Thursday, July 24, 2025

"Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan" (July 2025)--A Reverie on Building and Racing on A.I.'s Structural "Fury Road"

 

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The United States is in a race to achieve global dominance in artificial intelligence. Whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set the global standards and reap broad economic and security benefits. Under President Trump, our Nation will win, ushering in a new Golden Age of innovation, human flourishing, and technological achievement for the American people. America’s AI Action Plan has three policy pillars – Accelerating Innovation, Building AI Infrastructure, and Leading International Diplomacy and Security. (AI.Gov)

 

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Human like to race. Racing is one of the more complicated semiotic manifestations of human social relations. It suggests many of the key elements of the  way in which humans conceive of their cognitive spaces within the world in which they find themselves. It denotes space, time, place, and the forms of engagement with other humans. One can race against itself; one can race against time; one can race against a competitor; ne can race for a befit or reward or to avoid a negative impact or punishment.  One races from one's demons; perhaps one races as well towards one's objectives, understood as functions of time, place and space envisioned for the purpose of the race and placed  along a pathway that the race reveals.  But races need not go anywhere but in a circle--leaving place and space constant, but time dynamic--one here races against time toward whatever it is that is at the end of a temporal journey around oneself. It evolved from the in its Romance language forms from the vulgar Latin "carraria" (a route or pathway) and "carrus," the cart  that travels along routes. In the Spanish it refers to virtually any route that is understood and defined--from a race, to a career path, to the path along which animals are herded, to bus or train routes, to the undertaking of a profession, to certain sorts of ordering by placing things, objects or ideas in a line.  

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A race or racing is a profoundly comprehensive cognitive cage, one in or through which reality is not merely ordered but set in motion.  And that motion setting is itself ordered in ways that distinguishes between proper racing and other actions.  Its etymology suggests  something linear and temporal, a narrative, defining a space within which it travels from one place to another that is physical, virtual, textual or performative. It older meanings were built around watercourses--streams, for example--that created pathways within which things, people or other things could run. But not just streams--hippodromes, NASCAR, obstacle courses, courses of study against which a student must race against text, time and performance within a well defined pathways the markers of which suggest the consequences of the run. All of these imply or suggest speed. These carry over to the Latin--suggesting both a "race" (as in a competition) and a "career" (as in a professional path); both narrative objects that suggest the course of journey, competition, or course of cognitive construction through action. To race, then, suggests not merely an action, but also the structuring of the place, space, time and expectations within which it is possible to conceive of a race, and to follow a course from one place to another. To those ends, perhaps, the critical part of a race is not just the movement, but rather it is the construction of the pathways  and structures within which it is possible to organize, understand, assess and participate in a race. In effect, to engage in a race is to order a world in which it is possible to race in ways that a human collective invested in racing have all embraced. By the time one gets to the actual movement that constitutes the running, the most important part of the race has already been run--the construction of the race routes and the rules for its running. 

It is only in this sense that one can truly appreciate the current effort of the Trump Administration to produce and distribute its  "Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan" (July 2025). 

The Plan identifies over 90 Federal policy actions across three pillars – Accelerating Innovation, Building American AI Infrastructure, and Leading in International Diplomacy and Security – that the Trump Administration will take in the coming weeks and months. Key policies in the AI Action Plan include: 

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Exporting American AI: The Commerce and State Departments will partner with industry to deliver secure, full-stack AI export packages – including hardware, models, software, applications, and standards – to America’s friends and allies around the world.
Promoting Rapid Buildout of Data Centers: Expediting and modernizing permits for data centers and semiconductor fabs, as well as creating new national initiatives to increase high-demand occupations like electricians and HVAC technicians.
Enabling Innovation and Adoption: Removing onerous Federal regulations that hinder AI development and deployment, and seek private sector input on rules to remove.
Upholding Free Speech in Frontier Models: Updating Federal procurement guidelines to ensure that the government only contracts with frontier large language model developers who ensure that their systems are objective and free from top-down ideological bias. (White House Unveils America’s AI Action Plan 23 July 2025)

And the AI Action Plan also comes with its own web site within the umbrella of the White House site, a site that is meant to be as modern and forward looking  as the hoped for success of the initiative. 

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 The AI Action Plan is divided into three Pillars. Pillar 1 (Accelerating Innovation) focuses on technology innovation through markets.  Thus, the regulatory architecture of the present system offers a rich target (see, e.g., Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure). However, in the style of the beginning of the 2nd quarter of the 21st century, markets must be managed by and through the benign hand of the State--even under an ideology which is grounded in the power of individual autonomy and iterative risk based transactions that together evolves direction. Markets, then, even those driven by iterative aggregated individual (legal and natural person) activity must be guided. That is the essence of the race--the State must construct the routes on which the race is to be undertaken. It is, in this sense, that the actual race, run by market actors, assumes a consequential, rather than the generative, place in the scheme of "the" (or really "any") AI Action Plan. The critical element of any race is the construction of the space in which it is to be undertaken, the development and acceptable of the markers that identify points of progress and that suggest the direction of the course, and the shape of the course itself (linear toward a goal, circular perhaps spiraling up or outward, or merely circular generating wealth and self sustainability through the constant motion of the racers) (see eg here). In this case one constructs the race course out of American values, the role of American labor, the outward projection of race progress markers, the development of rich data warehousing with value, and the utility of all of this effort for national commercial and security objectives (see, e.g., Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Prevents Woke AI in the Federal Government;). The race course is itself part of a broader race, one in which States and other collectives vie for supremacy (as that concept is itself developed and assessed in accordance with the values and tastes of the times). 

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Pillar 2 (AI Infrastructures) focuses on the development of the physical and virtual structures of the race course itself.  Just as there is a sub-race built around innovation,  so there is another around infrastructure.  In this case that involves both physical and virtual infrastructure that is now to be given priority over competing national obsessions--climate action, ecological impacts, human rights and the like. Not that these priorities are abandoned, rather they are now all factors to be balanced against a national priority factor focused on the development of infrastructure that supports the innovation race. On the physical side one focuses on data centers and hardware manufacture. One focuses on grids, and on the production of a labor force whose work can be purchased and consumed (see eg here; Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Accelerates Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure).  One focuses on security, on connectivity, and on capacity. These are first internally structured and then structured for projection abroad.

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Pillar 3 (International AI Diplomacy and Security) then focuses on the outward projection of inward development (see, e.g., Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Promotes the Export of American AI Technologies).  In this sub-race the course is built to very closely resemble that built by the Chinese in the construction of their Belt & Road Initiative. These hub and spoke models permit outward projections from a central core along lines and routes that are integrated into and help support the core objectives of the center (see, eg., Promoting The Export of the American AI Technology Stack). That shapes the course--not as a circle or a line, but as a routed platform drawn around a center with flexible sub-routines within its shape. That suggests the limits of the core--the hub and spokes themselves (in this case the U.S. and its allies and partners, the essence of America First, like that of Belt & Road) with additional projections in a more controlled way beyond the physical limits of that "wheel." Thus the model is one of projection outward and security--distribution and control, use and policing. 

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The Three Pillars together constitute the race course within which the United States now proposes to run in an A.I. race. The running, of course, will be undertaken for the most part by the private sector. But the State, in addition to its managerial and oversight roles, will also be a contributor, as well as a consumer, and enforcer.  What is the A.I. race which Americans are now being invited to lead?  It is one that aligns direct innovation by the private sector, with a structural mangerialism by the State, and the instrumentalization of aspects of innovation for the protection and projection of high quality production abroad in a way that ties foreign and domestic markets through tech. These aspects of the AI Action Plan are then realized (at least in text) in a number of complementary actions and announcements made by the Trump Administration best considered together: (1) Preventing Woke AI in the Federal Government; (2) Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Promotes the Export of American AI Technologies; (3) Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Accelerates Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure; (4) Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Prevents Woke AI in the Federal Government; (5) Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure; and (6) Promoting The Export of the American AI Technology Stack.

It is a race as much for control of the ideologies and presentation (technical specifications), as it is for the production of national wealth for individuals. That was clearly understood by many important people quoted by the Trump administration highlighting the support the Action Plan has generated among the people who count: Wide Acclaim for President Trump’s Visionary AI Action Plan. Indeed, it is not clear that, in contemporary times, it is possible to separate the two at the level of apex States.  The course is designed, in this way to project not just innovation (hard and virtual goods from which money can be made) but also the premises, expectations, and norms that those hard and soft goods naturalize in the tech and especially the A.I. environment. And with that comes control--not just through the (self) control of normative hard structuring of innovation pathways) but also through the more mundane control through security measures. That is precisely, as well the Chinese and the European pathways--and also that emerging in the African and Latin American communities. 

Beyond that is the detail--all important, and the focus of  analysis of the AI Action Plan focus on its detail (e.g., here ). They are already in the race; those must, as a condition of analysis, accept at least the general parameters around which the "race" is conceived and its course constructed. That is critically important, of courser, at least a a national micro level. But that misses the essential object of the AI Action Plan itself--to develop and control the course, expectations, and running of the race on its own terms, by its own rules, and toward its own "finish line" as against deeply powerful alternative "race courses" being put forward by competitor groups, especially those with their hubs in Brussels and Beijing. 

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The Europeans are attempting to build a raceway that is focused on its normative rights project. It is a system grounded in the reduction or mitigation of risk, and ultimately the management of that risk through systems of regulatory supervision. The structures, and its innovation, serve the State and its core normative vision expressed in policy. The object is not the innovation but the risk based benefits that comport to the values and needs of the normative framework of the State. That is the essence, for example of the EU's AI Act, which provides a legal structure for the EU's digital strategy:

The digital transformation is one of the EU's priorities. The European Parliament is helping to shape the policies that will strengthen Europe's capacities in new digital technologies, open new opportunities for businesses and consumers, support the EU's green transition and help it to reach climate neutrality by 2050, support people's digital skills and training for workers, and help digitalise public services, while ensuring the respect of basic rights and values. (here)

AI and innovation, then, is an instrument that, like other collective activities, must be aligned with social normative values and overseen by the State through system of supervision to which operaitonal capacity is delegated to individuals.  During the Biden Administration, the U.S: position was closer to that emerging in Europe than it is to that now emerging in the United States.  (See, e.g., Key takeaways from the Biden administration executive order on AI; "with the goal of promoting the “safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence”;" see also discussion and links in "Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence" Text and Brief Reflections).

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While the Europeans build innovation raceways tied to normative policy and managed through systems of public risk based regulatory supervision, the Chinese  build a raceway that is meant to serve as an enhancement of a course already well established--the Socialist Path toward the eventual establishment of a Communist society. Innovation, in that sense is an aspect of socialist modernization. And socialist modernization is undertaken through programs of innovation and high quality production. High quality production in turn is a function of innovation. And all of this is judged as a function of its utility for meeting the challenge of the general contradiction in a contemporary stage of historical development,  and as an instrument of collective movement along that Socialist Path.  At the core of this enterprise are the vanguard elements of society, organized as a Communist Party, and vested with the responsibility for guiding the masses along the Socialist Path through political leadership and within the framework of the administrative apparatus  through which policy and leadership can be translated into action. 

It in especially in this context that one can understand the race between the three great powers in its more comprehensive senses. These are races against time, against oneself, toward something. These are races for the construction of the courses on which the races are to be held and the form and rules of and for those races. These are, in their most ancient sense--narratives of power and control moving from the structural to the phenomenological--that is from the development of a common conceptual universe of innovation and object to the actual running of the races  by those expected to participate as "runners". One is racing here to construct a world and its ordering.

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The table of contents of the  AI Action Plan follows. Supporting

Special Issue: Vol. 38/6 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law--" Semiotic Assemblage, Translanguaging and Translating Laws of the Middle East and North African Regions"

 


 

The Special Issue of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law (Volume 38, Issue 6 – August 2025) is now online. Title: Semiotic Assemblage, Translanguaging and Translating Laws of the Middle East and North African Regions. The Special Issue is guest edited by Rafat Y. Alwazna, Zoe Hurley, Tariq Elyas.

The issue is particularly relevant for those with an interest in the semiotics of translation--and transference--into and out of Arabic. Some of the articles are open access. The Editors, in their Introduction help frame the issues. 

Problems of meaning, communication and interpretation intensify within the processes of translation. These issues are not entirely resolved by computer-assisted translation tools or machine translation systems due to the semiotic complexities of context. While the present paper does not propose to resolve the challenges of legal translations in the Middle East context, it has engaged with these linguistic, technological and semiotic complexities in relation to legal matters. MENA is a distinct area where several laws, ranging from sacred laws to secular laws, are applied to different institutions in the area. Moreover, the conceptual and legal asymmetries, translations and tensions between laws within and outside the MENA region make the process of legal translation a daunting yet crucial task that needs to be assessed by professional and expert legal translators as well as semioticians who possess the relevant knowledge, competence and awareness of the dexterity of signs. Moreover, we need to appreciate how the processes of legal translation occur in relation to the contextual range of meanings and interpretation. Hence, English translations of legal terms across Arabic-speaking MENA countries can differ according to the political, social, cultural, and economic circumstances of the country in question. In addition, this can result in varying legal provisions having different wording, technical expressions and outcomes. Consequently, failure in conveying the nuanced legal meaning of any legal term may affect the practical application of the target legal text, thus impacting the entire legal effect of the law in question.

Access the issue here.

The Table of Contents follows with links along with links to the articles. Also below the Introduction by the Editors.

 

Wednesday, July 23, 2025

ICoCA Newsletter April-June 2025: "Technology and the Future of Private Security" and Policy Brief/Research Report-- "Ensuring Responsible Security in the Digital Age"

 

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Everyone and every "thing" is becoming smarter.  That "smartness"  is meant to suggest the broad and growing range of human individual and collective activity that is now enhanced by and soon perhaps driven, ordered, and managed through, technology. (Posting Text of "Smart Court (智慧法院 ), Smarter Party: A Necessary but Incomplete Interpenetration") These technologies can range from the mundane--the digitization of aspects of collective interaction, to the digitalization of human interactions, especially with State or private organs, through technologies approaching the self-ordering possibilities of simulated worlds applied to human life ('The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, and the “Human” Condition', International Journal for the Semiotics of Law).  

One aspect of these transformations that deserve attention is in the context of the operation of private security organizations. Those concerns are nicely encapsulated in the April-June Newsletter of The International Code of Conduct Association – ICoCA--"Technology and the future of private security." ICoCA "is a multi-stakeholder initiative formed in 2013 to ensure that providers of private security services respect human rights and humanitarian law. It serves as the governance and oversight mechanism of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers." (ICoCA--About).  The ICoCa summarizes the contents of then Newsletter this way:

This edition of ICoCA's newsletter focuses on the growing use of technology in private security. From digital surveillance to cybersecurity, private security companies are expanding beyond their traditional “boots on the ground” services to offer a range of ICT-based services. These developments raise new ethical and legal challenges. ICoCA remains committed to promoting their responsible use in line with human rights and international law. Learn more in this edition.

A summary of the Contents with links follows below. A French version of this newsletter is available here.

Perhaps especially interesting to those  working in the field of tech enhanced social ordering are two reports--one a policy brief, and a research report part of the ICoCA's research series, both titled "Ensuring responsible security in the digital age."

Responsible use of technology is a key strategic priority for ICoCA. To support this, ICoCA has initiated research and consultations to provide clear guidance to private security providers, technology companies and users. The insights in the policy brief and research report below are based on extensive consultations held throughout 2024, including field missions, interviews and workshops with industry experts, private security companies and civil society organisations. The key findings and recommendations were further reviewed at a consultative workshop held in Geneva in March 2025. As new technologies continue to transform the security landscape, ICoCA remains committed to helping the industry navigate this evolution responsibly – ensuring that respect for human rights is embedded throughout.
The Introduction to the Policy Brief also follows below.


 

Tuesday, July 22, 2025

Displacements and Stable Ordering: Legacies of the Post 1945 Global Order

 

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 Ethnic displacements are as old as human history, as far as one can tell.  And as far as one can tell, those displacements sometimes were treated as a matter of indifference, inevitability, right, justice, or tragedy. Much of that discussion might have focused more on the means by which population displacements were undertaken, and the level of savagery--judged by the standards of the times--as a function of the level of general antipathy or sympathy for the human collectives affected. More recently, displacements appeared to be at their most legitimate when undertaken through law, including international law--for example when displacements accompanied changes in borders. But even then, sometimes displacement could not be easily separated from older and more primitive desires by one collective against others. 

The great difficulty of displacement is perhaps at its most basic a twofold problem.  The first is that collective displacement is difficult to define with any precision--it is intimately contextual, and thus also political/ideological. One tends to reverse engineer displacement to suit one's politics. Aligned with the definitional problem is that of distinguishing between individual migration; and migration that may be formally uncoordinated but none the less collective in effect. Tied into that is the difficulty of distinguishing between collective displacement and methods--both by expelling and receiving populations and their political organs. The greater the tragedy in methodology, the more problematic in moral terms.  Since the end of the last century, as well, the more likely that such methods--tied to some sort of definition of collective displacement that suits--may also constitute a violation of international criminal law as forms of crimes against humanity, for example--and at their limit, genocide.   

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But what still appears to be true enough is that States, by agreement, may still have certain leeway in agreeing to mass displacements in the course of managing their relationships.  Less certain but more likely, States have a certain leeway in not preventing the action of social forces that produce tendencies toward mass displacement--though that leeway is a function of violence and the conditions of displacement. And States might have some sort of duty, to the extent of their capabilities sin that respect, to present their own populations from unofficially creating the conditions under which mass displacement occurs. Nonetheless that line of leeway is blurred where economic, social, or cultural conditions produce a reality in which individuals may seek to migrate and that individual decision, under generalize conditions, is repeated enough by enough people to produce what appears to be mass displacement, or migration, or whatever other (politically charged) term one might seek to use. 

In this context it is hard to find a State, or a people, whose own actions or histories are not clouded by (what in retrospect appears to have been a convenient and ordering) set of displacement actions that produced their contemporary conditions.  And it is even harder to find a State under those circumstances unwilling to judge, and sometimes harshly, States undergoing similar conditions and reactions in contexts of instability, war, or other conflict. Purity, however, is the starting point of law; and the presumption of purity is a concept that is tied to the moment and the context. Thus, for example, States and peoples who might, a generation or so ago, have found the matter of displacement of minorities in their own countries a matter of indifference or of positive benefit, however violent or tragic the circumstances, may now recoil in horror at displacement of their own communities from other lands. The essence of all of this is that: (1) the impulse, at this current stage of human development, to manage, mitigate the effects of, or eliminate the acts or conditions of displacement represent a high ideal that ought not to be dismissed; (2) the connection between objective and means may well lie at the core of the issue, or at least helps shape the antipathy to which the idea of displacement has been moving; and (3) the ability of human communities to meet that ideal in a neutral, dispassionate, and equal way appears to be as elusive as the any human goal. All of this might be useful to consider in the context of a particular infatuation of the global community respecting displacement (for the larger displacement picture consider here) that is indeed fascinating--the displacement of a formerly majority population by a population of formerly displaced communities, some of whom had been displaced by the extended "family" of the community now being displaced. The accumulation of displacement makes the situation impossible--but the layering of method adds not just tragedy but perhaps inevitability. In that context, the Occupied Palestinian Territories: joint statement, 21 July 2025 provides a quite nice illustration of the issues sketched here. The Statement follows below.  Beyond what has been generally described, additional commentary would necessarily be political, ideological, and expressions of communal solidarity that I leave to readers to sort out for themselves. It is, like many other Statements of this kind, made in the past and to be made in the future in this and other instances of displacement (assuming the requisite political interest), yet another instance of futility in search of a stable state. And the task is made harder in a global context in which virtually all parties have blood on their hands--in some cases that blood is still fresh. Yet that stable state may well be displacement itself under conditions of hostile difference or threat. 

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Text of Interview with Payman Yazdani for Tabnak News Service (Iran): "US expert talks of threats, opportunities of US proposal for Zangezur Corridor for regional states, Iran"

 

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I was delighted to have been able to sit for an online interview with Payman Yazdani for the Tabnak News Service (Iran).  The interview revolved around six questions:

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1. The US says it aims to facilitate peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. What are the real goals of the US? 

2. What can be the advantages and possible disadvantages of the US proposal for Baku and Yerevan?

3. How can this affect China's one road- one belt project? and basically what are the possible security and economic threats of the US proposal to China?

4. The EU has supported the US proposal; can this create any possible security or economic threats to Russia's interest in the region?

5.Armenia had announced that it would not hand over the control of the corridor to a third party but to push Armenia, Turkey has told Yerevan that the new developments have been against Iran. Do you think that Yerevan will finally accept the US proposal? How can this affect Iran's interest?

6. If finally Armenia agrees with opening of the corridor, what is the best strategy for Iran to face the reality on the ground? 

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The answers required one to try to consider the current version of one part of efforts to ease historically mutable and complex tensions in the region, and perhaps to freeze--a moment of relative stillness for everyone to regroup and perhaps reconsider the value of repeating past patterns of relations--the situation in the region long enough to change the way in Armenia and Azerbaijan consider the nature and objectives of their respective positions, and the forms of their ambitions going forward. Nonetheless, these considerations may not be undertaken in isolation--regional powers, extending through the Eastern Mediterranean on one side and up to the Chinese border on the other all have interests that may be reflected in whatever it is that comes out of thirty or so years war, major population displacements, and territorial adjustments. The area, as such, has presented some of the more interesting and layered sets of conflicting ambitions and displacements in global affairs, one that is as much driven by the local as it is by increasingly broader interests of regional and global powers. It also suggests the growing alignment of public and private institutions as instruments of State policy. Of course, there is much more to this than can be developed in the short space allotted to interview questions and answers. And there are as many perspectives about the issue as there are stakeholders with (diverse and often conflicting) interests. My focus is on an aspect that might tend to receive less attention than others more aligned with the State centered analysis of these sorts of conflicts. I start from the foundational element of pathways--one is, in fact, looking at pathways. These corridors, connectors, routes, conduits and the like accomplish more than the obvious, to connect in some fashion the points along its path. They are as important for what they transport, how it is transported, what might be inspected, taxed, limited, observed and the like, than merely serving as a physical space where these activities may be undertaken. These pathways, then, may also be understood as a peculiar sort of platform that are as important ot its users and producers globally as it is to the resolution of a problem along its path.


The interview (with internal links) may be found online (in English) HERE. It also follows below. Links to the Fasi language version HERE or direct access:

«کریدور زنگزور» می‌تواند حضور امنیتی آمریکا در قفقاز را تقویت کند/ ایران واقعیتهای جدید منطقه را دقیق رصد کند


.

 

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Saturday, July 19, 2025

The New Administrative State of Necessity: "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Creates New Classification of Federal Employee to Help Serve the American People" and "Creating Schedule G in the Excepted Service"

 

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It is a truism everywhere, even within Marxist-Leninist States still trudging along the Socialist Path, that capital is invested and labor is both purchased. Capital--the things, including things that hold value (like money)--is  exploited by exchanging it for other things at the end a cycle of such exchanges the total value of things grows (however it is that one values those things). Labor is the lubricant, the catalyzing agent, the kinetic force, that aids in the process of transforming one thing (investment capital) for another (the product of invest), both reduced to a fungible value that itself may be invested or transformed. Lubricants, catalyzing agents, and the like once purchased can be consumed in the process of the production of transformation of one set of things of value for another set of things of value--all ultimately reducible to money or its equivalents (or at least made fungible through the medium of this form of investing a thing with a quality (value) that can then be used, bargained for or exchanged or contributed to other things that produce even more or different things with (hopefully) higher aggregate value.  Perhaps that makes sense--people are easy enough to make, or to bring in (and thus the migration politics in part); objects may take more effort and their production is less predictable.  And the connection between people--people who are consumed in production also consume the objects of production in the production of which they are consumed adds a nice self-referencing touch to the semiotics of firstness (thingd including persons), their secondness/signification (production and consumption) and their collective understanding (adding value through production and consumption of things). 

It is in this sense that this fundamental (if ironically semiotic) understanding of the kinetic role and character of activity (whether economic, social, cultural or the like) and its two component parts. It is worth remembering here that there are two component parts--labor and capital--because of its semiotic power. That is, that the objects through which, when put through a process (iterative dialectic) can produce another thing or things have been signified in quite distinct ways in order to permit the elaboration of quite interesting, and sometimes oppositional, variations on a collective ideal that people (labor) ought to be consumed and that things (capital) ought to be preserved and augmented. Fair enough, and a critical premise of both markets based liberal democratic and  so-called Socialist (committed to Marxist ends through the deployment of Leninist machinery) conceptual cages. Their fundamental mimetic character is always and usefully veiled by the hyperfocus on the details through which each elaborates systems for the consumption of people and the apotheosis of things (including today the environment). 

Conceptual cages tend to bleed over into all forms of institutional life. And one might expect that public institutions (and institutional thinking about the character and function of its productive elements) would be similar.  With that in mind, then, President Trump's recent announcement-- "Creating Schedule G in the Excepted Service" and its explanation, "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Creates New Classification of Federal Employee to Help Serve the American People" make perfect sense. 

Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order creating a new classification of non-career federal workers, “Schedule G” employees, to better serve Americans’ needs by focusing on implementing Administration policies. The Order amends Civil Service Rule VI to fill an existing gap in federal employee classifications by creating a new type of hire, Schedule G, for employees who engage in policy-making or policy-advocating work. Schedule G positions will be non-career positions, meaning incumbents will generally be expected to leave when the President who appointed them leaves office. Schedule G will not apply to career positions or career employees.  Schedule G employees will be hired to help faithfully implement the President’s policy agenda. ("Fact Sheet)

Much of the press coverage/critique focused on the added power to hire political appointees (eg HERE).  That may be so. Much more profound, however, may be its enhancement of principles of labor consumption in the service of elected officials to produce objects of political values within the regulatory factories of the United States. The text of both are provided below.

 

Thursday, July 17, 2025

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Hearing Announcement: "Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression"

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 I have been following the work of the  Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) for some time.  Essays HERE: CECC. CECC serves as an important venue for the dissemination of official positions of the United States on its relationship with China.  Its prior leaders includes current Secretary of State Rubio.  It is also an official space in which debates or positions that might be taken by the State, or what may serve as encouragement for private action, might be developed.   

CECC has a fairly comprehensive range of issues on which it focuses.  CECC issue areas include Access to Justice; Business and Human Rights; Civil Society; Criminal Justice; Developments in Hong Kong and Macau; Ethnic Minority Rights; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of Religion; Freedom of Residence and Movement; Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally; Human Trafficking; Institutions of Democratic Governance; North Korean Refugees in China; Population Control; Public Health; Status of Women; The Environment and Climate Change; Tibet; Worker Rights; and Xinjiang.

Nonetheless, Taiwan does not play a role.  Part of that is likely political--because the status of Taiwan remains sensitive; the U.S. prefers to take the position that Chinese actions affect Taiwan, but not that Taiwan matters are matters internal to China. Thus, for example, in the CECC 2024 Report, Chinese actions that suggest election interference was noted, but in the same way that such interference was catalogued throughput the Pacific basin. 

The PRC attempted to influence Taiwan’s January 2024 general elections and “coax and coerce the Taiwanese population into accepting closer ties” with China, as described by the German Marshall Fund. According to commentary published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “while Beijing often tries to shape other countries’ political environments in its favour ahead of general elections . . . its interference in Taiwan is much more direct,” with the use of cognitive warfare, military threats, propaganda, economic retaliation, and measures to further isolate Taiwan in the international community. The PRC, in addition, “tried to co-opt business people and opposition politicians,” reportedly offering local politicians discounted or all-expenses-paid trips to mainland China. Leading up Taiwan’s May 2024 presidential inauguration, PRC authorities sanctioned five Taiwanese political commentators for “spreading rumors to smear the mainland.”  Bloomberg referred to the sanctions as an attempt to “[pile] pressure on incoming president Lai Ching-te just days before he takes office,” 68 with the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club describing them as “an affront to free speech and the rights of journalists to operate without intimidation or reprisal.”(2024 CECC Report, p. 294)

More importantly was the way Taiwan's elections evidenced Chinese internal censorship of the sort that merited CECC criticism. 

Taiwan’s election. Chinese social media platforms suppressed discussion of Taiwan’s January 2024 general election. Weibo blocked the hashtag “#TaiwanElection” after it reached number 11 on Weibo’s “hot list.” One observer also noted that a number of online comments praising Taiwan’s electoral process were censored. When the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office  spokesperson criticized the election results on Weibo, online commentators mocked China’s own political system in response, prompting a shutdown of the comments section. (2024 CECC Report, p. 53; see also page 105)

 Those strands of criticism play a large role in shaping an announced upcoming CECC hearing:  "Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression," to be held on Wednesday, July 23, 2025, 10:00 am at 222 Russell Senate Office Building.  Current speakers include Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, USN (Ret.): Former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence; Peter Mattis: President, The Jamestown Foundation; and Audrye Wong: Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Assistant Professor of political science and international relations, University of Southern California. Others will likely be added.

The Hearing announcement follows.  


Wednesday, July 16, 2025

Merchants Negotiate and Officials Manage Discretion Fueled Legal Structures--While Mexico Bargains Brazil Adopts Countermeasures

 

Pix Credit here

 

Latin America is as varied as its peoples. What they appear to share in common is adaptation to the substantial changes in the forms, cultures, and cognitive cages within which the United States seeks to deal with its Hispano-Lusitanian-Indigenous neighbors. 

Senator Henry Clay
That very American cognitive cage, sometimes referenced as America(s) First, posits a normative triumph of the transactional. That is, it returns the United States to a political-cultural position closer to that of the middle of the 19th century--markets driven, trading focused, and grounded on the notion that the State served the nation best as a large and multi-purpose Import-Export Bank and insurance enterprise, one that included a military wing for the protection of a trading environment centered in the nation but extending outward through investment transactions and transactions in goods and services, that serves the nation by creating wealth. Americans (at least the current crop of leadership) are now merchants again. One recalls Henry Clay and the tripartite economic organization of the nation built around tariffs and the win-win of a functionally differentiated economic Republic --Southern planters for export and supply of raw materials to domestic manufacturers, Northern industrialists and merchants for trading in goods and services and participating in domestic supply chains, and western farmers to feed the nation, and perhaps the rest of the world (Henry Clay, The American System, Speech Delivered in the Senate of the United States 2-3 and 6 February 1832). It is no longer 1832, the union has become a more unified State, tariffs are no longer the critical source of revenue for the general government, and functional differentiation within the Republic has become exceedingly multi-layered and partitioned, as well as deeply embedded in the foreign adventures of the Republic's economic actors. Nonetheless the ghosts of the antebellum Republic continue to haunt--spectres that remind us that cultural types--merchant, official, warrior, and farmer--may transcend the peculiarities of a stage of historical development to  appear and reappear as the dominant vision for an age (The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux). 

The response to these  changes in national leadership socio-political cultural "personality" by its neighbors has been one of the great sports of regional history. It also serves to unmask the cognitive cages, trip wires and rationalizing predilections of those sovereign enterprises that must deal both with foreign merchants, adventurers, investors and traders, while sending out their own to their own ends.  

On the one hand, Mexican leaders, through their President Claudia Sheinbaum, have adapted to these personality changes through a well developed process of flexibility that both mimics the ruling American archetype of a time and then reflecting it back in ways that serve the Mexican national interest. ("Vamos a llegar a un acuerdo con el gobierno de EUA; no se negocia nunca la soberanía de nuestro país: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum" [We will reach an agreement with the US government; our country's sovereignty is never negotiable: President Claudia Sheinbaum]; also here and here). The power imbalances between Mexico and the U.S. of course shape the nature of that interaction, but they do not make it either impossible or of some value to the Mexican Republic, itself a powerful regional actor within its own sphere of primary operation. And of course, Mexican elites have the capacity of transactional merchant cultures that in some ways equal or sometimes exceed that of the merchant types of their northern neighbor. The point, though is that Mexican political elites tend to be in the flow of their neighbor, and have learned to exploit it to the extent possible from time to time. In the age of the merchant, in the time of the triumph of the transaction, Mexico might become a saavy merchant and its transactions can be both defensive and offensive. In the latter respect one need only consider the way Mexico leverages both regional power and serves as a counterbalancing conduit for principal tiers competitors of its North American neighbor--for the moment particularly in its relations with China (here). 

On the other hand, Brazil, that other Latin American power, has tended to adopt a quite different approach. That difference, grounded in wariness and built on a need to preserve its cognitive borders (physically manifested, of course, through the State and its legal-administrative apparatus) against what it views as interference by foreigners, especially disfavored or ideologically threatening foreigners. If Mexico can flexibly move between the cognitive sensibilities of the merchant and the official, Brazil appears less able or willing to do so.  Probably less willing given its won development of a political culture around which the State apparatus has been built. In the current era, wariness of the United States--whether in its apparent  in the cultures of the official or the merchant--runs deep, and to some extent is both ideological and personal in a way the dogmatics of which are more powerful than in either the United States or Mexico. One might start the current history of those dogmatics from the time that Brazil helped spearhead the demise of the U.S. based Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2008 (an irony, really, considering the enthusiasm, less than half a generation later, for the arrangements of the Chinese Belt & Toad Initiative). But that speaks to ideology as well as economic interest--and to an attachment of Brazil (though not necessarily its masses beyond the intellectuals and officials) for European and "South" sensibilities over that of the North Americans. Fair enough, of course, and one, at least among segments of its intelligentsia long cultivated by deep connections with Cuban political ideology and European intellectual currents. 

The differences between Mexico and Brazil then tend to be quite showy, especially in moments of transition or crisis (both in the United States an in Brazil or Mexico). The showiest element, and the core triggering element of transactional discourse in both states touches on sovereignty.  Like every other Latin American State, the issue of sovereignty, its discourse, and the way in which it is made meaningful in culture, politics, and economics, is central to the way in which States approach their relations with others. Sovereignty, in this sense acquires a profoundly semiotic and cognitive character.  It is an object that incarnates the ideal of the State, but at the same time it is a way in which the State's ideal acquires significance, and through this signification (what does sovereignty mean in context and with respect to specific relations) it may be applied or interpreted expressed in the actions and policies of the State, as well as in the form of a conceptual framework within which it is possible to understand and abide by the "rules" and limits of actions  that trigger taboo negative impacts on sovereignty. But the practice of sovereignty, that is, the way that sovereignty is articulated, and thus articulated manifested as a form of that articulation,  is also a function of the history and national context in which it may be applied--even where the national feeling (the patriotic solidarity) among states may be viewed as equivalent. Mexican sovereignty, in this sense, is largely internalized. It is expressed within the self conception, and thus the action drivers, of its collective organs. Might it be possible to suggest that Brazilian sovereignty is more visible an an externalized force--projected outward through the expressions of an ideology of sovereign prerogative in law and discretionary actions  leveraged outward bit applied to those invited in. Mexican sovereignty can thus be expressed in and as transactions in a way that would be difficult for their Brazilian counterparts, for which a more formal legal-administrative language of the culture of the official (rather than the merchant) predominates. No judgment here--either works--but it makes sense to acquire some sort of understanding of the language and cognitive frameworks within which relationships might be approached with either or both. 

It is no surprise, then, that as President Sheinbaum negotiates, President Lula da Silva--ironically taking a page from the Executive playbook of President Trump, though within the cultural spaces of Brazilian approaches to these things--exercises administrative discretion within an apparatus of state. The result is inevitable--for Mexico the challenge of bargaining for a good deal; for Brazil, the start of a chess game of opposition and regulatory (as well as discursive) stances.  

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Monday signed the decree regulating the Trade Reciprocity Law, Chief of Staff Rui Costa confirmed in a statement from the Planalto Palace. The measure is to be published in a regular edition of the Federal Diário Oficial da União (Official Gazette - DOU). The new rule authorizes the Brazilian government to adopt trade measures against countries that impose unilateral barriers on Brazilian products in the global market. It could be used to respond to the 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States (US) as of August 1, as announced last week by US President Donald Trump. (HERE)

More specifically, the "Economic Reciprocity Law, approved by the Brazilian Congress in April and now formally implemented, allows the government to suspend trade concessions, investments and even intellectual property rights of countries that impose unilateral measures against Brazilian interests." (Here). To that end, President Lula da Silva promulgated DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025. The Decree establishes an Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, of a deliberative and executive nature, under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services. The Committee is authorized to consider adoption of provisional countermeasures referred to in Art. 6 of Law No. 15,122, of April 11, 2025; and to monitor negotiations to overcome unilaterally imposed measures detrimental to Brazil's international competitiveness. Chapter IV sets out the procedures for the adoption of provisional countermeasures and is worth a read. 

Neither the Apil 2025 Law nor its implementaiton within the structures of a State organ vested with substantial (though interlinked) discretionary authority is unexpected, nor aberrational within the cultural cultures and approaches of Brazil's elites. It is just interesting to see how, in context, it may play out for the moment.  Again, there is a measure of the personal, the cultural and the political that spices things up. President Trump favors the mortal enemy of President Lula da Silva, who suffered personally (as well as politically including his protege) at the hands of former President Jair Bolsonaro. And internet content oozing into (or from) Brazil on matters related to that feuding--including in its judicial forms--has irritated an influential sector of Brazilian leadership and raised old sensibilities anew. President Trump has also been a bit aggressive in response to the provocative (though not unexpected) discourse emerging from the BRICS summit of a few weeks ago. 

Although the decree does not mention the U.S., its publication on Tuesday is widely seen as a response to the tariff escalation pushed by Trump, who framed the sanctions as a response to a Supreme Court case against former President Jair Bolsonaro, calling it a "witch hunt." On Monday, Brazil’s Office of the Prosecutor General recommended Bolsonaro’s conviction, along with seven others, for attempting a coup d’état. The new law applies in three scenarios: when a foreign country interferes in Brazil’s sovereign decisions, violates existing trade agreements or imposes environmental restrictions stricter than Brazil’s legislation. That includes, for instance, unilateral barriers on Brazilian commodity imports based on non-negotiated environmental standards. (Here).

One does not negotiate--one responds, formally and through the instrumentalities of State and law. ""Now the country has a legitimate and autonomous legal tool to respond more effectively to unfair trade practices,” he said. “Responses can be faster, more coordinated and based on objective criteria. That strengthens both the legal and political legitimacy of any retaliation, even before international bodies.”" .(Here quoting Igor Machado, a tax attorney at São Paulo-based firm Meirelles Costa Advogados).  Early in the return of President Trump to Office, Welber Barral, a partner at the consultancy BMJ and Brazil’s foreign trade secretary from 2007 to 2011,explained the fundamental approach: "For trade policymakers in capitals everywhere, the issue is no longer whether to retaliate, but how to do so wisely. A poorly calibrated countermeasure risks harming domestic industries more than its intended target, while a well-crafted response can tilt the scales back toward negotiation." (here)

None of this is good or bad; it just is in the sense that it both reveals the nature and imperatives of cognitive cages and also the way that those cages make responses both inevitable and predictable. In the process it also serves as a reminder that cognition helps shape the way that people and collectives view, understand and respond to each other, that discourse sometimes provides a glimpse into the mindset that propels those relations, and that this knowledge can either be exploited or produces sometimes unfortunate though not unforeseen consequences.  In this case, it is likely that the personal and the ideological shape U.S. Brazil relations in ways that are not transposable to the U.S. Mexican relationship. It is likely to endure until President Lula da Silva and Trump's time in office (and that of the leaders in their factions) disappear from the scene. But that is years in the future. And there is much to be learned from the Brazilian legal architecture in a world that is increasingly redefined by layered hub and spoke platforms of economic-political relations with the two apex powers at the top. All states eventually will have to make a space for themselves somewhere in this layered universe of functionally and politically differentiated global platforms. Brazil provides one approach; Mexico another, and both in the shadow of the structural frameworks developed by China and the United States. 

And, of course, this is a U.S. Administration that is always eager to engage in leader play in the style of merchants negotiating transactions; President Lula da Silva, of course, will return the fvor, but in the style of the ideologiocally committed official thinking in terms of institutions and jurisdictional prerogatives seeking a positive stable state. The two styles are unlikely to align--and that may be the preference of both actors. And thus the American move:

Today, the Office of the United States Trade Representative initiated an investigation of Brazil under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investigation will seek to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.

“At President Trump’s direction, I am launching a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s attacks on American social media companies as well as other unfair trading practices that harm American companies, workers, farmers, and technology innovators,” said Ambassador Greer. “USTR has detailed Brazil’s unfair trade practices that restrict the ability of U.S. exporters to access its market for decades in the annual National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report. After consulting with other government agencies, cleared advisers, and Congress, I have determined that Brazil’s tariff and non-tariff barriers merit a thorough investigation, and potentially, responsive action." (Office of the US TRade Representative)

 The language is one of disadvantageous tariffs on the U.S. side. "Greer accused Brazil of disadvantaging American exports by offering lower tariffs to other trade partners. Investigators will look into alleged attempts by Brazil to penalise US companies involved in digital trade and services for not censoring political speech." (BBC)

 The text of  Lei nº 15.122 de 11 de abril de 2025 and of DECRETO Nº 12.551, DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2025 follow below in the original Portuguese and in a crude English translation. The Statement of the U.S. Trade Representative of 15 July, Brazil’s Unfair Trading Practices, also follows below. 

 

Pix Credit BBC