Martin Belov--Hybrid Lecture: "Constitutional Imaginaries between Urban Spaces and Memories" 4 March 2025 University of Teramo Italy

 

My friend and colleague Martin Belov, Visiting Professor presso il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Teramo - Docente di Diritto Costituzionale e Costituzionale Comparato (University of Sofia 'St. Kliment Ohridski'), will deliver what is going to be a marvelous address at the UNiversityof Teramo on 4 March 2025. It is entitled "Constitutional Imaginaries between Urban Spaces and Memories." The discussant for the event is the marvelous Prof.ssa Emilia Musumeci, Docente di Storia del diritto dell’Ambiente (Università di Teramo). For those with an interest in the the spatial and temporal lebenswelt within which constitutions function this may be of great interest.

For more information please contact Professor  Musumeci: emusumeci AT nite.it

The address aqnd dicussion may be accessed via this link:  

Aula Virtuale: https://meet.google.com/gbo-hgid-acw 

U.S. Department of Education Launches “End DEI” Portal

 

In a press release of 27 February 2025, the U.S. Department of Education announced the launch of a new "End DEI Portal." The Press release follows below.  It speaks for itself. It is of particular interest for the use of the techniques and instruments of DEI facilitation, but now turned to an opposite task.

In Search of Fixity--Historical Nihilism and the Dictatorship of Relativism in 王瑾 "1949～1989年《人民日报》对历史虚无主义的解析 " [Wang Jin, Analysis of Historical Nihilism in the People's Daily from 1949 to 1989]: Text and brief analysis

 

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One of the most significant aspects of our current situation, it should be noted, is the “crisis of meaning”. Perspectives on life and the world, often of a scientific temper, have so proliferated that we face an increasing fragmentation of knowledge. This makes the search for meaning difficult and often fruitless. Indeed, still more dramatically, in this maelstrom of data and facts in which we live and which seem to comprise the very fabric of life, many people wonder whether it still makes sense to ask about meaning. The array of theories which vie to give an answer, and the different ways of viewing and of interpreting the world and human life, serve only to aggravate this radical doubt, which can easily lead to scepticism, indifference or to various forms of nihilism. (St. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio [Faith & Reason]), Encyclical (14 September 1998) ¶ 81).

The Catholic Church and the Chinese Communist Party have relatively little in common. What they do appear to have a lot in common is a substantial opposition to nihilism. For the Catholic Church, the focus is on relativism and anomie (Durkheim)-- the dictatorship of  relativism («PRO ELIGENDO ROMANO PONTIFICE» , Homily of Joseph Ratzinger, Dean of the College of Cardinals, Vatican Basilica (Monday 18 April 2005) "We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires. "), and thus of a moral, social, cultural, and perhaps personal suicide.

Chinese Marxist-Leninism travels a similar path bit with both Leninist and Chinese characteristics. While one might best understand an important strand of nihilism in S. John Paul II's Fides et Ratio, and perhaps Durkheim's conception of anomie, one approaches Chinese Leninist notions through the evolving theory of historical nihilism, a theory that has come into its own in the current historical stage of Chinese (ideological) development since the founding of the Chinese Marxist-Leninist state. One gets a sense of that development, and its complexities, in a recently published essay--1949～1989年《人民日报》对历史虚无主义的解析 [Analysis of Historical Nihilism in the People's Daily from 1949 to 1989] authored by Wang Jin, then a PhD candidate at the Central Committee's Party School, and edited by Wen Shifang of the Party History Research Office of the Central Committee Party School, Beijing (本文作者王瑾，博士研究生，中共中央党校中共党史教研部；文世芳，编辑，中共中央党史研究室). The abstract sets the parameters of analysis.

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 摘要：虚无主义概念传入中国后，演化出几种不同类型，主要有：否定一切、消极颓废的虚无主义；以世界主义面目出现的民族虚无主义；否定民族文化的民族虚无主义。在虚无主义的基础上，1974年历史虚无主义的概念被提出，1979年陈云作为党和国家领导人第一次提出历史虚无主义，1983年有人从如何正确认识党的历史、如何正确评价党的领袖的角度提出邓小平既反对教条主义又反对历史虚无主义，1989年江泽民旗帜鲜明地提出反对历史虚无主义。从概念演化可见，历史虚无主义的意识形态色彩越来越浓，否定党的领导和社会主义制度的政治图谋越来越明显。反对历史虚无主义，必须加强对党的历史的认同，坚定对党的历史的自信，敢于承认问题、批判错误，要坚定“四个自信”，在不断推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业中，科学把握革命与传统的辩证关系，巩固唯物史观的指导地位。[Abstract: After the concept of nihilism was introduced into China, it evolved into several different types, mainly: nihilism that denies everything and is negative and decadent; national nihilism that appears in the form of cosmopolitanism; national nihilism that denies national culture. On the basis of nihilism, the concept of historical nihilism was proposed in 1974. In 1979, Chen Yun, as a leader of the Party and the country, first proposed historical nihilism. In 1983, someone proposed that Deng Xiaoping opposed both dogmatism and historical nihilism from the perspective of how to correctly understand the history of the Party and how to correctly evaluate the leaders of the Party. In 1989, Jiang Zemin clearly proposed to oppose historical nihilism. From the evolution of the concept, it can be seen that the ideological color of historical nihilism is becoming stronger and stronger, and the political plot to deny the leadership of the Party and the socialist system is becoming more and more obvious. To oppose historical nihilism, we must strengthen our recognition of the Party’s history, strengthen our confidence in the Party’s history, dare to admit problems and criticize mistakes, and firmly uphold the “four self-confidences”. In the process of continuously advancing the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, we must scientifically grasp the dialectical relationship between revolution and tradition and consolidate the guiding position of historical materialism.]

 Fides et Ratio. . . .

Like much else, the concept of Nihilism is foreign and requires Sinification; it also requires transposition to the cognitive cages of Marxist-Leninism (as it had to the cognitive cages of Catholicism in the 20th century). A distinction is made between "Nihilism that denies everything and is passive and decadent [否定一切、消极颓废的虚无主义];  Nihilism that appears in the form of cosmopolitanism [以世界主义面目出现的民族虚无主义]; and Nihilism that denies an alignment between nation/state and culture [否定民族文化的民族虚无主义]. It is from out of these that the popular (and then ideologically significant notion of historical nihilism emerged in the early 21st century. "Through a systematic review of the People's Daily, it can be found that while criticizing various forms of nihilism, the concept of historical nihilism has gradually emerged, and its connotation has gradually approached the specific concept of current historical nihilism." [通过对《人民日报》的系统梳理可以发现，在对形形色色的虚无主义进行批判的同时，历史虚无主义的概念逐渐出笼，其内涵逐步接近当前历史虚无主义的特定概念。]. This development is traced from the late 1950s.

 The authors suggest that part of the problem, and one that confounded during the Cultural Revolution, was the relationship between revolution and tradition--that is at the heart of the difficulties of historical nihilism, and especially so in China's new era. Reconciling both overcomes the dangers of historical nihilism "Therefore, to oppose historical nihilism, we must strengthen our recognition of the party's history, strengthen our confidence in the party's history, dare to admit problems and dare to criticize mistakes. The most fundamental thing is to strengthen the "four confidences" and scientifically grasp the dialectical relationship between revolution and tradition in the continuous advancement of the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and consolidate the guiding position of historical materialism." [因此，反对历史虚无主义，必须加强对党的历史的认同，坚定对党的历史的自信，敢于承认问题、敢于批判错误，最根本的是要坚定“四个自信”，在不断推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业中，科学把握革命与传统的辩证关系，巩固唯物史观的指导地位。]

Ultimately, the problem of historical nihilism is at its core, the problem of history, in the way that mimics the problem of nihilism in Catholic thinking, which is that of the problem of "relativism". In both cases the foundation must be grounded in the embrace of a firm structure of meaning--and to invest that meaning with a faith in its certainties. That is the necessary antidote to Durkheim's anomie or more radically of Nietzsche's radical critique of fixity in meaning or value (as opposed to the non-existence of meaning; and yet one might also note that Nietzsche did not reject meaning, or even the embrace of a meaning universe, only that its exogenous fixity was rejected). Fixity, in this sense, references the idea that something is unalterable, and as unalterable can serve as solid basis for the rationalization of the world around us, derive principles and ordering premises, objectives, and build authoritative structures of social collectives in politics, religion, morals, etc. A faith in the fixity of a core object provides the basis for the rationalization of the collective order and a means for understanding its relation to everything else.

And thus the problem of history and its contradiction in the concept of nihilism, as naturalized within Chinese Marxist-Leninism. That is, that the problem of nihilism is the problem of fixity, and that the problem of history is the corruption of the concept that history is itself not fixed.

The problem of history has never been limited to history, and the problem of culture has never been limited to culture. As a political trend of thought, historical nihilism is a reflection of objective existence, reflecting the value conflicts and social contradictions in social development. The motives of those who advocate historical nihilism vary greatly. Hostile forces at home and abroad want to discredit the party's history, damage the party's image, and erode the party's ruling foundation. There are also some people who are dissatisfied with reality and use history to make things; some have different views and pursuits on academic issues; some are sensational to increase the so-called "popularity" and seek economic benefits; some are attracted and misled by unconventional ideas and viewpoints because of their lack of historical knowledge and lack of independent cognitive judgment ability, and follow the crowd at will. These problems boil down to the lack of correct understanding and necessary confidence in the path, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics. [　历史的问题从来都不止于历史，文化的问题从来都不止于文化。历史虚无主义作为一种政治思潮，是对客观存在的反映，折射出社会发展中存在的价值冲突、社会矛盾等问题。主张历史虚无主义的人动机千差万别。国内外敌对势力是要抹黑党的历史，损害党的形象，侵蚀党的执政根基。还有一些人，有的是对现实不满，借历史说事；有的是对学术问题有不同看法、不同追求；有的是为增加所谓“知名度”和谋取经济利益，哗众取宠；有的是因为历史知识匮乏，又没有独立认知判断能力，被标新立异的思想观点吸引和误导，人云亦云，随意跟风。这些问题归结起来就是对中国特色社会主义道路、理论、]

Nihilism can be overcome by history; history is fixed; history is fixed because of its facticity; that facticity reveals the fact of historical development; the fact of historical development reveals in history the correctness of a faith in Marxism and its dialectics with and as historical  historical facticity. And at the heart of this is the dialectics of revolution and history--from historical nihilism to the dialectical revolution of history or historical revolution as a necessary dialectics. "Nihilism that denies everything and is passive and decadent [否定一切、消极颓废的虚无主义];  Nihilism that appears in the form of cosmopolitanism [以世界主义面目出现的民族虚无主义]; and Nihilism that denies an alignment between nation/state and culture [否定民族文化的民族虚无主义] all deny the fundamental fixity of history (the way that relativism might deny the historical truth of Jesus) and in that fundamental sense undermine the foundations of an undeniable stability within which a radical critique of the solid is impossible--or at least within which it is possible to build strong stable conceptual cages. The latter might be the way Nietzsche might have characterized it--not that either is wrong, but that both build stable self referencing structures within which human communities might operate.

"Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties Presidential Actions" (February 21, 2025)--Text; Fact Sheet, and Brief reflections

 

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While much of the attention on 21 February might have been focused on President Trump's  America First Investment Policy (preliminary discussion and text of EO here), another Executive Order also merits discussion as part of the emerging system of regulating outbound investment. In Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties (February 21, 2025) the United States, through the President, announced a substantial refinement of its retaliatory structures for actions taken against overseas investments and operations of U.S. companies. 

The focus is on "digital economy alone, driven by cutting-edge American technology companies." (Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties  §1). The challenges that these regulations targeted were described in the Executive Order's purpose (§1):

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Beginning in 2019, several trading partners enacted digital services taxes (DSTs) that could cost American companies billions of dollars and that foreign government officials openly admit are designed to plunder American companies. Foreign countries have additionally adopted regulations governing digital services that are more burdensome and restrictive on United States companies than their own domestic companies. Additional foreign legal regimes limit cross-border data flows, require American streaming services to fund local productions, and charge network usage and Internet termination fees. All of these measures violate American sovereignty and offshore American jobs, limit American companies’ global competitiveness, and increase American operational costs while exposing our sensitive information to potentially hostile foreign regulators. (Ibid.)

The characterization of the challenge and  blunt: "American businesses will no longer prop up failed foreign economies through extortive fines and taxes." (Ibid.). To those ends the Executive Order developed the following structure and methodology.

1. The standard:

"where a foreign government, through its tax or regulatory structure, imposes a fine, penalty, tax, or other burden that is discriminatory, disproportionate, or designed to transfer significant funds or intellectual property from American companies to the foreign government or the foreign government’s favored domestic entities, my Administration will act, imposing tariffs and taking such other responsive actions necessary to mitigate the harm to the United States and to repair any resulting imbalance." (Ibid., § 2).

There are several moving parts in the standard. The predicate action consists of roughly four parts that may be divided this way: 

(1) a foreign government (note that it may be harder to use this as a trigger where the action is indirectly tied to the government and it is not clear what a foreign government is where, for instance the action is undertaken by competing entities or occurs in a conflict zone where  authority is at best murky); 

(2)  the action is undertaken by its tax or regulatory structure ((a) that is an ambiguous identification--broadly read it could  include anything in the state apparatus the effect of the actions of which might "tax" in its colloquial or economic sense; (b) identifying the offending apparatus as a "structure" is also odd but suggests a broad reading); 

(3 ) the action taken is the imposition of a fine, penalty, tax or other burden (there are substantial issues of definition here, as well as a question of who decides on the appropriate interpretation, the suggestion here are a group of officials including the USTR and the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury); the "or other burden language" suggests a broad reading that might be drawn from BIT investment language);  Section 2(a)-(d) suggests the sources of burdens--including taxes, other regulations, "any act, policy, or practice" of a foreign government that "could inhibit growth or intended operations," and any other act, practice or action that "could undermine global competitiveness" of US enterprises (again BIT practice and perhaps ICSID expectations and decisions could provide a basis for interpretation/application). ).

(4) the fine, penalty, tax, or other burden must be (1) discriminatory, or disproportionate,  or (ii) designed to transfer "significant funds or intellectual property" from U.S. companies to either (i) a foreign government or (ii) a foreign domestic entity "favored" by a foreign government (the application of these terms remains to be fleshed out though again BIT practice may be is some help). The sense here is of constructive expropriation by virtually any means. 

2. Actions/Consequence.

The action consequence consists of a set of mirroring actions tied to the form through which the negative impact on US companies occurred (again §2 (a)-(d)--taxes, regulations, acts, policies, practices or any other act that could either inhibit growth or intended operators or that could more generally undermine global competitiveness. The principal instruments are tariffs but also includes other responsive actions " "necessary to mitigate the harm to the United States and to repair any resulting imbalance." (§ 2).

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The bulk of the Executive Order is in Section 3, which allocates administrative responsibility to the apparatus of the Office of the President. Section 3 is notable for naming names, suggesting the targets of the first wave of retaliatory (or mitigating) action: §3(a) (digital services taxes (DSTs) of France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; §3(b) ("the DST of any other country that may discriminate against United States companies or burden or restrict United States commerce. . . [and] determine whether to pursue a panel under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement on the DST imposed by Canada"); §3(c) (identify trade and other regulatory practices by other countries, including, without limitation, those described in section 2 of this memorandum [Australia, Canada, or most members of the European Union]); §3(d) ("any act, policy, or practice of any country in the European Union or the United Kingdom has the effect of requiring or incentivizing the use or development of United States companies’ products or services in ways that undermine freedom of speech and political engagement or otherwise moderate content"); §3 (e) ("determine whether any foreign country subjects United States citizens or companies, including, without limitation, in the digital economy, to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes, or has any tax measure in place that otherwise undermines the global competitiveness of United States companies, is inconsistent with any tax treaty of the United States, or is otherwise actionable under section 891 of title 26, United States Code, or other tax-related legal authority").

But there may be other states as well: "European countries, including Austria, Spain, Italy and France, alongside Canada and India, have imposed taxes on the total revenue of tech companies such as Apple, Google, Amazon and others operating inside them" (The Hill).

3. Additional Actions:  

Section 3(f) directs the USTR to "identify tools the United States can use to secure among trading partners a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions." The idea appears to be to extend the palette fof reciprocal mitigating measures beyond tariffs.  Section 3(g) requires the establishment of a complaints reporting system. The effect is to augment the capacity of the state to discover harms by permitting affected enterprises to complain. The "United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Senior Counselor to the President for Trade and Manufacturing, shall establish a process that allows American businesses to report to the United States Trade Representative foreign tax or regulatory practices that disproportionately harm United States companies."

4. Context.

The provisions of Defending American Companies are best understood alongside its counterpart "America First Investment Policy". That one focused primarily on China, though it radiated outward from there. Defending American Companies starts much closer to home, targeting the European Union, the UK, Canada, and Australia. One looks to national security for its motivation, the other looks to market distortion and extortion, especially among liberal democratic allies, as the predicate for retaliation.  They form two sides of the same coin, united by a reaction to what from the U.S. perspective is unequal treatment or aggressive efforts to exploit or produce negative impacts by opening U.S. markets.

 

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The text of Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties and the Factsheet (February 21, 2025) follows below.

 

中央军委主席习近平签署命令 发布新修订的《中国人民解放军内务条令》《中国人民解放军纪律条令》《中国人民解放军队列条令》 [Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping signed an order to issue the newly revised "Regulations on Internal Affairs of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", "Regulations on Discipline of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" and "Regulations on Formations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army".]

 

  In some interesting but not unexpected news, Chinese authorities announced revisions of certain core military regulations: 中央军委主席习近平签署命令 发布新修订的《中国人民解放军内务条令》《中国人民解放军纪律条令》《中国人民解放军队列条令》 [Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping signed an order to issue the newly revised "Regulations on Internal Affairs of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", "Regulations on Discipline of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" and "Regulations on Formations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army".]. The text of the announcement follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation.

 

 

"Economic security is national security": President Trump Issues Executive Order--"America First Investment Policy"

 

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The elaboration of the Americas First policy of the United States continues at a fairly quick pace.  On 21 February, issued an Executive Order that focused on the quality and character of inbound foreign investment in the United States.  Entitled "America First Investment Policy" (FR citation here), seeks to comprehensively re-frame the structures and operation of the regulation of inbound foreign investment and to exploit it in ways that align private and public interest along nationals security frameworks. That requires both the creaton of walls and the exploitation of opportunity.

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The PRC is also increasingly exploiting United States capital to develop and modernize its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which poses significant risk to the United States homeland and Armed Forces of the United States around the world. Related actions include the development and deployment of dual-use technologies, weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and malicious cyber‑enabled actions against the United States and its people.

The justification is not surprising except for its breadth and development.  What had been fractured reactions now serve as the basis for positive actin and provide a structure for the projection of national security both inward and outward around  and through investment markets.  

Investment at all costs is not always in the national interest, however. Certain foreign adversaries, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), systematically direct and facilitate investment in United States companies and assets to obtain cutting-edge technologies, intellectual property, and leverage in strategic industries. The PRC pursues these strategies in diverse ways, both visible and concealed, and often through partner companies or investment funds in third countries.

The target (at least the official target identified in the Executive Order, appears to be the People's Republic of China.

Economic security is national security. The PRC does not allow United States companies to take over their critical infrastructure, and the United States should not allow the PRC to take over United States critical infrastructure. PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of United States technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports, and shipping terminals. 

Nonetheless, the rules and certainly its conceptual baselines are applicable universally. There is a mimesis here as well. That mimesis is presented as reciprocity, but it is better characterized as dialectical mimesis--the replication of action designed as a sort of communication that leads to changes in the positions of both parties.

The object is to "reduce the exploitation of public and private sector capital, technology, and technical knowledge by foreign adversaries such as the PRC." (E.O. §1(e). To those ends, the "United States will establish new rules to stop United States companies and investors from investing in industries that advance the PRC’s national Military-Civil Fusion strategy and stop PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets, allowing only those investments that serve American interests." (Ibid.). 

Investments with be three tracked.  Fort favored investments a fast track; for disfavored investment the opposite, and as a bonus for investment over $1 billion environmental review will be expedited.  

(c) The United States will create an expedited “fast-track” process, based on objective standards, to facilitate greater investment from specified allied and partner sources in United States businesses involved with United States advanced technology and other important areas. This process will allow for increased foreign investment subject to appropriate security provisions, including requirements that the specified foreign investors avoid partnering with United States foreign adversaries.

(d) My Administration will also expedite environmental reviews for any investment over $1 billion in the United States.

It is not clear yet what any of this means in operation, but the thrust and direction of that regulatory architecture is clear enough.  In the end, a corp of techno-administrators, under the direction of the President and his advisors, of course, will exercise substantial discretion at all levels of review and assessment.  Section 3(a) vests broad regulatory authority in identified agencies. Regulatory details, of course, will make all the difference in the way these regulations are actualized, and perhaps extended beyond China. 

The text of the "America First Investment Policy" follows below.  The convergence with China's New Era policies continues apace. It makes sense in a way--the two apex powers, like the largest competitors in  a field of market activity (in this case the market for political authority) will tend to resemble each other more and more as their rivals are eliminated and the need for the stabilization of relations between them and the care and management of their dependent states and production chains begins to produce a dialectical iterative nemesis that eventually aligns action, adjusted of course, fr the discourse and practices of the political-economic model which serves as the cognitive cages of each. This is not only necessary, but also deeply embedded in the systemic thinking of the times. At some point the apex hegemons must align their ways of doing things if only because they must deeply intertwine their practices in order to rationalize both their internal and external relations within a stable and orderly system of power. There will be conflicts at the edges--but as long as the hegemons  are content to divide things between them, then it is natural tat they adopt a common language and approach to the systems which both impose each in their own spheres. . . . at least until the time comes when either or both decide that it is time to eliminate the other; either is weakened, another surges forward, or the whole system collapses from its accumulating contradictions. But that is for the long term. It may be useful to note, that convergence does not mean identity. Neither is the United States inching toward Marxist-Leninism nor is China lurching towards liberal democracy.  Each remains itself--what is changing is the semiotics of those objects, Marxist-Leninism and liberal democracy, within the conceptual cages of which both states continue to comfortably reside, even as each reshapes the signification of the systems that bind them.

There is much more to this than  the FDI element--a subject for a later post. Nonetheless, this is the basic postulate of political semiotics. For the rest--revolution, transformation, submission, or resistance. Nonetheless, within post-global imperial systems less interested (for the most past) in territory than in control, the issue of sovereignty will be often serve as the cloaking discursive trope beneath which power relations are sorted. 

习近平：健全全面从严治党体系 [Xi Jinping: Improve the system of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party]

 

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 The 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Congress made it quite clear that Chinese style socialist modernization  had moved again to the center of policy. With it, and as one of its essential elements was the objective of high quality production. Socialist modernization is meant to apply to all of the productive forces of the nation. And those productive forces all must engage in some process of self-revolution; for economic enterprises that focuses on innovation; for social collectives on high quality engagements with social and cultural practices for state organs it might focus on efficiency and technological innovation to ensure that its functions  fulfill the expectations of the CPC and the masses; and for the vanguard party, the CPC, it must necessarily focus on self-revolution. This self-revolution now acquires a new gloss in the new era of Chinese Marxist Leninism. It must also focus on innovation and high quality production of cadres and systems to ensure the highest level of leadership and guidance. (See generally Social Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) and the New Quality Production of CPC Modernization: 习近平 深入推进党的自我革命 [Xi Jinping, Deepen the Party's Self-Revolution] (Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8, 2024)).

It is with this in mind that one might more fruitfully approach a recent discussion of the CPC's General Secretary, published 18 February: 习近平：健全全面从严治党体系 [Xi Jinping: Improve the system of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party]. Much of this is well worn territory.  What is new is the new era gloss of innovative high quality productivity--built around the concept of self-revolution, and attached to the project of Party building and discipline.

 

1. The CPC is not only the core of leadership of the nation, but its driving productive force.  "The whole party must always maintain the sobriety and determination to test itself, and take the improvement of the comprehensive and strict governance system as an effective way to continuously push forward the new great project of party building in the new era." [全党必须永葆赶考的清醒和坚定，以健全全面从严治党体系为有效途径，不断把新时代党的建设新的伟大工程推向前进。] That requires innovation in Party building. "Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, we have unswervingly promoted the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, achieved a series of theoretical innovations, practical innovations, and institutional innovations, built a comprehensive and strict governance system for the Party, and opened up a new realm of self-revolution for the century-old Party." [ 党的十八大以来，我们坚定不移推进全面从严治党，取得一系列理论创新、实践创新、制度创新成果，构建起全面从严治党体系，开辟了百年大党自我革命新境界。].

2.  What does Party innovation look like? 

It must be based on the important thoughts of the Party Central Committee on Party building and the important thoughts on the Party's self-revolution, adhere to and strengthen the Party's overall leadership and the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, implement the general requirements of Party building in the new era, and use systematic thinking and scientific methods to promote the full coverage of Party management and governance, the full coverage of objects, the full chain of responsibilities, and the full integration of systems, and further improve the comprehensive and strict Party governance system with complete elements, complete functions, scientific norms, and efficient operation. [必须以党中央关于党的建设的重要思想、关于党的自我革命的重要思想为根本遵循，坚持和加强党的全面领导和党中央集中统一领导，贯彻落实新时代党的建设总要求，用系统思维、科学方法推进管党治党内容全涵盖、对象全覆盖、责任全链条、制度全贯通，进一步健全要素齐全、功能完备、科学规范、运行高效的全面从严治党体系。]

The object is to build a better infrastructure of command and control operations radiating fro the center. To those ends the focus is on systems.

3. This systemic innovation is built around five elements: (1) "First, improve the organizational system that is connected from top to bottom and has a strong implementation. " [第一，健全上下贯通、执行有力的组织体系。]; (2)  "Second, improve the education system that consolidates the foundation and strengthens the mind." [第二，健全固本培元、凝心铸魂的教育体系。]; (3) "Third, improve the regulatory system that is precise and effective and addresses both the symptoms and root causes." [第三，健全精准发力、标本兼治的监管体系] ; (4) "Fourth, establish a scientific, complete, effective and practical system" [第四，健全科学完备、有效管用的制度体系]; (5) "Fifth, establish a responsibility system with clear subjects and requirements." [第五，健全主体明确、要求清晰的责任体系。]. The approach is comprehensive--systems, theory, rules, practical efficiency and assessment/accountability. Yet this is basic institutional practice--the question revolves around innovation. That may lie within the systems element. Innovative party productivity requires an innovative layered system. " System construction must be adapted to the needs of managing and governing the Party, and be matched with the various Party constructions, and weave a cage of systems in all directions." [制度建设要与管党治党需要相适应、与党的各项建设相配套，全方位织密制度的笼子。]. Whether that can be delivered remains  to be seem, but all of it will require a substantial element of tech and tech based biog data governance model to pull it together.

Sovereignty as the State System "Flavor of the Month": Mexico Ramps Up its Sovereignty-Enhancing Legal Architecture (Presidenta anuncia iniciativa constitucional para reforzar la defensa de la soberanía nacional)

 

Pix credit here (Mel Brooks, History of the World Part 1 (1981))

It seems that the defense of sovereignty is very much in the air. It is a complicated business, however. The United States can  extend, for example, the definition of invasion of its sovereignty and its territory to include both mass migration and the incursions of non-state actors asserting military-political-economic power--in this case global criminal gangs  many of them based in Mexico.  At the same time, the United States might take the position that sovereignty and territorial integrity are purely contextual, and in the case of Ukraine, for example, a basis for bargaining against the interests of larger powers (in this case the United States and the Russian Federation). 

The two track approach to sovereign integrity and the rights to define and defend it, then, appears to be moving to a multi-track system. Thar system appears to leave intact the fundamental notion of sovereign equality among states as a conceptual matter.  On the other hand, it also appears to embrace the notion that sovereignty is also an object--a commodity--the negotiation of which may be a function of relations among states. The commodification of sovereignty (however one wishes to define it with more precision though that is a moving target) within a two track framework appears to allow apex (US and China) or near apex (the Russian Federation, the EU and perhaps others) states somewhat more leeway in bargaining away sovereign rights (including rights to territory and the exploitation of national productive forces) than it does with states lower on the rungs of power (however that is ascertained, again a moving target and highly contextual and situational). Thus for example, within the emerging conceptual frameworks, apex states may be relatively unconstrained (as log as it is managed through law or cages of legality) in projecting power in defense or the full realization of their sovereignty (however they conceive of it in whatever ideal form appeals from time to time) as a "natural" expression of their prerogatives. The same prerogatives, however, might be unavailable to other states--for example should the United States of Mexico seek to project power into the United States in defense of its own notions of sovereignty.  Or less of a conjecture, the way that Ukrainian efforts to project military power into Russia after the invasions of 2014 and 2022, have been effectively prohibited, constrained, or subject to the approval of the apex states bankrolling the Ukrainian military efforts. 

For middle and lower tier states within this framework, this ought to cause some worry.  It is clear that whatever passed for guarantees and assurances, especially those of apex states, may not be worth the bandwidth (or paper) used to record them. They certainly have proven at the very least, subject to an extraordinary and quite elegantly elastic semiotics of interpretation which almost miraculously always seems to serve the then contemporary interest of the apex power applying them.  It is also clear that the semiotics of the concept of sovereignty--that is, its signification (the bundle of principles or aggregations of characteristics with which the term is packed), and its collective interpretation within the community of states (that is conceptual phenomenology--its fulfillment of meaning through application)--provides the term tremendous cognitive power in the abstract and far less protection when applied. 

It is in this context now useful to begin to understand the way that middle level states--especially those within the orbits (whether  they want to orbit or not) of apex states--may be approaching responses to this sovereignty multi-layering. The Ukrainian situation is to some extent exceptional--though it is interesting in that context to see how Ukraine seeks to leverage what is of interest to a distant if fickle patron (its mineral resources) against the inclination of a apex and near apex states to determine the "as applied" meaning of Ukrainian sovereign expectations on the ground, all the while using that as a means of frightening another near apex collection of States (the EU) to upend what appears to be a radical shift in the core alliances of the United States apex--from US-EU to US-Russia, with the intention, ultimately perhaps, of carving up Europe after both have digested Ukraine. That would leave at least 2 but perhaps 2.5 apex states around which others may cluster (for example India to the new US-Russia combine, and Pakistan to China, etc. both of which would do what they must to preserve what they can). This is of course, wild conjecture and unlikely to be true in any respect. It in scenario planning exercises it might be worth including. 

 

Less of a conjecture is the example of Mexico.  The Mexican Republic's President on 20 February 2025 announced a sovereignty enhancing legal framework: Presidenta anuncia iniciativa constitucional para reforzar la defensa de la soberanía nacional; con EUA hay coordinación, no injerencismo [President announces constitutional initiative to strengthen the defense of national sovereignty; with the US there is coordination, not interference]. Its object was to modify Mexican law (including that of its constitution) to ensure that Mexico would not accept any type of foreign intervention, and that individuals violating this rule would be severely punished. The legal reform, of course, sets up a quite interesting challenge to the U.S. which, in defense of its own sovereignty has declared a number of non-state (criminal) organizations based in Mexico or operated on Mexican territory  terrorist enterprises (Terrorist Designations of International Cartels (20 February 2025))  the designation of which might provide U.S. legal authority to project its power within Mexican territory ("That means stopping the campaigns of violence and terror by these vicious groups both in the United States and internationally. These designations provide law enforcement additional tools to stop these groups." Ibid.). The action applies not merely to the projection of the police power, but also to projection of prosecutorial authority (including investigations) within Mexico. 

The intent is clear: "“¿Qué significa esto? Colaboramos, nos coordinamos, trabajamos juntos, pero no hay injerencismo, no hay violación a la soberanía." [“What does this mean? We collaborate, we coordinate, we work together, but there is no interference, there is no violation of sovereignty." ] (Presidenta anuncia iniciativa constitucional ). The best case scenario, of course, is that there will be no intervention without the consent of the Mexican State apparatus, though whatever systems are created with respect to those issues. The less best case, though, is that this provides window dressing, and preserves at east formally a shred of dignity, within the context of unequal bargaining that appears to be the emerging expectation among the community of states as they move from a unitary convergence model, to one grounded in fractured convergences within apex state hub and spoke models of state management.

This action was taken just days after Presidebt Sheinbaum addressed the gatering of military offiials celebrating the 112th Anniversary of the Mexican Army (En el 112 Aniversario del Ejército Mexicano, reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con la soberanía: presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum [On the 112th Anniversary of the Mexican Army, we reaffirm our commitment to sovereignty: President Claudia Sheinbaum]). Expressing the view that the Mexican military were the guardians of Mexican sovereignty and the defenders of peace in Mexico, President Sheinbaum stated: 

“Hoy, en un aniversario más del Ejército Mexicano, ante la bandera que ondea con dignidad, reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con la soberanía, que es un derecho inalienable, un grito de libertad que resuena en nuestros corazones, es la certeza de que unidos, como un solo pueblo podemos enfrentar cualquier adversidad; cuando nuestro pueblo se une en torno a su historia, su patria y su bandera no hay fuerza en el mundo que pueda doblegar su espíritu” [“Today, on another anniversary of the Mexican Army, before the flag that waves with dignity, we reaffirm our commitment to our sovereignty, which is an inalienable right, a cry for freedom that resonates in our hearts, it is the certainty that united, as one people, we can face any adversity; when our people unite around their history, their homeland and their flag, there is no force in the world that can break their spirit.”] (Ibid)

All of this expresses both the challenges and the growing pains of a system of post-global arrangements that are in a formative stage of development, that may never succeed in attaining their vision--or that might.  Worth noting, as well, is the convergence of the imagery and ceremonials of these high level public discourses. The holding up of the text of action to be undertaken, the ceremonies on its authorization. Here there is little that separates apex from lower tiered state--it is to the sovereignty of text that States appear now to base their incarnated sovereignty within territorial spaces and the cognitive spaces of collective solidarity.

The English and Spanish language versions of the text of  Presidenta anuncia iniciativa constitucional para reforzar la defensa de la soberanía nacional; con EUA hay coordinación, no injerencismo [President announces constitutional initiative to strengthen the defense of national sovereignty; with the US there is coordination, not interference] and of En el 112 Aniversario del Ejército Mexicano, reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con la soberanía: presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum [On the 112th Anniversary of the Mexican Army, we reaffirm our commitment to sovereignty: President Claudia Sheinbaum] follow below. One awaits the movement from discourse to action.

 

习近平：民营经济发展前景广阔大有可为 民营企业和民营企业家大显身手正当其时 [Xi Jinping: The development prospects of the private economy are broad and promising. It is the right time for private enterprises and private entrepreneurs to show their talents] and the Maturing of the two unwaverings [两个毫不动摇] policy

 

Pix credit here

 

习近平在民营企业座谈会上强调: (1) 民营经济发展前景广阔大有可为; (2) 民营企业和民营企业家大显身手正当其时 [Xi Jinping stressed the following at the private enterprise symposium: (1) The development prospects of the private economy are broad and promising; (2)  It is the right time for private enterprises and private entrepreneurs to show their talents] (习近平：民营经济发展前景广阔大有可为 民营企业和民营企业家大显身手正当其时 )

 

Pix credit here

 The General Secretary of the Communist Party of China presided over a symposium at which entrepreneurs of private enterprises were  invited to attend, provide their views and then hear what official accounts described as an important responsive speech by General Secretary Xi. The meeting received global attention, though the spin outside of China was slightly different than that within China. Notably the Wall Street Journal (China Changes Tack on Tech Titans) emphasized both the reactive nature of the meeting and the rehabilitation of a quite prominent business leader who had been disciplined in 2020. The coverage was not among the lead stories in the print edition, appearing only as the lead article on the "World News" section, p. A-12 alongside the story of airplane accident in Toronto.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping signaled to leading technology entrepreneurs and CEOs that he needed their help to deliver economic growth and self-sufficiency, more than four years after a crackdown by Beijing that dented confidence. Many of China’s most prominent business people gathered in Beijing to meet Xi on Monday, taking notes as Xi spoke from the front of the room, according to a video shown on state television.* * * The most striking face at the meeting was Jack Ma, co-founder and longtime leader of e-commerce and cloud-computing company Alibaba, who sat in the front row. The once-outspoken Ma has been largely absent from public view since he angered Xi with a speech in October 2020, and his companies were at the forefront of Beijing’s years-long tech-sector clampdown.

 The symposium, and the discussion by the General Secretary, however one frames the political narratives around it, was important if only to add clarity to the way that the policy of the two unwaverings [两个毫不动摇 (liǎnggè háobù dòngyáo)] is now being refined after the 3rd Plenum of the 20th Party Congress and its important developments of socialist (Chinese stye) modernization and high quality production within it (See 切实落实“两个毫不动摇” 习近平这样要求 [Xi Jingping Requires the Practical Implementation of the Two Unwaverings policy] the Chinese and English text of which follow below). It also suggests both the instrumental nature of markets, and even more the complementary-instrumental nature of the private sector.  It in this this respect that one might better appreciate the reporting of the General Secretary's participation in the event: "The General Secretary's concern and support for the private economy has a long history: "I have always supported private enterprises, and I have worked in places where the private economy is relatively developed. * * * General Secretary reiterated: "The basic principles and policies of the Party and the State for the development of the private economy have been incorporated into the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. They will be consistently adhered to and implemented. They cannot and will not change.""[“我是一贯支持民营企业的，也是在民营经济比较发达的地方干过来的。” * * * 总书记再次强调：“党和国家对民营经济发展的基本方针政策，已经纳入中国特色社会主义制度体系，将一以贯之坚持和落实，不能变，也不会变。”] ( “我是一贯支持民营企业的” ["I have always supported private enterprises"]).

That is significant for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most important of these is that it suggests the role that the private sector is to play in the elaboration of high quality production (in some sense a leading and risk taking role). The role is essentially unchanged though now guided by 3rd Plenum goals and forms. And it remains strikingly different from current manifestation of European Marxist-Leninism in which the private sector is understood as useful only within strictly contained consumer market fields. Cuba is perhaps the best example of that old European approach in contemporary guide. Perhaps another touches on the way that this role is to be undertaken in fulfillment of the larger policy objectives of socialist modernization (and the challenge of the current general contradiction), to which the innovations of the private sector will be utilized by the state sector as the leading force of deploying the nation's productive forces in the service of and under the leadership and of the CPC.  If the private sector is meant ot serve as innovation incubators, it is also meant to be built so that its innovations (and perhaps its operations) can be both more closely aligned with larger state owned or controlled enterprises, or be willing to yield productive innovation to them for more efficient elaboration on a comprehensive basis  through the more intimate connections between CSOEs and State-Party organs. Lastly, the symposium points to the specific fields of economic activity in which State organs, under Party leadership and guidance are emphasizing as of significance to the basket of development through which a guided Socialist Modernization is realized.  That last point ought to be of the greatest significance to foreigners with whom Chinese enterprises engage or compete. Particularity relevant may be the way in which thew working styles, division of authority (and markets), and points of emphasis and subsidy will shape the nature, character and quantum of Chinese overseas investments.

The text of the summary report, 习近平：民营经济发展前景广阔大有可为 民营企业和民营企业家大显身手正当其时  [Xi Jinping: The development prospects of the private economy are broad and promising. It is the right time for private enterprises and private entrepreneurs to show their talents], along with the reporting on the seminar ( “我是一贯支持民营企业的” ["I have always supported private enterprises"]), follow below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation.

Pix credit here (Xi says it is wrong to 'bad mouth' China's state forms. . . but country needs private sector as well; Chinese President says state owned enter`rises should grow stronger, better, larger, byt that reforms show private enter`rises could 'boost their confidence' 2018)

Additional brief reflections:

1. Here is the deal envisioned through the two unwaverings [两个毫不动摇 (liǎnggè háobù dòngyáo)] policy:

"We hope that private enterprises and private entrepreneurs will have the ambition to serve the country, focus on development, abide by the law and operate well, and promote common prosperity by getting rich first, so as to make new and greater contributions to promoting Chinese-style modernization. [希望广大民营企业和民营企业家胸怀报国志、一心谋发展、守法善经营、先富促共富，为推进中国式现代化作出新的更大的贡献。]

The ambition of private enterprise ought to be tied to the ambition of the State, and the ambition of the State is the manifestation of the guidance and leadership of the CPC; it would follow that the ambition of the private sector must align completely with the ambition of the CPC as it is manifested in its construction of the Socialist Market Economy. Private enterprise serves the country by serving the CPC. Considered fully, one can understand this as a further refinement of Sange Daibiao (the "three representations") within the framework of post 3rd Plenum development of the conception of socialist modernization as the policy engine around which the state apparatus is constructed under the guidance and direction of the CPC (considered in a constitutional context during the leadership of Hu Jintao in The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism). It is within this framework that the two track of public and private enterprise form lanes that together constitute an important element of the pathway through which the Socialist path can be moved correctly. That, anyway, is one way of understanding the theory.

2. Here the the core objective for economic structuring--achieving socialist modernization correctly within the cognitive cage of New Era Chinese Marxist-Leninism. 

"The Party and the State adhere to and improve the basic socialist economic system, unswervingly consolidate and develop the public economy, unswervingly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public economy; the Party and the State ensure that all kinds of ownership economies use production factors equally in accordance with the law, participate in market competition fairly, and are equally protected by law, promote the complementary advantages and common development of various ownership economies, and promote the healthy development of the non-public economy and the healthy growth of non-public economic personnel." [党和国家坚持和完善社会主义基本经济制度，毫不动摇巩固和发展公有制经济，毫不动摇鼓励、支持、引导非公有制经济发展；党和国家保证各种所有制经济依法平等使用生产要素、公平参与市场竞争、同等受到法律保护，促进各种所有制经济优势互补、共同发展，促进非公有制经济健康发展和非公有制经济人士健康成长。]

That cognitive cage starts from the presumption that private enterprises are utilizing productive forces--and the means of production--which are State assets, only by permission of those responsible for their utilization. These means of production do not lose their public character even when they are permitted to be used to enhance production within private enterprises.  It is in this way that one can understand both the notion of complementarity and of the overall public nature of the socialist market economy.  That is, that the economy, driven my markets, is in turn driven by and formed to maximize the fulfillment of, the public objectives which are a central element of economic activity. To those ends, and within those boundaries, individuals and firms may utilize markets and market practices. But socialist markets are goal oriented markets. And the goals are articulated by the CPC and internationalized through the state apparatus.  And that, in turn, suggests the risk allocation elements of the "deal."  Private entrepreneurs may be allowed to "get rich" (to the extent permitted) as a incentive for activity with respect to which they are the principle risk bearers. The risk controllers are the CPC and the State apparatus. The means of controlling risk is regulation. Here one encounters the critical element of complementarity--the fundamental allocation of risk and risk bearing between public actors and private entrepreneurs.  In the wake of the 3rd Plenum development of socialist modernization and high quality production concepts driven by innovation, the State profits even more. Effectively complementarity suggests that private sector activity drives higher risk based innovation, which it s pays off rewards the risk takers materially (they get richer) and the State immensely more. The State benefits from the arrangement by directing the private sector to fields of economic activity where higher risk innovation is in the national interest (for example today in the tech sector). Where the risk taking pays off and innovation produces new products, processes, etc., the State can then profir form it by deploying it nationally through its state sector enterprises.  Where risk produces no reward, the private sector bears its costs (loss of investment etc.).

3. This is possible only if those who may utilize the means of production undertake that activity strictly under the guidance of the CPC and the State--and that guidance is given form though law/rule/regulation/oversight. It is in this sense that one can better situate the focus on legality that is attached to and becomes a defining feature of private enterprise in socialist markets. 

"At the same time, we must realize that China is a socialist country under the rule of law, and the illegal acts of enterprises of all ownership types cannot be evaded." [中国特色社会主义制度具有多方面显著优势，社会主义市场经济体制、中国特色社会主义法治体系不断健全和完善，将为民营经济发展提供更为坚强的保障。]

Socialist legality, in that sense, then, can be understood as the means through which the guidance of the CPC in the utilization of the means of production by private sector enterprises, can be made mandatory.  This is not a uniquely Leninist practice.  It has become the standard approach  in liberal democratic regimes associated both with the rise of a compliance based regulatory regime for enterprises and in the way that markets driven international soft law is hardened through regulation that is meant  to enhance policy guidance from liberal democratic political organs. An example is the move toward regimes of mandatory human rights due diligence in enterprise management of behaviors within their global supply chains.

4. Serving the country: that is the essence of the deal of complementarity, and the expectations built into the permission for private sector firms to utilize the means of production:

" The majority of private enterprises and private entrepreneurs should be full of passion for entrepreneurship and serving the country, constantly improve their ideals, cultivate a sense of home and country, think of their roots and progress, promote the entrepreneurial spirit, concentrate on strengthening, optimizing and expanding enterprises, and firmly become builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics and promoters of Chinese-style modernization." [广大民营企业和民营企业家要满怀创业和报国激情，不断提升理想境界，厚植家国情怀，富而思源、富而思进，弘扬企业家精神，专心致志做强做优做大企业，坚定做中国特色社会主义的建设者、中国式现代化的促进者。]

Passion is expected, risking taking is expected, profit is the incentive, and adhering to the direction of the State is the responsibility of the private sector.  It is in this sense that complementarity assumes its character--not as add on, but as an incubator on a vast scale, and a gap filler, where the direct intervention of the State is inefficient.

5. The public character of the private sector is understood and embedded in the behavior expectations of private enterprises. Yet this is nothing new--charitable expectations have deep historical roots.  And that, too, aligns with current New Era policies to reach back into history to retrieve and apply ancient practices in contemporary form within the normative parameters of New Era Chinese Marxist-Leninism.

"We must actively fulfill our social responsibilities, actively build harmonious labor relations, do a good job in ecological environmental protection, participate in public welfare and charity to the best of our ability, and give more love to the society." [要积极履行社会责任，积极构建和谐劳动关系，抓好生态环境保护，力所能及参与公益慈善事业，多向社会奉献爱心。]

In this case, private enterprises, like public enterprises, are understood to be instruments of public policy. Where that instrumental quality can be directly deployed by State organs  in their (ownership) control over state enterprises, private enterprises may be managed through deepening layers of regulation, compliance mandates and oversight (effectively the European model but with Chinese characteristics in the broadest case, or otherwise an interesting convergence in regulatory sensibilities).

6. And within the context of the two unwaverings [两个毫不动摇] within the Socialist Modernization of the means of production--of economic, social, cultural and political activity--  the CPC itself, and through them the state apparatus, must also continue to innovate its own productive capacities and meet the challenges of the current general contradiction through the mechanisms of public and private economic activity.

"Xi Jinping emphasized that some of the difficulties and challenges currently facing the development of the private economy are generally in the process of reform and development, industrial transformation and upgrading. They are local rather than overall, temporary rather than long-term, and can be overcome rather than unsolvable. We must unify our thoughts and actions with the judgment of the Party Central Committee on the domestic and international situation, and with the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee on economic work, see the future, see the light, and see the future in difficulties and challenges, maintain development determination, enhance development confidence, and maintain the spirit of fighting and winning." [习近平强调，当前民营经济发展面临的一些困难和挑战，总体上是在改革发展、产业转型升级过程中出现的，是局部的而不是整体的，是暂时的而不是长期的，是能够克服的而不是无解的。要把思想和行动统一到党中央对国内外形势的判断上来，统一到党中央对经济工作的决策部署上来，在困难和挑战中看到前途、看到光明、看到未来，保持发展定力、增强发展信心，保持爱拼会赢的精气神。]

Self-revolution (自我革命) and CPC discipline, then, becomes the core challenge for the vanguard in a system that is wholly dependent on the correct operation of the CPC within its own institutional spaces. The essence of the relationship is dialectical in two respects.  The first is external--the dialectics between private enterprises and the CPC itself and mimics the mass line. That was the essence of the Symposium and the nature of the way the meeting was arranged. The second is internal--(习近平：健全全面从严治党体系 [Xi Jinping: Improve the system of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party]). Its essence is straightforward 

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, we have unswervingly promoted the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, achieved a series of theoretical innovations, practical innovations, and institutional innovations, built a comprehensive and strict governance system for the Party, and opened up a new realm of self-revolution for the century-old Party. [党的十八大以来，我们坚定不移推进全面从严治党，取得一系列理论创新、实践创新、制度创新成果，构建起全面从严治党体系，开辟了百年大党自我革命新境界。].

"Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies" Mr. Trump's Executive Order of February 18, 2025

 

Pix Credit NYT

 Mr. Trump signed an executive order effectively putting back on the table the issue of the extent of Presidential authority over the administrative apparatus of the State. The Executive Order, "Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies" (90 FR 10447) is grounded on the idea that past practices effectively amounted to an acquiesce of a practice that is neither required nor perhaps permitted under the Constitution ("previous administrations have allowed so-called “independent regulatory agencies” to operate with minimal Presidential supervision.  These regulatory agencies currently exercise substantial executive authority without sufficient accountability to the President, and through him, to the American people" §1).

 The order requires independent agencies to submit their proposed regulations to the White House for review, asserts a power to block such agencies from spending funds on projects or efforts that conflict with presidential priorities, and declares that they must accept the president’s and the Justice Department’s interpretation of the law as binding. (NYT)

In the American Republic old disagreement never die, they are just shunted off into the judicial sphere  and choices protected behind the paywall narratives of the role of the courts and the rule of law--unless that is inconvenient (e.g., Dred Scott).  Or they are left to academics and intellectuals to stir the pot, usually over decades, from out of which it might be possible either to pierce the judicial paywall (the usual and preferred consensus method) or challenged directly, crudely, and in the political spheres. The issue of the "unitary executive" is one that as been a issue from the time of the founding of the Republic, but in its current form is aligned to the development of administrative bureaucracies that reached "escape velocity" with the needs of a response to the Great Depression of 1929. The arguments that eventually coalesced around the so-called unitary executive theory lost--and they lost decisively it appeared in the mid 1930s.  But they returned first as an intellectual and then as a jurisprudential exercise with greater resonance from the time of the first Administration of Ronald Reagan. In that period the arguments were elegant and largely ignored except for polite debate that found its way into American Law Reviews--which is a fate akin to oblivion (eg here). But with the election of Mr. Trump the issue has again exploded--and it has exploded because in Mr. Trump those who find value in this theory and its implementation found a political risk taker bold enough to make the issue unavoidable.

Here is a nice summary:

One of the most long-standing complaints of American conservatives concerns the emergence, growth, and spreading mandates of the so-called “administrative state.” The Trump administration framed this in a typically crude way as the malign “deep state” of unelected bureaucrats doing the bidding of shadowy elites against the interests of ordinary Americans. Trump and his advisors like Steve Bannon vowed that they would smash the deep state as their first order of business.

This latest salvo simply echoes conservative critiques that multiplied as the New Deal got under way in the 1930s and created the plethora of administrative agencies like the National Labor Relations Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission. A variety of charges were laid against these federal agencies, beginning with the idea that the U.S. Constitution did not permit delegation of authority from Congress to unelected bureaucrats, and that these agencies violated the Constitution’s principle of separated powers. One of the drivers of Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing effort was the resistance of the Supreme Court at the time to these expansions of executive power within the federal government. (The Administrative State)

There is much more to this than this bald recounting.  And that is what makes the current action all the more interesting. It brings to a head--again--the debates that were quite vigorous engaged in in the 1930s but now in the shadow of a history of the consequences of the choices made then. At its core are many fundamental issues one of which particularly resonates: In a government apparatus the generative legitimacy and authority of which is grounded on a principle of separation of powers (however they might be interpreted and reinterpreted by the courts), how does one deal with the necessity, and perhaps the inevitability, of the organs of administration the essence of which is entirely the negation of separation of powers principles (combining in the common parlance quasi-judicial, executive and legislative authority) within organs of government that are not directly connected to the related theory of representative democracy that posits some sort of direct connection (again within a range of judicial (re)constructions) connection ought to exist between political officials and the people who elected them 

There are all sorts of theories that have been elaborated to make people feel better about the attenuation of the relationship between government officials and the people, and to rationalize the constitution of organs of government that invert the principle of separation of powers within a document the core principle of which is separation. And several theories that are meant to challenge the dominant constitutional cognitive cages within which the American political-economic model has operated, more or less efficiently, since the 1930s. Many of these over the last century have even attained something like quasi-constitutional adherence, though that too puts to the question the issue of the extent to which a constitutional court ought to be able to construct/construe ac constitutional text--again for which many theories have been advanced (some embraced by ruling elites) that reduce the urgency or even the legitimacy of the question or of a response other than--leave it alone. 

All of these issues have, if the players are smart and clever enough--been put back in play. The Republic was built to permit and perhaps invite those sorts of fundamental discussion by the people as they choose  to ways and principles under which they would consent to be governed for the public good and the defense of the Republic. And it is up to those who are heirs to the current approaches and principles to defend them and use them in ways that advance whatever arguments they may offer in the defense of the system constructed. Thus, that play includes those who would undo the 1930's resolution of crisis, those who have their sights set on the scope of judicial intervention in constitutional interpretation, and those who, much more ambitiously, wish to revisit the American political-economic model itself.  And it includes both the defenders of the contemporary system and its mechanics, as well as those who would further develop its trajectories toward more refined constitutional managerial. 

All is fair I suppose given the political character of the Republic adopted by the people in the late 18th century. But fair is fair--and these are the sorts of questions that ought either to be routed through  the modalities of textual amendment of the constitutional document, or otherwise permit a broad discussion. It would be a pity is these important debates remain nothing more than a bauble to be tossed around by elites or drivers or hierarchs none of whom have any mandate to undertake that task. Ironically, all of these issues may well be decided by the US Supreme Court, effectively conforming the structures of the post 1930s order, even if the substance of the decision appears to undo one of its signature innovations. Reporting here, here, here, here. and here.

The test of the Executive Order follows.  It may be accessed HERE.