the end of
the day, it will prevail on the underlying merits. That is
not how the Nken factors work. See 556 U. S., at 434. For
instance, when we are asked to stay an execution on the
grounds of a serious legal question, we ask whether the cap-
ital defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of the issue
before us, not whether he is likely to prevail on the merits
of the underlying suit. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Saenz, 603
U. S. ___ (2024) (granting application for a stay based on a
question implicating the prisoner’s standing to attempt to
access DNA testing). The same is true when an applicant
seeks a stay in other contexts. See, e.g., OPM v. AFGE, 604
U. S. ___ (2025) (granting application for stay because the
organizational plaintiffs’ allegations were “insufficient to
support [their] standing”). So too here.
The question before us is whether the Government is
likely to suffer irreparable harm from the District Courts’
entry of injunctions that likely exceed the authority con-
ferred by the Judiciary Act. The answer to that question is
yes. See Coleman v. Paccar Inc., 424 U. S. 1301, 1307–1308
(1976) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers); Trump v. Interna-
tional Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U. S. 571, 578–579
(2017) (per curiam); see also Maryland v. King, 567 U. S.
1301, 1303 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (“‘[A]ny
time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating stat-
utes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a
form of irreparable injury’” (alteration in original)). And
——————
circuits, Tr. of Oral Arg. 50, and when asked directly “When you lose one
of those, do you intend to seek cert?”, the Solicitor General responded,
“yes, absolutely.” Ibid. And while the dissent speculates that the Gov-
ernment would disregard an unfavorable opinion from this Court, the
Solicitor General represented that the Government will respect both the
judgments and the opinions of this Court. See id., at 62–63.26 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
the balance of equities does not counsel against awarding
the Government interim relief: Partial stays will cause no
harm to respondents because they will remain protected by
the preliminary injunctions to the extent necessary and ap-
propriate to afford them complete relief.
* * *
Some say that the universal injunction “give[s] the Judi-
ciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch.”
Trump, 585 U. S., at 720 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (citing S.
Amdur & D. Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Na-
tionwide Harm, 131 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 49, 51, 54 (2017);
S. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National
Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. Forum, 56, 57, 60–62 (2017)).
But federal courts do not exercise general oversight of the
Executive Branch; they resolve cases and controversies con-
sistent with the authority Congress has given them. When
a court concludes that the Executive Branch has acted un-
lawfully, the answer is not for the court to exceed its power,
too.
The Government’s applications to partially stay the pre-
liminary injunctions are granted, but only to the extent that
the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide com-
plete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. The lower
courts shall move expeditiously to ensure that, with respect
to each plaintiff, the injunctions comport with this rule and
otherwise comply with principles of equity. The injunctions
are also stayed to the extent that they prohibit executive
agencies from developing and issuing public guidance about
the Executive’s plans to implement the Executive Order.
Consistent with the Solicitor General’s representation, §2
of the Executive Order shall not take effect until 30 days
after the date of this opinion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 55.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
THOMAS, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24A884
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A885
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A886
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
concurring.
The Court today holds that federal courts may not issue
so-called universal injunctions. I agree and join in full. As
the Court explains, the Judiciary Act of 1789—the statute
that “‘authorizes the federal courts to issue equitable rem-
edies’”—does not permit universal injunctions. Ante, at 5.
It authorizes only those remedies traditionally available in
equity, and there is no historical tradition allowing courts
to provide “relief that extend[s] beyond the parties.” Ante,
at 5–11. That conclusion is dispositive: As I have previously
explained, “[i]f district courts have any authority to issue2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
THOMAS, J., concurring
universal injunctions,” it must come from some specific
statutory or constitutional grant. Trump v. Hawaii, 585
U. S. 667, 713–714 (2018) (concurring opinion). But, the
Judiciary Act is the only real possibility, and serious consti-
tutional questions would arise even if Congress purported
to one day allow universal injunctions. See id., at 714, n. 2;
see also United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 693–694
(2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment).
I write separately to emphasize the majority’s guidance
regarding how courts should tailor remedies specific to the
parties. Courts must not distort “the rule that injunctive
relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Cali-
fano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979). Otherwise,
they risk replicating the problems of universal injunctions
under the guise of granting complete relief.
As the Court recognizes, the complete-relief principle op-
erates as a ceiling: In no circumstance can a court award
relief beyond that necessary to redress the plaintiffs’ inju-
ries. See ante, at 18 (“Complete relief is not a guarantee—
it is the maximum a court can provide”). This limitation
follows from both Article III and traditional equitable prac-
tice. Because Article III limits courts to resolving specific
“Cases” and “Controversies,” see U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, it
requires that any remedy “be tailored to redress the plain-
tiff ’s particular injury.” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. 48, 73
(2018). And, equitable remedies historically operated on a
plaintiff-specific basis. Ante, at 6–9. Accordingly, any
“remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that
produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has estab-
lished.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 357 (1996).
Courts therefore err insofar as they treat complete relief
as a mandate. Some judges have read our precedents to
suggest that courts should provide plaintiffs whatever rem-
edy is necessary to give them complete relief. See, e.g.,Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
THOMAS, J., concurring
Mock v. Garland, 75 F. 4th 563, 587 (CA5 2023) (“[I]njunc-
tions should be crafted to ‘provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs’”); Z. Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117
Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2106 (2017) (“[C]ourts . . . tailor their
injunctions to provide complete relief to the parties—no less
and no more”). But, that reading misunderstands the com-
plete-relief principle.
This principle reflects the equitable “rule that courts gen-
erally ‘may administer complete relief between the par-
ties.’” Ante, at 16 (emphasis deleted). It is an important
“aim of the law of remedies . . . to put the plaintiff in her
rightful position.” S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reform-
ing the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 466
(2017) (Bray). But, “to say that a court can award complete
relief is not to say that it should do so.” Ante, at 18. And,
in some circumstances, a court cannot award complete re-
lief.
As the Court today affirms, any relief must fall within
traditional limits on a court’s equitable powers. See ante,
at 5–6 (citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alli-
ance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 319 (1999); Payne v.
Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430 (1869)). Courts must ask whether
the relief plaintiffs seek “was traditionally accorded by
courts of equity.” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 319. And,
they must ensure that any injunctions comport with both
the complete-relief principle and other “principles of eq-
uity.” Ante, at 26. For example, courts may need to weigh
considerations such as equity’s concern “with justice . . .
also for the defendant.” Bray 468; see H. McClintock,
Handbook of the Principles of Equity 78 (2d ed. 1948). In
some cases, traditional equitable limits will require courts
and plaintiffs to make do with less than complete relief.
This Court’s decision in Frothingham v. Mellon, decided
with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), exem-
plifies this constraint. Appellant Frothingham sought to
“enjoin the execution of a federal appropriation act” on the4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
THOMAS, J., concurring
grounds that the Act exceeded the Government’s authority
and that its execution would improperly increase her tax
burden. Id., at 479, 486. On a maximalist view of the com-
plete-relief principle, Frothingham would have been enti-
tled to a national injunction had her claim been meritori-
ous. After all, “a prohibition on using her tax money for the
[statute] would have been wholly ineffectual” in remedying
the injury caused by unlawful federal spending, given “the
fungibility of money”: The Government would still have
been free to execute the statute, so long as it labeled the
underlying funds as coming from other taxpayers. Bray
431. A court thus would have needed to enjoin all spending
under the statute to provide effective relief. But, this Court
rejected Frothingham’s request for such an injunction as
beyond “the preventive powers of a court of equity.” 262
U. S., at 487. Among other reasons, it emphasized that an
individual taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the Treas-
ury” was “comparatively minute and indeterminable,” and
that the petitioner had not suffered any “direct injury” but
rather was “suffer[ing] in some indefinite way in common
with people generally.” Id., at 487–488.*
To be sure, “[w]hat counts as complete relief ” can be a
difficult question. Bray 467. Many plaintiffs argue that
only sweeping relief can redress their injuries. And, I do
not dispute that there will be cases requiring an “indivisible
remedy” that incidentally benefits third parties, Tr. of Oral
Arg., 14–15, such as “[i]njunctions barring public nui-
sances,” Hawaii, 585 U. S., at 717 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
But, such cases are by far the exception.
An indivisible remedy is appropriate only when it would
be “all but impossible” to devise relief that reaches only the
plaintiffs. Ante, at 16–17, n. 12. Such impossibility is a
——————
*Although courts now treat Frothingham primarily as a case about
taxpayer standing, its analysis in fact “intertwine[d] concepts of equity,
remedies, and the judicial power.” Bray 430–433; see ante, at 8.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
5
THOMAS, J., concurring
high bar. For example, the Court today readily dispatches
with the individual and associational respondents’ position
that they require a universal injunction, notwithstanding
their argument that a “plaintiff-specific injunction” would
be difficult to administer and would subject the associa-
tions’ members to the burden of having “to identify and dis-
close to the government” their membership. Tr. of Oral Arg.
141–142. As the Court recognizes, “prohibiting enforce-
ment of the Executive Order against the child of an individ-
ual pregnant plaintiff ” is all that is required to “give that
plaintiff complete relief.” Ante, at 17. Courts may not use
the complete-relief principle to revive the universal injunc-
tion.
* * *
For good reason, the Court today puts an end to the “in-
creasingly common” practice of federal courts issuing uni-
versal injunctions. Hawaii, 585 U. S., at 713 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring). The Court also makes clear that the complete-
relief principle provides a ceiling on federal courts’ author-
ity, which must be applied alongside other “principles of eq-
uity” and our holding that universal injunctions are imper-
missible. Ante, at 26. Lower courts should carefully heed
this Court’s guidance and cabin their grants of injunctive
relief in light of historical equitable limits. If they cannot
do so, this Court will continue to be “dutybound” to inter-
vene. Hawaii, 585 U. S., at 721 (THOMAS, J., concurring).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
ALITO, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24A884
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A885
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A886
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, con-
curring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to note
two related issues that are left unresolved and potentially
threaten the practical significance of today’s decision: the
availability of third-party standing and class certification.
First, the Court does not address the weighty issue
whether the state plaintiffs have third-party standing to as-
sert the Citizenship Clause claims of their individual resi-
dents. See ante, at 2, n. 2; see also ante, at 26 (“The Gov-
ernment’s applications to partially stay the preliminary2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
ALITO, J., concurring
injunctions are granted, but only to the extent that the in-
junctions are broader than necessary to provide complete
relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue” (emphasis
added)). Ordinarily, “a litigant must assert his or her own
legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991). In limited circumstances,
however, the Court has permitted a party to assert the
rights of a third party. Admittedly, the Court has not
pinned down the precise circumstances in which third-
party standing is permissible. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. 118, 127, n. 3
(2014). And commentators have emphasized the need for
“greater doctrinal coherence.” C. Bradley & E. Young, Un-
packing Third-Party Standing, 131 Yale L. J. 1, 7 (2021)
(Bradley & Young).
But at a minimum, we have said that a litigant seeking
to assert the legal rights or interests of others must demon-
strate ordinary Article III standing for itself and answer
the additional “threshold question whether [it has] stand-
ing to raise the rights of others.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543
U. S. 125, 129 (2004). But see FDA v. Alliance for Hippo-
cratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 398 (2024) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring). This latter requirement, as we have explained,
entails a showing that the litigant has a “close relationship”
to the right holder and that there is some “‘hindrance’” to
the right holder’s ability to “protect his own interests.”
Kowalski, 543 U. S., at 130 (quoting Powers, 499 U. S., at
411). So long as third-party standing doctrine remains good
law, federal courts should take care to apply these limita-
tions conscientiously, including against state plaintiffs.
That is especially so in cases such as these, in which the
parties claiming third-party standing (i.e., the States) are
not directly subject to the challenged policy in the relevant
respect and face, at most, collateral injuries. See Bradley
& Young 56–60.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
ALITO, J., concurring
Today’s decision only underscores the need for rigorous
and evenhanded enforcement of third-party-standing limi-
tations. The Court holds today that injunctive relief should
generally extend only to the suing plaintiff. See ante, at 16–
17. That will have the salutary effect of bringing an end to
the practice of runaway “universal” injunctions, but it
leaves other questions unanswered. Perhaps most im-
portant, when a State brings a suit to vindicate the rights
of individual residents and then procures injunctive relief,
does the injunction bind the defendant with respect to all
residents of that State? If so, States will have every incen-
tive to bring third-party suits on behalf of their residents to
obtain a broader scope of equitable relief than any individ-
ual resident could procure in his own suit. Left unchecked,
the practice of reflexive state third-party standing will un-
dermine today’s decision as a practical matter.
Second, today’s decision will have very little value if dis-
trict courts award relief to broadly defined classes without
following “Rule 23’s procedural protections” for class certi-
fication. Ante, at 14. The class action is a powerful tool,
and we have accordingly held that class “certification is
proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous
analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been sat-
isfied.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 350–
351 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). These re-
quirements are more than “a mere pleading standard,” id.,
at 350, and a hasty application of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure can have drastic consequences, cre-
ating “potential unfairness” for absent class members and
confusion (and pressure to settle) for defendants. General
Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147, 161
(1982). Recognizing these effects, Congress took the excep-
tional step of authorizing interlocutory review of class cer-
tification. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(f ).
Putting the kibosh on universal injunctions does nothing
to disrupt Rule 23’s requirements. Of course, Rule 23 may4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
ALITO, J., concurring
permit the certification of nationwide classes in some dis-
crete scenarios. But district courts should not view today’s
decision as an invitation to certify nationwide classes with-
out scrupulous adherence to the rigors of Rule 23. Other-
wise, the universal injunction will return from the grave
under the guise of “nationwide class relief,” and today’s de-
cision will be of little more than minor academic interest.
* * *
Lax enforcement of the requirements for third-party
standing and class certification would create a potentially
significant loophole to today’s decision. Federal courts
should thus be vigilant against such potential abuses of
these tools. I do not understand the Court’s decision to re-
flect any disagreement with these concerns, so I join its de-
cision in full.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24A884
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A885
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A886
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
The plaintiffs here sought preliminary injunctions
against enforcement of the President’s Executive Order on
birthright citizenship. The District Courts granted
universal preliminary injunctions—that is, injunctions
prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Order against
anyone. Under the Court’s holding today, district courts
issuing injunctions under the authority afforded by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 may award only plaintiff-specific
relief. I join the Court’s careful and persuasive opinion,
which will bring needed clarity to the law of remedies.
To be sure, in the wake of the Court’s decision, plaintiffs2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
who challenge the legality of a new federal statute or
executive action and request preliminary injunctive relief
may sometimes seek to proceed by class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and ask a court to
award preliminary classwide relief that may, for example,
be statewide, regionwide, or even nationwide. See ante, at
13–14; A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(per curiam) (slip op., at 7); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S.
682, 701–703 (1979). And in cases under the
Administrative Procedure Act, plaintiffs may ask a court to
preliminarily “set aside” a new agency rule. 5 U. S. C.
§706(2); see, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U. S. 1126
(2016); see also Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 603
U. S. 799, 826–843 (2024) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).1
But importantly, today’s decision will require district
courts to follow proper legal procedures when awarding
such relief. Most significantly, district courts can no longer
award preliminary nationwide or classwide relief except
when such relief is legally authorized. And that salutary
development will help bring substantially more order and
discipline to the ubiquitous preliminary litigation over new
federal statutes and executive actions.
I write separately simply to underscore that this case
focuses on only one discrete aspect of the preliminary
litigation relating to major new federal statutes and
executive actions—namely, what district courts may do
with respect to those new statutes and executive actions in
what might be called “the interim before the interim.”
Although district courts have received much of the
attention (and criticism) in debates over the universal-
injunction issue, those courts generally do not have the last
word when they grant or deny preliminary injunctions. The
——————
1 In addition, as the Court notes, an injunction granting complete relief
to plaintiffs may also, as a practical matter, benefit nonparties. Ante, at
15–19.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
courts of appeals and this Court can (and regularly do)
expeditiously review district court decisions awarding or
denying preliminary injunctive relief. The losing party in
the district court—the defendant against whom an
injunction is granted, or the plaintiff who is denied an
injunction—will often go to the court of appeals to seek a
temporary stay or injunction. And then the losing party in
the court of appeals may promptly come to this Court with
an application for a stay or injunction. This Court has
therefore often acted as the ultimate decider of the interim
legal status of major new federal statutes and executive
actions. See, e.g., Ohio v. EPA, 603 U. S. 279 (2024); Danco
Laboratories, LLC v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 598
U. S. ___ (2023); National Federation of Independent
Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam);
Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and
Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758 (2021) (per curiam); see also
Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024)
(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 2–
3).
After today’s decision, that order of operations will not
change. In justiciable cases, this Court, not the district
courts or courts of appeals, will often still be the ultimate
decisionmaker as to the interim legal status of major new
federal statutes and executive actions—that is, the interim
legal status for the several-year period before a final
decision on the merits.
I
The Court’s decision today focuses on the “interim before
the interim”—the preliminary relief that district courts can
award (and courts of appeals can approve) for the generally
weeks-long interim before this Court can assess and settle
the matter for the often years-long interim before a final
decision on the merits. To appreciate the broader context
surrounding today’s decision, it is important to understand4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
this Court’s role in preliminary litigation of this sort.
The basic scenario in these kinds of applications to this
Court is by now familiar. Congress passes a major new
statute, or the Executive Branch issues a major new rule or
executive order. The litigation over the legality of the new
statute or executive action winds its way through the
federal courts. And that litigation may meander on for
many months or often years before this Court can issue a
final ruling deciding the legality of the new statute or
executive action.
In the meantime, various plaintiffs may seek preliminary
injunctions, sometimes in many different district courts.
And a government defendant against whom a preliminary
injunction is granted (or a plaintiff who is denied a
preliminary injunction) may seek a temporary stay or
injunction in the court of appeals and then in this Court.
That preliminary-injunction litigation—which typically
takes place at a rapid-fire pace long before the merits
litigation culminates several years down the road—raises a
question: What should the interim legal status of the
significant new federal statute or executive action at issue
be during the several-year period before this Court’s final
ruling on the merits?
That interim-status question is itself immensely
important. The issue of whether a major new federal
statute or executive action “is enforceable during the
several years while the parties wait for a final merits ruling
. . . raises a separate question of extraordinary significance
to the parties and the American people.” Labrador v. Poe,
601 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
in grant of stay) (slip op., at 2–3).
The interim-status issue in turn raises two other critical
questions: Should there be a nationally uniform answer on
the question of whether a major new federal statute or
executive action can be legally enforced in the often years-
long interim period until this Court reaches a final decisionCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
5
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
on the merits? If so, who decides what the nationally
uniform interim answer is?
First, in my view, there often (perhaps not always, but
often) should be a nationally uniform answer on whether a
major new federal statute, rule, or executive order can be
enforced throughout the United States during the several-
year interim period until its legality is finally decided on
the merits.
Consider just a few of the major executive actions that
have been the subject of intense preliminary-injunction or
other pre-enforcement litigation in the past 10 years or so,
under Presidents of both political parties. They range from
travel bans to birthright citizenship, from the Clean Power
Plan to student loan forgiveness, from the OSHA vaccine
mandate to the service of transgender individuals in the
military, from Title IX regulations to abortion drugs. And
the list goes on. Those executive actions often are highly
significant and have widespread effects on many
individuals, businesses, governments, and other
organizations throughout the United States.
Often, it is not especially workable or sustainable or
desirable to have a patchwork scheme, potentially for
several years, in which a major new federal statute or
executive action of that kind applies to some people or
organizations in certain States or regions, but not to others.
The national reach of many businesses and government
programs, as well as the regular movement of the American
people into and out of different States and regions, would
make it difficult to sensibly maintain such a scattershot
system of federal law.
Second, if one agrees that the years-long interim status
of a highly significant new federal statute or executive
action should often be uniform throughout the United
States, who decides what the interim status is?
The answer typically will be this Court, as has been the
case both traditionally and recently. This Court’s actions6 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
in resolving applications for interim relief help provide
clarity and uniformity as to the interim legal status of
major new federal statutes, rules, and executive orders. In
particular, the Court’s disposition of applications for
interim relief often will effectively settle, de jure or de facto,
the interim legal status of those statutes or executive
actions nationwide.
The decision today will not alter this Court’s traditional
role in those matters. Going forward, in the wake of a major
new federal statute or executive action, different district
courts may enter a slew of preliminary rulings on the
legality of that statute or executive action. Or
alternatively, perhaps a district court (or courts) will grant
or deny the functional equivalent of a universal
injunction—for example, by granting or denying a
preliminary injunction to a putative nationwide class under
Rule 23(b)(2), or by preliminarily setting aside or declining
to set aside an agency rule under the APA.
No matter how the preliminary-injunction litigation on
those kinds of significant matters transpires in the district
courts, the courts of appeals in turn will undoubtedly be
called upon to promptly grant or deny temporary stays or
temporary injunctions in many cases.
And regardless of whether the district courts have issued
a series of individual preliminary rulings, or instead have
issued one or more broader classwide or set-aside
preliminary rulings, the losing parties in the courts of
appeals will regularly come to this Court in matters
involving major new federal statutes and executive
actions.2
If there is no classwide or set-aside relief in those kinds
of nationally significant matters, then one would expect a
flood of decisions from lower courts, after which the losing
——————
2 By statute, some litigation may start in a court of appeals or three-
judge district court and then come directly to this Court.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
7
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
parties on both sides will probably inundate this Court with
applications for stays or injunctions.3 And in cases where
classwide or set-aside relief has been awarded, the losing
side in the lower courts will likewise regularly come to this
Court if the matter is sufficiently important.
When a stay or injunction application arrives here, this
Court should not and cannot hide in the tall grass. When
we receive such an application, we must grant or deny.4
And when we do—that is, when this Court makes a decision
on the interim legal status of a major new federal statute or
executive action—that decision will often constitute a form
of precedent (de jure or de facto) that provides guidance
throughout the United States during the years-long interim
period until a final decision on the merits.
——————
3 That scenario explains why it would not make much sense for this
Court to apply different standards to (i) an application for an injunction
and (ii) an application for a stay of an injunction. See, e.g., Tandon v.
Newsom, 593 U. S. 61, 64 (2021) (per curiam) (applying the usual stay
standard to an application for an injunction).
Suppose a district court in Circuit A enjoins a new executive action.
And the court of appeals in Circuit A then declines to stay the injunction.
Meanwhile, a district court in Circuit B does not enjoin that new
executive action, and the court of appeals in Circuit B also declines to
enjoin it. Both cases come to this Court on applications for interim
relief—one seeking a stay of injunction and one seeking an injunction. It
would not be particularly rational to deny a stay and leave the injunction
in place in Circuit A, and then to turn around and deny an injunction in
Circuit B on account of a purportedly higher standard for this Court to
grant injunctions rather than stays. The standards should mesh so that
this Court can ensure uniformity without regard to the happenstance of
how various courts of appeals and district courts ruled.
4 To obtain an interim stay or injunction, “an applicant must show (1) a
reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue
sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a
majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a
likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial” of the
application. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per
curiam); see Tandon, 593 U. S., at 64. The Court may also consider
(4) the “balance” of “the equities” and “relative harms” to the parties.
Hollingsworth, 558 U. S., at 190.8 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
II
It is sometimes suggested, however, that this Court
should adopt a policy of presumptively denying applications
for stays or injunctions—even applications involving
significant new federal statutes or executive actions—
regardless of which way the various lower courts have
ruled. That suggestion is flawed, in my view, because it
would often leave an unworkable or intolerable patchwork
of federal law in place. And even in cases where there is no
patchwork—for example, because an application comes to
us with a single nationwide class-action injunction—what
if this Court thinks the lower court’s decision is wrong? On
student loan forgiveness or the Clean Power Plan or
mifepristone or the travel bans, for example? Should we
have a rule of presumptively denying relief, thereby
allowing erroneous injunctions (or erroneous denials of
injunctions) of major new statutes and executive actions to
remain in place for several years, and thus severely
harming the Government and would-be beneficiaries of (or
regulated parties under) those new statutes and executive
actions? I think not. And this Court’s actions over the years
reflect that the Court thinks not.
Unless and until this Court grants or denies an
application for stay or injunction, tremendous uncertainty
may surround the interim legal status of the new federal
statute or executive action throughout the country. The
statute or executive action may be in effect in some places
but not others, for some businesses but not others, for some
Americans but not others. That temporary geographic,
organizational, and individual variation in federal law
might not warrant this Court’s intervention in run-of-the-
mill cases—which is why it makes sense that this Court
denies applications for interim relief when the Court is
unlikely to later grant certiorari. See Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595
U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring in denial of
application for injunctive relief ). But in cases involvingCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
9
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
major new federal statutes or executive actions, uniformity
is often essential or at least sensible and prudent. In those
kinds of cases, disuniformity—even if only for a few years
or less—can be chaotic. And such chaos is not good for the
law or the country.
One of this Court’s roles, in justiciable cases, is to resolve
major legal questions of national importance and ensure
uniformity of federal law. So a default policy of off-loading
to lower courts the final word on whether to green-light or
block major new federal statutes and executive actions for
the several-year interim until a final ruling on the merits
would seem to amount to an abdication of this Court’s
proper role.
Some might object that this Court is not well equipped to
make those significant decisions—namely, decisions about
the interim status of a major new federal statute or
executive action—on an expedited basis. But district courts
and courts of appeals are likewise not perfectly equipped to
make expedited preliminary judgments on important
matters of this kind. Yet they have to do so, and so do we.
By law, federal courts are open and can receive and review
applications for relief 24/7/365. See 28 U. S. C. §452 (“All
courts of the United States shall be deemed always open for
the purpose of filing proper papers . . . and making motions
and orders”). And this Court has procedural tools that can
help us make the best possible interim decision in the
limited time available—administrative stays, additional
briefing, amicus briefs, oral argument, certiorari before
judgment, and the like. On top of that, this Court has nine
Justices, each of whom can (and does) consult and
deliberate with the other eight to help the Court determine
the best answer, unlike a smaller three-judge court of
appeals panel or one-judge district court. And this Court
also will have the benefit of the prior decisions in the case
at hand from the court of appeals and the district court.
Some might argue that preliminary disputes over the10 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
legality of major new statutes and executive actions can
draw this Court into difficult or controversial matters
earlier than we might like, as distinct from what happens
on our slower-moving merits docket. That is an
understandable concern. But when it comes to the interim
status of major new federal statutes and executive actions,
it is often important for reasons of clarity, stability, and
uniformity that this Court be the decider. And Members of
the Court have life tenure so that we can make tough calls
without fear or favor. As with the merits docket, the Court’s
role in resolving applications for interim relief is to
neutrally referee each matter based on the relevant legal
standard. Avoiding controversial or difficult decisions on
those applications is neither feasible nor appropriate.
Some might also worry that an early or rushed decision
on an application could “lock in” the Court’s assessment of
the merits and subtly deter the Court from later making a
different final decision. But in deciding applications for
interim relief involving major new statutes or executive
actions, we often have no choice but to make a preliminary
assessment of likelihood of success on the merits; after all,
in cases of that sort, the other relevant factors (irreparable
harm and the equities) are often very weighty on both sides.
See Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024)
(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 3–
4). Moreover, judges strive to make the correct decision
based on current information notwithstanding any previous
assessment of the merits earlier in the litigation. It is not
uncommon to think and decide differently when one knows
more. This Court has done so in the past, see West Virginia
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), and
undoubtedly will continue to do so in the future.
To reiterate, this Court should not insert itself into run-
of-the-mill preliminary-injunction cases where we are not
likely to grant certiorari down the road. But determining
the nationally uniform interim legal status for several yearsCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
11
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
of, say, the Clean Power Plan or Title IX regulations or
mifepristone rules is a role that the American people
appropriately expect this Court—and not only the courts of
appeals or district courts—to fulfill.
* * *
The volume of preliminary-injunction and other pre-
enforcement litigation over new federal laws and executive
actions coming to this Court has been growing in recent
years. That trend is in part the result of the increasing
number of major new executive actions by recent
Presidential administrations (of both political parties) that
have had difficulty passing significant new legislation
through Congress. Meanwhile, applications for stays or
injunctions in capital-punishment cases, election disputes,
and other time-sensitive matters (including numerous
COVID–19-related disputes in the few years beginning in
2020) have also continued to come to this Court on a steady
basis, as they traditionally have.
Although the volume of applications has increased, the
Court’s responsibility for deciding consequential
applications for stays or injunctions is not new. See, e.g.,
West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U. S. 1126 (2016) (temporarily
enjoining Clean Power Plan); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S.
1 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating injunction pending appeal
regarding state voter ID law); Rubin v. United States, 524
U. S. 1301 (1998) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers) (denying
stay pending certiorari of order enforcing subpoenas to
Secret Service agents regarding their observations of the
President); Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U. S. 1321 (1973)
(Marshall, J., in chambers) (staying District Court’s
injunction that had ordered a halt to bombing in
Cambodia); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 584, 589 (1952) (after expedited oral argument,
affirming District Court’s preliminary injunction that
proscribed seizure of steel mills by government); cf.12 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273, 283–285 (1953)
(vacating stay of execution of the Rosenbergs).
Today’s decision on district court injunctions will not
affect this Court’s vitally important responsibility to resolve
applications for stays or injunctions with respect to major
new federal statutes and executive actions. Deciding those
applications is not a distraction from our job. It is a critical
part of our job. With that understanding, I join the Court’s
opinion in full.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24A884
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A885
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A886
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
Children born in the United States and subject to its laws
are United States citizens. That has been the legal rule
since the founding, and it was the English rule well before
then. This Court once attempted to repudiate it, holding in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), that the chil-
dren of enslaved black Americans were not citizens. To
remedy that grievous error, the States passed in 1866 and
Congress ratified in 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Cit-
izenship Clause, which enshrined birthright citizenship in2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the Constitution. There it has remained, accepted and re-
spected by Congress, by the Executive, and by this Court.
Until today.
It is now the President who attempts, in an Executive Or-
der (Order or Citizenship Order), to repudiate birthright
citizenship. Every court to evaluate the Order has deemed
it patently unconstitutional and, for that reason, has en-
joined the Federal Government from enforcing it. Unde-
terred, the Government now asks this Court to grant emer-
gency relief, insisting it will suffer irreparable harm unless
it can deprive at least some children born in the United
States of citizenship. See Protecting the Meaning and
Value of American Citizenship, Exec. Order No. 14160, 90
Fed. Reg. 8849 (2025).
The Government does not ask for complete stays of the
injunctions, as it ordinarily does before this Court. Why?
The answer is obvious: To get such relief, the Government
would have to show that the Order is likely constitutional,
an impossible task in light of the Constitution’s text, his-
tory, this Court’s precedents, federal law, and Executive
Branch practice. So the Government instead tries its hand
at a different game. It asks this Court to hold that, no mat-
ter how illegal a law or policy, courts can never simply tell
the Executive to stop enforcing it against anyone. Instead,
the Government says, it should be able to apply the Citizen-
ship Order (whose legality it does not defend) to everyone
except the plaintiffs who filed this lawsuit.
The gamesmanship in this request is apparent and the
Government makes no attempt to hide it. Yet, shamefully,
this Court plays along. A majority of this Court decides that
these applications, of all cases, provide the appropriate oc-
casion to resolve the question of universal injunctions and
end the centuries-old practice once and for all. In its rush
to do so the Court disregards basic principles of equity as
well as the long history of injunctive relief granted to non-
parties.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
No right is safe in the new legal regime the Court creates.
Today, the threat is to birthright citizenship. Tomorrow, a
different administration may try to seize firearms from law-
abiding citizens or prevent people of certain faiths from
gathering to worship. The majority holds that, absent cum-
bersome class-action litigation, courts cannot completely
enjoin even such plainly unlawful policies unless doing so
is necessary to afford the formal parties complete relief.
That holding renders constitutional guarantees meaningful
in name only for any individuals who are not parties to a
lawsuit. Because I will not be complicit in so grave an at-
tack on our system of law, I dissent.
I
The majority ignores entirely whether the President’s Ex-
ecutive Order is constitutional, instead focusing only on the
question whether federal courts have the equitable author-
ity to issue universal injunctions. Yet the Order’s patent
unlawfulness reveals the gravity of the majority’s error and
underscores why equity supports universal injunctions as
appropriate remedies in this kind of case. As every conceiv-
able source of law confirms, birthright citizenship is the law
of the land.
A
The Citizenship Clause provides that “[a]ll persons born
or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1.
That means what it says. Nestled in the Fourteenth
Amendment alongside the Equal Protection Clause, the
Citizenship Clause does not discriminate on the basis of
race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or, importantly here, parent-
age. It refers instead to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States.” Ibid.
Besides birth, there is only one condition: that one be4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. Yet that
condition too leaves no room for ambiguity. To be “subject
to the jurisdiction” of the United States means simply to be
bound to its authority and its laws. See N. Webster, An
American Dictionary of the English Language 732 (C.
Goodrich & N. Porter eds. 1865) (defining jurisdiction as the
“[p]ower of governing or legislating,” or “the power or right
of exercising authority”). As the Government would pre-
sumably concede, virtually everyone born in the United
States and present in its territory is subject to its authority
and its laws. After all, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and abso-
lute.” Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136
(1812) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court). Once a citizen of an-
other nation steps onto United States soil, she is (with nar-
row exception) “amenable to the jurisdiction” of the United
States. Id., at 144. That is why “no plausible distinction
with respect to Fourteenth Amendment ‘jurisdiction’ can be
drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United
States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was un-
lawful.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 211, n. 10 (1982).
Few constitutional questions can be answered by resort
to the text of the Constitution alone, but this is one. The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees birthright citizenship.
B
Unsurprisingly given the clarity of the Citizenship
Clause’s text, every other source of interpretation confirms
this conclusion. Consider, first, its history. Long before the
Fourteenth Amendment, and indeed before the founding,
the common-law rule of jus soli (literally, right of the soil)
governed English citizenship. That rule rendered a per-
son’s birthplace determinative of her citizenship status.
Thus, “the children of aliens, born . . . in England,” gener-
ally were “natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the
privileges of such.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on theCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
5
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Laws of England 361–362 (1765); see also H. Broom & G.
Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Com-
mon Law 31 (2d ed. 1885) (describing Calvin’s Case (1608),
which established that “[e]very one born within the domin-
ions of the King of England . . . is . . . entitled to enjoy all
the rights and liberties of an Englishman”).
That English common-law rule carried over to the United
States after the founding. Shortly after the Constitution’s
ratification, James Madison observed that “it [was] an es-
tablished maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance,” i.e.,
of citizenship. 1 Annals of Cong. 404 (1789). Birth, he ex-
plained, could convey citizenship in two ways: either
through “place” (under the “right of the soil” principle) or
through “parentage” (as for one born to United States citi-
zens). Ibid. “[B]ut, in general,” Madison explained, “place
is the most certain criterion” and “it is what applies in the
United States.” Ibid. Mere decades later, Justice Story
wrote that “[n]othing is better settled . . . than the doctrine
that the children even of aliens born in a country . . . are
subjects by birth.” Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Har-
bour in City of New York, 3 Pet. 99, 164 (1830). Well before
the Fourteenth Amendment, then, it was the undisputed
“law of the United States [that] every person born within
the dominions and allegiance of the United States, what-
ever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born cit-
izen.” Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 663 (N. Y. Ch.
1844).
Though the law was clear, the Nation did not always live
up to its promise. Infamously, this Court departed from the
birthright citizenship principle in Dred Scott, 19 How. 393,
holding that the children of enslaved black Americans “are
not included, and were not intended to be included, under
the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution.” Id., at 404. Follow-
ing the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress corrected
that grave error. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
14 Stat. 27, declared that “all persons born in the United6 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
States and not subject to any foreign power” would be “citi-
zens of the United States.” The Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of birthright citizenship followed two years later.
The lawmakers who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
understood that it would extend citizenship to all children
born here, regardless of parental citizenship. Indeed, some
objected to its passage on those grounds, complaining that
it would permanently extend citizenship to immigrants who
“invade [state] borders” and “settle as trespassers.” Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2891 (1866). Proponents
agreed, if not with the anti-immigrant sentiment, that the
Clause would extend citizenship to the children of immi-
grants. For example, Senator Conness of California (one of
the Amendment’s lead supporters) confirmed on the floor
“that the children born here of Mongolian parents shall be
declared by the Constitution of the United States to be en-
titled to civil rights and to equal protection before the law.”
Id., at 2892. “We have declared that by law” in the Civil
Rights Act, he explained, and “now it is proposed to incor-
porate the same provision in the fundamental instrument
of the nation.” Id., at 2891. Not one Senator disagreed with
this understanding of the Clause.
In the end, “[t]he Citizenship Clause was no legal inno-
vation.” J. Ho, Defining “American”: Birthright Citizenship
and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9
Green Bag 2d 367, 369 (2006); see also id., at 368 (“Birth-
right citizenship is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That birthright is protected no less for children of
undocumented persons than for descendants of Mayflower
passengers”). “It simply restored the longstanding English
common law doctrine of jus soli” abrogated by Dred Scott.
Ho, 9 Green Bag 2d, at 369; see also M. Ramsey, Original-
ism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 Geo. L. J. 405, 472
(2020) (The “central purpose” of the Citizenship Clause
“was, of course, to overrule Dred Scott”).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
7
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
C
Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
this Court confirmed the Amendment’s plain meaning in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898). At
issue was the citizenship of Wong Kim Ark, a young Cali-
fornia resident born in San Francisco to Chinese immigrant
parents. Id., at 652. When Wong returned to California
from a trip to China, a custom’s collector denied him entry
on the sole ground that he was not a citizen of the United
States. Id., at 653.
This Court held that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment af-
firms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by
birth within the territory.” Id., at 693. As the President
does today, the Government in Wong Kim Ark rested its
case on the Clause’s sole qualifier. Wong was not subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, the Government
claimed, because at birth his parents were aliens in the
United States who were “subjects of the emperor of China,”
thus making Wong a subject of the emperor of China as
well. Id., at 652–653. This Court squarely rejected that
attempt to limit the Citizenship Clause’s reach. Instead, it
held, the “‘subject to the jurisdiction’” qualifier excludes
only “children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation,
and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign
State,” id., at 682, “with the single additional exception of
children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct alle-
giance to their several tribes,” id., at 693.1
——————
1 The first two exceptions “ha[d] already been shown, by the law of Eng-
land and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the
English colonies in America, [to be] recognized exceptions to the funda-
mental rule of citizenship by birth within the country.” Wong Kim Ark,
169 U. S., at 682. The additional exception for certain children born to
Indian tribe members reflected the country’s historical understanding
that Indian tribes were “quasi foreign nations” within the physical
boundaries of the United States. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,8 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
That holding conclusively settled any remaining dispute
over the Citizenship Clause’s meaning. Since then, all
three branches of Government have unflinchingly adhered
to it.
This Court, for one, has repeatedly reaffirmed Wong Kim
Ark’s holding. Notwithstanding legislation purporting to
render Japanese persons “ineligible” for citizenship, we
held in Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934), that a
child with Japanese parents “is a citizen of the United
States if he was born within the United States.” Id., at 85.
The Court recognized the same rule even during World War
II, when individuals of Japanese ancestry were subject to
curfew and exclusion orders. See Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 96–97 (1943). So too has the Court
recognized that the child of parents unlawfully present in
the United States “is, of course, an American citizen by
birth.” United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy,
353 U. S. 72, 73 (1957). The same is true of children whose
parents gained admission into the United States by unlaw-
ful means. See, e.g., INS v. Errico, 385 U. S. 214, 215–216
(1966); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U. S. 444, 446 (1985).
Congress, for its part, has also reaffirmed the principles
of birthright citizenship by enshrining it in a federal stat-
ute. Section 201 of the Nationality Act of 1940 provides that
all those “born in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof,” “shall be nationals and citizens of the
United States at birth.” 8 U. S. C. §1401(a); see also Tag-
gart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. 554, 560 (2019) (recognizing
——————
2890 (1866). Treaties between many tribes and the Federal Government,
at the time, ensured that it was the tribe, and not the United States Gov-
ernment, that had “prescriptive and law enforcement authority” over
tribal members. M. Ramsey, Originalism and Birthright Citizenship,
109 Geo. L. J. 405, 443–444 (2020); see id., at 442–444. Congress even-
tually extended birthright citizenship to tribal members born in the
United States in 1924. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43
Stat. 253, 8 U. S. C. §1401(b). These exceptions are not at issue in these
cases.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
9
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
“longstanding interpretive principle” that if statutory term
“‘is “obviously transplanted from another legal source,” it
“brings the old soil with it”’”).
For at least the last century, the Executive Branch has
adhered to the same principle. When Congress proposed to
reaffirm birthright citizenship in the 1940 Nationality Act,
cabinet officials described it as “a statement of the common-
law rule, which has been in the United States from the be-
ginning of its existence.” House Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, Nationality Laws of the United States,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (Comm. Print 1939). Indeed, the
Government concedes even now that the Executive Branch
has recognized the vitality of birthright citizenship “at least
back to World War II, if not earlier.” App. to Opposition to
Application in No. 24A886, p. 323a. That explains, among
other things, why the Social Security Administration and
the Department of State have long accepted proof of one’s
birthplace as proof of citizenship. See 44 Fed. Reg. 10369,
10371 (1979); 20 CFR §§422.107(d), 422.103(c)(2) (2024); 22
CFR §§51.40, 51.42 (2024).
Some decades ago, the Office of Legal Counsel was asked
to respond to a House bill that would have denied birthright
citizenship to “‘children born in the United States to par-
ents who are not citizens or permanent resident aliens.’” 19
Op. OLC 340, 341 (1995). The answer well summed up the
state of the law: This “office grapples with many difficult
and close issues of constitutional law. The lawfulness of
this bill is not among them. This legislation is unquestion-
ably unconstitutional.” Ibid.
II
A
Undeterred by the Constitution, history, Supreme Court
precedent, federal law, and longstanding Executive Branch
practice, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Or-
der No. 14160 on the day of his inauguration that purported10 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
to redefine American citizenship. The Order declares that
United States citizenship does not extend to persons who
are born to a mother unlawfully present in the United
States, or lawfully present on a temporary basis, and a fa-
ther who is neither a citizen nor lawful permanent resident.
Ibid. It further prohibits federal agencies from issuing cit-
izenship documentation to such persons or accepting state
documentation to that effect, and it directs a slew of federal
officials to conform agency regulations to the Order. Id., at
8449–8450. The prohibition, according to the Order, ap-
plies “only to persons who are born within the United States
after 30 days from the date of th[e] order.” Id., at 8449.
B
Shortly after the President issued the Citizenship Order,
several groups of plaintiffs (together, respondents) chal-
lenged the Order in Federal District Courts in Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Washington. Respondents include: a
group of pregnant women2 whose children will not be
United States citizens under the terms of the Citizenship
Order; two immigrants-rights organizations with thou-
sands of members across the country who are likely to give
birth to children who would also be denied citizenship un-
der the Order; and 22 States, the District of Columbia, and
the city of San Francisco. In their respective suits, respond-
ents asserted that the Citizenship Order violates the Four-
teenth Amendment and §1401(a).
Respondents also sought a preliminary injunction bar-
ring enforcement of the Citizenship Order during the pen-
dency of the litigation. If allowed to go into effect, they said,
the policy would inflict irreparable harm on their children
——————
2 Two of these women seek to represent a class of pregnant women and
children residing in Washington State, who are affected by the Citizen-
ship Order. See Complaint in No. 2:25–cv–00127 (WD Wash., Feb. 4,
2025), ECF Doc. 106. The District Court has yet to rule on the certifica-
tion of that putative class.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
11
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
(and their members’ children) by denying them “enjoyment
of the full privileges, rights, and benefits that come with
U. S. citizenship,” and rendering them vulnerable to unlaw-
ful deportation before the Courts could adjudicate their con-
stitutional claim. Complaint in No. 8:25–cv–00201 (D Md.,
Jan. 21, 2025), p. 6, ¶12; see also Complaint in No. 2:25–cv–
00127 (WD Wash., Feb. 4, 2025), ECF Doc. 106, pp. 33–36,
¶¶120–139 (Washington Complaint).
As for the States, they attested that enforcement of the
Citizenship Order would cost them millions of dollars in
federal funding and impose significant administrative bur-
dens. The States “administer numerous programs for the
benefit of their residents, including for newborns and young
children, some of whom are wards of the plaintiff States
who are entitled to care by statute.” Id., at 23, ¶79. Those
social welfare programs include ones provided for by state
law, as well as ones established by federal law, such as Med-
icaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program: Sev-
eral of them “are funded in part by federal dollars, with fed-
eral funding frequently tied to the citizenship and
immigration status of the individuals served.” Ibid. By
stripping some children within the States of their citizen-
ship, the Order would reduce the States’ federal funding,
“forc[ing the States] to bear significantly increased costs to
operate and fund programs that ensure the health and well-
being of their residents.” Id., at 6, ¶8, 4–5, ¶6; see also Op-
position to Application in No. 24A886 (New Jersey), pp. 9–
11; Complaint in No. 1:25–cv–10139 (D Mass., Jan. 21,
2025), pp. 23–42, ¶¶121–201. Relatedly, because the States
must verify the citizenship status of the individuals they
serve, the States alleged that the Citizenship Order would
force them to expend significant sums to “modif[y] their . . .
operational structures and administration” to account for
the changes in citizenship. Washington Complaint 6, ¶8;
see also Opposition to Application in No. 24A886 (New Jer-
sey), at 9–11.12 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
All three District Courts preliminarily enjoined enforce-
ment of the Citizenship Order. Each court determined that
the Citizenship Order was likely unlawful, that respond-
ents were likely to face irreparable harm without an injunc-
tion, and that the equities and public interest cut decisively
in respondents’ favor. See 763 F. Supp. 3d 723, 727, 744–
745 (Md. 2025); 765 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1152–1153 (WD
Wash. 2025); Doe v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d 266, 274, 285–
287 (Mass. 2025).
The District Courts further determined that only injunc-
tions blocking the Citizenship Order’s enforcement nation-
wide would completely redress respondents’ injuries. For
the organizational plaintiffs, the Maryland District Court
explained that those plaintiffs have “‘over 680,000 mem-
bers . . . who reside in all 50 U.S. states’” and “hundreds of
them expect to give birth soon.” 763 F. Supp. 3d, at 746.
The Washington District Court found that “a geograph-
ically limited injunction would be ineffective” for the state
plaintiffs “as it would not completely relieve [the States] of
the Order’s financial burden(s).” 765 F. Supp. 3d, at 1153.
For one thing, that court explained, the constant flow of
people moving in and out of various States meant some chil-
dren born to noncitizen parents in a nonplaintiff State
would later reside in a plaintiff State. Once there, those
children (under state law) would be eligible for state bene-
fits. Yet due to the Citizenship Order, the plaintiff States
would no longer receive federal funding to support those
benefits. In addition, the plaintiff States would have to cre-
ate an entirely new administrative and recordkeeping sys-
tem to accommodate children who were not citizens under
the Order and born in a nonplaintiff State. So if the District
Court allowed birthright citizenship to continue for chil-
dren born in the plaintiff States, but not in any other State,
that would not completely redress the States’ financial in-
jury. Ibid.
For identical reasons, the Massachusetts District CourtCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
13
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
also found that the state plaintiffs’ injuries could be re-
dressed only by a universal injunction. See 766 F. Supp.
3d, at 288 (“The harms [the States] have established stem
from the [Order’s] impact on the citizenship status—and
the ability to discern or verify such status—for any child
located or seeking various services within their jurisdic-
tion”).
The Government filed motions to stay the injunctions in
three separate Courts of Appeals. Nowhere did the Govern-
ment contest the District Courts’ uniform holdings that the
Citizenship Order likely violated the Constitution. Instead,
it challenged only the scope of the ordered relief, arguing
that the injunctions should be narrowed to block the Order’s
enforcement against only the individual persons named in
the complaints.
All three appellate courts denied the Government’s re-
quest and left the preliminary injunctions intact. See 131
F. 4th 27 (CA1 2025); 2025 WL 654902 (CA4, Feb. 28, 2025);
2025 WL 553485 (CA9, Feb. 19, 2025). The Fourth Circuit,
which reviewed the preliminary injunction issued to the or-
ganizational plaintiffs, concluded that “[t]he district court
. . . carefully explained why an injunction limited to the par-
ties—including organizations with hundreds of thousands
of members nationwide—would be unworkable in practice
and thus fail to provide complete relie[f] to the plaintiffs.”
2025 WL 654902, *1. The First and Ninth Circuits left un-
disturbed the Massachusetts and Washington District
Courts’ respective determinations that only universal in-
junctions would fully redress the States’ injuries. See 131
F. 4th, 42–43; 2025 WL 553485, *1.
On March 13, the Government filed emergency applica-
tions with this Court requesting partial stays of the three
preliminary injunctions of the Citizenship Order. The Gov-
ernment renews its contention that the injunctions must be
narrowed to benefit only formal parties in these cases.14 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
III
In partially granting the Government’s remarkable re-
quest, the Court distorts well-established equitable princi-
ples several times over. A stay, this Court has said, “‘is not
a matter of right,’” but rather “‘an exercise of judicial dis-
cretion.’” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 433 (2009). For
centuries, courts have “close[d] the doors” of equity to those
“tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the
matter in which [they] seek relief.” Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324
U. S. 806, 814 (1945). Yet the majority throws the doors of
equity open to the Government in a case where it seeks to
undo a fundamental and clearly established constitutional
right. The Citizenship Order’s patent unlawfulness is rea-
son enough to deny the Government’s applications.
The Government also falls well short of satisfying its bur-
den to show that it will likely suffer irreparable harm ab-
sent a stay and that it will likely succeed on the merits of
its challenge to the scope of the injunctions. Nken, 556
U. S., at 434–435. The Executive Branch has respected
birthright citizenship for well over a century, and it ad-
vances no plausible reason why maintaining the status quo
while the litigation proceeds would cause it irrevocable
harm. Nor could it, for the Constitution and federal law
prohibit the enforcement of the Citizenship Order.
For all that, moreover, the Government is not even cor-
rect on the merits of universal injunctions. To the contrary,
universal injunctions are consistent with long-established
principles of equity, once respected by this Court. What is
more, these cases do not even squarely present the legality
of universal injunctions. That is because, even if the major-
ity were right that injunctions can only offer “complete re-
lief to the plaintiffs before the court,” ante, at 17, each of the
lower courts here correctly determined that the nationwide
relief they issued was necessary to remedy respondents’ in-Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
15
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
juries completely. So even ignoring the traditional stay fac-
tors and accepting the majority’s view of the merits, there
is no reason to grant relief in these cases.
A
It is a bedrock principle that parties who request a stay
must show they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent
such relief. Indeed, “[t]he authority to grant stays has his-
torically been justified by the perceived need ‘to prevent ir-
reparable injury to the parties or to the public’ pending re-
view.” Nken, 556 U. S., at 432 (quoting Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 9 (1942)). Thus, an appar-
ent likelihood of success on the merits never suffices on its
own to justify this Court’s intervention: Our emergency
docket is not a mechanism for an expedited appeal. Accord-
ingly, “this Court can avoid delving into the merits” “[i]f the
[applicant does not] demonstrat[e] an irreparable injury.”
Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (KAVANAUGH, J.,
concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 3); contra, ante, at
8–11 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).
What grave harm does the Executive face that prompts a
majority of this Court to grant it relief? The answer, the
Government says, is the inability to enforce the Citizenship
Order against nonparties. For the majority, that answer
suffices. See ante, at 24 (“When a federal court enters a
universal injunction against the Government, it ‘im-
proper[ly] intrude[s]’ on ‘a coordinate branch of the Govern-
ment’ and prevents the Government from enforcing its pol-
icies against nonparties”).
The problem, however, is that the Executive Branch has
no right to enforce the Citizenship Order against anyone.
As the Executive itself once put it, the Order is “unques-
tionably unconstitutional.” Supra, at 9. It defies logic to
say that maintaining a centuries-long status quo for a few
months longer will irreparably injure the Government. See
Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U. S. 339, 345–34616 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
(2024) (The “purpose” of equitable relief “‘is merely to pre-
serve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the
merits can be held’”). The President’s “mandate . . . to ex-
ercise his executive power,” Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52, 123 (1926), in any event, does not permit him to
rewrite the Constitution or statutory provisions at a whim.
By forging ahead and granting relief to the Government an-
yway, this Court endorses the radical proposition that the
President is harmed, irreparably, whenever he cannot do
something he wants to do, even if what he wants to do is
break the law.
The majority claims that it can sidestep “analysis of the
Executive Order” altogether because (in its view) every
overbroad injunction necessarily causes irreparable harm
sufficient to warrant emergency intervention. Ante, at 24.
Yet where a purportedly overbroad injunction orders the
Government to do only what this Court has expressly held
it is required to do, it is hard to see how it could cause any
harm. At oral argument, the Government conceded it was
bound to follow this Court’s precedent. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
62–63. This Court’s precedent establishes beyond a shade
of doubt that the Executive Order is unconstitutional. See
supra, at 3–9. Thus, by enjoining the Government from vi-
olating settled law, the District Courts’ orders do not cause
the Government any harm.
The majority’s contrary position is self-refuting. Suppose
an executive order barred women from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits or black citizens from voting. Is the Govern-
ment irreparably harmed, and entitled to emergency relief,
by a district court order universally enjoining such policies?
The majority, apparently, would say yes.
Nothing in this Court’s precedents supports that result.
It turns one of the “‘most critical’ factors we must consider
in deciding whether to grant a stay” into a box-checking ex-
ercise whenever the relevant enjoined action is an executive
one. Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
17
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
U. S. 571, 584 (2017) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Even accepting that “[a]ny time a State
is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable
injury,” Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2012)
(ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers), that democratic considera-
tion cuts against the Government in these cases. Through
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
and the States constitutionalized birthright citizenship.
Congress also codified birthright citizenship in §1401(a). It
is thus the Citizenship Order, not the District Courts’ in-
junctions, that prevents the “‘effectuat[ion]’” of a constitu-
tional amendment and repeals a “‘statut[e] enacted by rep-
resentatives of [the American] people.’” Id., at 1303.
Simply put, it strains credulity to treat the Executive
Branch as irreparably harmed by injunctions that direct it
to continue following settled law. “All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law and are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee,
106 U. S. 196, 220 (1882); but see Trump v. United States,
603 U. S. 593 (2024). The injunctions do no more harm to
the Executive than the Constitution and federal law do.
B
A majority of this Court nonetheless rushes to address
the merits of the Government’s applications, holding that
universal injunctions “likely exceed the equitable authority
that Congress has granted to federal courts.” Ante, at 1–2.
A majority that has repeatedly pledged its fealty to “history
and tradition” thus eliminates an equitable power firmly
grounded in centuries of equitable principles and practice.
By stripping all federal courts, including itself, of that
power, the Court kneecaps the Judiciary’s authority to stop
the Executive from enforcing even the most unconstitu-
tional policies. That runs directly counter to the point of
equity: empowering courts to do complete justice, including18 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
through flexible remedies that have historically benefited
parties and nonparties alike.
1
A brief recounting of equity’s history demonstrates the
majority’s grave error. The American legal system grew out
of English law, which had two primary judicial institutions:
the common-law courts and equity courts. Equity courts
arose because of the inflexibility of the common-law system;
their purpose was to look beyond formal writs and provide
remedies where the common law gave inadequate relief. In
Blackstone’s words, equity was meant “to give remedy in
cases where none before was administered.” 3 Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, at 50.
Adaptability has always been a hallmark of equity, espe-
cially with regard to the scope of its remedies. While com-
mon-law courts were “compelled to limit their inquiry to the
very parties in the litigation before them,” equity courts
could “adjust the rights of all, however numerous,” and
“adapt their decrees to all the varieties of circumstances,
which may arise, and adjust them to all the peculiar rights
of all the parties in interest.” J. Story, Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence §28, pp. 27–28 (2d ed. 1839). After
all, equity’s “constant aim” was “to do complete justice.” J.
Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings §72, p. 74 (2d ed.
1840). Accordingly, equity courts could “decid[e] upon and
settl[e] the rights of all persons interested in the subject-
matter of the suit, so that the performance of the decree of
the Court may be perfectly safe to those, who are compelled
to obey it, and also, that future litigation may be pre-
vented.” Ibid.
For equity courts, injunctions were “manifestly indispen-
sable for the purposes of social justice in a great variety of
cases.” Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§959a, at 227. Unlike this Court, then, those courts “con-
stantly decline[d] to lay down any rule which shall limitCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
19
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
their power and discretion as to the particular cases, in
which such injunctions shall be granted, or withheld.” Ibid.
Justice Story underscored the “wisdom in this course”: Eq-
uity courts needed flexibility to craft injunctions for partic-
ular cases, as it was “impossible to foresee all the exigencies
of society which may require their aid and assistance to pro-
tect rights or redress wrongs.” Ibid.
In their pursuit of complete justice, equity courts could
award injunctive and other equitable relief to parties and
nonparties alike. For centuries, they did so through what
was known as “bills of peace.” If a plaintiff or group of
plaintiffs filed such a bill, an English court could use a sin-
gle case to settle disputes affecting whole communities, for
“the inherent jurisdiction of equity” included the power “to
interfere for the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.” 1 J.
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §260, p. 278 (1881). Bills
of peace issued in cases “‘where the parties [were] very nu-
merous, and the court perceive[d] that it [would] be almost
impossible to bring them all before the court; or where the
question is of general interest, and a few may sue for the
benefit of the whole.’” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U. S.
815, 832 (1999) (quoting West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718,
722 (No. 17,424) (CC RI 1820) (Story, J.)). In such cases, a
court could “grant [equitable relief] without making other
persons parties,” instead considering them “quasi parties to
the record, at least for the purpose of taking the benefit of
the decree, and of entitling themselves to other equitable
relief, if their rights [were] jeopard[iz]ed.” Id., at 723.
Early American courts embraced bills of peace and ex-
tended their logic to cases “which [were] not technically
‘bills of peace,’ but ‘[were] analogous to,’ or ‘within the prin-
ciple’ of such bills.” 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §269,
at 293. One example was taxpayer suits, which allowed
courts to enjoin universally the enforcement of a challenged
tax. Sometimes, such suits were filed “by any number of
taxpayers joined as co-plaintiffs, or by one taxpayer suing20 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.” Id.,
at 277. But taxpayer suits were not always representative
in nature: Even “a single taxpayer suing on his own ac-
count,” if victorious, could enjoin the collection of a tax
against anyone. Ibid. Individual plaintiffs, moreover, could
secure an order “to set aside and annul any and every illegal
public official action . . . whereby a debt . . . would be un-
lawfully created.” Ibid. By allowing “complete and final
relief [to] be given to an entire community by means of one
judicial decree,” American courts (like their English coun-
terparts) spared nonparties and themselves from the bur-
den of “an indefinite amount of separate litigation.” Id., at
278.
Federal courts have also exercised equitable authority to
enjoin universally federal and state laws for more than a
century. For instance, before deciding the constitutionality
of a new federal law in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229
U. S. 288 (1913), this Court entered an order blocking the
law’s enforcement against parties and nonparties. See M.
Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133
Harv. L. Rev. 920, 944–946 (2020). In Lewis, two newspa-
per publishers challenged as unconstitutional a federal law
requiring publishers to file with the Postmaster General
twice-yearly disclosures about their editorial board mem-
bership, corporate ownership, and subscribership. Sohoni,
133 Harv. L. Rev., at 944. After the District Court upheld
the law and authorized a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court, one of the publishers moved for a restraining order.
The proposed order sought relief not only for the publisher
who filed it, but asked the Court to “‘restrai[n]’” the Post-
master General and other federal officials from enforcing
the law against “‘appellant and other newspaper publish-
ers.’” Id., at 946. This Court readily agreed, see Journal of
Commerce and Commercial Bulletin v. Burleson, 229 U. S.
600, 601 (1913) (per curiam), even as it would have sufficedCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
21
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
for the movant publishers’ sake to enjoin the Act’s enforce-
ment against them alone pending their appeal.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), too,
this Court affirmed a universal injunction of Oregon’s com-
pulsory public schooling law. See Sohoni, 133 Harv.
L. Rev., at 959–962. Two private school owners challenged
that law in a suit against the Governor of Oregon and other
state officials. “The plaintiffs did not sue on behalf of a rep-
resented group or class; they sued for themselves, alleging
that the law was an unconstitutional interference with
their property rights.” Id., at 959. Yet a three-judge federal
court awarded them a universal injunction. See id., at 960–
961. This Court, in affirming that relief, twice described it
as “appropriate.” Pierce, 268 U. S., at 530, 533. The Court
understood that the injunction it affirmed would provide re-
lief to nonparties, commenting that such relief was neces-
sary because enforcing the Act would result not only in the
“destruction of appellees’ primary schools,” but would also
destroy “perhaps all other private primary schools for nor-
mal children within the State of Oregon.” Id., at 534.
Cases like Lewis and Pierce were not outliers. Through-
out the early 20th century, federal courts granted universal
injunctions even when a narrower remedy would have suf-
ficed to redress the parties’ injuries. See, e.g., West Virginia
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) (affirming
an injunction that shielded the plaintiff class of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and any other children with religious scruples,
from complying with a state law requiring children to sa-
lute the American flag); see also Sohoni, 133 Harv. L. Rev.,
at 943–993 (collecting cases). It is certainly true that fed-
eral courts have granted more universal injunctions of fed-
eral laws in recent decades. But the issuance of broad eq-
uitable relief intended to benefit parties and nonparties has
deep roots in equity’s history and in this Court’s precedents.
The universal injunctions of the Citizenship Order fit22 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
firmly within that tradition. The right to birthright citizen-
ship is “clear,” the Citizenship Order is an “‘illegal act,’”
and without the “‘preventive process of injunction,’” the
right will be “‘irreparably injured.’” Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F.
310, 328 (CA7 1894) (Harlan, J.) (describing standard for
when an injunction should issue). It would be “‘almost im-
possible,’” moreover, “‘to bring all [affected individuals] be-
fore the court,’” Ortiz, 527 U. S., at 832, justifying the use
of one suit to settle the issue of the Citizenship Order’s con-
stitutionality for all affected persons. See 1 Pomeroy, Eq-
uity Jurisprudence §260, at 450–451. Complete justice, the
“constant aim” of equity, Story, Commentaries on Equity
Pleadings §72, at 74, demands a universal injunction: “‘the
only remedy which the law allows to prevent the commis-
sion’” of a flagrantly illegal policy. Arthur, 63 F., at 328.
The District Courts, by granting such relief, appropriately
“settle[d] the rights of all persons interested in the subject-
matter” of these suits, binding the Government so as to pre-
vent needless “future litigation.” Story, Commentaries on
Equity Pleadings §72, at 74.
Of course, as a matter of equitable discretion, courts may
often have weighty reasons not to award universal relief.
Among other things, universal injunctions can prevent dif-
ferent district and appellate courts from considering the
same issues in parallel, forestalling the legal dialogue (or
“percolation”) the federal system uses to answer difficult
questions correctly. Not so here, however, because the Cit-
izenship Order is patently unconstitutional under settled
law and a variety of district and appellate courts have re-
viewed the issue. So too can universal injunctions encour-
age forum shopping, by allowing preferred district judges in
a venue picked by one plaintiff to enjoin governmental pol-
icies nationwide. They also operate asymmetrically against
the Government, giving plaintiffs a litigation advantage: To
halt Government action everywhere, a plaintiff must winCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
23
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
only one universal injunction across many potential law-
suits. Yet this is not a scenario where granting universal
relief will encourage forum shopping or give plaintiffs the
upper hand. Quite the opposite: By awarding universal re-
lief below, the District Courts just ordered the Government
to do everywhere what any reasonable jurist would order
the Government to do anywhere.
There may be good reasons not to issue universal injunc-
tions in the typical case, when the merits are open to rea-
sonable disagreement and there is no claim of extraordi-
nary and imminent irreparable harm.3 See Story,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §959a, at 227 (“[In-
junctive relief] ought . . . to be guarded with extreme cau-
tion, and applied only in very clear cases”); cf. ante, at 13 (
“[The] use [of bills of peace] was confined to limited circum-
stances”). The universal injunctions in these cases, how-
ever, are more than appropriate. These injunctions, after
all, protect newborns from the exceptional, irreparable
harm associated with losing a foundational constitutional
right and its immediate benefits. They thus honor the most
basic value of our constitutional system: They keep the Gov-
ernment within the bounds of law. Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
2
The majority’s contrary reasoning falls flat. The majority
starts with the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives federal
courts jurisdiction over “all suits . . . in equity.” §11, 1 Stat.
78. In the majority’s telling, universal injunctions are in-
consistent with equity jurisdiction because they are not
“sufficiently ‘analogous’ to the relief ‘“exercised by the High
——————
3 These prudential considerations, however, have nothing to do with
whether universal injunctions are consistent with historical equitable
principles and practice. Contra ante, at 21, n. 16; but cf. ante, at 21
(“[T]he policy pros and cons [of universal injunctions] are beside the
point”).24 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judici-
ary Act.” ’” Ante, at 6 (quoting Grupo Mexicano de Desar-
rollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 318–
319 (1999)). In reaching that ahistorical result, the Court
claims that the English Chancellor’s remedies were “typi-
cally” party specific, and emphasizes that party-specific
principles have permeated this Court’s understanding of
equity. Ante, at 6–9.
The majority’s argument stumbles out the gate. As the
majority must itself concede, injunctions issued by English
courts of equity were “typically,” but not always, party spe-
cific. Ante, at 7. After all, bills of peace, for centuries, al-
lowed English courts to adjudicate the rights of parties not
before it, and to award remedies intended to benefit entire
affected communities. Taxpayer suits, too, could lead to a
complete injunction of a tax, even when only a single plain-
tiff filed suit.
The majority seeks to distinguish bills of peace from uni-
versal injunctions by urging that the former (but not the
latter) typically applied to small and cohesive groups and
were representative in nature. See ante, at 13. Yet those
are distinctions without a difference. Equity courts had the
flexibility to “adapt their decrees to all the varieties of cir-
cumstances, which may arise, and adjust them to all the
peculiar rights of all the parties in interest.” Story, Com-
mentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §28, at 28. There is no
equitable principle that caps the number of parties in inter-
est. Indeed, in taxpayer suits, a single plaintiff could get
the relief of “annul[ling] any and every kind of tax or as-
sessment” that applied to an entire “county, town, or city.”Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
25
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §260, at 277.4 “[T]he in-
herent jurisdiction of equity to interfere for the prevention
of a multiplicity of suits,” moreover, is what empowered
common law courts to issue bills of peace. Id., at 450–451
(4th ed. 1918). That is why early American courts under-
stood taxpayer suits, in which even a “single taxpayer suing
on his own account” and not on behalf of others could secure
a total injunction, to be a natural extension of a bill of peace.
Id., at 277 (1881).5
It is also unclear why “‘cohesive[ness]’” or “representa-
tive[ness]” would preclude even those universal injunctions
that, like here, benefit a discrete and cohesive group. Ante,
at 13. The Citizenship Order itself applies only to a subset
group of newborn children: that is, children born to a
mother unlawfully or temporarily present, and a father who
——————
4 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), which addressed a tax-
payer’s standing to challenge a federal appropriation, did not consider
how broadly a court could enjoin Government action and is therefore not
to the contrary. Id., at 488; contra, ante, at 15.
5 The majority asserts that taxpayer suits are an “inadequate historical
analogy” for a universal injunction, ante, at 14, but cannot dispute their
essential similarity: By providing relief to an entire affected community,
both do more than merely redress a plaintiff ’s injuries. Instead, the ma-
jority says that single-plaintiff, nonrepresentative taxpayer suits cannot
be proper “historical” analogues because they trace only back to the “mid-
19th century.” See ibid. Yet the same is true of plaintiff-protective in-
junctions against federal and state government officials, an equitable
remedy the majority embraces by reference to “a long line of cases au-
thorizing suits against State officials in certain circumstances” that
range from the cusp of the mid-19th century to the late mid-19th century.
Ante, at 11, n. 9. In any event, early American courts deemed taxpayer
suits “ ‘analogous to,’ [and] ‘within the principle of’ . . . bills [of peace],’ ”
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §269, at 293, which trace back to the
equitable practice of the English Chancery Court, ante, at 12. Nor is it
clear why it matters that individual taxpayer suits occurred in state
courts, or that those courts did not always award the broad injunctions
available to them. Contra, ante, at 15. The relevant question is simply
whether a court of equity could award injunctive relief to nonparties.
The answer to that question is, obviously, yes.26 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
is neither a citizen nor lawful permanent resident. Those
mothers and fathers share “not only [a common] interest in
the question, but one in common in the subject-matter of
th[is] suit.” Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 116 (1897). Nor
is there any doubt that at least the individual respondents
adequately represent the injunction’s beneficiaries: Like all
affected parents, they “are necessarily interested in obtain-
ing the relief sought” to preserve their children’s citizen-
ship. Emmons v. National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Assn. of NY,
135 F. 689, 691 (CA4 1905) (explaining the “well-known
doctrine of equity jurisprudence” that “ ‘the relief sought by
[a plaintiff]’” must be “‘beneficial to those whom he under-
takes to represent’ ” (quoting 1 R. White, F. Nichols, & H.
Garrett, Daniell’s Chancery Practice 243 (6th Am. ed.
1894))). What was true of bills of peace is thus true of these
universal injunctions and universal injunctions generally,
too: Both allow courts to “‘adjudicate the rights of members
of dispersed groups without formally joining them to a law-
suit through the usual procedures.’” Ante, at 13.
That bills of peace bear some resemblance to modern day
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions does not
mean they cannot also be a historical analogue to the uni-
versal injunction. Contra, ante, at 13 (“The bill of peace
lives in modern form” as the “modern class action . . . gov-
erned in federal court by Rule 23,” “not as the universal in-
junction”). In the majority’s view, Rule 23 class actions, but
not universal injunctions, would “be recognizable to an Eng-
lish Chancellor” because the limitations on class actions
mirror those that applied to bills of peace. Ante, at 14 (Rule
23 “requires numerosity (such that joinder is impractica-
ble), common questions of law or fact, typicality, and repre-
sentative parties who adequately protect the interests of
the class”); cf. supra, at 25 (explaining why the universal
injunctions in these cases are consistent with those limits).
To the extent that English Chancellors would care about
the differences between Rule 23 and universal injunctions,Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
27
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the majority provides absolutely no reason to conclude they
would think the former permissible and not the latter. To
the contrary, unlike the Court today, the English Chancery
Court recognized that principles of equity permit granting
relief to nonparties. The history of bills of peace makes that
apparent, particularly because they went beyond what Rule
23 permits. See ante, at 13–14 (“[T]he modern Rule 23 is in
some ways ‘more restrictive of representative suits than the
original bills of peace’”). They are thus a common ancestor
to both class actions and universal injunctions.
In any event, nothing in Rule 23 purports to supplant or
modify federal courts’ equitable authority under the Judici-
ary Act to grant relief to nonparties, nor could it. Contra,
ante, at 14. The majority frets that universal injunctions,
if permissible, will empower federal courts to create de facto
class actions at will, thereby circumventing Rule 23’s pro-
cedural protections. Ibid. Those concerns, however, have
not been borne out in reality. Rule 23 has coexisted with
universal injunctions against the Government for decades.
Universal injunctions also cannot supplant the paradigm
form of class actions, which seek money damages. In all
events, to the extent the majority’s concern has any teeth,
reviewing courts are already well equipped to safeguard
Rule 23’s procedural protections. If there is a genuine lack
of clarity as to the lawfulness of challenged Government ac-
tion, district courts may well abuse their discretion by re-
flexively issuing universal injunctions where a Rule 23
class action would be more appropriate. See Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 664 (2004)
(standard of review for preliminary injunctions is “‘abuse of
discretion’”).
The majority next insists that the practice of “founding-
era courts of equity in the United States” cuts against uni-
versal injunctions, and that this Court “consistently re-
buffed requests for relief that extended beyond the parties.”
Ante, at 8. The majority’s account is irreconcilable with28 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
early American bills of peace and the history of taxpayer
suits. It further contradicts this Court’s practice, in cases
like Lewis, Pierce, and Barnette, of affirming and granting
universal injunctions even when narrower, plaintiff-
focused injunctions would have offered complete relief to
the parties. See supra, at 20–21. The majority instead fo-
cuses on one case from 1897, in which this Court “permitted
only a narro[w] decree between ‘the parties named as plain-
tiff and defendants in the bill,’” ante, at 7 (quoting Scott,
165 U. S., at 117), over others, including from the same pe-
riod, doing just the opposite. The majority offers no princi-
pled basis to deem the question resolved by a single case
from 1897 while cases just a few years later charted a dif-
ferent course. Indeed, if the relevant inquiry turns on
“founding-era practice,” then there is no reason why a case
from 1897 should be dispositive. Ante, at 9, n. 7.
In the majority’s telling, Scott merely “illustrates that as
late as 1897, this Court adhered to a party-specific view of
relief.” Ante, at 7–8, n. 6. Nothing in Scott, however, dic-
tates that equitable relief must always be party specific. To
the contrary, just one year after Scott, the Court endorsed
the opposite view: “Only a court of equity,” the Court ex-
plained, “is competent to . . . determine, once for all and
without a multiplicity of suits, matters that affect not
simply individuals, but the interests of the entire commu-
nity.” Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 518 (1898); see also
id., at 517 (“[T]he circuit court of the United States, sitting
in equity, can make a comprehensive decree covering the
whole ground of controversy, and thus avoid the multiplic-
ity of suits that would inevitably arise under the statute”).6
——————
6 Regardless of the actual decree the Smyth court approved, see ante,
at 7–8, n. 6, its analysis clearly reveals that the Court understood equity
to permit broad relief intended to benefit parties and nonparties alike.
That is why this Court later approved or granted universal injunctionsCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
29
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The majority does not identify a single case, from the found-
ing era or otherwise, in which this Court held that federal
courts may never issue universal injunctions or broad equi-
table relief that extends to nonparties. That is to be ex-
pected, given the historical support for such relief and its
use in bills of peace and taxpayer suits.
Most critically, the majority fundamentally misunder-
stands the nature of equity by freezing in amber the precise
remedies available at the time of the Judiciary Act. Even
as it declares that “‘[e]quity is flexible,’” ante, at 11, the ma-
jority ignores the very flexibility that historically allowed
equity to secure complete justice where the rigid forms of
common law proved inadequate. Indeed, “[i]n th[e] early
times [of the common law] the chief juridical employment
of the chancellor must have been in devising new writs, di-
rected to the courts of common law, to give remedy in cases
where none before was administered.” 3 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, at 50. Adaptability has
thus always been at the equity’s core. Hence why equity
courts “constantly decline[d] to lay down any rule which
shall limit their power and discretion as to the particular
cases, in which such injunctions shall be granted, or with-
held.” Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§959(a), at 227. The Judiciary Act of 1789 codified equity
itself, not merely a static list of remedies.
Historical analogues are no doubt instructive and provide
important guidance, but requiring an exact historical
match for every equitable remedy defies equity’s purpose.
Equity courts understood the “wisdom” in keeping injunc-
tive relief flexible, for it was “impossible to foresee all the
exigencies of society which may require their aid and assis-
tance to protect rights or redress wrongs.” Ibid. Of course,
——————
in Lewis, Pierce, and Barnette without “address[ing] the propriety of uni-
versal relief.” Ante, at 9, n. 7. See also Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan,
229 U. S. 288 (1913); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).30 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
in assessing whether a remedy falls within federal courts’
equity jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, this Court has
asked “[w]hether the relief . . . was traditionally accorded
by courts of equity.” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 319.
Grupo Mexicano, however, does not dictate the level of gen-
erality for that historical inquiry, and general principles of
equity that themselves existed at the founding militate
against requiring a near exact match as the majority does.
Cf. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 692 (2024) (“The
law must comport with the principles underlying the Sec-
ond Amendment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘his-
torical twin’”).
Indeed, equitable relief in the United States has evolved
in one respect to protect rights and redress wrongs that
even the majority does not question: Plaintiffs today may
obtain plaintiff-protective injunctions against Government
officials that block the enforcement of unconstitutional
laws, relief exemplified by Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123
(1908). That remedy, which traces back to the equity prac-
tice of mid-19th century courts, finds no analogue in the re-
lief exercised in the English Court of Chancery, which could
not enjoin the Crown or English officers. See supra, at 24,
n. 4; see also Sohoni, 133 Harv. L. Rev., at 928, 1002–1006;
see also R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System
958–959 (5th ed. 2003) (noting that, in Young, “the threat-
ened conduct of the defendant would not have been an ac-
tionable wrong at common law” and that the “principle [in
Young] has been easily absorbed in suits challenging fed-
eral official action”). Under the majority’s rigid historical
test, however, even plaintiff-protective injunctions againstCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
31
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
patently unlawful Government action should be impermis-
sible.7 Such a result demonstrates the folly of treating eq-
uity as a closed system, rather than one designed to adapt
to new circumstances.
The relative absence of universal injunctions against the
United States before the late 20th century, moreover, re-
flects constitutional and procedural limitations on judicial
power, not equitable ones. Brief for Legal Historians in No.
24A884 as Amici Curiae 13–16. Until the enactment of the
Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act in 1976,
sovereign immunity barred most suits against the Federal
Government. Id., at 14–15 (citing G. Sisk, Litigation With
the Federal Government §4.10(b), p. 339 (2016)). Officer
suits against Cabinet officials before that point, moreover,
could be brought only in Washington, D. C., due to limits on
personal jurisdiction and venue that existed at the time.
Brief for Legal Historians in No. 24A884 as Amici Curiae
15–16. The later emergence of universal injunctions
against the United States followed the removal of those bar-
riers and the expansion of federal actions and laws. The
rise of universal injunctions therefore represents equity’s
essential adaptation to modern governance.
It is a “common expression . . . that Courts of Equity de-
light to do justice, and not by halves.” Story, Commentaries
on Equity Pleadings §72, at 74. The majority, however, de-
lights to do justice by piecemeal. Its decision to strip the
federal courts of the authority to issue universal injunctions
of even flagrantly unlawful Government action represents
a grave and unsupported diminution of the judicial power
of equity. Centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall warned
that “[i]f the legislatures of the several states may, at will,
——————
7 The majority’s expressed support for such injunctions is thus irrecon-
cilable with its view that equitable remedies must be very closely “‘anal-
ogous’ to the relief ‘ “exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the
original Judiciary Act.” ’ ” Ante, at 6.32 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the con-
stitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.” United States
v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136 (1809). The Court should have
heeded that warning today.
C
Even the majority’s view of the law cannot justify issu-
ance of emergency relief to the Government in these cases,
for the majority leaves open whether these particular in-
junctions may pass muster under its ruling. Indeed, the
lower courts issued the challenged injunctions consistent
with an equitable principle that even the majority em-
braces: Courts may award an equitable remedy when it is
“necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Cali-
fano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979). As the major-
ity recounts, “[t]he equitable tradition has long embraced
the rule that courts generally ‘may administer complete re-
lief between the parties.’” Ante, at 16 (quoting Kinney-
Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U. S. 488, 507 (1928); empha-
sis deleted).8
So too does the Court recognize that, in some cases, com-
plete relief will require a broad remedy that necessarily
benefits nonparties. See ante, at 17, n. 13 (“There may be
other injuries for which it is all but impossible for courts to
craft relief that is both complete and benefits only the
named plaintiffs”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. 48,
66–67 (2018) (“[T]he only way to vindicate an individual
plaintiff ’s right to an equally weighted vote [is] through a
wholesale ‘restructuring of the geographical distribution of
seats in a state legislature’”). Hence the majority’s nui-
——————
8 That explains the majority’s bottom line, in which it declares that the
Government’s applications are “granted, but only to the extent that the
injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each
plaintiff with standing to sue.” Ante, at 27.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
33
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
sance hypothetical: If a plaintiff sues her neighbor for play-
ing loud music at night, a court can order the neighbor to
turn off the music at night, even if doing so will naturally
benefit other neighbors who are not parties to the suit. See
ante, at 16–17.
The majority need not resort to hypotheticals, however,
because the very injunctions in these cases were necessary
to give respondents complete relief. Indeed, each District
Court found that a universal injunction was the only feasi-
ble option to redress fully respondents’ injuries. See 763
F. Supp. 3d, at 746 (concluding that “[o]nly a nationwide in-
junction will provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” be-
cause the organizational plaintiffs have “‘over 680,000
members . . . who reside in all 50 U.S. states and several
U.S. territories’” and “‘[h]undreds or even thousands’” of
those members “‘will give birth to children in the United
States over the coming weeks and months’” (alterations in
original)); 765 F. Supp. 3d, at 1153 (“[A] geographically lim-
ited injunction would be ineffective, as it would not com-
pletely relieve [the plaintiff States] of the Order’s financial
burden(s)”); 766 F. Supp. 3d, at 288 (explaining that “in-
junctive relief limited to the State plaintiffs [would be] in-
adequate” because it would “fai[l] in providing complete re-
lief to the State plaintiffs”).
Recognizing as much, the majority retreats to the view
that, even if a court “can award complete relief,” it “should
[not] do so” reflexively. Ante, at 18; see also ibid. (“Com-
plete relief is not a guarantee—it is the maximum a court
can provide”); ante, at 2 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (suggesting
courts “err insofar as they treat complete relief as a man-
date”). Even so, the Court never suggests that the District
Courts in these cases should not have awarded relief to the
parties that completely remedied their alleged injuries.
Nor could it. The majority recognizes that “in equity, ‘the
broader and deeper the remedy the plaintiff wants, the
stronger the plaintiff ’s story needs to be.’” Ante, at 18–19.34 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Here, respondents paired their respective requests for com-
plete relief with the strongest story possible: Without such
relief, an executive order that violates the Constitution, fed-
eral law, Supreme Court precedent, history, and over a cen-
tury of Executive Branch practice would infringe upon their
constitutional rights or cause them to incur significant fi-
nancial and administrative costs.
Perhaps that is why the majority leaves open the possi-
bility that the District Courts, in these cases, could have
granted at least respondent States a nationwide injunction
consistent with the notion of “complete relief.” The majority
recognizes, correctly, that the Massachusetts District Court
“decided that a universal injunction was necessary to pro-
vide the States themselves with complete relief.” Ante, at
18.9 And the majority does not dispute the basis for those
decisions: “Children often move across state lines or are
born outside their parents’ State of residence,” and “th[is]
cross-border flow” would make an injunction protecting
only children born in the party States “unworkable.” Ante,
18. A narrower injunction would “require [the States] to
track and verify the immigration status of the parents of
every child, along with the birth State of every child for
whom they provide certain federally funded benefits.” Ante,
at 18. Unrebutted record evidence bears this out and shows
that the Citizenship Order would irreparably harm the
States, even if it does not apply to children born within their
boundaries. The Court does not contend otherwise. That
should be the end of the matter.
——————
9 In the majority’s telling, the Washington District Court “acknowl-
edged the state respondents’ complete relief argument but primarily
granted a universal injunction” based on its weighing of the equities. See
ante, at 18, n. 14. Not so. That court carefully explained why “a geo-
graphically limited injunction would be ineffective, as it would not com-
pletely relieve [the States] of the Order’s financial burden(s).” 765 F.
Supp. 3d 1142, 1153–1154 (2025). A narrower injunction, it explained,
would be “unworkable” and would itself likely impose new “recordkeep-
ing and administrative burden[s]” on the States. Id., at 1154.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
35
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Nevertheless, the majority suggests that the District
Courts might consider, after this Court hands down its de-
cision, whether some alternative narrower injunction
would provide the States complete relief. See ibid. What
would such an injunction look like, and would it be feasible?
The Court does not say. The majority does note, but takes
no position on, two narrower injunctions the Government
claims would still give complete relief to the States: an or-
der prohibiting the Government from enforcing the Citizen-
ship Order in respondent States, including as to state resi-
dents born elsewhere; or an order directing the Government
to treat children covered by the Citizenship Order as eligi-
ble for federally funded welfare benefits when those chil-
dren reside in a respondent State. See ibid. (citing Appli-
cation for Partial Stay of Injunction in No. 24A884, p. 23).
As an initial matter, the Government never raised those
narrower injunctions to the District Courts, meaning it for-
feited them. That is what the First Circuit expressly held,
131 F. 4th, at 43 (“declining to consider” those alternatives
because they were “raised for [the] first time . . . in support
of stay pending appeal of preliminary injunction”), and the
majority does not dispute the point. It is true that plaintiffs
seeking a preliminary injunction bear the burden of making
“a clear showing that [they are] entitled to such relief.”
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S.
7, 22 (2008). The States met that burden, however: They
presented what is still uncontroverted evidence that an in-
junction applicable only to children born within their bor-
ders would give them less than complete relief. Accord-
ingly, it was reasonable for the District Courts to fashion
the remedies that they did, for they were “not obligated to
undertake the task of chiseling from the government’s
across-the-board [Executive Order] a different policy the
government never identified, endorsed, or defended.” J. D.
v. Azar, 925 F. 3d 1291, 1336 (CADC 2019) (per curiam).
Those proffered alternatives, moreover, are unworkable36 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
on their face. Each would require creating a two-tiered
scheme in which the Government’s recognition of some chil-
dren’s citizenship status or eligibility for federally funded
benefits would change based on whether a child resides in
one of respondent States at any given moment. That
scheme would have to operate, somehow, without imposing
an administrative burden on respondent States or disrupt-
ing their receipt of federal funds to which they are entitled.
“[T]he regular movement of the American people into and
out of different States . . . would make it difficult to sensibly
maintain such a scattershot system.” Ante, at 5 (opinion of
KAVANAUGH, J.).
Such a system would also be incompatible with federal
law. Some statutes, like those governing Medicaid and
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) bene-
fits, require States to give benefits only to applicants with
a Social Security number and to use those numbers for cer-
tain administrative purposes. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §2025(e);
42 U. S. C. §1320b–7(a)(1). States could not comply with
those laws under the Government’s alternative injunctions
because children covered by the Citizenship Order in non-
party States would still be treated as noncitizens at birth.
Thus, when some of those children later move to one of re-
spondent States, they would lack Social Security numbers.
No matter how it is done, discarding the nationwide status
quo of birthright citizenship would result in chaos.
What is more, the principle of complete relief does not re-
quire courts to award only the absolute narrowest injunc-
tion possible. To conclude otherwise would eviscerate the
“discretion and judgment” that is integral to the crafting of
injunctive relief. International Refugee Assistance Project,
582 U. S., at 579. Indeed, equitable relief “[t]raditionally
. . . has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shap-
ing its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconcil-
ing public and private needs.” Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (footnote omitted). That isCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
37
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
why the court in the majority’s nuisance hypothetical can
“order the defendant to turn her music down,” or to turn it
“off,” even though the latter is technically more burdensome
on the defendant than necessary to give the plaintiff com-
plete relief. Ante, at 16.
Accordingly, the District Courts appropriately deter-
mined that the “only one feasible option” that would give
complete relief to the States was a universal injunction.
See ibid. Clearly, the majority is asking the lower courts
themselves to explain what is patently obvious about the
Government’s proposed injunctions and any others that can
be imagined.
Inexplicably, however, the Court declares that, for the as-
sociational and individual respondents, injunctions enjoin-
ing the Government from enforcing the Citizenship Order
against them (and only them) would have sufficed. See
ante, at 17–18. In fashioning equitable relief, however,
courts must take into account “‘what is workable.’” North
Carolina v. Covington, 581 U. S. 486, 488 (2017) (per cu-
riam). Just like the injunction that the majority blesses in
the context of its nuisance-suit hypothetical, which will be-
stow a peaceful night upon the plaintiff ’s neighbors even
when the plaintiff is not herself at home, the preliminary
injunction for the associational and individual respondents
reflects what is practicable. As the Maryland District Court
found, “‘hundreds or even thousands’” of the associational
respondents’ members, who reside in all 50 States, “‘will
give birth to children in the United States over the coming
weeks and months.’” 763 F. Supp. 3d, at 746. Theoreti-
cally, it might be possible for a court to fashion an injunc-
tion that runs to each of the thousands of expectant moth-
ers in that group. But see ante, at 5 (opinion of
KAVANAUGH, J.) (“Often, it is not especially workable or
sustainable or desirable to have a patchwork scheme . . . in
which a major new federal statute or executive action . . .
applies to some people or organizations in certain States or38 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
regions, but not to others”). Yet anything less than a na-
tionwide injunction creates a risk that the Government, in-
advertently or intentionally, will enforce the Citizenship
Order against some of the plaintiffs’ children before this
Court rules definitively on the Order’s lawfulness.
A narrower injunction would necessarily task “[t]hose [re-
sponsible for] determining a baby’s citizenship status . . .
with [correctly] confirming [biological] parentage, the citi-
zenship or immigration status of both [biological] parents,
and membership in specific organizations.” Opposition to
Application for Partial Stay of Injunction in No. 24A884, p.
24. That, in turn, would “impose an enormous burden on
expecting parents, membership organizations, government
employees at all levels, and hospital staff,” increasing the
risk of mistake. Ibid. The risk of noncompliance is also
particularly stark here, where the challenged action itself
reflects an utter disregard for settled precedent, and given
the Government’s repeated insistence that it need not pro-
vide notice to individuals before their sudden deportations.
See, e.g., A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(per curiam) (slip op., at 2); Department of Homeland Secu-
rity v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 15). The majority does not identify
a narrower alternative that is both practical and mitigates
that risk.
At the very least, there is no reason to think that the Dis-
trict Court abused its discretion in deciding that only a na-
tionwide injunction could protect the plaintiffs’ fundamen-
tal rights. See Ashcroft, 542 U. S., at 664 (setting forth the
standard of review). “Crafting a preliminary injunction,”
after all, “is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often
dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the
substance of the legal issues it presents.” International Ref-
ugee Assistance Project, 582 U. S., at 579. Applying defer-
ential abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourth Circuit em-
phasized that the “[t]he district court . . . carefullyCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
39
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
explained why an injunction limited to the parties—includ-
ing organizations with hundreds of thousands of members
nationwide—would be unworkable in practice and thus fail
to provide complete relie[f] to the plaintiffs.” 2025 WL
654902, *1. The majority gives no justification for deeming
the District Court’s reasoned assessment an abuse of dis-
cretion.
D
The equities and public interest weigh decisively against
the Government. For all of the reasons discussed, the Citi-
zenship Order is patently unconstitutional. To allow the
Government to enforce it against even one newborn child is
an assault on our constitutional order and antithetical to
equity and public interest. Cf. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U. S.
700, 714–715 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“‘[A] court must
never ignore . . . circumstances underlying [equitable relief]
lest the decree be turned into an “instrument of wrong”’”).
Meanwhile, newborns subject to the Citizenship Order
will face the gravest harms imaginable. If the Order does
in fact go into effect without further intervention by the Dis-
trict Courts, children will lose, at least for the time being,
“a most precious right,” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U. S. 144, 159 (1963), and “cherished status” that “carries
with it the privilege of full participation in the affairs of our
society,” Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, 658 (1946).
Affected children also risk losing the chance to participate
in American society altogether, unless their parents have
sufficient resources to file individual suits or successfully
challenge the Citizenship Order in removal proceedings.
Indeed, the Order risks the “creation of a substantial
‘shadow population’” for covered children born in the
United States who remain here. Plyler, 457 U. S., at 218.
Without Social Security numbers and other documentation,
these children will be denied critical public services, like
SNAP and Medicaid, and lose the ability to engage fully in40 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
civic life by being born in States that have not filed a law-
suit. Worse yet, the Order threatens to render American-
born children stateless, a status “deplored in the interna-
tional community” for causing “the total destruction of the
individual’s status in organized society.” Trop v. Dulles,
356 U. S. 86, 101–102 (1958) (plurality opinion). That
threat hangs like a guillotine over this litigation.
The Order will cause chaos for the families of all affected
children too, as expecting parents scramble to understand
whether the Order will apply to them and what ramifica-
tions it will have. If allowed to take effect, the Order may
even wrench newborns from the arms of parents lawfully in
the United States, for it purports to strip citizenship from
the children of parents legally present on a temporary ba-
sis. See 90 Fed. Reg. 8449. Those newborns could face de-
portation, even as their parents remain lawfully in the
country. In light of all these consequences, there can be no
serious question over where the equities lie in these cases.
IV
The Court’s decision is nothing less than an open invita-
tion for the Government to bypass the Constitution. The
Executive Branch can now enforce policies that flout settled
law and violate countless individuals’ constitutional rights,
and the federal courts will be hamstrung to stop its actions
fully. Until the day that every affected person manages to
become party to a lawsuit and secures for himself injunctive
relief, the Government may act lawlessly indefinitely.
Not even a decision from this Court would necessarily
bind the Government to stop, completely and permanently,
its commission of unquestionably unconstitutional conduct.
The majority interprets the Judiciary Act, which defines
the equity jurisdiction for all federal courts, this Court in-
cluded, as prohibiting the issuance of universal injunctions
(unless necessary for complete relief ). What, besides eq-
uity, enables this Court to order the Government to ceaseCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
41
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
completely the enforcement of illegal policies? The majority
does not say. So even if this Court later rules that the Cit-
izenship Order is unlawful, we may nevertheless lack the
power to enjoin enforcement as to anyone not formally a
party before the Court. In a case where the Government is
acting in open defiance of the Constitution, federal law, and
this Court’s holdings, it is naive to believe the Government
will treat this Court’s opinions on those policies as “de facto”
universal injunctions absent an express order directing to-
tal nonenforcement. Ante, at 6 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).
Indeed, at oral argument, the Government refused to
commit to obeying any court order issued by a Federal
Court of Appeals holding the Citizenship Order unlawful
(except with respect to the plaintiffs in the suit), even
within the relevant Circuit. Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–63. To the
extent the Government cannot commit to compliance with
Court of Appeals decisions in those Circuits, it offers no
principled reason why it would treat the opinions of this
Court any differently nationwide. Thus, by stripping even
itself of the ability to issue universal injunctions, the Court
diminishes its role as “the ultimate decider of the interim
[and permanent] legal status of major new federal statutes
and executive actions.” Ante, at 3 (opinion of KAVANAUGH,
J.).
There is a serious question, moreover, whether this Court
will ever get the chance to rule on the constitutionality of a
policy like the Citizenship Order. Contra, ante, at 6 (opin-
ion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (“[T]he losing parties in the courts of
appeals will regularly come to this Court in matters involv-
ing major new federal statutes and executive actions”). In
the ordinary course, parties who prevail in the lower courts
generally cannot seek review from this Court, likely leaving
it up to the Government’s discretion whether a petition will42 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
be filed here.10 These cases prove the point: Every court to
consider the Citizenship Order’s merits has found that it is
unconstitutional in preliminary rulings. Because respond-
ents prevailed on the merits and received universal injunc-
tions, they have no reason to file an appeal. The Govern-
ment has no incentive to file a petition here either, because
the outcome of such an appeal would be preordained. The
Government recognizes as much, which is why its emer-
gency applications challenged only the scope of the prelim-
inary injunctions.
Even accepting that this Court will get the opportunity to
“ac[t] as the ultimate decider” of patently unlawful policies,
ante, at 3 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.), and that the Execu-
tive Branch will treat this Court’s opinions as de facto uni-
versal injunctions,11 it is still necessary for the lower courts
to have the equitable authority to issue universal injunc-
tions, too. As JUSTICE KAVANAUGH notes, it can take, at a
minimum, “weeks” for an application concerning a major
——————
10 On rare occasion, this Court has permitted a party who prevailed in
the lower courts nonetheless to obtain this Court’s review of a legal ques-
tion. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 698 (2011) (allowing a
government official who prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity to
challenge an underlying adverse constitutional ruling). Those exceptions
have no relevance here, however, because there is no adverse determina-
tion for respondents to challenge.
11 The majority insists that the constitutionality of the Citizenship Or-
der will come before this Court eventually and that, when it does, the
Government will obey this Court’s resulting opinion with respect to all
newborn children. Ante, at 25, n. 18. Why? The majority is sure that
the Government will honor its oral-argument promises to “‘seek cert’”
when it “‘lose[s] one of ’” its pending appeals and to “respect both the
judgments and opinions of this Court.” Ibid. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg.
50). The majority’s certainty that the Government will keep its word is
nothing short of a leap of faith, given that the Government has adopted
a plainly unconstitutional policy in defiance of this Court’s precedent and
then gamed the system to stymie this Court’s consideration of the policy’s
merits. In any event, the Government’s promise is cold comfort to the
many children whose parents do not file a lawsuit and whose citizenship
status remains in flux pending this Court’s review.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
43
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
new policy to reach this Court. Ibid. In the interim, the
Government may feel free to execute illegal policies against
nonparties and cause immeasurable harm that this Court
may never be able to remedy. Indeed, in these cases, there
is a serious risk the Government will seek to deport new-
borns whose parents have not filed suit if all the injunctions
are narrowed on remand. That unconscionable result only
underscores why it is necessary, in some cases, for lower
courts to issue universal injunctions.
Fortunately, in the rubble of its assault on equity juris-
diction, the majority leaves untouched one important tool
to provide broad relief to individuals subject to lawless Gov-
ernment conduct: Rule 23(b)(2) class actions for injunctive
relief. That mechanism may provide some relief, but it is
not a perfect substitute for a universal injunction. First, a
named plaintiff must incur the higher cost of pursuing class
relief, which will involve, at a minimum, overcoming the
hurdle of class certification. “‘[D]emonstrating th[e] pre-
requisites’” of numerosity, commonality and typicality and
the adequacy of the named plaintiff to represent the class
“‘is difficult and time consuming and has been getting
harder as a result of recent court decisions and federal leg-
islation.’” Chicago v. Barr, 961 F. 3d 882, 917 (CA7 2020)
(quoting A. Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1065, 1096 (2018); alterations in original).
“‘Courts have heightened the evidentiary standard for class
certification’” as well, “‘requiring hearings and sometimes
significant amounts of evidence on the merits of the class
before certifying the class.’” 961 F. 3d, at 917. In recent
years, moreover, “‘courts have started to deny class certifi-
cation if they think there has been a flaw in class defini-
tion,’” sometimes “‘without first allowing the plaintiffs to
amend that definition in response to the court’s concerns.’”
Ibid. What is more, “‘defendants can seek interlocutory re-
view of a court’s decision to certify a class, adding further
delay and expense to the certification process.’” Ibid.44 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Hence why some “‘describ[e] the class certification process
as a “drawn-out procedural bog,” which comes with signifi-
cant expense and delay for the would be class member.’”
Ibid. Indeed, at oral argument, the Government refused to
concede that a class could be certified to challenge the Citi-
zenship Order and promised to invoke Rule 23’s barriers to
stop it. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31–32.
Nevertheless, the parents of children covered by the Cit-
izenship Order would be well advised to file promptly class-
action suits and to request temporary injunctive relief for
the putative class pending class certification. See
A. A. R. P., 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Califano, 442
U. S., at 701–703; see also ante, at 1–2 (opinion of
KAVANAUGH, J.) (recognizing that lower courts, in some cir-
cumstances, can “award preliminary classwide relief that
may . . . be statewide, regionwide, or even nationwide”).
For suits challenging policies as blatantly unlawful and
harmful as the Citizenship Order, moreover, lower courts
would be wise to act swiftly on such requests for relief and
to adjudicate the cases as quickly as they can so as to enable
this Court’s prompt review.
* * *
The rule of law is not a given in this Nation, nor any
other. It is a precept of our democracy that will endure only
if those brave enough in every branch fight for its survival.
Today, the Court abdicates its vital role in that effort. With
the stroke of a pen, the President has made a “solemn mock-
ery” of our Constitution. Peters, 5 Cranch, at 136. Rather
than stand firm, the Court gives way. Because such com-
plicity should know no place in our system of law, I dissent.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
JACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24A884
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. CASA, INC., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A885
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
_________________
No. 24A886
_________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.
I agree with every word of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s dissent.
I write separately to emphasize a key conceptual point: The
Court’s decision to permit the Executive to violate the Con-
stitution with respect to anyone who has not yet sued is an
existential threat to the rule of law.
It is important to recognize that the Executive’s bid to
vanquish so-called “universal injunctions” is, at bottom, a
request for this Court’s permission to engage in unlawful
behavior. When the Government says “do not allow the
lower courts to enjoin executive action universally as a rem-
edy for unconstitutional conduct,” what it is actually saying2 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
is that the Executive wants to continue doing something
that a court has determined violates the Constitution—
please allow this. That is some solicitation. With its ruling
today, the majority largely grants the Government’s wish.
But, in my view, if this country is going to persist as a Na-
tion of laws and not men, the Judiciary has no choice but to
deny it.
Stated simply, what it means to have a system of govern-
ment that is bounded by law is that everyone is constrained
by the law, no exceptions. And for that to actually happen,
courts must have the power to order everyone (including the
Executive) to follow the law—full stop. To conclude other-
wise is to endorse the creation of a zone of lawlessness
within which the Executive has the prerogative to take or
leave the law as it wishes, and where individuals who would
otherwise be entitled to the law’s protection become subject
to the Executive’s whims instead.
The majority cannot deny that our Constitution was de-
signed to split the powers of a monarch between the govern-
ing branches to protect the People. Nor is it debatable that
the role of the Judiciary in our constitutional scheme is to
ensure fidelity to law. But these core values are strangely
absent from today’s decision. Focusing on inapt compari-
sons to impotent English tribunals, the majority ignores the
Judiciary’s foundational duty to uphold the Constitution
and laws of the United States. The majority’s ruling thus
not only diverges from first principles, it is also profoundly
dangerous, since it gives the Executive the go-ahead to
sometimes wield the kind of unchecked, arbitrary power the
Founders crafted our Constitution to eradicate. The very
institution our founding charter charges with the duty to
ensure universal adherence to the law now requires judges
to shrug and turn their backs to intermittent lawlessness.
With deep disillusionment, I dissent.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
3
JACKSON, J., dissenting
I
To hear the majority tell it, this suit raises a mind-numb-
ingly technical query: Are universal injunctions “suffi-
ciently ‘analogous’ to the relief issued ‘by the High Court of
Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act’”
to fall within the equitable authority Congress granted fed-
eral courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789? Ante, at 6. But
that legalese is a smokescreen. It obscures a far more basic
question of enormous legal and practical significance: May
a federal court in the United States of America order the
Executive to follow the law?
A
To ask this question is to answer it. In a constitutional
Republic such as ours, a federal court has the power to or-
der the Executive to follow the law—and it must. It is axi-
omatic that the Constitution of the United States and the
statutes that the People’s representatives have enacted
govern in our system of government. Thus, everyone, from
the President on down, is bound by law. By duty and na-
ture, federal courts say what the law is (if there is a genuine
dispute), and require those who are subject to the law to
conform their behavior to what the law requires. This is
the essence of the rule of law.
Do not take my word for it. Venerated figures in our Na-
tion’s history have repeatedly emphasized that “[t]he es-
sence of our free Government is ‘leave to live by no man’s
leave, underneath the law’—to be governed by those imper-
sonal forces which we call law.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 654 (1952) (R. Jackson, J., con-
curring). “Our Government is fashioned to fulfill this con-
cept so far as humanly possible.” Id., at 654–655. Put dif-
ferently, the United States of America has “‘“a government
of laws and not of men.”’” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 23
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting United States4 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 307 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in judgment)); see also, e.g., Mass. Const., pt. 1,
Art. XXX (1780), in 3 Federal and State Constitutions 1893
(F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (J. Adams); Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court);
United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.,
for the Court).
That familiar adage is more than just mere “‘rhetorical
flourish.’” Cooper, 358 U. S., at 23. It is “‘the rejection in
positive terms of rule by fiat, whether by the fiat of govern-
mental or private power.’” Ibid. Indeed, “constitutionalism
has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on govern-
ment; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is
despotic government, the government of will instead of
law.” C. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern
21–22 (rev. ed. 1947); see also id., at 21 (“All constitutional
government is by definition limited government”).
Those who birthed our Nation limited the power of gov-
ernment to preserve freedom. As they knew all too well,
“constant experience shows us that every man invested
with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as
far as it will go.” Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, in 38
Great Books of the Western World 69 (T. Nugent transl., R.
Hutchins ed. 1952). But the Founders reasoned that the
vice of human ambition could be channeled to prevent the
country from devolving into despotism—ambition could be
“made to counteract ambition.” The Federalist No. 51, p.
322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). If there were, say,
a Constitution that divided power across institutions “in
such a manner as that each may be a check on the other,”
then it could be possible to establish Government by and for
the People and thus stave off autocracy. Ibid.; see also My-
ers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote effi-
ciency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power”).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
5
JACKSON, J., dissenting
Through such separated institutions, power checks power.
See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, at 69. Our system of
institutional checks thus exists for a reason: so that “the
private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over
the public rights.” The Federalist No. 51, at 322.
B
The distribution of power between the Judiciary and the
Executive is of particular importance to the operation of a
society governed by law. Made up of “‘free, impartial, and
independent’” judges and justices, the Judiciary checks the
political branches of Government by explaining what the
law is and “securing obedience” with it. Mine Workers, 330
U. S., at 308, 312 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); see Marbury,
1 Cranch, at 177. The federal courts were thus established
“not only to decide upon the controverted rights of the citi-
zens as against each other, but also upon rights in contro-
versy between them and the government.” United States v.
Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 220 (1882).
Quite unlike a rule-of-kings governing system, in a rule-
of-law regime, nearly “[e]very act of government may be
challenged by an appeal to law.” Cooper, 358 U. S., at 23
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.). In this country, the Executive
does not stand above or outside of the law. Consequently,
when courts are called upon to adjudicate the lawfulness of
the actions of the other branches of Government, the Judi-
ciary plays “an essential part of the democratic process.”
Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 312. Were it otherwise—were
courts unable or unwilling to command the Government to
follow the law—they would “sanctio[n] a tyranny” that has
no place in a country committed to “well-regulated liberty
and the protection of personal rights.” Lee, 106 U. S., at
221. It is law—and “‘Law alone’”—that “‘saves a society
from being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute
power however disguised.’” Cooper, 358 U. S., at 23 (quot-
ing Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 308).6 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
The power to compel the Executive to follow the law is
particularly vital where the relevant law is the Constitu-
tion. When the Executive transgresses an Act of Congress,
there are mechanisms through which Congress can assert
its check against the Executive unilaterally—such as, for
example, asserting the power of the purse. See K. Stith,
Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L. J. 1343, 1360
(1988) (describing Congress’s ability to “regulat[e] execu-
tive branch activities by limitations on appropriations”).
But when the Executive violates the Constitution, the only
recourse is the courts. Eliminate that check, and our gov-
ernment ceases to be one of “limited powers.” Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991). After all, a limit that
“do[es] not confine the perso[n] on whom [it is] imposed” is
no limit at all. Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 176.1
II
With that background, we can now turn to this suit and
——————
1 These foundational separation-of-powers principles are, of course, the
doctrinal underpinnings of the observations I make in Parts II and III,
infra. If my point is “difficult to pin down,” ante, at 22, that could be due
to the majority’s myopic initial framing—it casts today’s emergency ap-
plications as being solely about the scope of judicial authority, while ig-
noring (or forgetting) the concomitant expansion of executive power that
results when the equitable remedial power of judges is needlessly re-
stricted. Or perhaps the culprit is the majority’s threshold decision to
rest its holding solely on the Judiciary Act, ante, at 5, n. 4, thereby facil-
itating its convenient sidestepping of the startling constitutional impli-
cations that follow from blanket limitations on the Judiciary’s response
to the Executive’s lawlessness. Whatever the source of the majority’s
confusion, there is no question that its statutory holding restricting the
traditional equitable power of federal courts to craft a suitable remedy
for established (or likely) constitutional violations has significant rami-
fications for the separation of powers and for constitutional rights more
broadly. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR thoroughly explains why restricting judges
in this manner is legally and historically unfounded. My goal is to high-
light the myriad ways in which the majority’s newly minted no-univer-
sal-injunctions limitation also subverts core constitutional norms and is
fundamentally incompatible with the rule of law.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
7
JACKSON, J., dissenting
focus on the ways in which the majority’s ruling under-
mines our constitutional system. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has
laid out the relevant facts, see ante, at 9–13 (dissenting
opinion), and I will not repeat what she has said. It suffices
for my purposes to reiterate that, before these applications
arrived here, three District Courts had concluded that Ex-
ecutive Order No. 14160—which attempts to alter the Con-
stitution’s express conferral of citizenship on all who are
born in this Nation, Amdt. 14, §1—likely violates the Con-
stitution. Those courts each thus enjoined the Executive
from enforcing that order anywhere, against anyone. See
763 F. Supp. 3d 723 (Md. 2025), appeal pending, No. 25–
1153 (CA4); 765 F. Supp. 3d 1142 (WD Wash. 2025), appeal
pending, No. 25–807 (CA9); Doe v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d
266 (Mass. 2025), appeal pending, No. 25–1170 (CA1).
Three Courts of Appeals then declined to upset these in-
junctions during the pendency of the Government’s appeals.
See 2025 WL 654902 (CA4, Feb. 28, 2025); 2025 WL 553485
(CA9, Feb. 19, 2025); 131 F. 4th 27 (CA1 2025).
The majority now does what none of the lower courts that
have considered Executive Order No. 14160 would do: It al-
lows the Executive’s constitutionally dubious mandate to go
into effect with respect to anyone who is not already a plain-
tiff in one of the existing legal actions. Notably, the Court
has not determined that any of the lower courts were wrong
about their conclusion that the executive order likely vio-
lates the Constitution—the Executive has not asked us to
rule on the lawfulness of Executive Order No. 14160. But
the majority allows the Executive to implement this order
(which lower courts have so far uniformly declared likely
unconstitutional) nonetheless.
Given the critical role of the Judiciary in maintaining the
rule of law, see Part I, supra, it is odd, to say the least, that
the Court would grant the Executive’s wish to be freed from
the constraints of law by prohibiting district courts from or-
dering complete compliance with the Constitution. But the8 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
majority goes there. It holds that, even assuming that Ex-
ecutive Order No. 14160 violates the Constitution, federal
courts lack the power to prevent the Executive from contin-
uing to implement that unconstitutional directive.
As I understand the concern, in this clash over the respec-
tive powers of two coordinate branches of Government, the
majority sees a power grab—but not by a presumably law-
less Executive choosing to act in a manner that flouts the
plain text of the Constitution. Instead, to the majority, the
power-hungry actors are . . . (wait for it) . . . the district
courts. See ante, at 1 (admonishing district courts for dar-
ing to “asser[t] the power” to order the Executive to follow
the law universally). In the majority’s view, federal courts
only have the power to “afford the plaintiff complete relief ”
in the cases brought before them; they can do nothing more.
Ante, at 16. And the majority thinks a so-called universal
injunction—that is, a court order requiring the Executive to
follow the law across the board and not just with respect to
the plaintiff—“grant[s] relief to nonparties.” See ante, at 6–
8. Therefore, the majority reasons, issuing such orders ex-
ceeds district courts’ authority. See ante, at 21.
So many questions arise.2 The majority’s analysis is fully
——————
2 Although I will not spend much space discussing it here, the major-
ity’s primary premise—that universal injunctions “grant relief to non-
parties”—is suspect. When a court issues an injunction (universal or
otherwise), it does so via an order that governs the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(d). That order
provides the plaintiff with relief: If the plaintiff believes that the defend-
ant has violated the court’s order, she may come back to court, injunction
in hand, and demand enforcement or compensation through the mecha-
nism of civil contempt. See Longshoremen v. Philadelphia Marine Trade
Assn., 389 U. S. 64, 75 (1967) (recognizing that an “injunction” is “an eq-
uitable decree compelling obedience under the threat of contempt”). As
the majority recognizes, nonparties may benefit from an injunction a
court issues in a plaintiff ’s case. See ante, at 16. But that does not mean
those incidental beneficiaries have received relief—“the injunction’s pro-Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
9
JACKSON, J., dissenting
interrogated, and countered, in JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s dis-
sent. My objective is to expose the core conceptual fallacy
underlying the majority’s reasoning, which, to me, also
tends to demonstrate why, and how, today’s ruling threat-
ens the rule of law.
The pillar upon which today’s ruling rests is the major-
ity’s contention that the remedial power of the federal
courts is limited to granting “complete relief ” to the parties.
Ante, at 15–16. And the majority’s sole basis for that prop-
——————
tection” (i.e., the ability to seek contempt) “extends only to the suing
plaintiff.” Ante, at 17.
An injunction prohibiting the Executive from acting unlawfully oper-
ates precisely the same way. Such an injunction may benefit nonparties
as a practical matter—but only the named plaintiffs have the right to
return to the issuing court and seek contempt, if the Executive fails to
comply. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 444–
445 (1911) (“Proceedings for civil contempt are between the original par-
ties”); Buckeye Coal & R. Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 269 U. S. 42, 48–
49 (1925) (holding that a nonparty injured by the defendant’s noncompli-
ance with an injunction could not enforce the injunction); cf. Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 750 (1975) (“[A] consent
decree is not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those
who are not parties to it even though they were intended to be benefited
by it”). So, the majority’s concern that universal injunctions inappropri-
ately grant “relief ” to nonparties is incorrect. Nonparties may benefit
from an injunction, but only the plaintiff gets relief.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 is not to the contrary. Contra, ante,
at 15, n. 11. At most, that rule and the cases the majority cites suggest
that, in certain narrow circumstances, a nonparty for whose benefit an
injunction was issued may be able to go to the issuing court and seek
contempt. But “the precise contours of Rule 71 . . . remain unclear,”
Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 995 F. 2d 280, 287–288 (CADC 1993),
and courts have largely recognized that, to the extent nonparty enforce-
ment of an injunction is available, the nonparty must stand in a close
relationship to the plaintiff or have been specifically named in the in-
junction. See United States v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers, 341 F. 2d 1003, 1008 (CA2 1965) (nonparty could not enforce
injunction where it was “not . . . named in the judgment” even though it
was “indirectly or economically benefited by the decree”).10 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
osition is the practice of the High Court of Chancery in Eng-
land. Ante, at 6–7. But this cramped characterization of
the Judiciary’s function is highly questionable when it
comes to suits against the Executive. That is, even if the
majority is correct that courts in England at the time of the
founding were so limited—and I have my doubts, see ante,
at 18–20 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting)—why would courts in
our constitutional system be limited in the same way?
The Founders of the United States of America squarely
rejected a governing system in which the King ruled all, and
all others, including the courts, were his subordinates. In
our Constitution-centered system, the People are the rulers
and we have the rule of law. So, it makes little sense to look
to the relationship between English courts and the King for
guidance on the power of our Nation’s Judiciary vis-à-vis its
Executive. See The Federalist No. 69, at 416 (A. Hamilton)
(explaining how the President differs from the King, includ-
ing because “[t]he person of the King of Great Britain is sa-
cred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to
which he is amenable”). Indeed, it is precisely because the
law constrains the Government in our system that the Ju-
diciary’s assignment is so broad, per the Constitution. Fed-
eral courts entertain suits against the Government claim-
ing constitutional violations. Thus, the function of the
courts—both in theory and in practice—necessarily in-
cludes announcing what the law requires in such suits for
the benefit of all who are protected by the Constitution, not
merely doling out relief to injured private parties.
Put differently, the majority views the Judiciary’s power
through an aperture that is much too small, leading it to
think that the only function of our courts is to provide “com-
plete relief ” to private parties. Sure, federal courts do that,
and they do it well. But they also diligently maintain the
rule of law itself. When it comes to upholding the law, fed-
eral courts ensure that all comers—i.e., everyone to whomCite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
11
JACKSON, J., dissenting
the law applies and over whom the court has personal ju-
risdiction (including and perhaps especially the Execu-
tive)—know what the law is and, most important, follow it.3
III
Still, upon reading the Court’s opinion, the majority’s
foundational mistake in mischaracterizing the true scope
and nature of a federal court’s power might seem only mar-
ginally impactful. Indeed, one might wonder: Why all the
fuss? After all, the majority recognizes that district courts
can still issue universal injunctions in some circumstances.
See ante, at 16–18. It even acknowledges that the lower
——————
3 No one is saying that the reasoning of a district court’s opinion, on its
own, “has the legal force of a judgment,” ante, at 22; of course it does not.
The real issue today’s applications raise is whether district-court opin-
ions are entitled to respect while litigation over the lawfulness of the de-
fendant’s conduct is ongoing. As I have explained, the majority’s key
move is to start by assuming that the remedial power of federal courts is
quite narrow (i.e., it is only appropriately exercised to grant “complete
relief ” to the parties). Ante, at 5–11, 16. The majority forgets (or ignores)
that federal courts also make pronouncements of law and issue orders
compelling compliance if violations are identified. Then, having zeroed
in on solely the courts’ plaintiff-specific-remedies function, the majority
unsurprisingly insists that a district court cannot respond to the Execu-
tive’s decision to violate the law universally by issuing an order compel-
ling universal cessation of the Executive’s unlawful behavior. This kind
of broad injunction is merely one tool in a judge’s kit of remedial op-
tions—one that is directly responsive to the court’s duty to uphold the
law and the Executive’s decision to consciously violate it—and it is no
more or less binding than any of the district court’s other determinations.
So, rather than disdainfully securing permission to disregard the district
court’s opinion and continue engaging in unlawful conduct vis-à-vis any-
one who is not the plaintiff, an enjoined Executive that believes the dis-
trict court was wrong to conclude that its behavior is unlawful has a rule-
of-law-affirming response at the ready: It can seek expedited review of
the merits on appeal. District courts themselves also have the flexibility
to stay their injunctions pending appeal, if that is requested and the cir-
cumstances demand it. But rather than permit lower courts to adapt
their remedies to the particulars of a given case, the majority today ties
judges’ hands, requiring them to acquiesce to executive lawlessness in
every situation.12 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
courts may reimpose the same universal injunctions at is-
sue in these cases, if the courts find on remand that doing
so is necessary to provide complete relief to the named
plaintiffs. See ante, at 19. From the standpoint of out-
comes, that’s all welcome news. But, as I explain below,
from the perspective of constitutional theory and actual
practice, disaster looms.
What I mean by this is that our rights-based legal system
can only function properly if the Executive, and everyone
else, is always bound by law. Today’s decision is a seismic
shock to that foundational norm. Allowing the Executive to
violate the law at its prerogative with respect to anyone
who has not yet sued carves out a huge exception—a gash
in the basic tenets of our founding charter that could turn
out to be a mortal wound. What is more, to me, requiring
courts themselves to provide the dagger (by giving their im-
primatur to the Executive Branch’s intermittent lawless-
ness) makes a mockery of the Judiciary’s solemn duty to
safeguard the rule of law.
A
Do remember: The Executive has not asked this Court to
determine whether Executive Order No. 14160 complies
with the Constitution. Rather, it has come to us seeking
the right to continue enforcing that order regardless—i.e.,
even though six courts have now said the order is likely un-
constitutional. What the Executive wants, in effect, is for
this Court to bless and facilitate its desire to operate in two
different zones moving forward: one in which it is required
to follow the law (because a particular plaintiff has secured
a personal injunction prohibiting its unlawful conduct), and
another in which it can choose to violate the law with re-
spect to certain people (those who have yet to sue).
In the first zone, law reigns. For the named plaintiffs in
the suits before us, for example, the lower courts’ determi-Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
13
JACKSON, J., dissenting
nation that Executive Order No. 14160 is likely unconstitu-
tional and cannot be implemented has teeth. Per the courts’
orders, the Executive is prohibited from denying citizenship
to the offspring of the named plaintiffs. See ante, at 26
(leaving the injunctions in place to the extent “necessary to
provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to
sue”). Within this zone, the courts’ rule of decision—that
Executive Order No. 14160 is likely unconstitutional—ap-
plies.
But with its ruling today, the majority endorses the crea-
tion of a second zone—one in which that rule of decision has
no effect. In this zone, which is populated by those who lack
the wherewithal or ability to go to court, all bets are off.
There is no court-issued mandate requiring the Executive
to honor birthright citizenship in compliance with the Con-
stitution, so the people within this zone are left to the pre-
rogatives of the Executive as to whether their constitutional
rights will be respected. It does not matter what six federal
courts have said about Executive Order No. 14160; those
courts are powerless to make the Executive stop enforcing
that order altogether. In effect, then, that powerlessness
creates a void that renders the Constitution’s constraints
irrelevant to the Executive’s actions. Of course, the Execu-
tive might choose to follow the law in this zone as well—but
that is left to its discretion. And the Solicitor General has
now confirmed that, in the absence of a personal injunction
secured by a particular plaintiff, this Executive’s view is
that compliance with lower court rulings on matters of con-
stitutional significance is optional.4
——————
4 The Solicitor General said that quiet part out loud by baldly asserting
that the Executive reserves the right to defy Circuit precedent. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 33–34, 60–61. Although he further suggested that the admin-
istration would abide by precedent from this Court in future similar
cases, id., at 35, 63, even that seems to be a matter of prerogative, as
there is no inherent limit to the limited-scope-of-authority logic that un-
derlies today’s holding, see ante, at 41 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). The14 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
I am not the first to observe that a legal system that op-
erates on two different tracks (one of which grants to the
Executive the prerogative to disregard the law) is anath-
ema to the rule of law.5 Thus, the law-free zone that results
from this Court’s near elimination of universal injunctions
is not an unfamiliar archetype. Also eerily echoing history’s
horrors is the fact that today’s prerogative zone is unlikely
to impact the public in a randomly distributed manner.
Those in the good graces of the Executive have nothing to
fear; the new prerogative that the Executive has to act un-
lawfully will not be exercised with respect to them. Those
who accede to the Executive’s demands, too, will be in the
clear. The wealthy and the well connected will have little
difficulty securing legal representation, going to court, and
obtaining injunctive relief in their own name if the Execu-
tive violates their rights.
Consequently, the zone of lawlessness the majority has
now authorized will disproportionately impact the poor, the
——————
Executive’s less-than-sterling record of compliance with Supreme Court
rulings to date casts further doubt on this compliance claim; as JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR has explained, the Executive Order at issue here seems to
squarely violate at least one—and perhaps five—of our bedrock prece-
dents. See ante, at 7–9 (dissenting opinion).
5 See E. Fraenkel, The Dual State, pp. xiii, 3, 71 (1941) (describing the
way in which the creation of a “Prerogative State” where the Executive
“exercises unlimited arbitrariness . . . unchecked by any legal guaran-
tees” is incompatible with the rule of law); see also J. Locke, Second Trea-
tise of Civil Government 13 (J. Gough ed. 1948) (“[F]reedom of men under
government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society . . . and not to be subject to the . . . arbitrary will of another
man”); The Federalist No. 26, p. 169 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)
(contrasting the monarch’s “prerogative” with the emergence of “lib-
erty”); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 295 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“[P]rotection of the individual . . . from the arbitrary or capri-
cious exercise of power [is] an essential of free government”); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 641 (1952) (R. Jackson, J.,
concurring) (observing that our Constitution—which embodies the rule
of law—does not grant to the Executive the “prerogative exercised by
George III”).Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
15
JACKSON, J., dissenting
uneducated, and the unpopular—i.e., those who may not
have the wherewithal to lawyer up, and will all too often
find themselves beholden to the Executive’s whims. This is
yet another crack in the foundation of the rule of law, which
requires “equality and justice in its application.” Papa-
christou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 171 (1972). In the
end, though, everyone will be affected, because it is law’s
evenhanded application—“to minorities as well as majori-
ties, to the poor as well as the rich”—that “holds society to-
gether.” Ibid.
The majority “skips over” these consequences. Ante, at
23. No one denies that the power of federal courts is lim-
ited—both by the Constitution and by Congress. But the
majority seems to forget (or ignores) that the Constitution
and Congress also limit the power of the Executive. In ad-
dition, it is indisputable that the Executive’s power to lev-
erage physical force in a manner that directly threatens to
deprive people of life, liberty, or property creates uniquely
harmful risks when unconstrained by law. But the majority
today roots its holding in a purported statutory limitation,
not a constitutional one. Ante, at 5, n. 4. And, as I have
explained, our Constitution gives federal courts the author-
ity to order the Executive to stop acting unlawfully. See
Part I, supra. To the extent Congress has attempted to
strip federal courts of that power via the Judiciary Act (and,
to be clear, I do not think it has, for the reasons JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR discusses, see ante, at 23–31), it is powerless
to do so.
The bottom line is this: If courts do not have the authority
to require the Executive to adhere to law universally, a
dual-track system develops in which courts are ousted as
guardians in some situations and compliance with law
sometimes becomes a matter of executive prerogative. But
“[t]here can be no free society without law administered
through an independent judiciary.” Mine Workers, 330
U. S., at 312 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). “If one man”—16 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
even a very important man, and even a democratically
elected man—“can be allowed to determine for himself what
is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyr-
anny.” Ibid.
B
This leads me to another potentially destructive aspect of
today’s decision—the Court’s dismissive treatment of the
solemn duties and responsibilities of the lower courts.
Sworn judicial officers must now put on blinders and take
a see-no-evil stance with respect to harmful executive con-
duct, even though those same officials have already an-
nounced that such conduct is likely unconstitutional. Yes,
certain named plaintiffs have brought particular lawsuits
seeking protection of their legal rights. But their claim is
that Executive Order No. 14160 violates the Constitution.
If the court agrees with them, why on Earth must it permit
that unconstitutional government action to take effect at
all?
I have already explained why the majority’s answer—be-
cause the court is powerless to do anything but give “com-
plete relief ” to those parties—is wrong in terms of the ac-
tual scope of federal courts’ authority. See Part I, supra. I
now observe that this response also erroneously suggests
that a court does something wrongful when it imposes a
universal injunction in a single plaintiff ’s lawsuit—akin to
giving a windfall to those who do not deserve the law’s pro-
tection because they have not sued. Ante, at 8–9, 12–15.
This way of conceptualizing universal injunctions mistakes
that remedy for the unearned spoils of particular adversar-
ial engagements, rather than a necessary tool employed to
defend the Constitution by reinforcing pre-existing rights.
Here is what I mean. Our Constitution indisputably con-Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
17
JACKSON, J., dissenting
fers individual rights that operate as unequivocal protec-
tions against government action.6 Thus, a constrained Ex-
ecutive—i.e., one who is bound by the Constitution not to
violate people’s rights—is a public benefit, guaranteed to all
from the start, without regard to the nature or existence of
any particular enforcement action.7 Properly understood,
then, when the Executive violates those pre-existing rights
in a nonparticularized manner, a universal injunction
merely restores what the People were always owed; that
remedy does not improperly distribute an unearned benefit
to those who did not have the temerity to secure it for them-
selves by filing a lawsuit.
Or consider it the other way: When a court is prevented
from enjoining the Executive universally after the Execu-
tive establishes a universal practice of stripping people’s
constitutional rights, anyone who is entitled to the Consti-
tution’s protection but will instead be subjected to the Ex-
ecutive’s whims is improperly divested of their inheritance.
The Constitution is flipped on its head, for its promises are
essentially nullified.8 So, rather than having a governing
——————
6 See, e.g., Amdt. 1 (prohibiting the government from preventing the
“free exercise” of religion or “abridging the freedom of speech”); Amdt. 2
(prohibiting the government from infringing on the right “to keep and
bear Arms”); Amdt. 4 (prohibiting the government from conducting “un-
reasonable searches and seizures”); Amdt. 5 (prohibiting the government
from depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law”).
7 In this way of framing the issue, nonparties are more than mere “in-
cidental” beneficiaries of universal injunctions that require the Execu-
tive to respect constitutional rights. See n. 2, supra. Rather, the very
concept of constitutional rights makes the People intended beneficiaries
of the constraints that the Constitution imposes on executive action.
8 Again, the law binds the Executive from the outset in our constitu-
tional scheme, for the benefit of all. See Part I, supra. Thus, a lawsuit
is merely the vehicle that invokes the Judiciary’s power to check the Ex-
ecutive by enforcing the law. The topsy-turvy scheme the majority cre-
ates today gets those well-established norms exactly backward: The law
disappears as an initial constraint on the Executive, and apparently only18 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
system characterized by protected rights, the default be-
comes an Executive that can do whatever it wants to whom-
ever it wants, unless and until each affected individual af-
firmatively invokes the law’s protection.
A concrete example helps to illustrate why this turnabout
undermines the rule of law. Imagine an Executive who is-
sues a blanket order that is blatantly unconstitutional—de-
manding, say, that any and all of its political foes be sum-
marily and indefinitely incarcerated in a prison outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, without any hearing or
chance to be heard in court. Shortly after learning of this
edict, one such political rival rushes into court with his law-
yer, claims the Executive’s order violates the Constitution,
and secures an injunction that prohibits the Executive from
enforcing that unconstitutional mandate. The upshot of to-
day’s decision is that, despite that rival’s success in per-
suading a judge of the unconstitutional nature of the Exec-
utive’s proclamation, the court’s ruling and injunction can
only require the Executive to shelve any no-process incar-
ceration plan that targets that particular individual (the
named plaintiff ); the Executive can keep right on rounding
up its other foes, despite the court’s clear and unequivocal
pronouncement that the executive order is unlawful.
The majority today says that, unless and until the other
political rivals seek and secure their own personal injunc-
tions, the Executive can carry on acting unconstitutionally
with respect to each of them, as if the Constitution’s due
process requirement does not exist. For those who get to
court in time, their right not to be indefinitely imprisoned
without due process will be protected. But if they are una-
ble to sue or get to the courthouse too late, the majority
says, oh well, there is nothing to be done, despite the fact
——————
exists if a particular plaintiff files a particular lawsuit in a particular
court, claiming his (particular) entitlement.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
19
JACKSON, J., dissenting
that their detention without due process is plainly prohib-
ited by law.
A Martian arriving here from another planet would see
these circumstances and surely wonder: “what good is the
Constitution, then?” What, really, is this system for protect-
ing people’s rights if it amounts to this—placing the onus
on the victims to invoke the law’s protection, and rendering
the very institution that has the singular function of ensur-
ing compliance with the Constitution powerless to prevent
the Government from violating it? “Those things Ameri-
cans call constitutional rights seem hardly worth the paper
they are written on!”
These observations are indictments, especially for a Na-
tion that prides itself on being fair and free. But, after to-
day, that is where we are. What the majority has done is
allow the Executive to nullify the statutory and constitu-
tional rights of the uncounseled, the underresourced, and
the unwary, by prohibiting the lower courts from ordering
the Executive to follow the law across the board. Moreover,
officers who have sworn an oath to uphold the law are now
required to allow the Executive to blatantly violate it. Fed-
eral judges pledge to support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domes-
tic. 5 U. S. C. §3331. They do not agree to permit unconsti-
tutional behavior by the Executive (or anyone else). But the
majority forgets (or ignores) this duty, eagerly imposing a
limit on the power of courts that, in essence, prevents
judges from doing what their oaths require.9
——————
9 The majority highlights a number of policy concerns that some say
warrant restriction of the universal-injunction remedy. Ante, at 20–21.
In my view, those downsides pale in comparison to the consequences of
forcing federal courts to acquiesce to executive lawlessness. Moreover,
and in any event, the various practical problems critics have identified
are largely overblown. For example, while many accuse universal in-
junctions of preventing percolation, the facts of this very suit demon-
strate otherwise: Three different District Courts each considered the
merits of Executive Order No. 14160, and appeals are now pending in20 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
I view the demise of the notion that a federal judge can
order the Executive to adhere to the Constitution—full
stop—as a sad day for America. The majority’s unpersua-
sive effort to justify this result makes it sadder still. It is
the responsibility of each and every jurist to hold the line.
But the Court now requires judges to look the other way
after finding that the Executive is violating the law, shame-
fully permitting unlawful conduct to continue unabated.
Today’s ruling thus surreptitiously stymies the Judici-
ary’s core duty to protect and defend constitutional rights.
It does this indirectly, by preventing lower courts from tell-
ing the Executive that it has to stop engaging in conduct
that violates the Constitution. Instead, now, a court’s
power to prevent constitutional violations comes with an
asterisk—a court can make the Executive cease its uncon-
stitutional conduct *but only with respect to the particular
plaintiffs named in the lawsuit before them, leaving the Ex-
ecutive free to violate the constitutional rights of anyone
and everyone else.
——————
three Courts of Appeals. See supra, at 7. Other prudential concerns are
better addressed in more targeted ways, such as by changing venue rules
to prevent forum or judge shopping, or by encouraging lower courts to
expedite their review, thereby teeing the merits up for this Court as
quickly as possible.
That is not to say that universal injunctions can or should be issued in
every case; a court must always fit its remedy to the particular case be-
fore it, and those particulars may caution against issuing universal relief
in certain instances. See ante, at 22–23 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). But
the Court today for the first time ever adopts a blanket authority-dimin-
ishing rule: It declares that courts do not have the power to exercise their
equitable discretion to order the Executive to completely cease acting
pursuant to an unlawful directive (unless doing so is necessary to provide
complete relief to a given plaintiff ). And, again, this very suit illustrates
why that bright line rule goes much too far. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR em-
phasizes, multiple courts have recognized that Executive Order No.
14160 is “patently unconstitutional under settled law,” and those courts
thus issued the relief necessary to “protect newborns from the excep-
tional, irreparable harm associated with losing a foundational constitu-
tional right and its immediate benefits.” Ibid.Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
21
JACKSON, J., dissenting
* * *
Make no mistake: Today’s ruling allows the Executive to
deny people rights that the Founders plainly wrote into our
Constitution, so long as those individuals have not found a
lawyer or asked a court in a particular manner to have their
rights protected. This perverse burden shifting cannot co-
exist with the rule of law. In essence, the Court has now
shoved lower court judges out of the way in cases where ex-
ecutive action is challenged, and has gifted the Executive
with the prerogative of sometimes disregarding the law. As
a result, the Judiciary—the one institution that is solely re-
sponsible for ensuring our Republic endures as a Nation of
laws—has put both our legal system, and our system of gov-
ernment, in grave jeopardy.
“The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a
day.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 594 (opinion of Frankfur-
ter, J.). But “[i]t does come,” “from the generative force of
unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even
the most disinterested assertion of authority.” Ibid. By
needlessly granting the Government’s emergency applica-
tion to prohibit universal injunctions, the Court has cleared
a path for the Executive to choose law-free action at this
perilous moment for our Constitution—right when the Ju-
diciary should be hunkering down to do all it can to preserve
the law’s constraints. I have no doubt that, if judges must
allow the Executive to act unlawfully in some circum-
stances, as the Court concludes today, executive lawless-
ness will flourish, and from there, it is not difficult to pre-
dict how this all ends. Eventually, executive power will
become completely uncontainable, and our beloved consti-
tutional Republic will be no more.
Perhaps the degradation of our rule-of-law regime would
happen anyway. But this Court’s complicity in the creation
of a culture of disdain for lower courts, their rulings, and
the law (as they interpret it) will surely hasten the downfall22 TRUMP v. CASA, INC.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
of our governing institutions, enabling our collective de-
mise. At the very least, I lament that the majority is so
caught up in minutiae of the Government’s self-serving, fin-
ger-pointing arguments that it misses the plot. The major-
ity forgets (or ignores) that “[w]ith all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the Executive be
under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary
deliberations.” Id., at 655 (opinion of R. Jackson, J.). Trag-
ically, the majority also shuns this prescient warning: Even
if “[s]uch institutions may be destined to pass away,” “it is
the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”
Ibid.
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