Thursday, August 25, 2011

Norwegian SWF Excludes Grupo Carso SAB de CV From Its Investment Universe

Today, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance announced the exclusion of the Mexican company, Grupo Carso SAB de CV from the investment universe of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund--Global. 


 (From Yahoo Finance, Grupo Carso SAB-A1 (Aug. 24, 2011 )

The determination was straightforward, involving application of the settled rule that the Fund would not invest in companies that produce tobacco either directly or indirectly. 
According to the guidelines for observation and exclusion of companies from the Pension Fund Global, Section 2 (1) b), “The assets in the Fund shall not be invested in companies which themselves or through entities they control: […] produce tobacco”. The Council has assessed Grupo Carso and the company has made it clear that it owns 69.94 percent of the company Compañia Mercantil de Productos de Tabaco S.A de CV, which produces tobacco products. The company has also stated to the Council that it owns 20 percent of Philip Morris S.A de CV, which produces cigarettes. Against this background, the Council has recommended that Grupo Carso be excluded from the Fund’s investment universe.(From Norway Ministry of Finance, Press Release: Tobacco producer excluded from the Government Pension Fund Global, Aug. 24, 2011).

The Ministry action was based on a recommendation of the  Council of Ethics (Recommendation on the exclusion of Grupo Carso SAB de CV from the GPFG, 15 February 2011),  which itself was straightforward in it application of settled principles.  It reads substantially as follows:

1 Introduction

The GPFG’s ethical guidelines’ paragraph 21 states,
The Fund’s shares shall not be invested in companies which, themselves, or through entities they control, produce tobacco.”

The Council on Ethics continuously monitors the Fund’s investment portfolio in order to identify companies which carry out activities that may be inconsistent with the ethical guidelines. This review has shown that the Mexican company Grupo Carso SAB de CV2 could be involved in the production of tobacco.

2 Contact with the company

In September 2010, the Council on Ethics sent a letter to Grupo Carso SAB de CV to enquire as to whether the company produces tobacco3, either itself or through entities under its control. The company responded to the inquiry and made it clear that it owns 69, 94 percent of the company Compañia Mercantil de Productos de Tabaco S.A de CV, which produces tobacco products. The company further informs that it owns 20 percent of Philip Morris S.A de CV, which produces cigarettes.4

3 The Council on Ethics’ evaluation

The Council on Ethics considers that the company’s ownership of Compañia Mercantil de Productos de Tabaco S.A de CV falls within the ethical guidelines’ criterion of control. Consequently, Grupo Carso SAB de CV produces tobacco through a company it controls.

4 Recommendation

Based on the information above, the Council on Ethics recommends the exclusion of the company Grupo Carso SAB de CV Ltd. from the investment universe of the Government Pension Fund Global.

***
[signed]
Gro Nystuen Dag Olav Hessen Ylva Lindberg Ola Mestad Bente Rathe Chairman


1 The guidelines for the observation and exclusion of companies from the investment universe of the Government Pension Fund Global
2 Sedol: 2393452
3 Letter from the Council on Ethics to Grupo Carso SAB de CV, 16 September 2010 4 Letter from Grupo Carso SAB de CV to the Council on Ethics, 22 October 2010

The Ministry's decision and the Council's recommendation are made publicly available when Norges Bank has divested in the relevant securities. The decision has not had an immediate impact on share prices which continue to trade near their 52 week low.  See Grupo Carso SAB de CV (GCARSOA1.MX). More interesting will be the effects several days out from the action. 

(From http://drpinna.com/the-fda-attacks-big-tobacco-14418)


The decision, of course, is a welcome extension of the work of the Council. It does emphasize, however, several points that bear significantly on the work of the Council, its mission, and its effectiveness.  

First,  the amount of time needed to take action, even with respect to routine application of the Guidelines, continues to be significant.  That time lag built into the process may contribute adversely to the ability of the Ethics Council to perform efficiently.  The initial letter of inquiry was sent to Grupo Carso dated September 16, 2010.  Grupo Carso's response was delivered promptly, dated October 22, 2010.  The recommendation of the Ethics Council was dated February 15, 2011, and Ministry of Finance action occurred almost half a year later (August 24, 2011).  The process leading to exclusion appears designed to slow rather than speed decision making. One important consequence might be to slow  or limit the ability of the Council to investigate companies.  That limitation, in turn, might reduce the effectiveness of the Council.

Second, this decision suggests the potential value to routinization.  Where, as in this case, the rules are clear, and the only issue is factual, it ought to be possible to streamline the process from investigation to recommendation and action by the Ministry of Finance.  Even if the ultimate decision of the Ministry is effectively political--in routine cases, like this one involving the production of tobacco with respect to which there is little controversy in Norway, the time to decision could be reduced by simple techniques.  For example, in cases like tobacco, it would be a simple matter to institute a rule that recommendations of the Council will be automatically adopted unless, within 30 days of receipt, the Ministry  either stays the exclusion or reveres it.  Moreover, routine cases might also be easier to transmit to the Ministry in the form of summary proceedings. The Council comes close in the form of recommendation adopted in this case. 

Third, the absence of any discernible routinization and the time lag between initiation and decision leads to the issue of monitoring.  It is not clear how long Grupo Carso shares were held in the investment universe before the monitoring process suggested the need for investigation.  It is also not clear whether there are ways in which non-compliance triggers can be built into the Secretariat's monitoring algorithms. .  

Fourth, with the largest conglomerates, it is sometimes possible to avoid the effects of exclusion through reorganization.  Though there is no present indication fo plans to effectuate such a reorganization to ameliorate the effects of exclusion, the complex of companies of which Grupo Carso is a part, has been known to engage in such actions for the aggregate welfare of the enterprise.  For example, a month aft the Ethics Council sent its letter of inquiry to Grupo Carso representatives, the company filed a notice of reorganization with the U.S. Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 20, 2010), the illustration of which suggests the complexity of modern multinational enterprises.  The action consisted of a multi-part spin off a sections of the company.

The broadest question, of course, touches on the institutional role of the Ethics Council and its work.  There is a hint of that from the procedures within which it operates.  That procedure suggests a more modest role for the Ethics Council within the complex of stakeholders involved in the management of the Fund's investment universe.  Yet, it might also suggest a more important role of the Council and perhaps especially of its Secretariat, behind the scenes.  The long road from initiation of action to Ministry determination may have been devised consciously to provide a temporal space within which Fund stakeholders might reach consensus on action.  And, additionally, it suggests a ceremonial or symbolic role for the Council.  Ethics Council recommendations, then, might be meant to signal standards to the Ministry and NBIM which they might then use in managing the investment universe directly, rather than serve as a critical enforcement node for the composition of that universe. 

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

China's Other Sovereign Wealth Funds--Complexity and Coherence in Sovereign Investing Strategies

For some time, I have been suggesting coherence and complexity in the structuring of Chinese strategies for projecting investment power abroad.  Backer, Larry Catá, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2009; Penn State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-2009.  That strategy has produced not merely China's leading role in the international framework for the management of soft law regulation of sovereign wealth funds (the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds); it has also produced a policy of competitive fracture among its own domestic sovereign wealth funds that may, in the aggregate project power outward and act to stabilize financial markets within China.


My research assistant, Lian Ma, has prepared a short paper generally describing some of the contours of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund investment universe.  The paper is designed to provide a general overview.  Still, certain important themes emerge: (1) Chinese outbound investment is not marked by its uniformity but rather by a loose coordination; (2) Chinese ministries with access to SWFs compete for power, influence and status through these funds, the more successful the funds, the more useful not only as a source of wealth but also internal influence within the state apparatus; (3) the blended objectives of politically targeted wealth maximization tends to provide a framework, but not an inflexible formula, for SWF investment activity; (4) the proliferation of SWFs make it possible to mediate between internal Chinese interests and activities and the expectations of host (mostly developed) states--some SWFs are put out as models and projected westward, others are more internally focused and less in the Western media  (and regulatory) eye (compare CIC with SAFE);   and (5) SWFs are providing China with an important vehicle for making an international mark--the prominence of China in SWF soft regulation, the Chinese involvement in the governance architecture of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds provides an international organization through which China can sharpen its skills in playing a positive leading role in international affairs.   

___________________________




China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund(s)
A Sketch of China’s Major Sovereign Wealth Funds

The following passages include three episodes with each briefly describing one of the three major Chinese state funds, namely, SAFE, CDB, and NSSF, other than the formal Chinese Sovereign Wealth Fund – the CIC.

An Introduction to SAFE

The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is China’s foreign exchange regulator and manager. As China’s foreign exchange reserves have amounted over 3 trillion dollars by early 2011 while the most recent global financial crisis is not showing any sign of recess, whether the huge Chinese wealth will be safe remains a question. This essay provides a brief overview of SAFE with a focus on its overseas investment activities since SAFE has been a low-key Sovereign Wealth Fund of China.

SAFE as a State Organ

SAFE was formally founded in 1979, the year that marked the beginning of China’s economic reform.[1] SAFE has been the state foreign exchange regulator under the direct supervision of the People’s Bank of China (the central bank), which is one of the ministry-level organs under the State Council.[2]

The history of SAFE has witnessed a gradual release of state control over foreign exchanges in the past three decades.[3] There are three phases in the transitioning process of SAFE. The first phase was before the economic reform, during which the Chinese economy was highly controlled by the central government; all foreign exchange had to be sold to the state, and all the uses of foreign exchange were being allocated according to State plans.[4] In the following 15 years, which is the second phase, China’s foreign exchange was transitioning toward a market-economy where central command was being lessened and the role of market adjustment was being increased. During this time, more financial institutions were allowed to have foreign exchange business (Before 1979, only Bank of China could have foreign exchange business). The third phase started from the middle of the 1990s when China gradually established floating foreign exchange rate.[5]

Currently, SAFE maintains control over the operations of the RMB capital account whereas the RMB current account has been open to the market.[6] For the future, SAFE has several goals which include having free exchange of the RMB financial account (convertibility of the RMB capital account), improving the floating currency mechanism, and making the RMB a regional currency.[7]

As SAFE serves more as the state foreign exchange regulator and policymaker rather than as manager and player, most of its functions are regulative in nature, such as “study and propose policy suggestions on the reform of the foreign exchange administration system” and “participate in the drafting of relevant laws, regulations, and departmental rules on foreign exchange administration.”[8] Among the 10 listed “major functions” only two of them are about managing state foreign exchange assets – one is “to undertake operations and management of foreign exchange reserves, gold reserves, and other foreign exchange assets of the state” and the other one is “to take part in relevant international financial activities.” [9]

SAFE is a deputy-ministerial level administration. The organizational structure of SAFE is very much like other government organs that have branches across the country. Headquartered in Beijing, SAFE has 34 branches in China’s provinces and autonomous regions, 2 administrative offices – one in Beijing and one in Chongqing, as well as 298 central sub-branches and 518 sub-branches in cities and counties across China. [10]

The management team is currently headed by Yi Gang, who was a tenured economics professor at Indiana University. [11] Mr. Yi has become the administrator of SAFE from July 2009 while also serving as one of the vice governors of the central bank. Mr. Yi is a scholar-turned currency policy regulator. Before joining China’s central bank in 1997, he was a scholar of economics. He has been tackling China’s inflation issue and pointed out that the transformation of China’s economic development pattern held the key to addressing the inflation issue.[12]

SAFE as a China SWF

Being responsible for managing China’s huge foreign exchange reserve, SAFE has always been one of the major overseas investors before and after the high-profile Chinese sovereign wealth fund – China Investment Corporation (CIC) – was created in 2007. Derek Scissors, a research fellow from The Heritage Foundation, says SAFE is China’s largest overseas investor in the U.S.[13] However, SAFE has not been well known in the world, which is probably because of its role as a government branch rather than a business investor.

SAFE’s overseas investment started from the 1990s.[14] SAFE set up four overseas offices in Hong Kong, Singapore, London, and New York to carry different investment portfolios.[15] The most important overseas office, however, is the Hong Kong based SAFE Investment Company Ltd. (Hua’an 华安, literarily means China safe),[16] through which SAFE has been investing in western financial markets such as the U.S., the UK, etc. [17]

SAFE Investment Co. Ltd. was registered in Hong Kong in June 1997, shortly before the handover of Hong Kong to China.[18] The registration capital was 100 million Hong Kong dollars, of which SAFE held 99.999999 million shares and the then SAFE boss Ms. Hu Xiaolian held one share.[19] SAFE Investment Co. Ltd has been holding stakes in 40-50 companies in the UK worth £ 5 billion since 2008. Most of the holdings remain at about 1 percent of the total shares. For example, SAFE was reportedly to have purchased 1 percent of BP’s share in 2008.[20] The small percentage of share-holding (less than 3 percent) allowed SAFE Investment Co. Ltd to keep its activities from going public, as analysts said.[21] In other European markets, SAFE is also maintaining a low-key manner. For instance, SAFE purchased 1.6 percent shares of French Total in 2008.[22]

According to a 2008 survey by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the Hong Kong based SAFE subsidiary was listed as the third largest sovereign fund while CIC was the eighth.[23] One major issue with SAFE and its subsidiaries is the lack of transparency. There does not seem to be much information on how they operate in the global financial market. One could hardly find any detailed information about SAFE Investment Co. Ltd. online. It was reported that SAFE Investment Co. Ltd had set up another company in Hong Kong in 2007 but no information was available for this new company.[24] Due to this lack of transparency, the motivation of SAFE has been questioned by western scholars. In 2008, SAFE purchased 1.5 billion US treasury bonds from Costa Rica for Costa Rica to give up its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.[25]

SAFE was being reported to have invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds, along with CIC and large commercial banks from China.[26] Reports said SAFE could lose 450 billion dollars after the American housing market meltdown starting in 2007. In response, SAFE disputed the speculation and claimed that SAFE’s investment in the securities of the two American housing markets was “normal”; the annual average investment return rate was 6 percent from 2008 to 2010.[27] The strong response to media estimation of loss in American housing markets securities was deemed as a way to offset some public concerns about the safety of China’s wealth. One blogger argued that although there might not be loss in the near term, China’s holding of American housing securities has potential risks as the American housing bubble does not seem to recover fully in the long term.[28]

SAFE vs. CIC

As SAFE and CIC both perform as China’s sovereign wealth funds, albeit CIC is more well-known than SAFE, the two seem to be competitors. From an organizational perspective, SAFE is under the People’s Bank of China while CIC is under the Finance Ministry. The Finance Ministry is the sole shareholder of CIC, as an insider familiar with both SAFE and CIC said, given that the initial capital for CIC came from the Finance Ministry rather than from SAFE.[29]

SAFE was approved by the State Council in 2008 to use 5 percent of the total foreign reserves to invest in stocks, as an alternative to its traditional investment in American bonds.[30] One of the investments SAFE made was a 250-million-dollar project through American PE investment group TPG, which was involved in the bailout of Washington Mutual.[31] Unfortunately, Washington Mutual went to bankruptcy during the American financial crisis and so SAFE was unable to get back its investment, as the insider pointed out.[32] This insider also revealed that initially TPG approached CIC for the Washington Mutual project, but was turned down by CIC for fear of losing money. TPG then found SAFE and made the deal.[33]

In terms of incentives, SAFE is not as good as CIC because SAFE does not have many experienced investment managers; “in the front line of foreign currency investment, there are only seniors and kids,” said the insider, implying that SAFE is missing a group of capable and competent investors.[34]

The current SAFE director has made efforts to recruit experienced investment managers to boost SAFE’s performance. Mr. Yi hoped that by recruiting some of the top Chinese financial managers working in Wall Street would improve China’s foreign reserve investment portfolios.[35]

One of the newly recruits is Zhu Changhong, who was named as the chief investment officer of SAFE starting in February 2010.[36] Zhu was recruited by SAFE as part of a state plan to attract back one thousand top talents; in return, Zhu got a benefit package including an award of RMB 1 million.[37] Before joining SAFE, Zhu worked for Pacific Investment Management Co. in charge of 23 billion dollars.[38] A 2010 report said Zhu has been very effective in making a few successful SAFE investments overseas.[39] SAFE increased its holdings of the Japanese bonds in the first seven consecutive months in 2010 and then sold its holdings in August and September, making a good return at 9 to 10 percent.[40]

The good performance was reportedly associated with some mechanism changes within SAFE such as good salary package. According to a source close to SAFE’s foreign reserve department, the new salary incentive has been quite effective to attract back some of the lost talented dealers to work for SAFE. Investment dealers who had left SAFE for other global investment banks for higher salaries – the phenomenon of “brain drain” – now came back to work for SAFE when there is a need from the country.[41]

“The Invisible Vessel”

Today’s SAFE really has two hats. One is the hat of foreign exchange regulator; the other is a semi sovereign wealth fund. Domestically, SAFE is being mentioned in the media mainly as a currency regulator as SAFE often issues statements or new rules about foreign currency management. Internationally, SAFE has been wearing the hat of a sovereign wealth fund, making business investments in hope of making profits, just like CIC.

The only difference, however, is that SAFE is still being regarded as a secret investor. According to a Reuters report, SAFE has been using scores of foreign investment agents to make overseas transactions. Sometimes, SAFE also uses China’s state owned commercial banks to do some preparatory work before any transactions.[42] All the transaction orders came directly from Beijing.[43] “SAFE is like an invisible huge vessel in Wall Street,” according to an overseas dealer.[44]





China Development Bank

Overview

The China Development Bank (CDB) was founded in 1994 according to the State Council Document No. 22. As a policy bank, CDB has been providing financial resources to infrastructure, basic and pillar industries in China.[45] In 2008, CDB made a step toward commercialization by reforming the policy bank into a CDB shareholding company. The Finance Ministry and Central Huijin held 51.3 percent and 48.7 percent of its shares respectively.[46]

However, the organization structure of the bank is still very much like a government institution. The bank is headquartered in Beijing, the capital of China, with 35 branches and over 7,000 staff in every provinces and major cities as well as in Hong Kong. (The CDB Hong Kong branch was opened in July 2009 as it was upgraded from an office level institution.[47]) . Additionally, it has four offices (office is a lower level compared with branch) in Tibet, Xiamen, Cairo (as of Nov. 2009), and Moscow (as of Sept. 2010) respectively.[48] CDB is the second largest bond issuer in China after the Finance Ministry.[49] CDB also has an international advisory board, which includes former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,[50] to help expand CDB’s global vision.

As the mission statement says, CDB is dedicated to “strengthening China’s competitiveness and improving the living standards of its people in support of the State’s medium to long-term development strategies and policies.”[51] Under this ambitious mission, CDB really has opened two fronts: domestic and international. Domestically, CDB loans have been used to support a wide range of industries from energy, transportation, to communication and cultural industries. Internationally, the Bank has been active in supporting the global expansion of SOEs in response to the call of the State for domestic enterprises to go global.[52] Such SOEs include PetroChina, Sinopec, State Grid, CITIC Pacific, Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group, Goldwind and Xi'an Electric Engineering Co., Ltd.[53] By the end of 2010, the Bank has financed projects in 90 countries and regions, issuing a total loan of 141.3 billion US dollars.[54]

CDB’s Global Plan

According to a 2007 report, the initial idea of CDB’s going out strategy was based on the fact that many foreign banks have had branches in China while Chinese banks rarely had branches overseas.[55] To address this issue, the headquarters divided the world into a few big chunks and having each one of CDB’s domestic branches in charge of certain overseas areas respectively. For example, CDB’s Sichuan Branch is responsible for Nepal and neighboring countries while CDB’s Henan Branch is responsible for five countries in southern Africa.[56] Usually, the procedure is to form a team for international business; mainly with 3 or 4 staff, going to the target country and making an overall assessment of the country before investing in any Chinese businesses there. After establishing a team in a target country, CDB will seek opportunities to invest in local businesses and even introduce foreign businesses to invest in China.[57] The team may be later developed into an overseas branch, as needed.[58] CDB has sent out over 100 teams overseas to establish an international network for investment and business expansion, but mostly these teams are in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[59]

When commenting on the international expansion and collaboration of Chinese financial institutes, CDB’s Chairman Chen Yuan said overseas investment by Chinese banks and Chinese enterprises should not only focus on Wall Street. Instead, they should consider going to energy and resource rich places.[60] Chen also suggested an innovative way to serve both state and commercial interests by striking deals with energy rich countries by bypassing the international/western energy markets.[61] A good example is the “loans for oil” deal that CDB has been quite successfully engaged in. [62]According to media reports, CDB has inked “oil for loans” deals in the past few years with energy rich countries including Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, etc. at a total of more than 65 billion dollars; in return, China will get an annual 75 million tons of oil.[63]

CDB has also loaned to Turkmenistan to secure gas supply to China. In this “gas for loans” deal, CDB loaned $ 4.1 billion to Turkmengaz, Turkmenistan’s state gas producer, to support the development of South Iolotan, reportedly one of the world’s most remote gas fields with challenging geological conditions, after a previous $ 4 billion loan to help develop this gas field.[64]

It is important to note that CDB has been using both political and commercial resources in its international activities. As the message given by CDB President Jiang Chaoliang said, CDB signed 79 financial collaboration agreements and memoranda with 51 countries in 2010 “under the auspices of senior government officials.”[65] The statement indicates that CDB and the Chinese government are working closely to make those energy deals. In other words, the national interests and CDB’s commercial interests converge when it comes to energy related projects. CDB does not hide its commitment to facilitating China’s state strategies and diplomatic interests, as Jiang voiced support for the state strategies and goals such as to encourage more Chinese SOEs to go global in the years ahead.[66]

However, in addition to CDB’s close relationship with the government and SOEs, CDB also supports private companies to expand globally. For example, CDB signed a cooperation deal with Huawei in 2009, providing 30 billion US dollars for Huawei’s overseas expansion.[67] Huawei, established in 1988, is a Chinese ICT provider who has established presence in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America. In a previous agreement between CDB and Huawei, the former provided 10 billion US dollars to assist Huawei’s overseas expansion. Similar to the most recent “loans for oil” deals, CDB loaned money to foreign information service providers for them to buy Huawei’s products. For instance, in 2007, India’s Reliance got a CDB loan of 750 million dollars; in return, Reliance purchased Huawei’s GSM equipment.[68]

CDB’s Role: Policy Bank + SWF?

As a financial institution, CDB has been wearing at least two hats: one is the policy bank hat and the other is the sovereign wealth fund hat. When CDB invests heavily in domestic projects in China’s domestic infrastructure, basic and pillar industries, CDB is a policy bank. When CDB is investing overseas, either through buying shares of foreign financial institutes or providing financial support to China’s SOEs, CDB is functioning like a sovereign wealth fund. But the only difference from CIC (the formal Chinese sovereign wealth fund) is probably that CDB works closely with SOEs in pursuing State strategic interests.

Although CDB has embarked on a journey of commercialization since 2008,[69] there does not seem to be a timetable for that goal to be reached. Would the goal of CDB’s commercialization become more closely tied to making CDB a secondary sovereign wealth fund after CIC? One analyst argues that CDB should become another CIC to help relieve the risk of holding trillions of dollars of foreign reserves.[70] In practice, CDB seems to be in close cooperation with other state funds such as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). In April 2011, CDB got a total of RMB 10 billion capital from NSSF, which holds about 2.19 percent of CDB’s shares.[71] The cooperation between CDB and China’s sovereign-wealth-fund like financial institutions signaled that the commercialization of CDB would not produce a purely commercial bank. As Yan Qingmin, Assistant Chairman of China’s Banking Regulatory Commission, said in May 2011, the role of CDB will be likely a combination of a commercial bank and a policy bank.[72] CDB has been entitled to zero-risk weighting for the bonds it has issued, same as the Finance Ministry. But that entitlement will come to an end by the end of 2012, after which its risk weighting will be evaluated and determined according to its commercialization and bond market situation.[73]

As a policy bank, CDB has also been financing cultural industry projects in recent years, in addition to its priorities on infrastructure, basic and pillar industries. For example, in 2010, CDB signed an agreement to finance China’s press and publishing projects, with an annual capital investment of RMB 50 billion.[74] CDB also financed the first Chinese media and culture fund – China Media Capital, which is considered to be a Personal Equity fund.[75]

As a policy bank, CDB has also tried to forge close financial relations with Taiwan, which has always been on the top political agenda of the State. CDB has provided financing to projects involving Taiwan, [76] which has been having good economic relations with mainland China especially after a newly launched free-trade like agreement between the two sides in 2010.[77] In a cultural industry seminar between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, held in Shanghai in May 2011, CDB’s Vice President Li Jiping said CDB has financed 517 Taiwan projects with a total of RMB 46.9 billion and will continue to support the cross-strait cultural industry development.[78] Additionally, CDB is reportedly to consider setting up a joint fund with a Taiwan financial institution.[79] CDB is also thinking of opening a branch in Taiwan.[80]

Summary

CDB is probably the most influential bank in China given its close relationship with the State and its close working relationship with China’s SOEs in overseas expansion and equity acquisition. What makes CDB unique is the bank aligns its own strategic interests with the State’s political and economic interests, as seen in the high profile energy deals with energy rich countries. The power of this converged interest between CDB, which represents the Chinese financial institution, the Chinese government, and giant SOEs, has caused debate and alarm among western observers, as China has been using this unique combination of entities to pursue energy supplies from around the world.[81]

There does not seem to have a lot of speculations about CDB becoming another Chinese sovereign wealth fund. As for CDB’s relationship with the SWFs, it seems so far limited to being a channel of relieving huge foreign reserves managed by SAFE. [82]

National Social Security Fund

The National Social Security Fund (NSSF or SSF) was established in 2000 in Beijing.[83] The Fund is managed and operated by the National Council for Social Security Fund, which is currently headed by Dai Xianglong, a former central bank’s governor.[84] Directly affiliated to the State Council, the Fund is organized under a general assembly of the councilors. Among them, the general secretary, and three other deputy secretaries are appointed by the State Council while all the other councilors are hired.[85]

According to the Fund’s official mission statement, the NSSF “aims to be a solution to the problem of aging and serves as a strategic reserve fund accumulated by the central government to support future social security expenditures and other social security needs.”[86] Ever since the establishment of the NSSF, it has been investing both domestically and overseas. The investment scope of NSSF ranges from domestic treasury bonds, securities investment funds, stocks to foreign treasury bonds, stocks, funds, and even futures.[87]

The Fund had largely remained less well known until four years after its establishment. In its first press conference held in 2004, the then general secretary Xiang Huaicheng, who was a former finance minister, made a few important announcements that unveiled the Fund to the public. Xiang announced that NSSF would increase the Fund’s stocks investment from 5.1 to 15 percent of the Fund’s total.[88] The Fund would seek to invest overseas and the first overseas investment would include Hong Kong market.[89] In 2005, NSSF made its debut in Hong Kong through the IPO of Bank of Communications.[90]

NSSF’s overseas investment was formally launched in December 2006, after the Council selected 10 foreign assets management companies as the Fund’s overseas investment agents.[91] Over the past few years, the Fund has continued to hire foreign fund management companies to help manage its overseas activities. Among the foreign agents are State Street Global Advisor, Alliance Bernstein, AXA Rosenberg, T.Rowe Price, JANUSINTECH, Allianz, UBS, INVESCO, Black Rock, PIMCO, etc, according to a 2008 report of NSSF’s overseas investment.[92] The Fund’s overseas investment portfolios include global stocks, bonds and foreign currency deposits.[93] According to Xiang, NSSF’s overseas investment had plenty of room to grow as long as the overseas investment was being kept under a limit of 20 percent of the Fund’s total assets. By 2006, the overseas investment was only about 5 percent of the Fund’s total.[94]

The Fund is getting more attention now as it has been growing and expanding in the world. According to a 2010 annual report, NSSF’s total asset has reached over RMB 8 trillion by 2010, in which 58.1 percent comes from direct investment and 41.9 percent comes from commissioned investment.[95] A recent Financial Times report says NSSF has been expanding its overseas investment not only in the US and EU markets, but also in India and other emerging markets, as well as unlisted companies and global private equities.[96]

Although the Fund has adjusted its investment portfolios by increasing stocks and entities investment, Dai, the current general secretary, argued that that the Fund is facing a major institutional obstacle while making overseas investment. He believed that the Fund should be managed according to the rule of market, implying a less government role in the Fund management activities.[97] Additionally, the fact that the Fund is relying on foreign agents to manage its overseas investment says that NSSF is still a very young investment fund.

Concluding Thoughts

In the current global financial crisis where western countries are deep in debt, China’s situation seems to be far better. China is now the loaner, lending money all over the world and buying energy and stocks. The aforementioned three major Chinese state funds, how they are organized and how they are investing in the global market introduced some basics about the various types of Chinese sovereign wealth funds, which are summarized in the following points.

First, these informal Chinese sovereign wealth funds have close ties with the state. In terms of organizational structure, both SAFE and CDB have headquarters in Beijing and branches across China. CDB works close with the State in securing foreign energy resources. NSSF is governed by a group of former government officials mainly from the Finance Ministry or the Central Bank. Second, these state funds all share a lack of transparency in terms of how they invest overseas. SAFE is probably the most secret government fund as information about SAFE’s foreign investment is not immediately available to the public. Finally, as various types of Chinese sovereign funds go overseas to invest, they do not seem to have coordination; competition may be inevitable among them as shown in the case of SAFE and CIC. As a Chinese blogger commented, China’s overseas investment and acquisition becomes “a chorus without a conductor.” [98]






[1] See “The History and Function of SAFE”, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-03/07/content_764583.htm; also see “About SAFE” on www.safe.gov.cn


[2] See the structure of the central government at http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-08/01/content_18608.htm


[3] See “About SAFE” at http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/whjjs/whjjs_detail.jsp?id=1&ID=160500000000000000


[4] Ibid.


[5] Ibid.


[6] Ibid.


[7] Ibid.


[8] See “About SAFE” in English at http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe_en/whjjs_en/whjjs_detail_en.jsp?id=1&ID=30202000000000000


[9] Ibid.


[10] See “SAFE Structure” at http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/whjjs/whjjs_detail1.jsp?id=1&ID=160400000000000000


[11] See “Management Team”, “Yi Gang”, at http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe_en/whjjs_en/jzjs_list_en.jsp?id=1&ID=30201000000000000 , accessed July 19, 2011


[12] Shu. M. (2008). “Vice Governor Yi Gang: Looking for an answer to the question of controlling inflation”, Nanfang Weekend, available at http://www.infzm.com/content/7510, accessed on July 12, 2011


[13] Scissors, D. (2009). “An overview of China’s overseas investment”, available at http://www.21bcr.com/a/shiye/yuwai/2010/0605/253.html, accessed on July 12, 2011


[14] Qiao, et al. (2010). “The truth about the American housing bonds”, Caijing Magazine, Vol. 19. Sept. 13, 2010. Available at http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2010-09-12/110519332_5.html, accessed July 13, 2011


[15] Ibid.


[16] Ibid.


[17] Sester. B. (2009). Blog. Available at http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/03/15/safe-seems-to-have-started-buying-us-equities-in-the-spring-of-2007-and-didnt-stop-until-july-2008/, accessed on July 13, 2011


[18] Wu. G. (2009). Blog. “SAFE overseas investment suffers 80 billion dollars loss?”, available at http://blog.soufun.com/21101922/3222433/articledetail.htm, accessed June 3, 2011


[19] See “SAFE Investment Co.” available at http://www.ezcap.cn/Org/Invest/200006370.html, accessed July 13, 2011


[20] Chen. H. (2008). “Report says China’s SAFE purchases 1 percent of BP’s share with 2 billion dollars.” Available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/gjjj/20080416/01554753820.shtml, accessed July 18, 2011


[21] Scissors, D. (2009). “An overview of China’s overseas investment”, available at http://www.21bcr.com/a/shiye/yuwai/2010/0605/253.html, accessed on July 12, 2011


[22] 21cbh.“China’s SAFE invests 1.8 billion euros in French Total”, available at http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2008-4-7/HTML_VRE3XL2UIDI8.html, accessed July 15, 2011


[23] Cao. Zh. (2009). “SAFE Investment Co. listed third among SWFs”. Caijing. Available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-27/110129316.html, accessed on July 13, 2011


[24] Wang. L. (2008). “SAFE increases securities investment overseas”, available at http://forex.cnfol.com/080919/134,1501,4792209,00.shtml , accessed July 19, 2011


[25] Scissors, D. (2009). “An overview of China’s overseas investment”, available at http://www.21bcr.com/a/shiye/yuwai/2010/0605/253.html, accessed on July 12, 2011


[26] Qiao, et al. (2010). “The truth about the American housing bonds”, Caijing Magazine, Vol. 19. Sept. 13, 2010. Available at http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2010-09-12/110519332_5.html, accessed July 19, 2011


[27] SAFE release. (2011). Available at http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/news/new_detail.jsp?ID=90000000000000000,876&id=2, accessed July 13, 2011


[28] Ye. T. (2011). Blog. “Why angry at American hoursing market bonds?”Available at http://ytyetan.blog.hexun.com/61359641_d.html, accessed July 13, 2011


[29] Cnfol.com. (2011). “SAFE is considered not as good as CIC”. Available at http://news.cnfol.com/110517/101,1277,9877628,05.shtml, accessed July 15, 2011.


[30] Ibid.


[31] Ibid.


[32] Ibid.


[33] Ibid.


[34] Ibid.


[35] Wu. X. (2010). “State Chief Investment Officer”, available at http://wallstreetcn.com/node/82, accessed July 15th, 2011


[36] Ouyang. (2010). “SAFE’s impressive deals led by investment guru”, available at http://money.163.com/10/1127/00/6MF5LKT200253B0H.html, accessed July 15th, 2011.


[37] Ibid.


[38] Ibid.


[39] Ibid.


[40] Ibid.


[41] Ibid.


[42] Chen. J. (2011). Blog. “SAFE did not waste people’s money”, available at http://chenjibingblog.blog.163.com/blog/static/11196197420112703543264/, accessed July 18, 2011


[43] Ibid.


[44] Ibid.


[45] See “Brief Introduction to CDB”, available at http://job.cdb.com.cn/, accessed July 19, 2011


[46] Ibid.


[47] Jin. Y. (2009). CDB Hong Kong Branch opens. Available at http://news.sohu.com/20090729/n265582442.shtml, accessed July 29, 2011


[48] See CDB’s organization chart at http://www.cdb.com.cn/website/cdb/upfile/2011/201167141817392.gif, accessed July 29, 2011


[49] See Baidu entry “development bank” at http://baike.baidu.com/view/950434.htm, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[50] See Bloomberg News, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-02/financing-china-costs-poised-to-rise-with-decision-on-cdb-debt.html, accessed Aug 2, 2011


[51] See CDB’s mission statement at http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=460, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[52] See CDB’s 2010 performance highlights at http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=415, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[53] Ibid.


[54] Ibid.


[55] “CDB divides the world test”, available at http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2007-5-16/HTML_34K1Q4NIA1ST.html , accessed July 22, 2011


[56] Ibid.


[57] Ibid.


[58] Ibid.


[59] See “SAFE issues global loans through CDB”, available at http://www.1ploan.com/forum.do/listsimp/qrySeqID_10000460.html, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[60] CCTV-finance interview with Chen Yuan, available at http://www.cdb.com.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=3279, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[61] Ibid.


[62] See CDB’s major international energy deals at http://www.cdb.com.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=3676, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[63] “SAFE issues global loans through CDB”, available at http://www.1ploan.com/forum.do/listsimp/qrySeqID_10000460.html, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[64] Gorst. I. (2011). Turkmenistan gets closer to China, available at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/04/28/turkmenistan-gets-closer-to-china/#axzz1Tyz1P5OM, accessed Aug. 3, 2011


[65] See President’s message at http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Column.asp?ColumnId=93, accessed Aug 1, 2011


[66] Ibid.


[67] Jiang, J. & Yang, Zh. (2009). CDB provides 30 billion to support Huawei, available at http://www.c114.net/news/126/a445662.html, accessed Aug 2, 2011


[68] Ibid.


[69] Xinhua news, Policy bank to be commercialized, available at http://www.china.org.cn/business/2008-02/18/content_1243063.htm, accessed Aug 2, 2011


[70] See Anbang Consulting, available at http://blog.guandian.cn/user/anbang/2011052545215, accessed Aug. 2, 2011


[71] He. X. (2011). NSSF invests RMB 10 billion in CDB, available at http://finance.qq.com/a/20110427/005261.htm, accessed Aug. 2, 2011


[72] Ye. L. (2011). The identity of CDB yet to be determined, available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/2011-05-10/110714384.html, accessed Aug. 2, 2011


[73] Ibid.


[74] CDB finances press and publishing industry, available at http://www.cflac.org.cn/newscenter/2010-08/05/content_20535240.htm, accessed Aug. 2, 2011


[75] Chen. D. The first cultural PE into operation, available at http://finance.qq.com/a/20100622/000499.htm, accessed Aug. 3, 2011


[76] Xu. & Yang. (2011). CDB finances over 500 Taiwan projects. http://finance.jrj.com.cn/industry/2011/05/29161010079705.shtml, accessed Aug. 2, 2011


[77] The agreement is called The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed in Chongqing, China in June 2010.


[78] Ibid.


[79] Dong. Y. (2011). CDB seeks to set up joint fund with Taiwan partner, available at http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/1354,20110706146617726.html, accessed Aug. 3, 2011


[80] Business China. (2010). China Development Bank plans Taiwan presence, available at http://en.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-12-8/CDB-Taiwan.html, accessed Aug. 3, 2011


[81] See Erica S. Downs (2011). Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals, The Brookings Institute, March 21, 2011, available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/0321_china_energy_downs.aspx, accessed Aug. 3, 2011

For CDB’s international operations, also see Eiichi Sekine’s article available at http://www.nicmr.com/nicmr/english/report/repo/2010/2010aut02.pdf, accessed Aug. 3, 2011


[82] Zhang. Y. (2010). “SAFE loans worldwide through CDB”, available at http://blog.jrj.com.cn/bskx,772973a.html, accessed July 22, 2011


[83] See the report at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzsj/201105/t20110519_3185.html, accessed Aug. 5, 2011


[84] See “about ssf” at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/Eng_Introduction/, accessed Aug. 5, 2011


[85] Ibid.


[86] See “about ssf” at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/Eng_Introduction/, accessed Aug. 5, 2011


[87] Ibid.


[88] See Caijing magazine, issue 8, April 2004, available at http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/templates/inc/chargecontent2.jsp?id=110063558&time=2004-04-20&cl=106, accessed Aug. 5, 2011


[89] Ibid.


[90] Li. Y. (2005). NSSF lands in Hong Kong through IPO of Bank of Communications. Available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/fund/sbjj/20050608/04011665972.shtml, accessed Aug. 8, 2011


[91] Xu. K. (2007). Xiang: NSSF to increase overseas investment. Caijing, available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-03-28/100017379.html, accessed Aug. 5, 2011


[92] See overseas investment chart at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzyy/jwtzdt/200812/t20081208_1563.html, accessed Aug. 8, 2011


[93] Ibid.


[94] Ibid.


[95] See the report at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzsj/201105/t20110519_3185.html, accessed Aug. 5, 2011


[96] Jamil Anderlini. (2010). China Fund Looks West for Rapid Expansion. Available at http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031970, accessed Aug. 8, 2011


[97] Liu. L. (2011). On NSSF’s Selection of Foreign Agents for its Overseas Investment. Available at http://finance.southcn.com/f/2011-06/17/content_25604172_3.htm, accessed Aug. 8, 2011


[98] Zhao. J. (2009). China’s Overseas Acquisition: A Chorus without a Conductor. Available at http://zhaojianfei.blog.caixin.cn/archives/59, accessed Aug. 8, 2011


___________________

From the SAFE website:




Yi Gang     Particular
Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) & Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
Dr. Yi Gang, Ph.D in Economics, Professor. Dr Yi Gang was an Associate Professor with tenure at Indiana University and then joined the faculty of Peking University as professor, vice head of the Center for Economics Research, and Ph.D advisor in Economics. He went to the PBC in1997 and then successively served as Deputy Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Monetary Policy Committee, Deputy Director-General and Director-General of the Monetary Policy Department, and Assistant Governor, as well as President of the Operations Office from September 2006 to October 2007. In December 2007, he was appointed Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China.  He now serves as Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China and Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).

DENG Xianhong     Particular
Deputy Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
Mr. DENG Xianhong, Master degree. Prior to joining the SAFE, he successively served as Deputy Director of Annual Project Division of Comprehensive Programming Department, Director and Deputy Director-General and Director-General of Department of Comprehensive Programming and Experimentation in the State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems. Then he worked as Director-General of General Affairs Department of the SAFE. In October 2004, he was appointed as Deputy Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.

FANG Shangpu     Particular
Deputy Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange(SAFE)
Mr. FANG Shangpu, Master degree, associate research fellow. In the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) Fujian Branch, he successively served as Deputy Director and Director of Finance Research Institute, Director of General Administration Division, Director of Comprehensive Programming Division, Director of Finance Center. Then he joined Fujian Industrial Bank as Deputy Governor. After that, he worked as Vice President of PBOC Shanghai Branch and Deputy Administrator of SAFE Shanghai Branch,Chief Accountant of State Administration of Foreign Exchange.In June 2006, he was appointed as Deputy Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.

WANG Xiaoyi     Particular
Deputy Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
Mr. WANG Xiaoyi, Bachelor's Degree, Senior Economist. Prior to joining the SAFE, he served in the Office of Economic Policy Reform and in the Planning Department of the People's Bank of China.  At the People's Bank of China, he successively served as Deputy Director of the Forecasting Division of the Research and Statistics Department and Director of the Economic Survey Division; Deputy Director-General and Director-General of the Research and Statistics Department and Director-General of the Statistics Department.  He has also served as Alternate Executive Director and Executive Director of China's Executive Director Office of the IMF and as Chief Economist of the SAFE. In December 2007, he was appointed Deputy Administrator of the SAFE and a member of its Leading Party Members' Group.

LI Chao     Particular
Deputy Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
Mr. LI Chao, Master's Degree, Senior Economist. Prior to joining the SAFE, he served successively at the China Construction Bank, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the People's Bank of China. At the China Construction Bank, he served successively as Deputy Office Secretary for the Deputy Director of the Personnel Division of the Human Resources Department, Director of the Cadre Administration Division of the Personnel and Education Department, Director of the First Division of the General Office, and Deputy Director of the General Administration Division. He then joined the China Securities Regulatory Commission as Deputy Director of the General Administration Department and Deputy Director of the Party Committee Office.  At the People's Bank of China, he was appointed successively as Deputy Director and Director of the General Administration Department and Deputy Director and Director of the Party Committee Office. In December 2008, he was appointed Deputy Administrator of the SAFE and a member of its Leading Party Members' Group.
An additional source for the National Social Security Fund is Stuart Leckie, A Review of the National Social Security Fund, The Japanese Society of Certified Pension Actuaries (2008).

Sunday, August 21, 2011

Global Law Schools on U.S. Models: Internationalism and Nationalist Globalization

I have written about an international conference on legal education held in June in Toledo, Spain.  See, Larry Catá Backer,  The Internationalization of Legal Education--Globalization or Americanization? The View From Spain, Law at the End of the Day, .June 26, 2011, in which I also included the PowerPoint slides of my presentation.




I am now able to share with readers of "Law at the End of the Day" a draft of the paper, "Global Law Schools on U.S. Models: Emerging Models of Consensus-Based Internationalization or Markets-Based Americanization Models of Global Legal Education," co-authored with Bret Stancil (U. Penn '2013), which will appear in  Revista de Educación y Derecho/Education and Law Review 2:-- (forthcoming 2011) and now available through the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) here.

Included here is the article Abstract, a Spanish language abstract (resumen breve), an executive summary in Spanish (resumen) , and the introduction to the article (in English). 
___________________




Larry Catá Backer[1] and Bret Stancil[2]

Revista de Educación y Derecho/Education and Law Review 2:-- (forthcoming 2011)

ABSTRACT:  This article examines two substantially irreconcilable approaches to internationalization that are emerging in the United States.  The first focuses on globalizing the law school curriculum through internationalization. This approach is congruent with emerging trends in legal education internationalization in Europe.   The second approaches internationalization as a market driven competition for influence among dominant domestic legal orders, that is, as nationalist globalization.  Internationalization is understood as the extension of the influence of national law outside the national territory and is nicely illustrated by recent efforts to globalize the law school curriculum by internationalizing the conventional U.S. law school curriculum.  The principle thesis is this:  The global legal education community, led by the Europeans, has been constructing a vision of globalization of legal education that has as its basis the idea of harmonization and convergence of different systems and the development of a new institutional model grounded in harmonized global trends in law. The United States appears to be taking two approaches to this development.  After an Introduction, Part II examines the internationalization efforts of U.S. law schools following one of five models:  (1) integration; (2) segregation; (3) aggregation; (4) immersion; and (5) multi-disciplinary department models. This project seeks a newer framework for the construction of shared legal structures grounded in joint effort that is not dominated by the approaches off any one state. Part III then examines the ways in which American institutions are also working against this general trend by positing a form of nationalist globalization that has as its foundation the idea that national legal education can go global without globalizing the law taught. Nationalist globalization takes three forms: a focus on the training of lawyers for domestic service whose pedagogical methodologies can be exported, the extraterritorial extension of the U.S. law school system, and the management of post graduate degrees in law for foreign law graduates.  In place of harmonization and globalization of law, the American nationalist globalization model grounded in extraterritorial competition for socialization in the laws of the domestic legal order of dominant states.  The article ends with an analysis of the consequences of these competing forms of global engagement in legal education. While much of the attention on changes to the American law school environment has focused on internationalization within consensus-based and supplementary programs founded on the internationalization ideal, American law schools have also been developing market-based strategies that are, at their core, fundamentally inconsistent with the internationalization framework.

Key words:  internationalization of law, legal nationalism, accreditation of law schools, LL.M. programs for foreign trained lawyers, legal education, licensing of lawyers, American Bar Association, dual degree programs.

RESUMEN BREVEEn este artículo se examina dos enfoques sustancialmente incompatibles de la internacionalización que están surgiendo en los Estados Unidos. La primera se centra en la globalización del currículo escolar a través de la ley de internacionalización. Este enfoque es congruente con las nuevas tendencias en la internacionalización de la educación legal en Europa. La internacionalización de los enfoques en segundo lugar como la competencia por el mercado por la influencia entre dominante ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales, es decir, la globalización nacionalista. La internacionalización es entendida como la extensión de la influencia de la legislación nacional fuera del territorio nacional y está muy bien ilustrado por los recientes esfuerzos para globalizar el currículum escolar la ley por la internacionalización del derecho convencional EE.UU. currículo escolar. La tesis de principio es el siguiente: La comunidad global de educación legal, liderado por los europeos, ha sido la construcción de una visión de la globalización de la educación jurídica, que tiene como base la idea de la armonización y convergencia de los diferentes sistemas y el desarrollo de un nuevo modelo institucional basado en la armonización de las tendencias mundiales de la ley. Los Estados Unidos parece estar tomando dos enfoques para este desarrollo. Por un lado, algunas instituciones están participando en la internacionalización de la educación. Sin embargo, las instituciones estadounidenses también están trabajando en contra de esta tendencia general al plantear una forma de globalización que tiene como fundamento la idea de que la enseñanza del derecho nacional puede ser globalizado y el rechazo de la necesidad de crear y enseñar derecho más allá del derecho nacional. En lugar de la armonización y la globalización del derecho, los estadounidenses de un modelo basado en la competencia extraterritorial para la socialización de las leyes del ordenamiento jurídico interno de los estados dominantes.

PALABRAS CLAVE:  internacionalización, nacionalismo, globalización del currículo de derecho, enfoques pedagógicos, maestría en derecho, acreditación de estudios de derecho al extranjero,  licenciatura de abogados.




RESUMEN:  Hay una costumbre reciente de hablar de la libertad que nos trae las oportunidades a  internacionalizar le educación de derecho.  Pero también nos trae una oportunidad de ejercer un poco la libertinaje. En este artículo atento hablar del libertinaje Americano en asuntos del internacionalización.  En punto:  no hay un modelo sino varios modelos contrarios con efectos internacionalistas ahora en desarrollo en EEUU.  Desarrollo paralelos?: La educación jurídica EEUU esta afectada por dos fuerzas contrarios:  por un lado, un Modelo Internacionalista:  transnacional y énfasis  más allá del estado.  Fundado en el derecho internacional y comparativo, extranjeras y transnacionales en el currículo como parte de la formación jurídica básica de los estudiantes de derecho.  Hay varios modelos utilizados.  También se nota mucha variedad en la aplicación de estos modelos en los 200 facultades de derecho en EE.UU. Tendencias en Oposición se ajuntan en un  Modelo Nacionalista, con énfasis en el derecho domestico; menos énfasis a lo más allá del estado.  Informe de la Fundación Carnegie, Educating Lawyers:  Preparation for the Profession of Law.  Este modelo tiene un mayor apoyo por ABA y los jueces, no tanto por las escuelas de derecho de élite.  Han desarrollados distintas filosofías de implementación, pero todos con similares objetivos.  Estos dos grandes esfuerzos de reforma de los últimos 20 años se han desarrollado a lo largo de vías paralelas en forma casi completamente aislados uno del otro.  Analizamos el desarrollo de estos debates paralelos         de la reforma de la educación legal de los EE.UU. Y del debate entre los dos sistemas distintos de “internacionalización”.  Examinamos primero los métodos analíticos (métodos de evaluación). (2) Con esta base analítico, desagregamos CINCO modelos o métodos del internacionalismo; (1) Método de integración; (2) Método de agregación; (3) Método de segregación; (4) Método de Inmersión; y (5) Método de Creación de una facultad Multidisciplinario.  Segundo, examinamos el Modelo Nacionalista. Discutiremos este modelo con énfasis a lo domestico y a los deseos de las colectivas judiciales y de abogados locales.  Examinemos también la internacionalización del sistema y pedagogía Americana a través del extra-territorialismo ABA considera acreditación de facultades de derecho situado afuera del territorio nacional.  

Respeto al Modelo Internacionalista, análisis requiere una sistemitación de enfoques analíticos, inclusos los siguientes: Identificar los interesados (stakeholders); Identificar los objetivos del programa (derecho comparativo, internacional, extranjero o transnacional y con qué fin); Efectuar preferencias internas de la institución; Utilizar los talentos y habilidades de los profesores; Utilizar consenso; Los recursos disponibles; Expectativas realistas.  Estos enfoques analíticos describe un proceso impulsado por intereses de varios grupos interesados : incluso, la administración, alumnos, empresarios, gobierno, tribunales, los clientes. Las necesidades y actitudes de cada uno y su poder relativo darán forma a la internacionalización. El resultado es significativo: La estratificación basada en las preferencias, incentivos, beneficios para miembros de la facultad, y recursos institucionales.  Facultades de mas alta reputación y los que están más cerca de las fronteras son más propensos a participar más plenamente. Facultades de nivel secundario pero con más recursos también más propensos para poner en práctica.  Con estos procesos en mente se puede examinar los métodos internacionalistas.  El primero, Integración, se base en la reorientación del centro educativo y de investigaciones de la Facultad de Derecho de la nacional a las transnacionales en la mayor medida de lo posible.  El objetivo es producir generalistas que combina lo nacional/ internacional.  Este método es complicado y costoso; requiere transformaciones cultural: puede exigir que todos los profesores cambien sus enfoque a la enseñanza y la investigación; cambios fundamentales en la metodología de la profesión. El segundo método internacionalistas, Agregación, es el modelo más popular—preserva distinciones entre las disciplinas en que se divide la “ciencia” de derecho.  En muchas variedades, las asignaturas internacionales y transnacionales están separados, pero considerados como unos entre iguales de las programas  de estudio, así como derecho laboral, de empresas o la legislación fiscal.  Sus ventajas: aprovecha enfoques convencionales para la enseñanza del derecho, no un cambio real de la cultura o pedagogía.  Sus inconvenientes: refuerza marco convencional, con énfasis a las fuentes del estudio de derecho en las ordenes jurídicas nacionales. Norma de suplementación no de integración. El tercer método internacionalista, Segregación, por lo cual la Facultad de Derecho crea un aparato administrativo que sirve como base institucional por la cual que todos los programas internacionales y transnacionales pueden ser desarrollados, ofrecidos, evaluados e incorporados en la misión de investigación de la educación y de la Facultad de Derecho.  Es un sistema para la institucionalización del método de agregación.  Sus ventajas: evita los problemas de la integración sistemática y formación del profesorado a través de múltiples  disciplinas; es más fácil agregar programas adicionales: certificados, formación profesional; y es más fácil de administrar.  Sus inconvenientes: instituciones pueden evitar el tema cultural; dos facultades creado en efecto.  Es también más fácil de terminar o reducir el tamaño del programa, más fácil de utilizar profesores sin  (pista internacional subordinada)); y se convierte en un gueto y pierdes conexión entre profesores.  El cuarto método internacionalistas, inmersión, es método emergente de redes de instituciones. base es la idea de que derecho extranjero se aprende in situ, la internacionalización a través de asociaciones con las facultades de derecho extranjero.  Los alumnos eligen el área de estudio (sistema nacional extranjero) que se centran en el marco de la educación internacional.  Ventajas: no requiere entrenamiento de profesores por uso de profesores en su sitio nacional, concesión de licencias en jurisdicciones múltiples posibles. Inconvenientes: no hay incorporación real de los internacionales o extranjeras dentro de la Facultad de Derecho; programa depende de la capacidad de cultivar y mantener redes, puede ser costoso y difícil de administrar.  El último método internacionalista—creación de un departamento multidisciplinario adentro de la facultad de derecho, es más complicado y el menos desarrollado.  Tiene dos enfoques principales: primero, el auto contenido sino que se organiza como porosa unidad de la Facultad de Derecho; segundo, autónoma unidad con conexiones fuera de la escuela de leyes.  Ambos requieren el establecimiento de un nuevo departamento que se distingue la forma de la escuela de derecho. Las cuestiones de la segregación y de la aculturación se evitan; sin embargo, la  internacionalización es reconocido como algo aparte del corpus de estudios nacionales y del “derecho” como se entiende en común.   

Cuando hablamos de los modelos nacionalistas, entramos en un mundo donde los sistemas jurídicos nacionales predominan.  Los nacionalistas creen mucho en la globalización de sistemas nacionales (ahora universalizados); pero rechazan internacionalización.  En los modelos nacionalistas, la atención se centra en el entrenamiento práctico que es la filosofía principal de estos métodos en todas sus variaciones. El foco: el entrenamiento para servir pueblos (y clientes) locales.  Igualmente, se nota un énfasis en la jurisdicción local; procesos judiciales y legislación; si no aplica directamente es de menos interés.  También un énfasis en entrenamiento de aspectos técnicos and útiles; relaciones con jueces y organizaciones de abogados de la localidad; y menos énfasis en materias más teoréticos/académicos.  Hay tres variantes importantes del modelo nacionalista: (1) entrenamiento práctico bajo normas substantivos del EE.UU; (2) programas de maestría en derecho para abogados licenciados  en otros países; y (3) el establecimiento de facultades americanas en universidades en el extranjero acreditado por ministerios nacionales del EE.UU. El primero, el método del momento se elabora en el Informe Carnegie del 2010.  Separe la formación de abogados de cultura universitaria.  Este método afirma que la práctica es más importante que la teoría / política.  De consecuencia, tiene el efecto de segregar facultades de derecho; los recursos determinará la medida en que puede ser el modelo utilizado, sin afectar la orientación académica de las facultades de derecho moderno; las facultades más pobres serán orientado más a lo local y lo de la a la formación; los más ricos podrán cumplir sin cambiar su orientación internacionalista o la cultura de sus facultades.  Los otros métodos nacionalistas se refieren a la extensión extraterritorial del sistema jurídico educativo EE.UU.  Estos punta a distintas maneras de participar en el mercado mundial para estudiantes de derecho. Pero en lugar de ampliar estudios internacionales en facultades de derecho nacionales, busca expandir el modelo nacional en el extranjero.  Dos partes del modelo: Reducir la disponibilidad de las licencias a través de programas de post-graduado (EE.UU. LLMs); y fomentar el establecimiento de escuelas de derecho de EE.UU. en el extranjero. Esfuerzo actual:  Propuesta de la “American Bar Association” de acreditación de facultades de derecho en universidades al extranjero que operan como universidades americanas.  Dos informes esquema las propuestas: American Bar Associaiton, Report of the Special Committee on International Issues , 2009 (Lacy Committee); y American Bar Association, Report of Special Committee on Foreign Law Schools Seeking Approval Under ABA Standards, July 19, 2010 (Kane Committee). La Comite propuso 4 recomendaciones.  En primer lugar, el proyecto de acreditación debería seguir adelante.  En segundo lugar, las normas de acreditación real debe ser examinado y revisado para evitar los posibles obstáculos a este proyecto de  expansión geográfica.  En tercer lugar, una declaración de política debería ser elaborado para asegurar el lugar central de la ley estadounidense, el idioma Inglés, un cuerpo docente formado principalmente por los beneficiarios de USJDs, y una pedagogía de América en estas escuelas acreditadas extranjeros. Por último, el Comité recomendó a la prueba de funcionamiento de una escuela modelo que podría proporcionar la plantilla aceptable para esta forma de expansión. Las justificaciones son interesantes e informativos: ayudar a los tribunales supremos estatales en sus procesos de licenciatura; controlar los requisitos y la manera de aculturación necesario para licenciar; hacer más difícil la posibilidad de poder calificar para examinarse por medios de programas de maestría en derecho ofrecido por muchos facultades de derecho en EEUU; la profundización de la influencia del derecho EEUU y su sistema de educación legal como referente global "para mejorar la formación de abogados a nivel mundial y contribuir a la economía moderna y de la abogacía internacional;" este modelo contribuyera “al proceso global de armonización legal;" por último, reduciendo los obstáculos a la creación de sucursales el extranjero permitiría que las escuelas americanas convertirse en operaciones multinacionales por reducir los obstáculos a la creación de sucursales universitarias en el extranjero.

El Modelo Acreditación como desafío del internacionalismo global sustitutos de competición entre estados por el dominio de las culturas jurídicas en lugar de la creación de un consenso transnacional.  Crea incentivos para que "descreme" los estudiantes al servicio de la jurisdicción extranjera; la enseñanza del derecho atado con los ideales y culturas jurídicas Americanas se filtra fuera del ámbito académico y se aplica en la práctica, a menudo cambiando o subvirtiendo la legislación nacional. Al mismo tiempo, la entrada de grandes números de abogados extranjeros en el sistema EEUU podría transformar la práctica del sistema nacional, haciéndolo más global y menos nacional.  Acreditación se combina con más grandes dificultades en calificar para examinación con un posgrado (LLM) de programas EEUU.  Propuesta de incorporar más difíciles sistemas de licenciar programas de pos grado en derecho, incluso certificación de esos programas.  Al mismo tiempo limita la flexibilidad de esos programas.  Pero, estados que se conforman hacen más fácil el uso de estos programas para licenciar estudiantes del extranjero. 

Sin embargo, hay algo de oposición importante a la acreditación externa de las escuelas de derecho. Gran parte de esa oposición se basa en el temor de la pérdida de los estudiantes. Pero algunos de los oposiciones también cultural - abogados extranjeros afectará a la cultura jurídica en los Estados Unidos, y el modelo se acreditación cambio de poder a los abogados de la licencia de los estados al gobierno federal. Sin embargo, acreditación extranjeros se basa en décadas de antigüedad programas de ABA de exportación con sede en EE.UU. las normas legales a través de su iniciativa "rule of law." Pero que, a su vez, ha sido criticado por su potencial neo-colonialista efectos.

Conclusión: Hay una enorme cantidad de actividad y discusión en EEUU en temas de la internacionalización de programas de educación de derecho.  Pero estas discusiones y movimientos mueven en direcciones incompatibles—Internacionalistas y Nacionalistas.  Qué va a prevalecer y qué será el carácter del consenso se queda por ver.  Pero las opciones que se escogen afectarán el carácter de la educación legal de los EE.UU. y la forma en que el derecho internacional y los programas mundiales se desarrollan tanto en los Estados Unidos y en el extranjero.





I.  Introduction

            The internationalization of legal education continues to gain momentum.  Once a hodgepodge of efforts--harmonization based efforts in Europe, comparative law efforts from the United States and Japan, and development based efforts from Asia, Africa and Latin America--the focus of efforts now have increasingly stressed an internationalization of both curricular efforts in home faculties, and institutional arrangements within a growing network of participating institutions.  While there is much focus on the efforts of American institutions to participate (and perhaps to seek to dominate) the framing and implementation of these efforts, there are equally important developments outside the United States, some of which include participation by U.S. educational institutions.[3]

            One approach seeks to transform legal education by blending legal studies from a variety of jurisdictions and creating a curriculum that starts as essentially transnational.  Consider the Center for Transnational Legal Studies[4] and its innovative structure, pedagogy and approach to legal internationalization.[5]  The Center for Transnational Legal Studies provides model for networked education, in which a number of law faculties from across the globe come together in a place not connected to any of them for the purpose of bringing selected numbers of each of their students and faculty together for instruction in a curriculum liberated from the structures of any of the domestic legal orders of any of the participating schools.[6]  It suggests a form of internationalization that is built through cooperative projects among a number of diverse institutions.  But it has its complications--from cost to administration, to devoting the time and energy necessary to avoid deviating from the internationalizing mission of the program. Yet it evidences the possibility a useful pedagogy beyond the domestic legal order of any predominant state. There is now enough law beyond the state, and which affects actors in transactions across borders, to support a course of study and serve as a basis for training useful to lawyers. Yet this is not an endeavor for the fainthearted, or for institutions with inadequate resources to support such efforts. 

            Another approach emphasizes dual or multiple degrees.  One, "El programa de doble titulación de la Universidad de Barcelona con la Nova Southeastern University" provides a model of the form The presentation provided an analysis and description of emerging double degree programs, in this case leading to the possibility of acquiring law degrees (and consequently providing the necessary basis for seeking licensing as a lawyer) in multiple national jurisdictions.  Professor Navarro suggested both the complexity and value of double degree programs.  Beyond issues of coordination, the principle difficulty is one of language and students' sense of the existence of value in a double degree.  Yet it also provides a mechanism for making it easier for students to take advantage of market opportunities across borders.  When done correctly, it can also serve as a bridge for faculty interaction, exchange and research possibilities.  That bridge can also be used to bring faculty from the home to host state.  The programs at the University of Navarra provide a case in point.[7]

            Lastly, internationalization can be detached from a physical presence in any place.  Some efforts now suggest the possibilities of distance education in the context of the internationalization of legal education.  What made the presentation particularly interesting were both the language of instruction and the growth of the market for this type of education delivery.  Professor Gómez Jena noted that English had become the lingua franca of supra national legal studies--so that distance learning courses offered by this Spanish university abroad tended to be offered to non-Spanish audiences in English.  He also described the substantial growth in interest in distance education.  The distance learning efforts now reaches 160,000 students, and covers 26 field options, with a staff of about 10,000 instructors.  The UNED option offers the possibility of internationalization without the cost associated with on-the-ground programs that may be limited to only the most well endowed institutions.   It is likely that internationalization will at least be supplemented, if not spearheaded, through the use of technology, especially for those financially unable to create live programs. 

            This article examines two substantially irreconcilable approaches to internationalization that are emerging in the United States.  The first focuses on globalizing the law school curriculum through internationalization. This approach is congruent with emerging trends in legal education internationalization in Europe.[8] This Internationalist Model is transnational and outward looking.  It focuses on modifying the traditional curricula by adding substantial international, comparative, foreign and transnational law elements into instruction and as a part of basic legal training of law students.  U.S. law schools have internationalized their curricula following one of five models:  (1) integration; (2) segregation; (3) aggregation; (4) immersion; and (5) multi-disciplinary department models.[9]  Internationalization, however, has been uneven, with a wide variation in the appetite of law schools for internationalization.  Many schools, sensitive to the needs of the markets into which their students are likely to obtain employment, have opted for regionalization, localization or nationalization of their curricula.[10] 

            The second approaches internationalization as a market driven competition for influence among dominant domestic legal orders, that is, as nationalist globalization.  This approach is domestic and inward looking in its construction,[11] and aggressively outward looking in its quest to dominate markets for the provision of legal education. Internationalization is understood as the extension of the influence of national law outside the national territory.  Nationalist globalization is nicely illustrated by recent efforts to globalize the law school curriculum by internationalizing the conventional U.S. law school curriculum.  Like its internationalist counterpart, nationalist internationalization is not universally accepted within the U.S. academic community.  Elite law schools appear to have rejected the concept as a sole basis for engaging globally; some lower tiered law schools fear it for the foreign competition insertion into non-territorial markets may bring.  But U.S. legal entrepreneurs, some of them with elite educational backgrounds, have been influential in generating interest in this approach.

            These two great reform efforts of the last 20 years have developed along parallel tracks and in substantial isolation from each other.  Yet both have become influential in the United States, and both may affect the way in which U.S. legal educational institutions engage in relationships with non-U.S. law faculties, students and indigenous legal cultures.  The principle thesis of the article is this:  The global legal education community, led by the Europeans, has been constructing a vision of globalization of legal education that has as its basis the idea of harmonization and convergence of different systems and the development of a new institutional model grounded in harmonized global trends in law. But U.S. educational institutions are divided between two approaches to the development of the framework for engagement with globalization.  On the one hand, some U.S. educational institutions are focusing educational internationalization on the internationalization of the curricula offered to their students.  Other American institutions working against this general trend by positing a form of globalization that has as its foundation the idea that national legal education can go global without globalizing the law taught. In place of harmonization and globalization of law, this nationalist version of internationalization is grounded in extraterritorial competition for socialization in the laws of the domestic legal order of dominant states.  

            The consequences for harmonization of educational practice, and especially for consensus about educational curricula, might be profound.  More importantly, the choice of model could have profound effects on the legal cultures of target states, and the course of internationalization.  The legal education sector is now the site for a contest between internationalization as a collaborative effort and global competition among domestic law systems as the foundation system for global legal culture.  The first mirrors emerging collaborative, stakeholder driven, forms of internationalization in which the governance framework is public in character meant to develop and implement a rough consensus among participants.  Its object is harmonization and collaboration to increase the efficiency of systemic interaction.[12]  The second mirrors emerging global market behaviors in which law and legal education are understood as commodities competing for markets in a borderless world.  Its object is not so much amalgamation and harmonization as it is the globalization of the domestic legal order of the system most successful at presenting a national framework for the handling of legal issues on the global stage. For smaller and less developed states, it also represents the projection of foreign national law, and foreign national legal cultures into their states and their legal systems.  This can be viewed as a useful addition to national legal aspirations or potentially as neo-colonialist intrusions.[13]  As such, it represents not merely globalization, but a sort of legal colonization.

            Part II focuses on the internationalist model as developed in American law schools.  It first suggests the analytical framework within which internationalization is constructed in the U.S.  It then considers the forms and character of U.S. internationalization efforts in its integrationist, aggregationist, segregationist, immersion and multi-disciplinary forms.  Part III then turns to the forms of the nationalist model.   After suggesting the analytical framework, this part of the article examines several of the practical expressions of nationalist globalization of legal education:  focus on the training of lawyers for domestic service, and the extraterritorial extension of the U.S. law school system.  The recent and influential Carnegie Report illustrates the first.[14]  The second is illustrated by the regulation of Master of Laws programs for foreign law students[15] and, more importantly, by the accreditation of foreign law schools with the effect of preparing foreign students for licensing and practice in any U.S. state.[16]   The article ends with an analysis of the consequences of these competing forms of global engagement in legal education.



[1] W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law,  and Professor of International Affairs Pennsylvania State University.  An earlier version of this article was presented at Congreso Sobra la internacionalización de la educación superior de derecho, Toledo, Spain, June 15, 2011.  My thanks to the conference organizers, D. Pedro José Carrasco Parrilla, profesor titular and decano of the faculty of juridical and social sciences at the Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha and Da. Eva Andrés Aucejo profesora titula at the Universitat de Barcelona. Professor Backer can be reached at lcb911@mac.com
[2] University of Pennsylvania  (J.D. expected 2013).  Many thanks to Professor Backer for both the experience to participate in the writing of this article and for his invaluable mentorship and guidance. Mr. Stancil can be reached at BStancil@law.upenn.edu.

[3] See, e.g., Aisha Labi, As Universities Globalize, Consortia Take On a New Meaning, Chronicle of Higher Educaiton, Aug. 13, 2011.  Available http://chronicle.com/article/As-Universities-Globalize/128633/?sid=gn&utm_source=gn&utm_medium=en (“One network has taken the notion of collaboration a step farther, developing an entirely new institution with degree-granting authority of its own. The Euro-Mediterranean University, or Emuni, was created in 2008 following a Paris summit of 43 countries around the Mediterranean, including several in the Arab world. Involving nearly 200 member institutions, it provides what Joseph Mifsud, its president, calls "just-in-time education," focusing on pressing regional issues that are not adequately dealt with through traditional university syllabi and teaching methods”).

[4] The Center’s presence on the internet may be accessed at  http://ctls.georgetown.edu/The London-based Center for Transnational Legal Studies (CTLS), a global partnership spearheaded by Georgetown University Law Center, will receive the 2011 Andrew Heiskell Award for International Partnerships from the Institute of International Education (IIE) on March 18 in New York.  This is the first time the award has been given to a program focused on legal education.”  Georgetown Law School, Press Release, Center for Transnational Legal Studies Receives Award, Jan. 27, 2011; available  http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/january.25.2011.html.
[5] Discussed in Arjona Sebastià “Transnational Law as an Excuse. How Teaching Law Without the State Makes Legal Education Better”, in C. Menkel-Meadow & F. Werro (eds.), Teaching Transnational Law, Ashgate (forthcoming, 2011).
[6] “The London-based Center for Transnational Legal Studies, launched in 2008 and administered by Georgetown University Law Center staff, is a global partnership currently encompassing 24 schools from almost as many countries around the world. The initiative is premised on a belief that, as legal practice becomes increasingly “transnational”, the best legal education must include exposure to ideas, faculty, and fellow students from many different legal systems.”  Centre for Transnational Legal Studies London, Brochure (2011), available http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCAQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fctls.georgetown.edu%2Fdocuments%2FCTLS-LondonBrochurePT.pdf&rct=j&q=georgetwon%20center%20for%20translational%20legal%20studies&ei=ctM1To6NA-n00gGFufTwDw&usg=AFQjCNENfxUZ0NjAeOPSxNzkvbuiVhQofg&cad=rja
[7] Nicolás Zambrana Tévar, La globalización de las Facultades de Derecho: el Global Law Program de la Universidad de Navarra [Universidad de Navarra], paper presented at the Congreso Sobra la internacionalización de la educación superior de derecho, Toledo, Spain, June 15, 2011.
[8] See, e.g., Joana Abrisketa Uriarte y Cristina Churruca Muguruza, El Máster Europeo Conjunto en Acción Internacional Humanitaria: un máster basado en competencias [Universidad de Deusto], paper presented at the Congreso Sobra la internacionalización de la educación superior de derecho, Toledo, Spain, June 15, 2011; Manuel Bermejo Castrillo, y Pilar Otero González, Hacia una formación jurídica sin fronteras. El reto de la implantación de titulaciones conjuntas de dimensión internacional [Universidad Carlos III de Madrid], paper presented at the Congreso Sobra la internacionalización de la educación superior de derecho, Toledo, Spain, June 15, 2011.
[9] Discussed below at Section II. See, Larry Catá Backer, “Internationalizing the American Law School Curriculum (in Light of the Carnegie Foundation’s Report),” in The Internalization of Law and Legal Education 49-112 (Jan Klabbers and Mortimer Sellers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands:  Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2008) (2 Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice (Mortimer Sellers series ed.).
[10] An influential U.S. academic in matters of the cultural expectations of legal education in the U.S. described the general understanding this way:
Students, academics, and law schools themselves often talk in terms of schools being "national" or "regional," though there doesn't seem to be an agreed-upon set of criteria at work in such discussions.  The vast majority of ABA-approved law schools are "national," for example, in offering a curriculum that is not specific to the state jurisdiction in which the school is located, so in terms of course offerings, "national" is the norm.  More interesting to prospective students, and more likely what is at stake when students wonder whether a school is "national," are the employment prospects of graduates.  Genuinely "national" law schools draw prospective employers to campus from around the nation, not just from the immediate area in which the school is located; more "regional" law schools mainly draw employers to campus from the immediate region. 
Brian Leiter, "National" and "Regional" Law Schools,” Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, Feb. 6, 2006, available http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2006/02/national_and_re.html.
[11]  See, e.g., Judith W. Wegner, “Reframing Legal Education’s Wicked Problems,” 61(4) Rutgers Law Review 867-1008 (2009).
[12] Larry Catá Backer Inter-Systemic Harmonization and Its Challenges for the Legal-State, in The Law of the Future and the Future of Law (HiiL Law of the Future Series, The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis, Laura Kistemaker and Morly Frishman, eds., The Hague, Netherlands: Torkel Opsahi Academic Editor, 2011).
[13] See, e.g., the essays in The Export of Legal Education (Ronald A. Brand and D. Wes Rist, eds., Fanham (Surry, UK): Ashgate 2009).
[14] William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond, Lee S. Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Carnegie Foundation; San Francisco: Jossy-Bass, 2007).
[15] “The ABA sounds off on foreign-trained attorneys,” The Posse List, May 24, 2011, available  http://www.theposselist.com/2011/05/24/the-aba-sounds-off-on-foreign-trained-attorneys/ (“Sitting for the bar exam may soon be trickier for the thousands of foreign-trained attorneys who take the test each year.  The New York Court of Appeals in April adopted stricter requirements for master of laws (LL.M.) programs, which help foreign lawyers gain eligibility to take the bar. The new rules focus primarily on the content of LL.M. programs, which many foreign attorneys use as an entry point into the domestic legal market.”).
[16] See, e.g., Honorable Elizabeth B. Lacy, Report of the Special Comm. on International Issues, 2009 A.B.A. Sec. of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar (Lacy Report) http://www.abajournal.com/files/FINAL.pdf.