Brief Thoughts on Zheng Yongnian: Is Marxism Really Revived in China? [郑永年：马克思主义在中国真的复兴了吗？]

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Over the course of the last several weeks  The Coalition for Peace & Ethics Working Group on Empire has been focusing an an interesting element in the ongoing reshaping of the global order through the dialogue between the two emerging imperial powers--China and the United States (CPE EmpireSeries).  That dialogue has been external--as both seek to define themselves in relation to each other and to transform and apply a substantially new conceptual framework. That framework takes as a given the rejection of the old bases of empire--occupation, racism, colonialism, and exploitation--in favor of what appears to be a new foundation. That new foundation is based on an embrace of the fundamental tenets of post 1945 economic globalization, and principally the free movement of goods, capital, and investment, along with the managed movement of people.  While it remains to be seen whether this transformation will succeed either as theory or in fact, the dialogue between the leadership cores of both states (Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump), suggests a commitment toward those efforts to which the intellectual and official classes of both states have been deployed.

The dialogue has also been internal. Since 2013 in China and since 2016 in the United States, internal elites have been faced with the core contradictions of their internal systems in the face of the emergence of empire.  For the United States, that internal dialogue has been both operatic and exaggerated-at least in public. Despite the unhelpful histrionics, the dialogue has forced the Americans to look more deeply at themselves and their sense of self, a process that is both far from complete and unclear as to its direction. Yet that dialogue itself helps situate the American movements out of the old approaches to its relationship with the world toward something new if still somewhat undefined (and untested). 

The internal dialogue of Chinese intellectuals and the leadership classes has been equally interesting for its intensity and sincerity. At its core, the external dialogue is shaped by the intense internal debate about Chinese principles, and more important, the Chinese character of these principles. That, in turn, has its core in a fundamental intellectual contradiction of the Chinese Marxist Leninist Line in the New Era--the principles underlying the outward reach of the principles of Reform and Opening Up (改革开放) and the long arc of stripping China of what is perceived as the vestiges of its semi-colonial humiliation and dependence on the West for its modernization and political-economic model. 

Sinification becomes a more delicate and complicated enterprise in the face of two countering realities.  The first is that the construction of empire requires an openness to imperial interaction between the core and the collective. China remains at an early stage of development of its mass line principle--both as a means of internal democratization, and as a means for weaving together the complex relationships that will eventually constitute a strong Belt and Road Initiative system. The second is that of the nature of inter-systemic communication itself in the face of history. That requires a careful balancing between the necessarily of every living political culture to absorb as well as project its own self-reflexive principles and by successfully operating within them prove their legitimacy and authority, against the danger of intellectual colonialism and the loss of autonomy.

Indeed, the balancing between absorption and autonomy and the utility of the mass line have been playing out in China's construction of its own trading system and in its reconstitution of its relationship with a non-dependent partner-competitor. Indeed, the discomforts of this contradiction, and its resolution, might well provide a foundation for the development of the Chinese line in its bilateral negotiations with the United States. Those negotiations may be important in themselves; but they assume a far greater importance as the discursive site in which China seeks to resolve its own historical contradictions and emerges as a more self-reflexive political model fit for its new era.

These issues converge in recent intellectual (and political) efforts to develop both Marxism (the normative a basis for the Chinese system) and Leninism (its operational principles founded on the leadership core of a revolutionary vanguard responsible for its collective). The issue is particularly delicate because it exposes the difficulty of a simple minded Sinification project--the core values of the political-economic model of China is itself the product of the intellectual power of German Jews resident in part in England, and Russian intellectuals who developed and operationalized a version of the normative vision whose birthplace is undeniably European.

The resolution of the issue is a critical barometer for the nature and intensity of the deployment of Chinese principles against Western negotiating partners.  Yet there is little the West can do as China sorts through the development of its own political theory in the shadow of its recent past. n this respect China is undergoing the same stormy process as the U.S..  While the Chinese focus on its relationship with the West from the end of the Qing period, the Americans are now equally absorbed in the resolution of its Civil War.  In both cases, the ghosts of the 19th century and its perceived perversion of both states into the 20th century now consume their respective intellectual and political classes--and help shape the approaches to empire--and thus the bilateral negotiations of each with the other.

In an excellent essay, Zheng Yongnian, Prof. Chairman of the Public Policy Institute (IPP) South China University, provides a quite useful window on the Chinese side of these dialectics. His essay, "Is Marxism Really Revived in China? [马克思主义在中国真的复兴了吗？] follows below, along with some brief observations. The article was first published in the Lianhe Zaobao on July 10, 2018.

It is important ot note the historical starting point for Zheng's analysis: modern Chinese history did not begin with the overthrow of the Qing Emperors, but rather with the first negative encounter with the West--in the course of the Opium Wars.  That tends to be undervalued in the West.  Yet it has some significant ramifications.  First it situates the relationships with the West as one of defeat and rehabilitation.  It structures that relationship as one in which China must both catch up and achieve a measure of justice for past wrongs (in the sense of the West's lèse majesté) for which the only palliative must be equally public and equally triumphant.  That line of thinking is by no means shared by every Chinese intellectual or political official--and yet that strain of thinking cannot be dismissed , nor are its echos hard to find lying just below the surface of powerful discourse. Just as the a strain of American intellectual approaches to its outward relations now tend to view international events through a racialized-volkish and gendered lens the baseline of which is the unfinished business of the Civil war and the epochs of emancipation that followed, so the a strain of Chinese intellectual and political perspective is founded on and seen through the lens of the first humiliating encounters with the West and in the unfinished business of the Opium War and its aftermath.  

That unfinished business both acknowledges the historical superiority of the West, and consequently the need for China to reassert its own ancient superiority in its own way.  Sinificaiton serves as a model of this autonomy.  It looks backwards to the time of Chinese preeminence in the world.  But it also necessarily looks forward to Chinese absorption of and liberation from the ideas and practices of the West.  The absorption part was relatively easy and embodied in the Reform and Opening Up Initiative followed by a generation of Chinese leaders and intellectuals.  The Sinificaiton part  provides a basis of liberation--making China's progress its own. There is much power in the arguments that modernization and Westernization are not necessarily synonymous. Certainly this has been a discussion common to other Asian states, Japan, for example.  Zheng is right to note the way that it has permeated Chinese thinking from the start of the post Qing period.  And China is right to seek its own path to modernization without Westernization--but that was precisely Deng Xiaoping's intent from the 1980s.  But it also poses a significant problem precisely because it cannot walk away from the fundamental structures on which its political and economic model is founded.  That contradiction is the object of the essay, and a window on the ways that intellectuals may be seeking to overcome contradiction. 

But what about Marxism.  Here the question gets more interesting.   Just as modern Chinese history begins with the late Qing, so, apparently, modern Marxism begins not with Marx but with the middle (or even late) Soviets and its Stalinized version of that model. Gone is Marx from Marxism, much less its intellectual flows outward from Europe worldwide through the Communist International in the years of struggle leading to the 1949 establishment of the Chinese People's Republic.  These are telling choices for the discursive project of Marxist reconstruction. In China, the indigenization began with Mao. 

Zheng starts, correctly, by noting that the origins of Chinese communism, and its path to revolutionary victory was not the same as the Russian (then Soviet) path.  The Cubans have made the same arguments--as have the North Koreans. That entry path permitted, as Zheng suggested, the complete reworking of Soviet Marxism into something "Chinese." That "something" at leats at the beginning appears to be a contrast between Soviet rigid centralization and the decentralized leadership style of early Mao. Yet that goes to the Leninist construct and working style of the vanguard party.  It is not clear how that touches on the core normative values of Marxism itself.  But of course that is the great challenge--the difficulty of seeing clearly the weaving of the political theory of Leninism with the normative theory of Marxism. 

But most interesting is Zheng's suggestion of the Western corruption inherent in Mao's Cultural Revolution--which at its core incorrectly sought to change people.  But here Zheng walks a fine line.  As he delicately suggests: "Transforming people from the cultural level has always been the theme of the May Fourth Movement to the "Cultural Revolution." When human beings become guinea pigs, they will inevitably have serious consequences. This is a profound historical lesson. In other words, Mao Zedong successfully carried out "Marxism in China" in the early days, but in the latter period, this problem was not solved." 

It is with Deng Xiaoping that Zheng suggests the start of the contemporary forms of developing Marx with Chinese characteristics. It is not without reason that Zheng argues that the great leap forward of Marxist theory was evidenced in the  move from class struggle to the objective of developing productive forces through the socialist market economy.  Markets Marxism is indeed a quite powerful development; ironically its Chinese characteristics might well have appeal and traction well beyond China (discussed in "Central Planning versus Markets Marxism: Their Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and Economy"). Yet Zheng suggests, again delicately, that those who took up Deng's socialist market economy policy might have committed rightist error in their tendency to merge Westernization with modernization through this policy.  That is ironic if only because at the time Deng appeared far more worried about leftist error.  But history has a way of reconstructing analytical lenses to suit the times. And perhaps that is as it should be. It is a pity, though, that the inherently Marxist elements of market mechanisms are not recognized more fully.  But Marxism is still in an early stage of development for which the new era serves as yet another development point.--and not the last.

Yet the point is also critical for an understanding of Chinese sensitivities and negotiating positions in its bilateral negotiations with the United States. If the official line is now to equate the implementation of the otherwise correct policy of Reform and Opening up and its mechanics of developing productive forces through socialist market economy initiatives with rightist error and Westernization that weakens Marxism, then it becomes easier to understand  Chinese resistance to the fundamental structural premise of post 1945 globalization on private markets and markets based regulatory governance.  One sees here the internal logic of a position in external relations--and in an agenda for reforming global trade to resist not just Westernization, in this sense, but also the structures regulation that are viewed as another version of the post Opium War humiliations.

Here Zheng makes his most powerful point--that at its core, the difficulty is not with the evolving party line, but with the detachment of Chinese leadership classes from the study of and adherence to an evolving and dynamic Marxism with Chinese characteristics.  That close connection between theory and practice, Zheng suggests, was the great strength of the founding generations.  But tat has been lost.  As a mere academic discipline, Marxism loses its vital connection with the people and the source of its ability to guide and evolve with change sin historical eras.  The Americans, of course, suffer the same problem--as their own founding ideology becomes ever more remote and captured in academic institutions less relevant except as an instrument of orthodoxy disconnected form everyday life.  In both cases the real danger is the reduction of core foundational ideology to sloganeering.

But Zheng makes a further point.  That is that only a Marxism with Chinese characteristics can be relevant to China. Here Zheng is critical of the current establishment, viewed as tending toward rigidity and dogmatism that makes Marxism both more remote and less Chinese.   Aaaaahhh but what are those characteristics?  That, itself, is a function of the current historical era:

If the main task of the sinicization of Marxism in Mao Zedong era is to seize political power and safeguard national unity, the main task of Marxism in China in Deng Xiaoping’s era is to break away from poverty and develop the economy. The main task of Marxism in China in the new era is the system. Construction and national governance. If we cannot recognize this historical logic of China's development, any form of Marxism in China will be manifested as illusory.

Now one can align the development of a Chinese Marxism, with the New Era CPC line, and with the resulting triumph of China as it regains its role  that it had lost in the middle of the 19th century.  And that triumph takes on a specific form framed by a set of principles that have already been made manifest in the U-S--China negotiations and that follow from Zheng's essay.

Specifically, the Marxist Sinicization in the new era is manifested in the pursuit of the institutionalization of the rule of law and the goal of social equity. This is consistent with the reform and development line established by the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Economically, it is manifested in the control of capital, the implementation of mixed ownership, and the mutual checks and balances between various capitals. Politically, it is manifested in the political participation of various social forces, namely democracy.

In place of markets privileging private capital, Marxism with new era Chinese characteristics offers markets that are instruments in the development of state capital. In place of private sector driving economics--and the societal sphere to which it is attached--new era Marxism is grounded on the leadership of private capital by the political vanguard whose role is to ensure the welfare of the nation and to plan (and manage) accordingly.  This is a great transformation of the Leninist core principles of the collective and the core, of the vanguard's role in the management of the revolutionary process that maintains social development of a course toward the establishment (eventually) of a communist society.  But it is not clear that this changes the normative nature of communism itself--at least in its European 19th century Marxist roots. But then perhaps it is not meant to--such an abandonment would itself breach a core principle of the CPC Basic Line.  

At the same time, it also suggests the bright lines that Chinese negotiators will not cross in their relationship with the U.S.  And more importantly, it begins to make clear the environment in which Western private sector activity will be operating in during the Chinese new era period. That leaves the West with the same contradiction that China faces, but only in reverse:

Today, if China cannot absorb and digest Western civilization, it is not only difficult to integrate the traditions of modern times into the great tradition of Chinese civilization, but it is also more difficult to govern a society that has accepted Western values ​​such as democracy, freedom, and equality. In any case, Marxism is the product of Western civilization. That is to say, the process of Chinese civilization absorbing and digesting Western civilization is also the process of Marxism in China.

Zheng leaves us much room for thought in this excellent essay.  It is worth the time to contemplate its profound insights more closely.  And it helps broaden the understanding of foreigners into the interior dialogue that Chinese intellectuals and the political leadership are having, the consequences of which tend to be manifested both in the construction of China's outward relations within its own economic sphere in the Belt and Road system, but also int he way it manages its relations with non-tributory leadership-network systems (the new form of empire) with whom it has deep entanglements--not just economically, but socially, politically and ideologically. These will indeed be hard to unravel. 

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Zheng Yongnian: Is Marxism Really Revived in China?

Original: International Vision; China’s Feelings IPP Review Today

The 0IPP commentary is the national high end think tank led by Professor Zheng Yongnian, the official WeChat platform of the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of South China University of Technology

Also reposted HERE. 

If China's modern history began with China's defeat by the West (the Opium War), what happened in China in modern times is indeed inseparable from the West. Whether it is a change in ideas or a change in material technology, it is a direct result of Western influence. However, at the practical level, many aspects of development, especially at the institutional level, are more based on China's own logic; some developments seem to be Western-style, but deep-seated still Chinese-style. . Here is a question of "Chineseization" of Western things.

Since modern times, many people regard China's modernization as a process of westernization, but the whole westernization only exists in people's minds, because at the practical level, total Westernization is simply impossible. Even before the Chinese Communist Party, politicians did not have to be fully westernized. Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s “five-power constitution” is a good example. The Five-Power Constitution is intended to combine the three powers of the West (ie, legislation, administration, and justice) with the traditional Chinese "two powers" (ie, examination and supervision). Although various political forces are influenced by the West, different political forces accept different Western influences. The Communist Party of China accepted Marxism, so there is a question of "Chineseization" of Marxism.

In the period of revolution and early construction, although the thinking and practice of the Communist Party of China were modeled after the Soviet Union, even in this case, it could not be fully Marxist or Soviet. Revolution and construction are not a simple theoretical issue, but more practical. Even if it is "Chinese Marxism," the proposition itself is not a theoretical issue, but a foreign idea fails in practice. From Mao Zedong to the present, "Chinese Marxism" has generally experienced three historical periods.


Mao Zedong’s reform began with the transformation of people

The first historical period was the Mao Zedong period. The Mao Zedong period was divided into two phases, the revolutionary period and the construction period. In the revolutionary period, the struggle of the city-centered strike was based on the experience of the West, but it was defeated. Later, Mao Zedong and other leaders put forward the "armed struggle" and "urban encircling the city" in line with China's reality, only to reverse the fate of earlier failure. Even armed struggle is not a Soviet-Russian tradition, but an inherent tradition of China. The enduring peasant war in Chinese history is a model of "armed struggle." The “urban encirclement of the city” is just the opposite of the Western revolutionary approach. In the West, because industrialization took place early, the focus of the revolution was in the city.

After 1949, China moved to the construction period. In the 1950s, it completely transformed from the Soviet model to the anti-Soviet model. This transformation is very important. Many studies have shown that the reform of China after Mao Zedong became possible and successful, and has a great relationship with the Soviet model in the Mao Zedong era. The main difference between China and the Soviet Union is that the Soviet system is highly centralized, while the Chinese system is highly decentralized, at least economically.

After bidding farewell to the Soviet model, Mao Zedong embarked on his own "Utopia model." The "Utopia model" also has profound Chinese traditional factors. Before that, China had at least experienced reforms with a strong utopian color such as Wang Shuo reform, Wang Anshi reform, and Zhu Yuanzhang reform. Mao Zedong’s Utopia reform began with the transformation of people. This is a new factor and is deeply influenced by the West.

There has never been a transformation of people in Chinese history. The transformation of people began with the contact between modern and western. Before Mao Zedong, the concept of "new people" put forward by Liang Qichao was to start from transforming people. Transforming people from the cultural level has always been the theme of the May Fourth Movement to the "Cultural Revolution." When human beings become guinea pigs, they will inevitably have serious consequences. This is a profound historical lesson. In other words, Mao Zedong successfully carried out "Marxism in China" in the early days, but in the latter period, this problem was not solved.


The Sinicization of Marxism in Deng Xiaoping

The Deng Xiaoping period was the second period. During this period, China successfully solved the economic problem, that is, the problem of non-development. The solution to the economic problem is inseparable from the concept of "socialist market economy" proposed by Deng Xiaoping. The concept of this concept is the result of "Chineseization of Marxism." In the later period of the "Cultural Revolution", the Soviet-Russian version of Marxism, the planned economy, had failed because the planned economy led to "poverty socialism" before the reform and opening up.

What the Deng Xiaoping generation accepted was more of a European version of Marxism or socialism, intended to solve economic development and social equity. Although there have been many problems, it is undoubtedly very successful in terms of economic development. China’s poor economy before the reform and opening up developed into the world’s second largest economy 40 years later, and it has contributed to the poverty alleviation of nearly 700 million people. This is a rare miracle in the history of the world economy.

During this period, the "market economy" of the West became China's "socialist market economy." Although similar factors can be found in the Chinese tradition, whether it is a "socialist" factor or a "market factor", the external Soviet-style planned economy model obviously artificially hinders these traditional factors from functioning. The reason why Deng Xiaoping can solve this problem is mainly to ideologicalize the "market economy" and think that the market economy is only a tool for economic development, and both capitalism and socialism can be used. This new argument for the “market economy” has led to the recovery of traditional market factors and the introduction of new market mechanisms (Western). This has had a revolutionary impact on the Chinese economy.

In politics, Deng Xiaoping also made a lot of explorations. Overall, in the 1980s, China focused on the exploration of social democracy. After the "Cultural Revolution", both political elites and intellectual groups believed that Western-style democracy was not only desirable but also possible.

However, the political events that took place in the late 1980s showed that Western-style democracy is hard to come true, at least at this stage. Since the 1990s, the ruling party has embarked on a "democratic inner-party democracy" line, which is to first achieve inner-party democracy and then achieve social democracy. However, it is precisely because of this that some people mistakenly believe that China will embark on a Western-style social-democratic line, the Western European and Nordic Social-Democratic line. This of course has not become a reality. Although the CCP has absorbed some Western democratic factors, the overall system has not evolved into a Western-style system.


Insufficient Marxism in China

For many years after Deng Xiaoping’s entry, people have not emphasized enough about the sinicization of Marxism. Although China's reality has undergone tremendous changes, there is not much innovation in Marxist theory. The current state of Marxism in China today is that it cannot explain the changes that have taken place in China's reality, nor does it use China's rich experience to enrich itself.

On the surface, China's Marxist research has reached a new climax. For many years, the relevant parties have invested a lot of manpower, financial resources and material resources, and established numerous Marxist colleges. Marxist studies have become official scholarships. But is Marxism really revived in China? If China can revive Marxism, the first condition is the sinicization of Marxism. Marxism is the product of Western history. It can scientifically explain the history of the West, but it cannot explain Chinese history scientifically. Only after the sinicization of Marxism can Marxism explain China. At the same time, only in the process of sinicization of Marxism can China enrich and develop Marxism with its rich practical experience.

What is the point at this stage that can be said to be the Chineseization of Marxism? To a large extent, Chinese Marxism has begun to “dogmatically” in both theoretical and academic circles. Under the banner of reviving Marxism, people mechanically use Marxism to "interpret" China's reality. It is better to say "interpretation" than to "interpret". The "dogmatic" of Marxism has already appeared before Marx's life, so that Marx denies that he is a "Marxist." The spirit of Marxism is seeking truth from facts, and thought must change with the changes of the times. Without this spirit of change, it itself violates Marxism.

The reasons for the dogmaticization of contemporary Marxism are not difficult to understand. The core of the first generation of leaders, Mao Zedong himself, is both a practitioner and a theoretician. There is not much problem in the sinicization of Marxism. On the practical level, Mao Zedong felt the need to be Chinese in Marxism, because if it was not Chinese, it would lead to failure; and Mao Zedong's theoretical cultivation led to the completion of Marxism in China at the theoretical level.

The same is true of Deng Xiaoping, the core of the second generation of leaders. Although at the theoretical level, Deng Xiaoping did not have such a long-form discussion as Mao Zedong, after experiencing the experience and lessons of the Mao Zedong era, Deng Xiaoping had more experience in construction to expand and develop Marxism.

But in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, Marxism only existed in the study of Chinese scholars. More often, Marxism becomes a dogma and becomes the only ideology, making Marxism lack a new source of thought. Marxism originally competed, produced and developed in many ideas. Once Marxism became a dogma and became a "standard" for judging other ideas, the exhaustion of its ideas became inevitable.


The Key Point of Marxism in China in the New Period

Now China's development has entered a new era. In addition to establishing Marxism as the guiding ideology of the ruling party, should the task of Chinese Marxism be raised to the agenda? Whether at the practical or theoretical level, this is undoubtedly a top priority. Although some traditional cultural factors are reviving, the theoretical legitimacy of the ruling party still relies to a large extent on Marxism. The history of the development of the ruling party itself is inseparable from Marxism.

If Marxism cannot be effectively Chinese, it will be difficult to explain China's practice. If Marxism cannot explain China's practice, it can only become a pure ideology and lose its real life. The process of giving Marxism the ability to explain China's reality is the process of Marxism in China.

In the new era, where is the focus of Marxism in China? If the main task of the sinicization of Marxism in Mao Zedong era is to seize political power and safeguard national unity, the main task of Marxism in China in Deng Xiaoping’s era is to break away from poverty and develop the economy. The main task of Marxism in China in the new era is the system. Construction and national governance. If we cannot recognize this historical logic of China's development, any form of Marxism in China will be manifested as illusory.

Specifically, the Marxist Sinicization in the new era is manifested in the pursuit of the institutionalization of the rule of law and the goal of social equity. This is consistent with the reform and development line established by the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Economically, it is manifested in the control of capital, the implementation of mixed ownership, and the mutual checks and balances between various capitals. Politically, it is manifested in the political participation of various social forces, namely democracy.

Marx criticized the bourgeois democracy because bourgeois democracy is a minority democracy. Obviously, in the era of Marx, democracy is the democracy of capital. Marx not only did not deny the importance of democracy, but pursued democracy with a broader social foundation, namely social democracy.

At the individual level, it is manifested in the establishment of a social system that contributes to human liberation. Although Chinese civilization itself does not produce values ​​such as democracy and freedom, whether people like it or not, these values ​​have been accepted and pursued by Chinese society in modern times. Or, these values ​​have become part of Chinese cultural expectations.

At a higher level, from the perspective of the development of Chinese civilization, China has reached a new stage of absorbing and digesting Western civilization into Chinese civilization. Traditionally, it took China nearly a thousand years to absorb and digest the Buddhist civilization, making Buddhist civilization an intrinsic part of Chinese civilization. Today, if China cannot absorb and digest Western civilization, it is not only difficult to integrate the traditions of modern times into the great tradition of Chinese civilization, but it is also more difficult to govern a society that has accepted Western values ​​such as democracy, freedom, and equality. In any case, Marxism is the product of Western civilization. That is to say, the process of Chinese civilization absorbing and digesting Western civilization is also the process of Marxism in China.

Author: Prof. Chairman of the Public Policy Institute (IPP) South China University Academic Committee Zheng Yongnian.

The article was first published in the Lianhe Zaobao on July 10, 2018.
Edit: IPP dissemination.


About IPP

The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of South China University of Technology is an independent, non-profit research platform for knowledge innovation and public policy. Created by Mr. Mo Daoming, alumnus of South China University of Technology. IPP has a research team led by Professor Zheng Yongnian, and carries out a series of research work around China's system reform, social policy, Chinese discourse and international relations, and on this basis, forms a coordinated development of knowledge innovation and policy consultation. Good pattern. IPP's vision is to create an open knowledge innovation and policy research platform and become the world's leading think tank.

郑永年：马克思主义在中国真的复兴了吗？

原创： 国际视野中国情怀 IPP评论 今天

0IPP评论是郑永年教授领导的国家高端智库——华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平台。

如果中国近代史是从中国被西方打败（即鸦片战争）开始的，那近代以来中国所发生的一切确实离不开西方。无论是思想观念的变化，还是物质技术层面的变化，都是西方影响的直接产物。不过，在实际层面，很多方面的发展，尤其是制度层面的发展，则更多地是依据中国本身的逻辑在进行；有些发展即使表层看似乎是西方式的，但深层次仍然是中国式的。这里就产生一个西方事物“中国化”的问题。





自近代以来，不少人把中国的现代化，视为全盘西化的过程，但全盘西化只存在于人们的观念中，因为在实践层面，全盘西化根本就不可能。即使在中国共产党之前，政治人物也没有要全盘西化的。孙中山先生的“五权宪法”就是很好的例证。五权宪法就是想把西方的三权（即立法、行政和司法）和中国传统的“两权”（即考试和监察）结合起来。尽管各种政治力量都受西方影响，但不同政治力量接受不同的西方影响。中国共产党接受了马克思主义，所以就有一个马克思主义“中国化”的问题。

在革命时期和建设早期，虽然中国共产党的思想和实践都是以苏俄为模范，但即便如此，也不能全盘马克思主义化或者苏俄化。革命和建设并不是一个单纯的理论问题，更多的是实践问题。即使是“马克思主义中国化”，命题本身也不是理论问题，而是外来思想在实践中失败了，才提出来的。从毛泽东到当代，“马克思主义中国化”大体上已经历三个历史时期。


毛泽东的改革从改造人开始

第一个历史时期就是毛泽东时期。毛泽东时期又分为两个阶段，即革命时期和建设时期。在革命时期，早先根据西方的经验，搞以城市为中心的罢工等斗争，但惨遭失败。之后，毛泽东等领导人提出了符合中国实际的“武装斗争”和“农村包围城市”，才逆转早先失败的命运。即使是武装斗争，也不是苏俄传统，而是中国固有的传统。中国历史上经久不衰的农民战争，都是“武装斗争”的典范。“农村包围城市”则是和西方革命方式刚好相反。在西方，因为工业化发生得早，革命的重心在城市。

1949年之后，中国转入建设时期，1950年代从完全模仿苏联模式，转型到反苏联模式。这个转型很重要。很多研究表明，毛泽东之后中国的改革之所以成为可能，并且能够取得成功，和毛泽东时代已经脱离苏联模式有很大的关系。中国和苏联的主要区别在于苏联体制高度集权，而中国体制高度分权，至少在经济上如此。

告别苏联模式之后，毛泽东走上了自身的“乌托邦模式”。“乌托邦模式”也有深厚的中国传统因素，之前中国至少已经历王莽改革、王安石改革、朱元璋改革等具有浓厚乌托邦色彩的改革。毛泽东的乌托邦改革从改造人开始，这是新的因素，是受西方的深刻影响。

中国历史上从来就没有改造人一说。改造人是从近代和西方接触开始的。毛泽东之前，梁启超提出的“新民”概念，就是从改造人入手。从文化层面来改造人，一直是从五四运动到“文化大革命”的主题。当人类本身成为试验品的时候，就不可避免产生严重的后果，这是深刻的历史教训。也就是说，毛泽东早期成功进行了“马克思主义中国化”，但在后期，这个问题没有解决好。


邓小平时期的马克思主义中国化

邓小平时期是第二个时期。这个时期，中国成功解决了经济问题，即不发展的问题。经济问题的解决，与邓小平提出的“社会主义市场经济”概念分不开。而这个概念的提出，便是“马克思主义中国化”的结果。到“文革”后期，苏俄版本的马克思主义，即计划经济已经失败，因为计划经济导致改革开放之前的“贫穷社会主义”。

邓小平一代所接受的，更多的是欧洲版本的马克思主义或社会主义，意在解决经济发展和社会公平问题。尽管也产生了诸多问题，但就经济发展来说，无疑是非常成功的。中国从改革开放前如此贫穷的一个经济体，在40年之后发展成世界第二大经济体，促成近7亿人口脱贫，这是世界经济史上少有的奇迹。

在这段时期，西方的“市场经济”成了中国的“社会主义市场经济”。尽管无论是“社会主义”因素，还是“市场因素”，在中国传统中都可以找到类似因素，但外来的苏联式计划经济模式，显然人为地阻碍了这些传统因素发挥作用。邓小平之所以能够解决这个问题，主要是把“市场经济”去意识形态化，认为市场经济只是一种发展经济的工具，无论是资本主义还是社会主义都可以使用。对“市场经济”的这种新论证，促成传统市场因素的复苏和新的市场机制（西方式）的引入。这对中国经济产生了革命性的影响。

在政治上，邓小平时代也做了很多探索。总体而言，在1980年代，中国侧重于对社会民主的探索。经历“文革”之后，当时无论是政治精英层还是知识群体，都相信西方式的民主不仅是可期望的，而且是有可能的。

不过，1980年代末发生的政治事件表明，西方式民主很难成为现实，至少在现在这个阶段。1990年代以来，执政党走上一条“党内民主”路线，就是先要实现党内民主，再来实现社会民主。不过，也正因如此，一些人误认为中国会走上一条西方式的社会民主主义路线，即西欧和北欧式的社会民主党路线。这当然并没有成为现实。尽管中共也吸收消化了一些西方民主因素，但总体制度并没有演变成西方式制度。

马克思主义的中国化不足

在进入后邓小平时代的很多年来，人们对马克思主义中国化强调得不够。尽管中国的现实已经发生了巨变，但在马克思主义理论方面并没有多少创新。今天中国的马克思主义现状是：既解释不了中国现实层面所发生的变化，更没有利用中国的丰富经验来丰富自身。

从表面上看，中国的马克思主义研究已经达到一个新的高潮，很多年来有关方面投入大量人力、财力、物力，设立了众多的马克思主义学院，马克思主义研究成为官方显学。但马克思主义真的在中国复兴了吗？如果中国可以复兴马克思主义，首要条件便是马克思主义的中国化。马克思主义是西方历史的产物，它可以科学地解释西方的历史，但不能科学地解释中国历史。只有马克思主义中国化之后，马克思主义才能解释中国；同时，也只有在马克思主义中国化的过程中，中国才可以用自身丰富的实践经验，来丰富和发展马克思主义。

现阶段有哪一点可以说是马克思主义的中国化呢？在很大程度上，无论在理论界还是学术界，中国的马克思主义开始“教条化”。在复兴马克思主义的旗号下，人们机械地搬用马克思主义来“解释”中国现实。与其说是“解释”，倒不如说是“曲解”。马克思主义“教条化”，在马克思生前已经出现，以至于马克思否定自己是“马克思主义者”。马克思主义的精神是实事求是，思想必须随着时代的变化而变化，缺少这种变化精神，本身就违背了马克思主义。

当代马克思主义教条化的原因并不难理解。第一代领导人的核心毛泽东本人既是实践家，也是理论家，在马克思主义中国化方面没有太大的问题。在实践层面，毛泽东感觉到对马克思主义进行中国化的需要，因为如果不中国化，就会导致失败；而毛泽东理论上的修养，又促成了在理论层面完成马克思主义的中国化。

第二代领导人的核心邓小平也是如此。尽管在理论层面，邓小平并没有毛泽东那样的长篇论述，但在经历了毛泽东时代的经验教训之后，邓小平在建设方面具有更为丰富的经验，来拓展和发展马克思主义。

但在后邓小平时代，马克思主义只存在于中国学者的书斋里。更有甚至，马克思主义变成教条，变成唯一的意识形态，使得马克思主义缺少新的思想来源。马克思主义本来就是在众多思想中竞争、产生和发展起来的，一旦把马克思主义变成教条，变成评判其他思想的“标准”，其思想的枯竭变得不可避免。

新时期马克思主义中国化的重点

现在中国的发展进入一个新时期。在再次确立马克思主义为执政党的指导思想之余，是否应当把马克思主义中国化的任务提高到议事日程上？无论在实践还是理论层面，这无疑是当务之急。尽管一些传统文化因素在复兴，但执政党的理论合法性在很大程度上仍然依赖马克思主义。执政党本身发展的历史，更是和马克思主义不可分离。

如果马克思主义不能有效中国化，就很难解释中国的实践。如果马克思主义不能解释中国的实践，它就只能成为一种纯意识形态，会失去其现实生命力。赋予马克思主义解释中国现实的能力的过程，就是马克思主义中国化的过程。

在新时期，马克思主义中国化的重点在哪里？如果说毛泽东时代马克思主义中国化的主要任务是夺取政权和维护国家的统一，邓小平时代马克思主义中国化的主要任务是脱离贫穷和发展经济，那新时代马克思主义中国化的主要任务，便是制度建设和国家治理。如果不能认识到中国发展的这种历史逻辑，任何形式的马克思主义中国化都会表现为虚无缥缈。

具体说来，新时代的马克思主义中国化会表现在法治制度化和社会公平目标的追求上。这和中共十八大、十九大以来所确立的改革发展路线是吻合的。在经济上，表现为对资本的节制上，实行混合所有制，并且达成各种资本之间的互相制衡。在政治上，表现为各种社会力量的政治参与，即民主。

马克思批评资产阶级的民主，因为资产阶级民主是少数人的民主。很显然，在马克思时代，民主就是资本的民主。马克思不仅没有否认民主的重要性，而是追求具有更加广泛社会基础的民主，即社会民主。

在个人层面，表现为确立有助于人解放的社会制度。尽管中国文明本身并没有产生民主、自由等价值，但不管人们喜欢与否，近代以来，这些价值已经为中国社会所接受、所追求。或者说，这些价值也已经成为中国文化期待的一部分。

从更高层次来说，就中国文明发展的角度，中国已经到了一个新的阶段，即把西方文明吸收消化到中国文明中。传统上，中国花了近千年时间，吸收消化了佛教文明，使得佛教文明成为中国文明的内在一部分。到了今天，如果中国不能吸收消化西方文明，不仅很难把近代以来的传统整合到中国文明的大传统中，也更难治理一个已经接受诸如民主、自由、平等西方价值观的社会。不管怎样，马克思主义是西方文明的产物。就是说，中国文明吸收消化西方文明的过程，也就是马克思主义中国化的过程。







本文作者：华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）学术委员会主席郑永年教授。
文章首发于《联合早报》2018年7月10日。
编辑：IPP传播。

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