Thursday, August 13, 2009

From Political to Economic Wrongs--The Rio Tinto Prosecutions in China

I have written about the arrest of Stern Hu, general manager of Rio Tinto's Shanghai office and three of his Chinese co-workers Liu Caikui, Ge Minqiang and Wang Yong. See Larry Catá Backer,State Owned Enterprises and the Integrity of Private Markets and Commercial Activity: On the Arrest of the Rio Tinto Executive, Law at the End of the Day, July 10, 2009.
When the character of commercial activity, even wrongful activity, changes character from an economic to a political crime, the distinction between private and public spheres is more likely to collapse. Thus, . . . the actions were not directed against the state, as sovereign. But it does appear that the activity was intended to advantage Rio Tinto in its dealings with competitor enterprises in markets that touched on Chinese state economic policies affecting enterprises controlled by the state. That had the effect of transforming competitive market activity into anti state activities. That is certainly how the Chinese officially saw it. . . . . Yet that transformation might well produce collateral effects--from a suspicion of the integrity of markets, to the inability of the Chinese state apparatus to convince others that its enterprises are not public interventions in otherwise private markets. Moreover, the privileging of this political transformation also hides the commercial issues underlying the events--recent attempts to purchase a large stake in Rio Tinto by Chinalco, a Chinese State Owned Enterprise, had been resisted. And on the eve of the arrest, Chinalco was again attempting to increase its stake in Rio Tinto. Id.
I suggested that "the rise of great sovereign industrial giants under the framework rules of economic globalization, including the United States and China, the haphazard amalgamation of sovereign and market power, when directed to the benefit of sovereigns as market participants, bodes ill for the preservation of market integrity and the maintenance of level playing fields in the economic sphere." Id.

Today, in a perceptive article, Vivian Wai-yin Kwok chronicles a sensible reconsideration of the issues raised by the possible prosecution of these individuals under the political crimes provisions of Chnese law. Vivian Wai-yin Kwok, China Lightens Up on Rio Tinto, Forbes.com, Aug. 12,2009. "Four employees of Rio Tinto have been charged by the Chinese government of illegally obtaining corporate secrets and bribery. The four were expected to be charged with violating more serious state secrets laws." Id. Instead, relying on a "statement of China's Supreme People's Procuratorate, state media Xinhua reported Wednesday that prosecutors found evidence to prove that they were involved in commercial bribery, and investigations have also revealed that there were suspects in China's steel and iron enterprises who were providing commercial secrets for them." Id. The change in charge is significant. "The penalty for stealing business secrets is much lighter than the maximum penalty of stealing state secrets, which could be life imprisonment." Id.

Ms. Kwan noted quite correctly noted the belief among a segment of the international community that the change in charging strategy was "an attempt to assuage growing unease within the foreign investor community over the blurred line between what is considered standard commercial information and state secrets, particularly given that a large number of companies are still controlled by the government in China." Id. (referencing the analysis of Sarah McDowall, an analyst with IHS ( IHS - news - people ) Global Insight). She also noted how others within the international community have suggested that China is responsible for the actions of Mr. Hu and his associates--as a necessary strategy for private enterprises to compete against the use of state power in market participant activities by the state. "Legal expert Daniel Rosen, Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said Beijing is partly responsible for the aggressive market research efforts both domestic and foreign are forced into, whether legal or not, because legitimate economic information on demand and supply, inventories, and plans that will impact markets are unnecessarily opaque and inaccessible." Id.

And there is a politics to this decision, though it is consequential. "Nicholas Lardy, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told Forbes.com that China's dropping charges on State Secrets Law is a welcome sign." Id. This is especially important in defining the course of future Sino-Australian relations. But more than that, "'It provides a means of continuing to build a separation between political and economic action. The great fear of other states has been a conflation of state and market activity.'" Id. (quoting Larry Catá Backer).

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

A Conversation About Three Represents (三个代表), Harmonious Society (和谐社会), Scientific Development (科学发展观) in Chinese Constitutional Development

My former student, Jason Buhi and I have been debating the relationship and importance of the three important theories growing out Mao Zedong thought and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping. These three concepts, three represents (三个代表), harmonious society (和谐社会) and scientific development (科学发展观), are foundational to Chinese political discourse.

These three concepts now define normative framework of the overarching guidance of the Chinese Communist Party through which society is organized and the political organs of the state operate. The official English description of Three Represents, circulated under the auspices of the State Council Information Office provides: "Three Represents" refers to what the Communist Party of China currently stands for. . . . It represents the development trends of advanced productive forces. It represents the orientations of an advanced culture. It represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people of China. It was put forward by Jiang Zemin, former Chinese president, in 2000." What Is "Three Represents" CPC Theory? China Through a Lens (nd).

The resolution on Harmonious Society, “Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society, . . . .was adopted at the conclusion of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on October 11.” China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, Xinhua News Agency October 19, 2006
“The resolution highlights the importance, guidelines, goals and principles of building a socialist harmonious society; coordinated development; social equity and justice; cultural harmony and the ideological and ethical foundations of social harmony; and the need to improve public administration to build a vigorous and orderly society. It says social harmony is the intrinsic element of socialism with Chinese characteristics and an important guarantee of the country's prosperity, the nation's rejuvenation and the people's happiness. The resolution stresses the harmonious socialist society is to be built and shared by all Chinese along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics and under the leadership of the CPC.” The resolution highlights the importance, guidelines, goals and principles of building a socialist harmonious society; coordinated development; social equity and justice; cultural harmony and the ideological and ethical foundations of social harmony; and the need to improve public administration to build a vigorous and orderly society.” Id.

It builds on Three Represents, especially in its inclusive elements: “The resolution stresses the harmonious socialist society is to be built and shared by all Chinese along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics and under the leadership of the CPC.” No longer privileging workers and peasants, Harmonious Society embraces all elements of society—the price is political loyalty.

Closely tied to Harmonious Society concept is the principle of Scientific Development. It was unveiled in the West by Hu Jintao in a speech in the United States in 2006, to “realize [the] goals [of Harmonious Society], China has adopted a new concept of development in line with its national conditions and the requirement of the times," Hu told Yale University students in New Haven, Connecticut.” China Embraces New Scientific Development Concept: Hu, People’s Daily Online, April 22, 2006. Scientific development suggested methodology. “China will ‘pursue a scientific outlook on development that makes economic and social development people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable,’ Hu said. ‘We will work to strike a proper balance between urban and rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, development of man and nature, and domestic development and opening wider to the outside world,’ said Hu.” Id.


Jason has nicely suggested what appears to be a majority consensus view. This consensus is grounded in a sociological view of politics in China, one grounded in the personal politics of Party leadership within the cultural context of Chinese society and the normative rhetorical framework of Chinese Marxist Leninism: the CCP Party line has shifted to meet the needs of the current generation of leadership, and thus, to some extent is personal to them. Within this analytical structure, the symbolic representation of the four generations of Chinese leadership becomes critical to the analysis of the evolving “Party Line”. Mao, for example, was the peasant revolutionary who came to hate his roots, Deng was humble and Jiang was a Shanghai elitist, Hu and Wen, the 4th generation leaders, have different perspectives. They were in quite insular posts. Hu spent 14-years in extremely poor Gansu Province (China’s poorest), 3 in Guizhou and 4 in Tibet. Wen spent 14 years in Gansu himself. While the demands of Hu’s office don’t let him go to the field so much, Wen was at every accident and disaster scene in China within hours during my time there (blizzards, Earthquakes and the like).

When Jiang passed the reigns over to Hu, he did not do so completely. He maintained the military portfolio until 2004, and members of his Shanghai Clique remain a key constituency within the CCP to this day. Hu, quite astutely, decided not to challenge this powerful group head-on. Rather, he broadcast new initiatives which no one could really disagree with, then co-opted as many of the Shanghai’ers into promoting them as he could. Notably, he promoted his “Harmonious Society” concept as being a continuation of the Three Represents. He shifts focus from the first prong – representing the advanced productive forces of society (and by doing so turning the CCP, like so many other Asian ruling parties, into an elitist organization) – to the third – representing the interests of the majority of the people. This was done because Hu better sensed the widening Gini gap across China and growing resentment owing to it. Hu and Wen have turned attention and rhetoric away from Jiang’s coastal constituency to the interior hinterland where they spent so much time. While presumptively building upon Jiang, Hu’s focus on a “socialist harmonious society” is a clear difference from Jiang’s ideal “well-off society.”

Hu first explained his concept at the Central Party School in 2005, calling it, “The socialist harmonious society we want to build should be a society featuring democracy, the rule of law, fairness, justice, sincerity, trustworthiness, amity, full vitality, stability, orderliness and harmony between mankind and nature.” Basically, it’s not well defined at all. Rather, it was designed by Hu and the Central Party School to be an umbrella concept, more like a political platform than any particular policy or set of policies. Shanbaugh notes that it is nonetheless a positive vision, rooted in both socialist and traditional Confucian norms. The 11th Five-Year Program, submitted in 2005 and ratified in 2006, included things like:

- Doubling the 2000 GDP by 2010
- Improving energy efficiency by 20%
- Developing a number of companies into internationally competitive brands
- Achieving a basic equilibrium in balance of international payments
- Universalizing 9 years of public education and developing a sound social security system
- Keeping overall prices stable while increasing the quality of life for all
- Increasing production safety…etc.

In short, there is a shift away from the “GROWTH, GROWTH, GROWTH” of the Jiang era to a more humanist platform.

The central element of the Harmonious Society is the Scientific Development concept which has two elements: “taking people as the basis,” and “comprehensive development.” A key part of this is the personnel system, meant to weed out corruption and improve the CCP’s governing capacity. There was a good, old fashioned “rectification” campaign in three phases over 2005 which weeded out about 45,000 party members. More anti-corruption mechanisms are in place. Also, there has been a revitalization of the party apparatus at the local level.

When put together, the movement from Three Represents to Harmonious Society and Scientific Development marked the outer manifestation of the transfer of power from the Jiang Shanghai faction of the Party, with its intellectual and elitist base, to the Hu faction. The anti Corruption campaigns served to weed out weak elements in the Party, to strengthen the institutional cohesion of the Party apparatus and its effective connection with the administrative branches of the government, and to weaken the hold of the remaining Jiang loyalists at the local and regional levels. It also served, perhaps to discipline Party cadres within the large economic sector controlled by the State and now incorporated into the Party through the mechanism of the Three Represents.

Very interesting as political sociology. But I would add an institutionalist and legal perspective. I would reject the power-based assumptions of disjunction between Three Represents and Harmonious Society, but embrace the idea scientific development is the key concept, the glue that joins Jiang’s great opening of the Party and its position above the state apparatus, and Hu’s great opening of the objectives of this Party dominance in terms of its obligations to produce social good. Scientific development provides a dynamic basis for change while appearing to stay true to tradition--harmonious society, and all within the political framework of three represents.

So for me it works more like this: The three concepts are building blocks in the institutionalization of a self disciplining rule of law system with political citizenship vested through Party membership. See Larry Catá Backer, The Party as Polity, the Communist Party, and the Chinese Constitutional State: A Theory of State-Party Constitutionalism, Journal of Chinese and Comparative Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009; Penn State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-2009.

In that construction, the three concepts rest against each other for their effectiveness in defining the parameters of a collective political organization of political power above the state in the following way.

1. Three represents--defining the position of the party and the social, economic and political order. Institutionalizing and bureaucratizing effect is key to the concept. Three Represents is an organizer of political space within the Party apparatus, rather than in an individual or in the apparatus of state government (for example through the National People’s Congress system). But within this space was added a key theoretical element of openness (though clearly limited). Political power rests ultimately in the Party, and Party membership is now more open to all elements of society, including merchants. For a more detailed discussion, see Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism. Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006.

2. Harmonious society--defining the key elements of the obligations of state and party to society. If Three Represents established the framework, then harmonious society established the context of the obligations of the Party and state apparatus to the people and the general framework of the social order. Indeed, in the explanation of the Resolution on Harmonious Society, the Party “stresses that the CPC's role as the core leadership is critical for building a harmonious socialist society. The principle that the Party is organized for the people and exercises power on behalf of the people must be adhered to.” China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, Xinhua News Agency October 19, 2006. Thus, it is clear that Harmonious Society was meant to sit atop Three Represents, at least as a matter of theory. The Party represents the social body of the State and its people, Harmonious Society is the broad statement of the obligations of leadership of that Party. Those goals could also be quite specific by Chinese standards:
Goals for 2020 include "further improvement of the socialist democratic and legal system; implementation of the fundamental principle of administering the country according to law; guaranteeing respect for people's rights and interests; narrowing the gap between urban and rural development and between different regions; favoring the emergence of a reasonable and orderly income distribution pattern; increase of household wealth and enabling people to lead more affluent lives". Further 2020 goals include "a relatively high employment rate and the establishment of a social security system covering both urban and rural residents; further improvements to the basic public service system and significant improvements to government administrative and service levels; enhanced ideological and moral qualities, scientific and cultural qualities and health status of the whole nation; further progress in fostering a sound moral atmosphere and harmonious interpersonal relationships; enhanced creativity of society as a whole and the development of an innovation-based nation," it said. Id.
3. Scientific development--the institutionalization of a certain flexibility. Scientific Development might be understood as effectively providing a legitimate basis for organic growth of Chinese political theory, and its institutionalization, from Mao to Hu through Deng Xiao Ping and Jiang. It is also the basis on which the mechanics of institutionalization of the structure of political organization (three represents) and social objectives (harmonious society) may be elaborated--with enough cushion to permit mistakes, and backtracking, without appearing to effect the legitimacy of the regime itself. This is a “breathing space” doctrine—it eliminates the direct connection between specific policies and actions of the Party or the state apparatus, and the legitimacy of either. Policy can go wrong, or be discarded when no longer effective, and these changes no longer go to the legitimacy of the regime. This separation of policy (action) from institutional legitimacy is critical for the survival of the organization of the Chinese political system. Indeed, the anti corruption campaign in its current form would be impossible without scientific development. In the absence of this structure corruption itself would be evidence of the fundamental illegitimacy of the system. Reduced to the traditional “rectification campaigns,” such activity would be more likely understood as personal and political, rather than normative and bureaucratic. Instead, now institutionalized, corruption can be reconstituted as the acts of bad people rather than a bad system. And indeed, the system itself now serves as the basis for disciplining conduct on the basis of loyalty to its norms, rather than to individuals. The effect appears ot be consistent with the old fashioned rectification campaigns, but the basis for the action is substantially distinct, at least at the level of theory.

QED--the Chinese arrive at an institutionally cohesive self disciplining system, ironically enough like those of mature Western democracies in effect (though still substantially more limited in the distribution of political as opposed to social citizenship rights), at least in its theoretical construction, but with a very different (and incompatible) framework!

Thursday, August 06, 2009

Moving Legal Education into the On Line Age--On the Production of Knowledge and Education Through the Internet

The number, scope and quality of on line institutions of higher education is growing quickly in the United States. They have become more important as the democratization of higher education has reached larger segments fo the population and technological advances have made remote and asynchronous education not merely feasble but effective.

Technology growth in the 1990s prompted a surge of online-learning collaborations. The groups prodded member colleges to put classes online, pooled courses into collaborative degrees, and supported online programs with promotions. Some became little more than state- or systemwide online catalogs.

Fast forward to 2009: With budgets strained, every state is looking at how it pays for online learning, which can be a big expense. “As these organizations have evolved over the last decade, how they were set up and funded is becoming more important,” says Rhonda M. Epper, co-executive director of Colorado Community Colleges Online. If a virtual university was paid for with a grant or one-time financing, or relies on a big appropriation, “those are getting looked at more closely and maybe reconsidered,” she says.

. . . . .

Some virtual universities have found financial footing through entrepreneurial savvy, per-course fees, revenue-sharing deals, and other income sources. Marc Parry, News Analysis: Online Education Grows, but Painfully, The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 22, 20009.

Indeed, as traditional universities seeking entry into online erducation has struggled, a new generation of on line institutions have begun to develop new models, unconstrained by traditional and technologically outdated assumptions about education and its pedagogy. The state appears ready to encourage more online education.

"Online learning has definite advantages over face-to-face instruction when it comes to teaching and learning, according to a new meta-analysis released Friday by the U.S. Department of Education. The study found that students who took all or part of their instruction online performed better, on average, than those taking the same course through face-to-face instruction. Further, those who took "blended" courses -- those that combine elements of online learning and face-to-face instruction -- appeared to do best of all. That finding could be significant as many colleges report that blended instruction is among the fastest-growing types of enrollment." The Evidence on Online Education, Inside Higher Education, June 29, 2009.
It can be cost effective, leveraging resources. On line education i likely to assume a greater role in the education of larger segments of the American populaiton int he coming decade. Though it will not replace traditional face to face education, it can serve as a useful methodf for education many otherwise unable to take advantage of traditional education methodologies.

More importantly, on line and technologically driven education, and the production of knowledge useful for education, are increasingly being communicated online. Except perhaps for maintaining hierarchies of academic standing among professors, traditional means of producing and communicating knowledge--the scholarly article, the monograph and similar hard copy forms--are beginning to share space with on line publication. Whether as a supplement to traditional means of communicating knowledge or as a substitute form, on line knowledge production is becoming more and more important.

The production of legal knowledge and its use in legal education is no exception. "Law school is an arduous ordeal few are prepared to undertake. In recent years, the proliferation of technology has made it easier for students to get study tips, career advice or anything else they may need. Blogs have been especially useful for sharing information between people. Whether you’re already in law school or are thinking about applying check out the 100 best blogs for law school students." 100 Best Blogs for Law School Students, On Line Schools .com (2009). I am pleased that this site, Law at the End of the Day can serve in some way in the production and dissemination of knowledge, especially for students and others unable to take part in traditional forms of education. I am also grateful that "Law at the End of the Day" has been named one of the 100 Best Blogs for Law School Students recently announced by Online Schools.org, a portal site for online education.

Democracy Part XVI: Empathy and Hubris: America in Africa

The representatives of the American political elite have found it expedient, both in massaging their media image and in appearing to be empathetic, to make pilgrimages to Africa. They have been met by wildly enthusiastic crowds, crowds humbled by what appears to be the mark of respect that these visits represent. But rather than serve as examples of empathy and brotherhood, they have appeared to cement the notions of political hierarchy and arrogance in which the United States comes to Africa as a sort of "Great Teacher" and Africans are expected to learn their lessons gratefully. Particularly interesting was President Obama's speech in Ghana, Barack Obama, Text of President Barack Obama's speech, provided by the White House, as delivered to the Ghanaian parliament today in Accra, Ghana, July 11, 2009. Mr, Obama starts with a grand rhetorical gesture--"We must start from the simple premise that Africa's future is up to Africans" (Id.)--bound up in a legitimacy inseparable from his own body ("say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this part of the world. After all, I have the blood of Africa within me, and my family's - (applause) - my family's own story encompasses both the tragedies and triumphs of the larger African story." (Id.)). For a discussion of the conflation of the person of the President with the Office, see Larry Catá Backer, Mr. Obama Speaks in Egypt: "Islam is a Part of America"--The Ummah Wahida, and the State in Two Distinct World Orders Law at the End of the Day, June 5, 2009. But then the lecturing starts. Examples abound:
"Yes, a colonial map that made little sense helped to breed conflict. The West has often approached Africa as a patron or a source of resources rather than a partner. But the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants. In my father's life, it was partly tribalism and patronage and nepotism in an independent Kenya that for a long stretch derailed his career, and we know that this kind of corruption is still a daily fact of life for far too many."
"Let me be clear: Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at perpetual war. But if we are honest, for far too many Africans, conflict is a part of life, as constant as the sun. There are wars over land and wars over resources. And it is still far too easy for those without conscience to manipulate whole communities into fighting among faiths and tribes."

"Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves - (applause) - or if police - if police can be bought off by drug traffickers. (Applause.) No business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 percent off the top - (applause) - or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. (Applause.) That is not democracy, that is tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle an election in there. And now is the time for that style of governance to end. (Applause.)"
"And here is what you must know: The world will be what you make of it. You have the power to hold your leaders accountable, and to build institutions that serve the people. You can serve in your communities, and harness your energy and education to create new wealth and build new connections to the world. You can conquer disease, and end conflicts, and make change from the bottom up. You can do that. Yes you can - (applause) - because in this moment, history is on the move."
But, of course, there was much that the President found to his liking. And he was kind enough to complement his hosts on their taste for democratic government and progress as Americans understand the term. "Here in Ghana, you show us a face of Africa that is too often overlooked by a world that sees only tragedy or a need for charity. . . . Now, time and again, Ghanaians have chosen constitutional rule over autocracy, and shown a democratic spirit that allows the energy of your people to break through." Id. Mr. Obama judges the Ghanaians well in other respects: "So in Ghana, for instance, oil brings great opportunities, and you have been very responsible in preparing for new revenue." Id. And these positive developments were spreading in small bites across Africa: "Across Africa, we've seen countless examples of people taking control of their destiny, and making change from the bottom up. We saw it in Kenya, where civil society and business came together to help stop post-election violence. We saw it in South Africa, where over three-quarters of the country voted in the recent election - the fourth since the end of Apartheid. We saw it in Zimbabwe, where the Election Support Network braved brutal repression to stand up for the principle that a person's vote is their sacred right." Id. Other examples were offered as well.

But most importantly, he could not resist ending his address by telling his African hosts (as a stand in for all of sub Saharan Africa) what was expected of them and of their use of their newly rediscovered democratic and sovereign powers:
And here is what you must know: The world will be what you make of it. You have the power to hold your leaders accountable, and to build institutions that serve the people. You can serve in your communities, and harness your energy and education to create new wealth and build new connections to the world. You can conquer disease, and end conflicts, and make change from the bottom up. You can do that. Yes you can - (applause) - because in this moment, history is on the move.

But these things can only be done if all of you take responsibility for your future. And it won't be easy. It will take time and effort. There will be suffering and setbacks. But I can promise you this: America will be with you every step of the way - as a partner, as a friend. (Applause.) Opportunity won't come from any other place, though. It must come from the decisions that all of you make, the things that you do, the hope that you hold in your heart. Id.
And the bare bones of a framework for democratic organization was offered to those who might not know better: "In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success - strong parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges - (applause); an independent press; a vibrant private sector; a civil society. (Applause.) Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in people's everyday lives." Id. Well, at least the President was honest. Though it was not clear that he was speaking to political equals--and in their own house. . . . .

And now comes the Secretary of State to Africa.

June McLaughlin will be posting a quite relevant discussion of these issues in her blog site--Muzungu on Africa. In a post entitled Hillary, she starts:

I love the woman. I would have voted for her. But she is an idiot. Why would you get mad at a student, from the Congo, who asks a question in French that gets translated maybe correctly, maybe not asking for more information. Where exactly does she think she is? That woman has spent too much time in Washington and not enough time around students, kids, or non-Americans. Can America ever have a good Secretary of State who is American?

Why is it that every time we see new of an American official in Africa, the Africans are getting schooled? I am not sure a student from the Congo really needs to understand the politics of a powerful marriage between two American politicians. Surely, she has the graciousness to understand the question or answer it without anger. I simply think she has not spent enough time around students or young people and has some anger issues.
It is worth one's while to read the rest. And it behooves the "grandees" of American political life to remember that a respect requires mutuality, and hubris is the start down the path to tragedy.

Postponing the Cuban Communist Party Congress

I have written before that it is possible to build the foundations of rule of law constitutionalist states within the normative framework of Marxist Leninist states. See Larry Catá Backer, The Party as Polity, the Communist Party, and the Chinese Constitutional State: A Theory of State-Party Constitutionalism, Journal of Chinese and Comparative Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009. In the context of the project of polity building within China, I noted that

The basis of Chinese state-party constitutionalism requires a reconception of an understanding of constitution - to include both the document constituting the state and that constituting the Party as equivalent components that together form the national constitution as understood in the West. It is also based on a different understanding of the character of the Communist Party - not as a political party or as a private actor but as an integral part of the institutional structure of government, and more importantly, as the holder of political citizenship. These insights produce substantial consequences for the ways in which Chinese constitutionalism are understood and evaluated under global constitutionalist standards, which are discussed in the last section of the paper. These include the reflection of the party-state construct (1) in a division of the character of citizenship between economic and social citizenship, claimed by all persons, and political citizenship, which can be exercised through the Party, (2) in an understanding of political organization in which the state power and its institutions are subordinate to political authority, (3) in an institutionalization of political authority within a collective that serves as the source and conduit of constitutional values to be applied by the holders of state authority, and (4) in a system in which Party elaboration of rule of law values is contingent on state and party self discipline. Chinese constitutionalism, understood as state and party constitutionalism can, together, serve as a basis for understanding the way in which rule of law governance is legitimately possible where the disciplinary focus of constitutional duty is focused, not primarily on the state apparatus, but instead centers on the Party apparatus. Rule of law constitutionalism in China, then, is better understood as state-party constitutionalism, with a necessary focus on party rather than state, grounded in separation of powers principles in which the administrative function is vested in the state and political authority over all is vested in the Party under law. But thus constructed, even state-party systems can claim a certain legitimacy as a constitutionalist system - though one whose substantive values are inconsistent with those of secular transnationalist constitutionalist states. This is constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics.
Id. The great vehicle of this scientific development of a polity from out of a Party structure is both an institutionalized Party structure and a willingness to move to institutional values. that increasingly are open to individuals willing to support the basis of political organization in the state. Backer, Party as Polity, supra.

"The concept of scientific development is intimately tied to the project of institution building and stability within all aspects of Chinese governance—public and private. “Scientific development and social harmony are integral to each other and neither is possible without the other.” Id. It is also a long term project that involves all aspects of political organization. “Building a harmonious socialist society is a historical mission throughout the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as a historical process and the social outcome of correctly handling various social problems on the basis of development.” Id." Larry Catá Backer, A Constitutional Court for China within the Chinese Communist Party: Scientific Development and the Institutional Role of the CCP, C.P.E. Working Paper No. 11-1 (November 28, 2008). I also suggested that, ironically enough, this process of development in some ways parallels that of the United States, where, for example, property and its ideology, rather than party affiliation, served as the basis for political citizenship in the 18th and19th century. Backer, Party as Polity, supra.

As Hu Jinato noted, under the constitutional system, the CCP must:

Improve the mechanism of restraint and oversight and ensure that power entrusted by the people is always exercised in their interests. Power must be exercised in the sunshine to ensure that it is exercised correctly. We must have institutions to govern power, work and personnel, and establish a sound structure of power and a mechanism for its operation in which decision-making, enforcement and oversight powers check each other and function in coordination. We will improve organic laws and rules of procedure to ensure that state organs exercise their powers and perform their functions and responsibilities within their statutory jurisdiction and in accordance with legal procedures. We will improve the open administrative system in various areas and increase transparency in government work, thus enhancing the people's trust in the government. Hu Jintao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 15, 2007, at Part VI, 6).
I noted that the suggestion is clear, though its implementation may lag, "as a constitutive and vanguard element of Chinese Constitutionalism, the CCP has a vital institutional role to play within the constitutional system. That role is grounded in bureaucratization and institutionalization of rule of law governance." Backer, A Constitutional Court for China, supra.

This movement from Party to polity might also serve as a basis for the political development of Cuba, a development that might lead, eventually to a normal set of relationships with its neighbors, including the United States. The Cuban Constitution (2002) provides "artículo 5o.- El Partido Comunista de Cuba, martiano y marxista-leninista, vanguardia organizada de la nación cubana, es la fuerza dirigente superior de la sociedad y del Estado, que organiza y orienta los esfuerzos comunes hacia los altos fines de la construcción del socialismo y el avance hacia la sociedad comunista." ("The Cuban Communist Party, Marti-ist andMarxist Leninist, organized vanguard of the Cuban nation, is the superior directing force of society and state, which organizes and orients common efforts to the ends of the construction of socialism and the advance to a communist society.") The Party thus assumes a superior political role within the state, above the apparatus of state government. Its political role thus serves as a template for state action.

But that requires a move toward an institutionalization and bureaucratization of the Cuban Communist Party. That, in turn, requires the elaboration of an institutional framework for Party organization in which governance principles, like American constitutional principles, can be developed and applied uniformly to Party, state and cadres. While the Chinese model might not transpose easily to Cuba, the forms of that model might ensure the construction of an institutional framework that would permit the development of a rule based system. A key element of that development in China has been the work of the Party Congresses, especially from the time of the leadership of Deng Xiao Ping. Whatever its flaws from an American perspective, the system has been important in the institutionalization of organizational structures and governance principles that have bureaucratized and diffused power within the Chinese system. The broader and more inclusive the Party Congress, the more likely the possibility of building a more broadly based institutional structure for the exercise of political power among a larger number of people committed to the preservation of that system. And, of course, the broader that participation, within the Party apparatus, the greater the ambit of political participation among the people.

But it has been 12 years since the last Party Congress in Cuba. Recently Raul Castro announced "the postponement of the Cuban Communist Party congress to an unknown date. Fidel Castro, who stepped down from presidency following intestinal surgery in 2006, remains the head of the Communist Party of Cuba." Larry Moonze, Raul Announces Postponment of Cuban Communist Party Congress, The Post, Aug. 6, 2009.

During the 7th Cuban Communist Party Central Committee plenary session in Havana that discussed the national and international situation, President Raul said the current economic situation, defined by the prevailing global economic recession that had hit hard, Cuba and the nation's prospects must be analysed comprehensively with the party members and all the people before the congress could be staged. He said the 6th party congress, which would definitely be the last under the leadership of the historical figures of the revolution, was not just another event."Given the law of life it will most probably be the last headed by the historical leadership of the Revolution,” President Raul, the current second secretary of the party deputising his elder brother, Fidel, said. . . . The Central Committee thereby agreed to postpone the party congress until "this crucial stage of prior preparationî has been completed.

Id. Yet one would think that Party discipline could be maintained on the basis of democratic centralism which forms a key part of Cuban Communist Party organization:
El Partido Comunista de Cuba se estructura orgánicamente y desarrolla su vida interna sobre la base de la observación más rigurosa del principio leninista del centralismo democrático que conjuga una disciplina estricta y consciente con la más amplia democracia interna, el ejercicio de la dirección colectiva y de la responsabilidad individual y la práctica de la crítica y la autocrítica ante los propios errores, todo lo cual garantiza la pureza y la cohesión de sus filas y la necesaria unidad de pensamiento y de acción junto a la mayor libertad de discusión y de iniciativas de los comunistas.
Estatutos del PCC, at 2 ("The Communist Party of Cuba is organically structured and develops it internal life based on the strict observation of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, combining strict and conscious discipline with the most extensive internal democracy, the exercise of collective leadership, individual responsibility and the practice of criticism and self-criticism of errors, all of which ensures the purity and cohesion of its ranks and the necessary unity of thought and action together with the greater freedom of discussion and initiatives of the Communists").

It is possible that the leadership is unprepared for the deployment of this exercise of democratic centralism in the lead up to the Party Congress. But postponement could suggest a lack of maturity in the institutions of the Party. It could also suggest a need to pay greater attention to the mechanics for dealing with changes in the leadership. In a state seeking stability at a delicate moment, even the symbolism of a postponement might be regrettable. And indeed, from outside the Island, the postponement reinforces the sense that the current governance framework is fragile. The recent removal of Felipe Perez Roque and Carlos Lage suggests the fundamental nature of that fragility.

Perhaps the most prominent of those ousted, Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, was the youngest of Cuba's top leaders and had been widely mentioned as a possible future president. Perez Roque, 43, was replaced by his own deputy, Bruno Rodriguez. Vice President Carlos Lage, 57, apparently kept his job as vice president of the ruling Council of State, but was replaced as Cabinet Secretary by Gen. Jose Amado Ricardo Guerra, who had been a top official in the military that Raul Castro ran for decades. Lage was credited with helping save Cuba's economy by designing modest economic reforms after the Soviet Union collapsed.Perez Roque was once personal secretary to Fidel Castro and a former leader of the Communist Party youth organization. He had been foreign minister for almost a decade. Carlos Lage and Felipe Perez Roque replaced among other changes in Cuban goverment, Cuba News Headlines, March 22, 2009.
Postponement after a shake up of this magnitude might suggest, especially abroad, an inability to control or disciplinary issues extending down to the Party rank and file. Indeed, it appears that Party officials at the highest levels have been very sensitive about the removals.

"An official video that presents the reasons for the ouster of Vice President Carlos Lage and Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque has been shown for the past several weeks to selected groups of Cuba's ruling elite, according to information received by El Nuevo Herald from Havana. . . .The video is shown in two versions: one lasting almost three hours, the other, seven. Both contain compromising images and statements made by Lage and Pérez Roque about retired leader Fidel Castro, current President Raúl Castro and First Vice President José Ramón Machado Ventura, according to those familiar with the footage. Both versions show conversations between Lage and Pérez Roque in which they make jokes about Fidel Castro's infirmities and his years in power, and question Raúl Castro's ability to govern the country." Video shows why two top Cuban officials were ousted,The Miami Herald, May 23, 2009.
But it also adds fuel to the increasingly vocal sentiment among opponents of the current government that it is moving not towards Chinese style Marxist Leninist rule of law Party-State, but to a conventional model of military dictatorship with socialist rhetoric, a sort of perverted Peronism.

More importantly, perhaps, lingering dissatisfaction, hinted at by Lage and Perez Roque, might also be found among Party faithful. That dissatisfaction might have exploded into the open at a Party Congress. Party Militants, it seems, have the right to "Demandar en todo momento la aplicación de la política del partido y el cumplimiento de lo establecido en estos estatutos y los reglamentos, así como de los acuerdos del partido." Estatutos del PCC, at art. 8 ("Demand at any time the implementation of the policy of the party and compliance with the CCP rules and regulations, as well as the agreements of the party). Yet, if one cannot trust one's cadres, the bearers of political rights within a Marxist Leninist state, then one runs the risk of moving away from a rules and group based system, however limited the extent of political rights, to one which is seen as increasingly individual rather than group centered. And even if the reasons for the postponement was to sort through the difficulties of the current economic crisis and its effects in Cuba, the postponement itself serves to suggest that the situation is graver within the Island than has been reported. That might make potential economic partners more jittery. The next few months will suggest the way in which the Party leadership in Cuba intends to fashion the Party-State institutional framework for the future. They might do better to reconsider the Stalinist model that the postponement suggests.



Monday, August 03, 2009

Some Thoughts at the Start of Curriculum Reform Season in American Law Schools

As Summer wanes and American Law Schools begin their preparations for another academic year, curriculum reform remains very much in the air. In particular, the shape and character of first year legal education appears to continue to elicit concern. Faculties worry about the goals should be achieved by the 1-L curriculum, the construction of ideal curricula, the extent of curricular control by faculty rather than students, and a significant concern about measurement--of strengths, weakness, comparative advantage, satisfaction, and the like. For these purposes faculties tend to like to consider changes in legal practice and in the way in which students use their law degree, curricular innovations adopted by other schools, and the curricula of schools against which an individual faculty prefers to benchmark. Indeed, with respect to this issue, the law school academic trade association, the Association of American Law Schools Curriculum Committee, maintains an Overview of Curricular Innovations Survey, including innovations, "starter documents" (fairness, ethics, justice, globalization), and eventually additional resources. Faculties worry about elective courses in the first year--whether there are too few, too many, ought to be none at all, and how carefully controlled the "elective experience" ought to be.

I have written about issues in curriculum reform, especiually as they touch on matters of internationalizing that curriculum. See Larry Catá Backer, Parallel Tracks? Internationalizing the American Law School Curriculum in Light of the Principles in the Carnegie Foundation's 'Educating Lawyers'. Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, Vol. 3. My purpose here is to engage, very lightly, on some of these issues, and suggest some of the approaches that might become or remain influential during this academic season's engagement with the issue of improving curricula.

General Observations: The character of a law school curriculum tends to serve as a window into the character of the institution itself, and its sense of place among its peers. It is my sense that we now have an opportunity to energetically join our peers at the highest levels of American legal education, while allowing ample space for the very necessary education and training of those who serve all communities requiring legal services. The current curriculum tends towards the production of a singular type of lawyer with an excess of rigidity serving a singular set of increasingly local communities. Our training mission is broader than that. We produce traditional lawyers that serve the region, lawyers that serve emerging markets in larger cities, and lawyers expected to participate and shape changes in law and lawyering in the coming generations. At the same time, we serve other communities, from legally trained members of civil society, to those who look as law as a component of an interdisciplinary set of studies. Increasingly, we serve an international community of students at the J.D. and soon the post J.D. level. We made great strides toward a modern curriculum with our last set of reforms. But, further change is necessary in these dynamic times, especially in light of changes to faculty composition and aggregate faculty talents and interests.

Change is unsettling. But from an acceptance of the notion that law schools now serve increasingly varied markets should come a realization that change is inevitable. But change ought not to be reduced to a process of discarding the old. Rather, the ancient traditions that have produced and will continue to produce in the future large numbers of extraordinary lawyers ought to be reconstituted to suit the realities of changes in law as theory and as practice. Law schools serve a variety of markets that were on the fringes even a decade ago. The profession has expanded its scope and grown more flexible and dynamic. The needs generated thereby ought to be accommodated as well. Whatever its form, the most successful set of innovations will likely be those that avoid a narrow, rigid and singular view of the sort of graduate law schools produce.

Short explanation of a sensible approach to curriculum reform:

A. First Year Program. “Like the practice of law at the highest level, our curriculum is global, interdisciplinary, and rigorously practical.” Columbia Law School, Our Curriculum. First year programs range from wholly mandatory (Ohio State) to minimally compulsory with substantial integration between first year and other students (UC Berkeley). Whichever approach is chosen, it seems sensible to design its contents with the goal of providing the entering student with a related set of introductory materials grounded in only two sets of pedagogical goals. The first is to introduce the student to fields of substantive law. The second is to introduce the student to the variety of law frameworks she will encounter. The overall goal is to provide the student with a range of experience of legal contexts in which substantive law is realized: traditional case law and case law analysis (torts); statutory law and analysis (criminal law); modern hybridity through rulemaking statutes and case law (civil procedure) or statute (property); higher law (constitutional law); and law beyond the state (transnational law). Thus, for example, torts might be taught to acquaint the student with a field of law (personal wrongs) and a legal methodology (elaboration of legal rules and standards in cases, what is left, in effect, of the ancient common law). A first year student, then, ought to be exposed as much to the distinct methods and frameworks through which regulation is effected (common law, statutory systems, rule based systems, hybrids, etc,.), as to mastery of selected fields of law (torts, contracts, etc.). Both are necessary foundations for later work.

In this regard, it might be useful to consider the well reasoned policy objectives approach to reforms adopted in 2006 by the Harvard Law School. See,

* greater attention to statutes and regulations;
* introduction to the institutions and processes of public law;
* systematic attention to international and comparative law and economic systems;
* opportunities for students to address alone and in teams complex, fact-intensive problems as they arise in the world (rather than digested into legal doctrines in appellate opinions) and to generate and evaluate solutions through private ordering, regulation, litigation and other strategies;
* more sustained occasions to reflect on the entire enterprise of law and legal studies, the assumptions and methods of contemporary U.S. law and the perspectives provided by other disciplines, and to develop a common fund of ideas and approaches relevant to designing effective and just laws and institutions.
HLS Faculty Unanimously Approves First Year Curriculum Reform. For a criticism of this approach on somewhat narrow grounds, see Lloyd de Vries, How Not to Fix a Law School: Legal Analyst Andrew Cohen Schools Still Aren’t Preparing Lawyers for the Real World, CBS News, Nov. 10, 2009, (the difficulty here, of course, is Mr. Cohen’s view that law schools, like some sort of single purpose machine, is tasked with the production of a very specific sort of graduate). Michigan, on the other hand, continues to tilt toward a more traditional approach “to keep the first year students together in groups of about 90,” and to socialize students in “one of the experiences shared by almost all lawyers.” The University of Michigan Law School Course Descriptions. Washington & Lee Law School shares a similar rationale. “Everyone takes the same first-year courses, creating a shared intellectual experience and a true sense of collaboration that carry throughout the years at W&L.” About the J.D. Program at Washington & Lee.

In addition to an introduction to forms of law and fields of substantive law associated with these distinct forms of law production and application, the first year ought to introduce students to forms of communication appropriate for lawyers. Just as Roman jurists studied rhetoric, American law students ought to be able to develop a facility for written and oral persuasive communication. They ought also to cultivate a talent to research, not merely a facility for uncovering law, but for uncovering those facts essential for legal analysis. It is in this respect, of course, that the recent Carnegie Report made the most sense. In this respect it might be useful to consider Indian Bloomington’s approach adopted last year:

Beginning in the spring of 2008, first-year law students began taking The Legal Profession, an innovative new course on the economics and values of the profession. This course was inspired by the 2007 Carnegie report, one of the most important studies on legal education in decades. Team-taught by professors and professionals, this 4-credit-hour course immerses students in the true complexities of lawyering, overturning myths and preconceptions.


Indiana University—Bloomington, The Difference: A First Year Foundation. Training students to be competent lawyers, rather than competent students, is a more worthy goal. But persuasive communication grounded in competent research is no longer limited to the research memo and legal memoranda of the traditional domestic law office. Writing persuasive letters to regulators, to clients, to opposing counsel, to legislators, and the like is also important. As law graduates assume more varied roles, the sort of writing and research they are training in ought to change as well. Consequently, an integrated two year six or eight credit course ought to be considered for this purpose.


B. First Year Elective. The faculty might be guided by a pedagogical preference increasingly embraced by top tier schools to retain in the first year a flexible menu of broadening options for students. The idea here is that since one size fits all education is no longer consistent with the increasingly diverse markets top tier schools serve, then it is important to open the first year courses to a limited and carefully chosen menu of courses designed to broaden the exposure of law students to diverse areas of law that accords with the interests of students. A difficulty with the current design of the program is the sense of the serendipity of the courses offered. One, criminal procedure, is likely inappropriate as an elective, being better suited for teaching as a general upper level course. But beyond that, the is little holding the offerings together. A more useful approach, perhaps, would be for the offering of courses that might serve a foundational purpose for upper level study in conventional law fields or for deeper analysis of particular issues of law. Transnational law, jurisprudence, critical race theory, gender and the law, legal history, statutory interpretation, and similar courses might be suitable.

Other schools provide alternatives to this model worth considering. At Columbia, elective courses included Critical Legal Thought, Foundations of the Regulatory State, Law and Contemporary Society, Law and Economics, Law and Social Science, Law, Culture, and Notions of Justice, Lawyering Across Multiple Legal Orders, Legislation, Principles of Intellectual Property, Regulation: Decentralization and Globalization. Columbia Law School, First Year Courses, First Year Curriculum. At least one school, the University of California Berkeley, there are no segregated first year electives. See University of California, Berkeley Law School, First Year Curriculum. That is the practice at Michigan as well, though there, a specific list of upper level courses are selected for use as a first year elective. See The University of Michigan Law School Course Descriptions.

C. Upper Level Curriculum. The academy tends to oscillate between an upper level curriculum that is bereft of mandatory course and those that evidence a compulsion to control all aspects of education in the second and third years of study. But the problem with compulsion is that the assumptions underlying it may be false or falsely applied to a number of students. Thus, for example, it is possible to conceive of a mandatory curriculum based on the ideal of the well trained general litigator, but such a mandatory curriculum will be of less value to a transactional lawyer, and even less for someone interested in civil society work. More useful would be the development of paths to competence that might serve to guide student choices. Some of the old certificate programs used to serve that function, but that approach has been abandoned by some faculties, and may not be appropriate in all practice areas. Another approach would task the Curriculum committee with the development of model programs of study that focus on different interests—property, commercial law, litigation, international, public service, banking, transactional, and the like. A useful model, perhaps, is that of Indiana—Bloomington and their “areas of focus.” See Indiana—Bloomington, Areas of Focus. Others have adopted similar approaches. See Ohio State University, Areas of Study.

More importantly, perhaps, at the upper levels, curriculum is more closely tied to appointments and depth of resources. It might be useful to aim eventually to achieve a range and diversity of faculty, as a result of which “students benefit from a curriculum that can adjust quickly to changes in the legal profession and the world. In recent years, for example, HLS has enhanced its offerings in terrorism, corporate responsibility, and Islamic law.” Harvard Law School, Courses. But law school faculty mobility cuts in many ways, some of which can affect the durability of reforms. See, Clayton Gillette, “Law School Faculty as Free Agents,” 17 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 213 (2008). Beyond the complexities of fluidity in hiring, and thus in faculty resources, Curriculum planning . . . takes place in a world of restraints and costs. Despite the obviousness of this point, it has received little attention.” John C. Weistart, “The Law School Curriculum: The Process of Reform,” 1987 Duke Law Journal 317-314 (April 1987). Nimbleness in curricular design, an ability to respond to market, grounded in a firm foundation in the foundations of the approaches through which regulation is effected in the United States or other jurisdictions might well be the most important innovation to any curriculum.

D. The Process of Curricular Reform. Beyond the traditional approach to curriculum reform, based on faculty committee study, the production of a report and, after discussion, faculty voting to adopt or reject the proposals, law schools have begun more intensive engagements with reform and the reform process. Instructive was the process used for reform at Vanderbilt Law School in 2005. See Vanderbilt Law School’s Curricular Reform Initiative (2006). That approach was both provided an institutional basis for reform and individual flexibility. It involved a multi day retreat, the development of new courses by faculty, and faculty approval of proposed revisions. But these forms of experimentation can be expensive.
Once these plans were approved by the Dean, the faculty member or members who proposed it were offered teaching relief, generally for one semester, so that they could develop the course and create materials for it without taking time away from their research activities. To replace the courses that were not being taught by these faculty members, visitors were hired with the funds provided by the University.
Id. Likewise, Washington & Lee’s new and much touted experimental program to redesign the third year involves substantial resources. “The new third-year curriculum, approved unanimously by the Law School faculty, will be entirely experiential in nature. Traditional classroom instruction will be replaced by practice simulations, real-client interactions and the development of law practice skills. All third year students will be required to obtain a Virginia practice certificate and participate in at least one real-client experience during the year.” Washington & Lee School of Law Announces Dramatic Third Year Reform. On the other hand, Washington and Lee offers little flexibility in their first year classes. “All first year courses are required, to give you a broad perspective of legal issues: American Public Law Process, Civil Procedure I and II, Criminal Law, Contracts, Property, Torts and Transnational Law.” About the J.D. Program at Washington & Lee.

The best approach, then, might be one that mimics the dynamic nature of law and its markets for law students. A faculty that is willing to constantly renew its curriculum, even in small ways, and to communicate those reviews and resulting changes to its stakeholders—students, lawyers, judges, community, etc.—is likely one better able to meet the needs of students, and the markets for lawyers and law school graduates, than others.

Friday, July 31, 2009

Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Part V, The Case of China

This is the FIFTH of a multi-part series exploring the rise of a new form of integrated sovereign investing. The focus will be on the regulatory framework that is being developed in the West and the reality of innovative sovereign investing being implemented in China. A complete version of these materials will be published in the University of Iowa College of Law Journal, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems. The manuscript of which may be accessed HERE.

The materials will be divided into the following parts:

Part I. Introduction

Part II. Projections of Public Economic Power in Private Form: Contextualizing Sovereign Wealth Funds--Form, Function and Policy.
A. Form in SWF Definition and Operation.
B. Function in Sovereign Investing.
C. Form and Function in the Policy Context on the Eve of Financial Crisis.

Part III. Complexity and Coordination in Sovereign Investing: The State Owned Enterprise as Sovereign Investment Vehicle.

Part IV. The Expression of Dissonance in Regulatory Responses.
A. National Approaches to Regulatory Reform.
1. The United States, Canada, Australia
2. Europe
B. Proposed Non-National Approaches to Regulatory Reform.
1. The European Union
2. American Bi-Lateralism
3. Santiago Principles.
4. OECD Soft Standard Setting

Part V. Coordination, Development, Opposition and the Challenges of Sovereign Investing in the Context of Global Economic Crisis: The Case of China.
A. “Go Global” Strategy and the Consolidation of Sovereign Investment
B. The Organization and Operation of Chinese Sovereign Investing.
C. Sovereign Investment as Cooperative Public-Private Networks: CIC and Its Subsidiaries.
D. Conformity to Current Regulatory Models and Policy Ramifications.

Part VI. Conclusion.