It has now been over a decade since Xi Jinping first announced the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (丝绸之路经济带,
sichou zhilu jingji dai)
on land in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, in September 2013. Later
that year, in October, he also announced a new “twenty-first century
Maritime Silk Road” (21世纪海上丝绸之路
, ershiyi shiji haishang sichou zhilu)
in Indonesia. These announcements marked the beginning of what is now
best known as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI; 一带一路,
yidai yilu).
For several years in the early first decade of the twenty-first
century, as China's economy grew exponentially in size following its
entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, there were increasing
calls for the country to clarify its global ambitions now that it was a
genuinely global economic power. The short-lived notion – around the
period between 2003 and 2005 – of China enjoying a “peaceful rise”
(和平崛起,
heping jueqi) didn’t help much in this regard, with the US
and others calling on Beijing to state more clearly its commitment not
just to multilateral trade agreements and arrangements, but to their
underpinning values (
Glaser and Medeiros, 2007).
Hu Jintao's presidency from 2002 to 2012 coincided with a period of
spectacular gross domestic product (GDP) growth and diplomatic silence.
When
China did indeed surpass Japan as the world's second-largest economy in
overall GDP terms in 2010, the need to clearly articulate its view on
its global role became more urgent. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012,
the era of the “China Dream” (中国梦,
zhongguo meng) and of “telling China's story well” (讲好中国故事,
jianghao zhongguo gushi), both internally and externally, has finally begun (
Wang and Feng, 2016;
Xue Er Shi Xi, 2021).
The BRI, therefore, was a core part of the messaging that the country
was now engaged in. The initial policy document jointly issued by three
ministries of the State Council in 2015 talked of connectivity, a zone
of free trade, people-to-people links, and greater cultural
communication, all of which were predicated on win–win outcomes (
National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, 2015).
That was met increasingly, however, with external criticisms, which
ranged from the general vagueness attributed to the BRI to its role in
creating indebted partner countries as well as the suspicion that this
was about attempting to acquire power, rather than being a cooperative,
constructive member of the international community (
Perlez and Huang, 2017).
Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, for instance, labelled the
initiative something that did “harm” and framed it as the primary
vehicle by which Beijing was extending its malign influence across the
world to support authoritarianism and push back against democratic
values (
Murray-Atfield and Staff, 2020).
With
over a decade now in existence, this is a good time to reflect on and
review what the BRI has meant to the world so far. In 2015, there was no
real track record, beyond alluding to China's growing energy and
economic interests in Africa, Latin America, and what became labelled as
the “Global South.” Since then, a plethora of different treatments and
studies have emerged, utilising various metrics, conceptual frameworks,
and datasets (e.g.
Garlick, 2020;
Garlick and Havlová, 2020;
Gerstl, 2020;
Shakhanova and Garlick, 2020;
Turcsanyi and Kachlikova, 2020;
Vangeli, 2020).
This Special Edition contributes to that literature with a set of
contrasting approaches and geographical focuses regarding the BRI. This
is a testament to the complexity of the phenomenon itself and its
multidimensional character. The one thing that each contribution has,
for all their differences, is a recognition of how complex the BRI is,
and how it quickly evades straightforward frameworks and unilinear
approaches.
In Africa, as
Ajah and Onuoha (2025)
write in their study of Nigerian experiences with the BRI, the record
shows that things are not as simple as to support the notion that China
is using its newly acquired economic assets solely to assert its power
in its own interests. Acknowledging the often critical analysis offered
by subscribers to neocolonial, neo-realism and dependency prism
theorists, they opt to use complex interdependence theory, stating that
the BRI has “provided Nigeria with an opportunity to secure funds for
rehabilitating and upgrading its railway infrastructure” (
Ajah and Onuoha, 2025:
134). Based on detailed interviews and field research in the country,
they show a situation in which the BRI, not just in railways, but in
ports and airports, has “yielded tangible results in addressing
Nigeria's infrastructural deficits” (
Ajah and Onuoha, 2025:
137). That issue of tangibility is essential, with empirical data on
both the amount Chinese partners have spent and the results they have
achieved. Recognising the issues around lack of transparency by Chinese
partners at some points, and the problems around terms of funding and
how these are negotiated and settled, the authors nonetheless conclude
that the BRI offers Nigeria more opportunity than vulnerability,
providing a cogent corrective to the blanket accusation of one-sided
deals where “win–win” for China means that it gains twice.
Comerma (2024)
addresses the issue of values and frameworks in the differing context
of the European Union, and in particular, how normative language
emanating from the Chinese government appeared in the eighty Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs) issued between China and various European
governments since 2018. To some, this was a clear attempt by China to
gain validation more widely for its signature foreign policy initiative,
and ultimately, for its own desire for influence, recognition, and
status. It was linked, as Comerma argues, to a push for a form of soft
power with Chinese characteristics, which was popular in the first
decade of the twenty-first century and which lingered during the early
Xi era. However, leaving aside those MOUs that were impossible to get
hold of, in the two that she offers detailed analysis of – those with
Italy and Hungary – the outcomes proved very different in the end.
Despite adopting some of China's normative language, its soft power was
limited, particularly with an audience that holds European values (
Comerma, 2024:
242). As she concludes, even if governments did accept Chinese
normative language, which overrode their subscription to market values
and democratic principles, in implementation, things have not gone
smoothly. This is further testified to by the fact that Italy allowed
its agreement on the BRI to lapse in 2022.
Lin's (2024)
approach looks not at a region or territory and its experience and
engagement with BRI, but at the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR). As this article shows, China has shown interest not so much in
soft power, but in what is labelled as “soft connectivity,” recognising
that there were issues and responsibilities in terms of engagement and
management of its overseas interests through the BRI that needed to be
considered. As Lin writes, historically, China has “found itself at the
receiving end of norms diffusion” (
Lin, 2024:
154). With its own celebrated “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”
adopted in the 1950s, China stands by a position of non-interference in
the affairs of others. That should mean that its investments and
engagements in the outside world do not seem to have overt social and
political aims, despite the accusations made to the contrary by the
country's critics. Lin argues that while China, of course, does not
compromise on observing its own mode of doing things domestically, it
has proven a “rational and pragmatic” actor externally (
Lin, 2024:
172). In environmental issues, in particular, it has found at least a
relatively non-contentious space by which to explore CSR-related actions
in ways which are seen as mutually beneficial and acceptable, even as
its stance on labour rights has been far fainter.
The
BRI land route was, as noted at the start of this introduction,
initially announced in Kazakhstan. It is therefore timely that this
volume includes a contribution by
Primiano and Kudebayeva (2023)
on how students at a university in Almaty view the BRI and Chinese
influence generally. Their findings make sobering reading. Despite
Central Asia being a key focus of BRI activity and often regarded as a
region of largely positive relations with China, the views revealed
through the surveys are largely negative and critical. Unsurprisingly,
those with greater adherence to liberal and democratic values are the
most critical of China, viewing the latter's investments as a threat to
the country's oil and gas interests and displaying high levels of
unease. At the same time, it is interesting and perhaps significant to
note that the study also found a general lack of knowledge regarding the
BRI and China's presence in Kazakhstan.
Finally, shifting our attention to the sea,
Schmitz (2024)
offers an assessment of China's historical statecraft in the context of
BRI, with a specific focus on the instrumentalisation of the Chinese
notion of
tianxia (天下, all under heaven) by the country's
political and academic elites to narrate both China's past and present
as a maritime power and legitimate its claims over various maritime
territories. Drawing on textual materials sourced from the China
National Knowledge Infrastructure, one of the largest databases of
academic publications in the country, Schmitz analyses the resurrection
of memories of the now-celebrated Ming-era eunuch admiral Zheng He, as
well as the archaeological and historical records of Zheng's extensive
explorations up to the coast of eastern Africa in the early fifteenth
century. For Schmitz, the BRI embodies this expansive thinking of
tianxia, which maps out a world where there are the “core region” and “surrounding, concentric zones of influence” (
Schmitz, 2024:
215). Acknowledging that “[d]espite the ambitious narrative that frames
it, in practice, BRI is a patchwork […],” Schmitz argues, the narrative
of
tianxia under the sea should be understood as “more than simply a strategy used to calm fears” (
Schmitz, 2024:
214), but presenting a different notion of what international space
might be, and of how, at least from China's perspective, it seeks to
operate within that space.
This Special
Issue, a decade after the BRI appeared, shows the enormous complexity
not only of the idea itself, but also of China's global influence and
the range of attitudes and responses to it. That the contributions
contain perspectives from Africa, Europe, Central Asia, and the Asian
region itself proves how expansive the reach of the project is, as well
as how many different issues, from values to CSR, notions of power and
dependency, and intellectual frameworks, are involved with it. We hope
that these studies, with their very different approaches and evidence
bases, help to enrich the growing literature on the BRI – a trend that
is unlikely to disappear anytime soon as China continues to be a global
force in the twenty-first century.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The
authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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