While interest in this case, HKSAR v Lai Man Ling [2022] 4 HKC 410, [2022] HKDC 355, reported in September 2022, may be diminishing, its relevance rewards sustained examination. This short essay suggests useful contours that examination.
The case is well known, and in some quaters notorious. As reported by CNN:
Five speech therapists in Hong Kong were found guilty of a conspiracy to publish seditious children's books on Wednesday, in a case that rights defenders say marks a major blow to free speech amid a tightening of civil liberties in the Chinese territory.
The charges center around a set of picture books telling the stories of a village of sheep resisting a pack of wolves invading their home -- a storyline that the government prosecutors alleged was meant to provoke contempt of the local government and China's central government in Beijing. In one book, the wolves tried to takeover a village and eat the sheep, in another, 12 sheep are forced to leave their village after being targeted by the wolves, which the court believed alluded to the case where 12 Hong Kong activists attempted to flee the city to Taiwan as fugitives, but were intercepted by Chinese law enforcement. (Five Hong Kong speech therapists convicted of sedition over children's books about wolves and sheep)
The prosecution is important for many reasons (as reported eg here, and here). And its global implications are intense as another objectification of the great conversation between the more ancient discourse of liberal democratic rights systems and those now emerging as its Marxist-Leninist alternatives. This discursive 'conversation' finds a primary battleground in Hong Kong.
My object here is not to take sides. Both sides are reflections of ideological starting points that are mutually incompatible. It would follow that once one teased out those ideologies, then the only interesting issue, from the perspective of theory, is the gap between the ideal application of the ideological position and its expression in judgment and decision (or opposition). The size of that gap suggests two things: (1) the valuation of words in their translation frm principle (abstraction) to application (judgment); and (2) a point on the plausible spectrum of the manifestation of that gap grounded in other reasonable applications of the ideal. In this case, of course, that gap is most noticeable in the application of the HK National Security Law and speech ideals in Hong Kong.
To those ends it may be worth focusing on a critical aspect of the case--one that touches on the construction of the space for political speech (as well as its definition and scope) within the disciplinary space of the National Security Law. One section of the opinion is worth a careful read in that respect:
100. The real arguments
turn on Step 3, ie whether the restriction or limitation is no more than
necessary to accomplice that legitimate aim. It is clear that the only
possible ground justifying the restriction or limitation are national
security and public order (ordre public) as stated in Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of HKBOR.
101. The dispute
is to what extent restrictions can be imposed on the right to free
speech in the name of national security. It is submitted that the
concept of national security should be construed according to the
Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogation Provisions in the
ICCPR so that the right to freedoms of expression, publication and
literary and artistic creation will not be unduly restricted. According
to the Siracusa Principles, a legitimate national security interest is
one that aims “to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial
integrity or political independence against force or threat of force.
102. The Siracusa
Principles do not enjoy the status of rules of law in HKSAR. They were
issued 38 years ago and likely to be outdated. Nowadays, the existence
of a nation, its territorial integrity or political independence can be
threatened not just by force or threat of force, but by propaganda
spreading rumours, misinformation and disinformation that make the
people no longer trust and even hate their government, resulting in
serious social unrest and chaos. In this sense, making sedition an
offence should be even a more important tool for protection of national
security rather than holding it unconstitutional. In addition, its
scope should not be unduly restricted, or else it will be ineffective in
protecting national security. The issue is how to strike a balance.
It must also be borne in mind that vague and arbitrary limitations on
the right to freedoms of expression and publication cannot be accepted.
103. On this
issue, I am of the view that the overseas statutes, case law, law
commission working paper, academic commentaries are of little
assistance. Their political background, social condition, culture and
the availability of alternative legislations to deal with seditious
situations to safeguard their national security are different to those
in HKSAR. Hence, our focus should be on the unique political and social
conditions of the Region, and the other laws in force in HKSAR.
104. In
considering whether the offences created by sections 9 and 10 of the
Crimes Ordinance are no more than necessary to accomplice the legitimate
aim, it is important to understand the political and social condition
in HKSAR at the time of the alleged offence against the defendants up
till now: see paragraph 12 above. Since the start of the
Anti-Extradition Movement in mid-2019, HKSAR went through a lengthy
period of mass riots and civil unrests, some of them were extremely
violent and weapons and petrol bombs were used. While the exact number
of people participated in these riotous activities will never be known,
it can be said with certainty that there were over tens of thousands of
them. What these people had demonstrated during this period of time was
that they did not recognize the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of
China over HKSAR, and they did not support the policy of the “One
Country, Two systems”. There were calls for Hong Kong independence or
self-determination. Although the situation in HKSAR has more or less
calmed down after the promulgation of the NSL, it is clear that these
people have little change in their attitude. They just go underground
and the seeds of unrest are still there. The political situation
appears to be calm on the surface but very volatile underneath.
105. Under these
circumstances, there is a strong pressing need to safeguard national
security in HKSAR to prevent riots and civil unrests of any magnitude
from happening again. It is also essential to protect the
constitutional order of HKSAR under the “One Country, Two Systems”
policy and to restore national unity as soon and as fullest as
possible. It is also of fundamental importance that Hong Kong residents
can have a prolonged period of living in peaceful environments after
public tranquility had been destroyed or damaged for one year. It is
therefore important to adopt measures to protect the general welfare and
the interest of the collectivity as a whole under the concept of public
order (ordre public). For these reasons, I find that the
restrictions imposed by sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance on the
right to freedoms of expression and publication are necessary for the
protection of national security and protection of public order (ordre public). From the decision of Ng Kung Siu, it is clear that a person’s right to freedom of expression can be restricted for the protection of public order (ordre public)
for the benefit of the legitimate societal interests to consolidate the
new constitutional order in Hong Kong and to implement the policy of
“One Country, Two Systems”. The same principle should apply to the
present case. At all material times of this alleged offence up till
now, HKSAR has a wounded constitutional order to heal, and a detached
national unity to restore.
106. Of course,
there is still the question whether the restriction caused by these
seditious offences is no more than necessary to limit the right to
freedom of expression and of publication, etc. The present law does not
prevent anyone to say and publish whatever they like, including
criticisms of the Central Authorities and the Government of HKSAR in any
form, provided that they do so without a seditious intention.
Furthermore, on a proper construction of sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes
Ordinance, the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant
cannot benefit from the “defence” stated in section 9(2) of the Crimes
Ordinance, and that the defendant had a seditious intention when he did
the act complained of.
There is much to unpack here much of which is bound up in the politics and resolution of the civil unrest in Hong Kong in 2019-2020 (see Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and Two Systems'). Some of that unpacking is worth highlighting.
1. One starts with the usual binary (¶100)--individual or collective speech as a function of its (lawful) limitation. This frames the issue in ways that are trans-systemically compatible; that is one might this proposition irrespective of the system or governing ideology in which the issue might arise. These are framed in the broadly drawn and idealized language of Art. 19 of ICCPR.
2. But it is at this point that one begins to veer into a contextually specific application of a broader contextually specific constitutional order (¶101). One moves from the identified action of the ideal to its application by asking first if there are global consensus instruments that help define or guide application of ICCPR Article 19. Defendants suggested the Siracusa Principles. But the Siracusa Principles are just that--soft law in the sense that they might be made binding in private law systems (through contract) but that they do not have, strictly speaking, binding effect unless transposed into the domestic legal order and applied within the constraints that territory's constitutional order.
3. That ought to have been the point made in ¶ 102. But this court went further. It first dismissed the principles as old and ts potentially outdated (though there is irony in applying the even older ICCPR)--suggesting that soft law consensus principles musty have a shorter political half life. But that cannot be entirely true. What can be true is that states can, as they deem expedient, adhere, re-interpret, or reject such consensus principles as they like. That action is not because of the passage of time, but of the change in the political and constitutional order of the state confronted with that decision. That is fair. It then follows that ¶102 tells one more about HK than it does about, in an abstract sense at least, the viability or decrepitude of the Siracusa Principles themselves. Indeed, the deprecating language used picks up the essence of the position of the Central Authorities developed during the height of the civil unrest in Hong Kong toward the end of 2019 and included in a quite important speech of General Secretary Xi at the beginning of 2020 (see, e.g., Open-Shut (bai he 稗閤) Strategies: 习近平;止暴制乱 恢复秩序是香港当前最紧迫的任务 [Xi Jinping; Stopping the storm and restoring order is Hong Kong’s most urgent task at present]). That is also fair, though the lack of direct connection in the opinion is to be lanmented.
4. The opinion, however, goes further still. Picking up both the underlying theme of the black hand of foreign interference (外国干涉的黑手) elaborately developed by the Central Authorities furing the civil unrest and then reflected in the National Security Law (see, e.g., Assessing (Quan 權) the “Black Hand” (黑手) of Foreign Interference and the Justification for Intervention; chapter 8 of Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and Two Systems') the opinion takes it on itself to make policy. That policy, reflected in ¶103 starts from the fundamental principle "that the overseas statutes, case law, law
commission working paper, academic commentaries are of little
assistance." Fair enough. It reflects a tendency that one sees in liberal democratic states where, for example, in the constitutional debates among the members of the federal Supreme Curt, there has been a debate about the relevance and utility of foreign sources in US jurisprudence (see, e.g., here, here, and here).
5. It follows, then, that national or regional context takes precedent. The object pf ¶ 104, then, is both to make that case, and to start applying the court's interpretation of that context to the case. And the context in Hong Kong is a mass collective that has yet to fully or decisively embrace the principles and behaviors of a united patriotic front: "Although the situation in HKSAR has more or less
calmed down after the promulgation of the NSL, it is clear that these
people have little change in their attitude. They just go underground
and the seeds of unrest are still there. The political situation
appears to be calm on the surface but very volatile underneath. " (Ibid. ¶ 104). The National Security Law, then, serves not just to regulate speech, but also as an instrument of popular pacification--constitutionally mandated, and necessary to enhance the relationship between the HKSAR and the state apparatus of the central authorities. To those ends, there is very little that foreigners can decisively contribute. That, at any rate, appears to be the constitutionally plausible logic.
6. The rest follows. Thus, ¶ 105 adds a precautonary principle, b ut now applied in an quite interesting way to the protection of the social order itself through the mechanisms of the National Security Law. But it does more than that. In alignment with the fundamental building block of Chinese constitutionalism in the primacy of the collective, it then effectively sketches the privileging of speech in which the needs and protection of the collective take precedence over the views and desires of the individual to discursive performance. This extends, it seems, down to the books at the center of this case. ("From the decision of Ng Kung Siu, it is clear that a person’s right to freedom of expression can be restricted for the protection of public order (ordre public)
for the benefit of the legitimate societal interests to consolidate the
new constitutional order in Hong Kong and to implement the policy of
“One Country, Two Systems”. The same principle should apply to the
present case." Ibid).
7. What is then left, is the issue of intent. And inference drawn from the general principles built in ¶¶101-105 suggests a fairly low thresh hold for inferring intent.
The reasoning in the opinion, at least with respect to the small part considered, suggests a substantial widening of the gap between the emerging approaches of the HK courts and those of liberal democratic states, especially OECD states. That is both to be expected and to some extent uninteresting as theory, if only because the sources and nature of that gap and this widening are well understood. Far more interesting is the construction of the new constitutional ideal against which one can measure the application of principle to the facts of this case. In that respect, it is now becoming clearer that HK courts will be developing a new form of jurisprudence in which the forms of traditional interpretation and application will be maintained, but the fundamental basis for decision will develop in a new and perhaps uniquer, direction. The more interesting question, then, is whether the court could have plausibly reached a different result n this case, even if it rigorously applied the same underlying jurisprudence and principles. It is in that answer to that question that the scope and direction of HK jurisprudence may be found.