A Seance in Perú and the Witch of Endor: The Readouts of the Meetings Between Messrs Biden and Xi

 

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3 Now Samuel was dead, and all Israel had lamented him, and buried him in Ramah, even in his own city. And Saul had put away those that had familiar spirits, and the wizards, out of the land. 4 And the Philistines gathered themselves together, and came and pitched in Shunem: and Saul gathered all Israel together, and they pitched in Gilboa. 5 And when Saul saw the host of the Philistines, he was afraid, and his heart greatly trembled.  6 And when Saul enquired of the Lord, the Lord answered him not, neither by dreams, nor by Urim, nor by prophets. 7 Then said Saul unto his servants, Seek me a woman that hath a familiar spirit, that I may go to her, and enquire of her. And his servants said to him, Behold, there is a woman that hath a familiar spirit at Endor. (1 Samuel 28 (KJV))

A séance is an event with a fairly short history of inserting meaning into that word.  Around the time of the founding of the American Republic its meaning was understood as "a sitting, a session," as of a learned society, originally in French contexts, from French séance "a sitting,"(here), and ultimately from the Latin sedere "to sit". Its more popular meaning dates form the 1840s--in the sense of a "spiritualistic session in which intercourse is alleged to be held with ghosts of the dead" (here). The rituals of meetings of the factotums of States in this century might perhaps be characterized as one long séance in which all sorts of ghosts have attempted to be conjured up for the predilection of those invited to view the spectacle. Everyone understands this--real conjurers of the dead stay away from things--but the spectacle is hard to resist and is a useful markers for those involved in the performance of séance. 

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It is always fun to seek to conjure ghosts and apparitions (信鬼神)--even for the apparatus of the Chinese State, though one must be careful about the sort of spirit one seeks to conjure (China warns party members to stick to Marx, not 'ghosts and spirits'). Messrs Biden and Xi, along with their entourages, appeared eager to conjure the spirit of Mr Trump at the performative spectacle that was their side meeting at the 2024 annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum of its leaders that was held from 15 to 16 November 2024 (here). And yet that conjuring also required the medium of a leader quickly fading from the scene, along with his entourage, someone who was very much present in the moment, but also a bridge to another realm of reality that will explode on the global scene in January 2025. 

Beyond that, it was not clear the point other than to address the spirits outside th the séance room, and more particularly an incoming president who is not known to take instruction from other leaders kindly. The performance was likely the point, and its opportunity for the press to take something away from it for the purpose of dissemination among the masses. Perhaps an instruction delivered through his fading predecessor would be more effectively received? That is unlikely, especially when the instruction is interpreted by Mr. Trump's key advisors around these issues--the Secretary's of State and Defense, and the new national security advisor. Perhaps the object was provocation of a leader who loved to be provoked (and in that sense can be managed through well conceived provocations).  That is a gamble--the Trump Administration and its leader, version 2.0 may be quite different than that in Trump Administration version 1.0.  And the U.S. Congress is more likely to go along with Administration initiatives that require legislation this time around. Of course, this is not much of a provocation.  Nothing in the points raised was either new or otherwise hidden.  In a sense, at its most benign, it appears to be nothing more than one leader reminding the other about what is important to them. The Biden Administration has been reminded about this list, in whole or in part, since  the last version of these sorts of meetings occurred at the start of the Biden Administration in Anchorage (consequences considered here, and here). On the other hand, it is not the content but the delivery that counts in public performances like this one--that is something that both thin skinned countries are well aware of. And that, rather than the content, might be the provocation, if the Americans chose to see it that way. It seems that the "Anchorage" shoe may now have moved to the other foot; assuming the Trump shadow administration is even in a mood to listen.

All of this raises questions that cannot be answered even through a performance in which the questions themselves beg answering ("A reporter in the room asked Biden whether he has any concerns about the relationship under Trump, but he did not respond. The same reporter asked Xi whether he had any concerns about tariffs that Trump has called for, but Xi did not respond." here). Beyond that, the usual--performances for domestic audiences, projections outward to the press organs outside of China, and theater that can be leveraged within the international institutions in which China has been acquiring more experience in successfully managing--if and when it suits them. That is both banal and likely will have an infinitesimally short half life in media reporting cycles.  But people have longer memories.

 And yet, at least from the Chinese side, some important information--or at least formal and official stances--were transmitted and underscored, and that ought to have some significance.  They could not possibly be more than a transmission; great States tend not to lecture each other except as theater for consumption by others, but they do signal. Among the more important of the signals said to have been conveyed in the formal performance of text between the two sides was the 4th of 7 lessons from the term of Mr. Biden:

Fourth, it is important not to challenge red lines and paramount principles. Contradictions and differences between two major countries like China and the United States are unavoidable. But one side should not undermine the core interests of the other, let alone seek conflict or confrontation. The one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués are the political foundation of China-U.S. relations. They must be observed. The Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right are four red lines for China. They must not be challenged. These are the most important guardrails and safety nets for China-U.S. relations. (MoFA, President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Joe Biden in Lima)

That one, certainly, caught the attention of press organs--if only because they provided a handy list of specific conditions that would be more or less easy to track. The others were a bot more ethereal; with the exception of the very few spots where some movement toward joint action were announced (see eg, here, here, here, here, and here. What did not catch the media's attention was that the Americans also have strongly held core positions--and these were also expressed. Unstated were the red lines that the Americans will develop now more forcefully under the incoming administration.

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But even signals can lose something in its transmission--that is the nature of séance in which apparitions are the object of communication, and its medium of transmission.   Still it is worth considering the way in which the meeting was packaged for digestion by press organs and the masses who read them.  The form of that feeding, of course, were the now much expected "read outs" of high level meetings like this one. Both the Chinese and the U.S. readouts follow below: (1) An Overview of the Meeting Between Chinese and US Presidents in Lima by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson; and (2) Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China.  As is usual for these devices, they say more about the way in which each side orders the world for consumption by others than it says about the meeting itself.  But then semiotics suggests that it is not the meeting but its perception that, for outsiders at least, is the more important, at least in the construction of the memorialization of the event. Trust, of course, is an entirely different matter.  Tricky business among the land of living ghosts and the spirits of that which may become.

"What awaits Sino-US ties in Trump 2.0 era": Opinion Essay in China Daily

 

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I was delighted to respond when the folks at the China Daily asked if I might be willing to write a short essay with some thoughts on what might lie ahead in Sino-U.S. relations.  The result, What awaits Sino-US ties in Trump 2.0 era (China Daily, 16 November 2024), now appears on line. My thanks to China Daily for providing this space to share some views on the issues of U.S.-China trade  as Mr. Trump's second term is set to begin.

The issues are of course important.  But so is the approach that one takes when considering the scope of possibilities.  Lately the elaboration of core premises in analytics has appeared to reduce much of the agency that States (and their apparatus operating within the confines of their political-economic systems) can take in their relations and in working toward the enhancement of their respective people's welfare (and with that of their respective nations).  

What has worried me on both sides has been the tendency--now sadly global--for embracing discursively and (sometimes) in application the worst case starting premises for analytics. Of course, no analsis is worth the trouble to engage in it without considering the full range of scenarios, from best to worst, and the unimaginable. But the descriptive analytics of scenario analytics is worthless without applying a risk and rewards based analytics to it. And both are less than useful in the absence of engaging in agency based (that is proactively interventionist) predictive analytics. Neither people, nor States, are inevitably floating toward some inevitable ends on micro or macro levels.  Both the dynamic nature of movement within stages of historical development, and the power of asserting agency within sometimes complex ecologies of action, suggest that least at the margins, nothing is inevitable.

In the context of U.S. China relations, all of this is especially true.  Both States, within the community of States, have the greatest scope of agency; both have responsibility not only for the safeguarding of the political-economic models (and the premises from out of which these are animated), but also for the safeguarding of the community of States with shared values over which their interactions produce responsibility for care. Both must live together in a world in which the nature of the systems of hierarchy and domination over which they will assert  great influence will take shape. Those realities--rational and consistent with their respective core economic-political premises--suggest a useful starting point for agency--building, in small ways at least, a means of learning to live together in ways that protect their respective interests but build stringer and reasonable ties between them at every level of social relaitons. That is harder than it sounds. Much of that will require a self restraint, on both sides, to avoid the creation of red lines that are unreasonable and unnecessary given realities on the ground. And it will require the development of systems of engagement in which the core of each system remains protected, and pathways toward mutual engagement are developed on a sound basis around those cores. The essay, then, considers, whether it is possible to conceive of a basis within which this is possible. If not, the alternatives are (or ought to present themselves) increasingly unpalatable, and hopefully not inevitable.

The essay, What awaits Sino-US ties in Trump 2.0 era (China Daily, 16 November 2024), follows below. It may be accessed HERE.

Draft Revisions to China's Arbitration Law Posted for Comment

 

 

The brilliant Susan Finder has recently reminded those interested of the release by the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee of draft Amendments to China's Arbitration Law (仲裁法（修订）).  She writes:

As followers of Chinese dispute resolution matters might know, the Arbitration Law draft amendments have been released by the NPC Standing Committee https://npcobserver.com/china-npc-draft-law/, the draft open for comment until December 8. I haven't seen a translation of the draft posted, unfortunately. Hu Ke, a partner of Jingtian & Gongcheng posted this article on LinkedIn, which summarizes the draft without any comments https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/whats-new-ongoing-chinese-arbitration-law-reform-hu-ke-q4nvc/.

The Text of the Revision may be accessed HERE; the explanatory materials (NPC Observer) may be accessed here (with thanks for the links to the NPC Observer Website folks).  The Explanation follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translations.

Online Seminar--China Keywords: Information Sovereignty (xìnxī zhǔquán, 信息主权); Telos-Paul Piccone Institute

 

 

I am happy to pass along this announcement of another installment of the Telos-Paul Piccone Institute's China "keywords" series.  This one focuses on Information Sovereignty (xìnxī zhǔquán, 信息主权).

 Each webinar in the “China Keywords” webinar series will introduce and explore a single concept essential for understanding contemporary Chinese social and political theory. The series will illuminate these concepts with an eye toward non-specialists in the West, while also addressing deep contestations of interest to experts in the field. The webinars will take place monthly, on the third Thursday of every month. Sign up for our newsletter to receive updates on upcoming webinars and other TPPI events. (here)

The seminar will take place 18 November 2024.  Registration via Eventbrite is required. Register for the webinar here!

More about the Seminar below and HERE.

 

Very Brief Thoughts on Remarks as Delivered by John Podesta at a Press Conference at the 29th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 29) in Baku, Azerbaijan)

 

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 In a quite remarkable, though unremarked, remarks addressed to the assembled press organs in 11 November 2024 at the Climate Change Conference (COP 29) held in Baku, Azerbaijan, John Podesta  suggested both the character of the transition from the Biden to the 2nd Trump Administration, and the nature of the sort of approaches those who will after 20 January 2025 will be in opposition will undertake. During the course of a set of remarks in which he outlined the normative principles and applied efforts of the outgoing Biden Administration, he also took the time to sketch out his sense of the antimonies between the vision and operational policies he serves and those he expects from the successor Administration of Mr. Trump.

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"It’s clear that the next Administration will try to take a U turn and reverse much of this progress. Of course, I am keenly aware of the disappointment that the United States has at times caused the parties of the climate regime, who have lived through a pattern of strong, engaged, effective U.S. leadership, followed by sudden disengagement after a U.S. presidential election. And I know that this disappointment is more difficult to tolerate as the dangers we face grow ever more catastrophic."

"But that is the reality. In January, we will inaugurate a President whose relationship to climate change is captured by the words “hoax” and “fossil fuels”. He has vowed to dismantle our environmental safeguards— and once again withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement."

"This is what he has said, and we should believe him."

"The United States is a democracy. And in a democracy, the will of the people prevailed. Our administration is working with the incoming Administration to ensure a peaceful and orderly transition of power. "

"But what I want to tell you today is that while the United States federal government under Donald Trump may put climate action on the back burner, the work to contain climate change is going to continue in the United States with commitment and passion and belief. As President Biden said in the Rose Garden last week, setbacks are unavoidable, but giving up is unforgivable. This is not the end of our fight for a cleaner, safer planet. "(Remarks as Delivered by John Podesta Press Conference at the 29th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 29) in Baku, Azerbaijan)

Mr. Podesta  would know. He has been serving as Senior Advisor to President Biden for Clean Energy Innovation and Implementation since September 2022 And in a similar role during the Obama Administration). He also served as chairman for Hillary Clinton's failed 2016 campaign for president and as chief of staff for Mr. Clinton  during his Presidency(here). The entirety of the remarks are worth reading. They are worth reading not solely for what Mr. Podesta says, but more importantly, for the normative stance that serve as the foundations for those remarks, its principles and most importantly--from the perspective of climate change sensitive policies--for the choice of fundamental principle of what and who ought to be guiding ad leading climate sensitive policies and how that guidance and leadership ought to be undertaken.  In that sense Mr. Podesta represents the American version of an emerging orthodoxy with respect to climate sensitive policy and a further orthodoxy respecting how that policy ought to be realized (Cf.Climate-Related Disclosures: A Comparative Analysis Between Securities Frameworks in the U.S. and E.U.).

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Mr. Podesta's unhappiness, echoes that of the political-normative class that has been at the vanguard of shaping narrative and policy since before the start of this century, a narrative and policy orthodoxy that has been injected into mass perception through  press and academic organs. The UK's Guardian provides an excellent example of the state of thinking on the cusp of a return of Mr. Trump to the presidency:

Experts say Trump’s second term could be even more destructive, as he will be aided by an amenably conservative judiciary and armed with detailed policy blueprints such as the Project 2025 document published by the rightwing Heritage Foundation. Trump’s incoming administration is already reportedly drawing up executive orders to erase climate policies and open up protected land for ramped-up oil and gas production. “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world,” the president-elect said on Wednesday. Staff at the US Environmental Protection Agency, which was targeted the last time Trump was president, are already bracing for a mass exodus. Swaths of work done by the EPA under Biden, such as pollution rules for cars and power plants, as well as efforts to protect vulnerable communities living near industrial activity, are set to be reversed. (US climate envoy says fight against climate crisis does not end under Trump)

Mr. Podesta's warning to the global magisterium of like minded techno-bureaucracies along with the political leaders that these bureaucracies manage, expose in a quite useful way, both the boundaries of orthodoxy and the possibilities of a counter-orthodoxy (now heresy) even among those committed in some form or another to climate change sensitive policy (and consequential action). 

Those boundaries are important, but not in the useful and banal ways.  The boundaries suggest a presumption of an inevitable and unbreakable connection between an issue (sensitivity to the realities of climate change) and a specific set of objectives (minimizing, or eliminating at its limit, human contribution to climate change), and the apparatus necessary to connect issue and objective (the state, law and the techno-bureaucratic complex). That is neither unusual nor unnecessary in the current stage of the historical development of governance in social relations. But it does create a set of hard presumptions that do not invite consideration of other starting or ending points, even when these may be committed to the same objectives. The cluster of presumptions that are woven into Mr. Podesta's remarks, then, are as important for signalling allegiance to a core set of starting presumptions (structural orthodoxy) and a commitment to the regulatory class that has embraced them. That is an important element of the remarks--the description of the orthodoxy in which Mr. Podesta and the Biden Administration have been invested; one that aligns with what is meant to be an international consensus.

Yet consensus ought not to suggest identity, even among the broad groups that adhere to some variation of consensus around the core components (issue, objectives, apparatus).  Going forward, both the incoming administration and those who still adhere to the reigning orthodoxy ought to at least be sensitive to these groups.  They will, each in their own way, play a role in the movement from vanguard driven orthodoxies to a naturalization of orthodox consensus, and with it, the cluster of objectives implemented through an apparatus developed or deployed for the purpose). Four broad groups may be particularly worth noting:

But beyond orthodoxies--an inverted phenomenology in which ideology drives experience which is then interpreted in ways that affirm ideology, over and over--require an object.  And the great actors on the stages of climate change sensitivity all  appear to focus on the engines through which preferred forms of performing climate sensitivity toward even more preferred ends--public and private bureaucracies, the propaganda departments  of the great institutions (however styled in accordance with the vocabularies of distinct political-economic systems), and social collectives whether to not they are attached to great institutions, primary among them are states and the instrumentalities of state collectives. It is easiest this way--top down, "expert" driven" and designed to lead their objects toward proper attitudes and behaviors. And they will (learn to) like it.

And yet there lies the problem--the problem of the indifferent masses. It might not be unreasonable to assume that a large number of people are indifferent to issues of climate change.  There are any number of reasons.  Many people are concerned about survival, with respect to which climate issues may be at best a peripheral and long term factor.  The exception is where survival is impacted by climate change--those are the stories that are widely publicized and then consumed by vanguard forces as objects that might move forward their political projects in political and judicial bodies at every level of regulatory institutions.  Others may just not care. For those who do care these are the great object of narrative strategies, and the large body of actors whose preferences will drive compliance.  That compliance can be demanded through public regulatory structures, commands, and nudging. Or it can be driven through markets and autonomously applied individual action guided (or dialectically evolved) by social actors that may or may not be the state. 

Whether (1) one wraps climate sensitivity and shared objectives within the hierarchies, and cocoons of institutional (usually public) apparatus, or (2) manifests it through guided (or unguided) markets lead by (sort of) autonomous decision making (within the constraints and expectations of markets and its (eminently teachable) framework for valuing things), or (3) whether the object is to reject climate sensitivity in whole or in part leaving the masses to the whatever awaits (the vanguard tends to always figure out and privilege a means of self-preservation), the masses must be made to care. Some approaches to collective perception might suggest that mass perception--and its choices of caring or indifference--ought to be driven by the masses themselves.  Contemporary approaches tend to belittle that starting point, preferring instead to feed the illusion of free will , exercised only under the guidance of those who know better,  And perhaps they do. To shape perception is to shape the arena within which choice cane  be rationalized.  And the construction of the perception of the consequences of choice become the foundation for the management of inclinations toward caring or indifference. It is that to which much effort has been devoted already.  And that will continue.  What Mr. Podesta reminds us, though, is that where consensus exists only within different social collectives, and within factions of such social collectives, one moves from perception to politics. And in 2024, at least in the United States, politics has now produced a potentially great shift away from Mr.Podesta's vanguard elements to those of another, to clusters of groups fundamentally suspicious of the controlling role of the State and its instrumentalities that power 

The text of Mr. Podesta's Remarks follow below.  They may also be accessed HERE. 

Remarks by President Biden at a Veterans Day Wreath Laying Ceremony | Arlington, VA

 

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We're the only nation in the world, build on an idea. Every other nation is based on things like geography, ethnicity, religion. We're the only nation, the only in the world build on an idea, that ideas were all created equal. Deserve to create it equal throughout our lives. We haven't lived up to it every time. We've never walked away from it. Even when it's hard, especially when it's hard. And today, standing together to honor those Americans of dared all, risk all and given all to our nation, must say clearly, we never will give up. (Biden Live Transcript of Remarks here)

Mr. Biden delivered remarks on the commemoration of Veteran's Day. This Blog will commemorate this Day and what it represents by re-posting the text of those remarks. They follow below and may be accessed from CNN's website HERE and HERE; final cleaned up version HERE  The quoted remarks from that address appear to have been important enough to President Biden that he repeated them almost verbatim in both the Veteran's Day Address and also in  the Remarks by President Biden at the 156th National Memorial Day Observance ("America is the only country in the world founded on an idea — an idea that all people are created equal and deserve to be treated equally throughout their lives. We’ve never fully lived up to that, but we’ve never, ever, ever walked away from it. Every generation, our fallen heroes have brought us closer.") .  

The transcript along with the cleaned up version posted several days after the event to the White House website also follow below

Greater China Legal History Seminar Series – ‘How to own a forest: shareholding, futures contracts, and ancestral trusts in southern China’ by Prof. Ian Miller (Online)

 

Happy to pass along the announcement of this quite intriguing upcoming presentation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong's Legal History Seminar Series. This from the organizers:

Can you own a forest? To a modern audience, this question may appear absurdly naive, but to villagers in Ming and Qing China, it was a surprisingly fraught question. First, labor was a key way to demonstrate possession, but forestry labor was far less regular than farm labor. By plowing, weeding, and reaping farmland, peasants regularly demonstrated their claims to ownership, or at least possession. But forests were planted in the space of a few years and then left to mature for several decades. How could peasants demonstrate ownership of trees that they were not managing on a day-to-day basis? Second, inheritance was a key basis for ownership claims, but ancestral forests had taboos on their use. Trees near graves, temples, wells, watercourses, and other ritually significant sites were off-limits. How could descendants claim ancestral forests without limiting their own abilities to use them productively?

To answer these questions villagers in southern China developed contractual mechanisms to both subdivide and merge forest rights and responsibilities. These included shares and other clauses used to partition forest rights and responsibilities, as well as trusts, portfolio deeds, and management contracts to combine properties for easier investment and oversight. In this talk, I will discuss the key role that forests played in the emergence of several financial instruments, including shares, futures contracts, and trusts, and the implications this has for our understanding of land ownership itself.

Information about the speaker follows below.

Review Essay: Anne Wagner: "Jean-Claude Gémar: The Pioneer and Vanguard of Jurilinguistics," in the International Journal of Legal Discourse.

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I am delighted to pass along the announcement of the publication by the marvelous Anne Wagner of her review essay (2024) titled, "Jean-Claude Gémar: The Pioneer and Vanguard of Jurilinguistics," in the International Journal of Legal Discourse. This work celebrates Gémar's foundational contributions to jurilinguistics, recognizing his pivotal role in shaping this field and advancing our understanding of the complexities involved in legal translation across different legal traditions:

It may be accessed here: Wagner, Anne. "Jean-Claude Gémar: the pioneer and vanguard of jurilinguistics" International Journal of Legal Discourse, 2024. Jean-Claude gémar: the pioneer and vanguard of jurilinguistics.

A taste from teh beginning of the review essay follows below.

Panel: "Moutains Beyond Mountains: The Challenges for Non-State Actors to Contribute to Climate Givernance" 15 January 2025 (Hybrid & In Person)

 

Well worth the time if you are able to attend either in person or via Zoom.

 This panel will explore issues surrounding the role of non-state actors in the fight against climate change. The movement from state-centred regulation towards sub-national / local or transnational governance behoves us to de-construct and re-construct our understandings of the role of the state versus those outside the state such as corporations, NGOs and private landholders.

REGISTER HERE: https://machformext.osgoode.yorku.ca/machform/view.php?id=407128

“Revolutionary Constitutions and their Constitutionalism: The Internalization of Fear as Process and the Performance of Crisis in the Service of Stability.”--Text of Remarks Delivered at the International Scientific Conference ‘Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear’ 9 November 2024, Sofia Bulgaria

 

 I was delighted to have been asked to contribute to the International Scientific Conference ‘Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear’ taking place 9 November 2024, in Sofia Bulgaria (more on that event HERE). 

Somewhat ironically, given the results of the U.S. election, though wholly unintended, my contribution is entitled “Revolutionary Constitutions and their Constitutionalism: The Internalization of Fear as Process and the Performance of Crisis in the Service of Stability” the abstract of the paper from which my remarks are drawn nicely sketch  out its substance:

Abstract: The object of revolutionary constitutionalism—the fundamental basis of constitutional design and perception since the late 18th century (though with antecedents well before then), is to preserve a revolutionary settlement of a political-economic order by cultivating revolutionary dialectic (rather than suppressing them) within revolutionary structures, now memorialized in a constitutional document. The object is redirection—from the utilization of revolutionary dialectics against a post-revolutionary apparatus now in power to an instrument for the preservation and affirmation of that post-revolutionary apparatus. It becomes a mimetic device denatured and now serving an apparatus. Stability is not forever; it retains its power at least until the fundamental contradictions of this revolutionary constitutional order collapse the system. At some point, the revolutionary dialectics that produced the post-revolutionary order will itself target that ordering from the outside. What remains is the cyclicity of dialectic—fear, response-reconstruction—rather than the systems to which it furthers from one to another stage of human historical development. It is to the preservation of that emotional explosion, and its alignment with core constitutional text, that constitutions devote time and effort, usually in its preambular text, and sometimes in extraconstitutional documents with quasi-constitutional significance. If powerful enough, the emotive semiotic of constitutional explosion can affect not just its political community but those of other political communities looking for a way to rationalize and direct their own collective political emotion. The focus of this essay, then, will be on the way that emotive context is transposed from revolution to post-revolutionary constitutional text in distinctive contexts—a revolution to preserve traditional values; a communist revolution within a multi-state imperial power; a revolution with a long fuse grounded in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism; and an ethno-revolution embedded within multilateral managerialism. To those ends the essay first looks to a powerful instance of emotive semiotics, the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), and its reflection in the subtextual mimetic dialectics of threat and crisis and resolution in the U.S. federal Constitution (1789). It then considers its value as a template for the constitutionalization of separation in the 21st century through the lens of the preambular texts of the Chinese (1982) and Cuban (2019) constitutions and the Kosovo Declaration of Independence (2008). All of these emotive revolutionary impulses are then transposed into and as the constitutional settlement within which the revolutionary is to be distilled, tamed, and contained within their respective ideological cages.

I have prepared remarks for presentation at the Conference, drawn from the paper, which may be  accessed here: Backer_Remarks_RevolutionaryConstitutions, and which follow below.

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ACCESS REMARKS HERE: Backer_Remarks_RevolutionaryConstitutions; 

TEXT of ESSAY MAY BE ACCESSED HERE: Backer_EmotiveSemiotics_Draft_v2.0; 

PPT MAY BE ACCESSED HERE: Backer_RevCon_Sofia-11-2024

Mr. Trump's Second Term: Brief Reflections on a Successful Campaign by or Around the President Elect

 

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It appears that Mr. Trump will serve a second term in office. Mrs. Harris, the current Vice President will address her supporters, and the nation, later on Wednesday. There will be much by way of analysis, and even more by way of prognostication. There will be plenty of time for both. I offer neither. 

Instead I suggest, in preliminary form, some fo the factors that may have played a part in returning Mr. Trump to office.

1. The demonification of Mr. Trump. Almost from the moment of Mr. Trump's electoral defeat in 2020, and certainly after January 2021, Mr. Trump's enemies and opponents engaged in a vigorous campaign of demonification. The object was to transform Mr. Trump into the antithesis of the patriotic American.  He was, in the language of some an enemy of the Republic, and of the people, or at least those that mattered. That demonification intensified through the end of the campaign with the usual comparisons to the hierarchy of narrative trope figures that are most opposed to the American ideal. The problem was that the campaign appears to have had a positive effect on those inclined to despise Mr. Trump; on everyone else the effect was less pronounced and might well have produced the opposite of its intended effect.

2. The dangers of the juridification of politics.  The enemies of Mr. Trump might have been satisfied with engaging in the sort of demonification that worked so well on Mr. Nixon.  The idea ight have then been that Mr. Trump would have slowly descended back into obscurity, a historical object, reduced to writing irate letters t the editors of local news media and appearing on television and on the conference circuit.  But Mr. Trump's enemies chose a different path.  They began to apply the law as often and as broadly as possible. What to many appeared to be the application of the principle that no one was above the law, the application of that principle over and over and over again, and by people and institutions who could barely hide their antipathy nor their politically tinged objectives, began to produce the sense in some that the law and legal process might have been instrumentalized in ways that might appear to be objectionable., and threatening to a vision of the relationship between law and politics in an idealized version of the US. This tendency was augmented by what appeared to be the uneven application of prosecutorial discretion.

3. The narratives of populist revolution. The enemies of Mr. Trump sough to transform the hooliganism and violence of January 6th into something more profoundly threatening to the Republic.  That was a reasonable strategy. At the same time the risk was that on the one hand it suggested a fragility in the Republic that might bear unfortunate consequences, and it tended to equate the strength of the Republic with its buildings. Yet a Republic is not the monuments it builds to reflect its greater glory. The narrative did have an unintended consequence: it significantly strengthened the narratives of popular democracy exercised through voting, and thus to a heightened sense of the need to vote, and of the greater need to protect the integrity of the franchise.  But, it appears, that narrative was as successfully embraced among Mr. Trump's supporters as it was among those who despised Mr. Trump and everything they insisted he stood for. 

4. Garbage in/Garbage Out. Mr. Trump's enemies committed the same error that produced the shock results of the 2016 election. They were so focused on their ability to extract knowledge from the ata they collected that they failed to see that the environment they produced in which data was to be extracted created substantial incentives to either ignore data sources, or for data sources to lie.  Here one sees the consequences of the 4 year effort to demonize and deploy the judicial power of the State against Mr. Trump.  Many people would have been disinclined (in now appears, again, in retrospect) be be truthful or forthcoming to pollsters or even with friends and employers in an environment in which the consequences of that openness might be quite negative.  On the other hand, Mr. Trump's enemies appeared to be so desperate to have their own views vindicated that they might have, again in retrospect, skewed their data collection and analytics to "tell" them what they wanted to hear. That is always fatal.  And in this case decisively so. It is also a warning to those who seek to rely on data and data based analytics about the dangers of ego or desire in analytics. 

5. The Jewish problem. This one is likely to be debated for decades.  The choice of Mr. Walz (Minnesota) as Mrs. Harris' running mate was not a bad one.  And in the end he might have been a better choice than Mr. Shapiro (Pennsylvania). The decision to make that choice in the context of a debate within the Democratic Party about its approach to the Israel-Hamas War turned both into avatars of the politics around which some supposed the decision revolved.  The costs of that decision will be hard to gauge. I suspect it is a number reater than zero. And it appeared not to have produced the positive effects intended--at least not as great a positive effect as hoped.

6. The Versailles effect.  In an essay of 200 I noted the disastrous consequences of the "Versailles effect"(Forbidden Cities). Elites that wall themselves off (physically or virtually) within structures of their own creation, where they exist in a world far removed from others run the risk that they will be strangers in their own land. In democratic Republics where the masses still count for something--whatever the power of guidance may be among techno-bureaucracies, social and media elites, and academics who believe themselves invited guests in these palaces--these palaces, these forbidden cities may either be ignored or displaced.  That was a great error of the 2016 campaign for the Democrats (the "despicables"); it appears to have repeated itself in the 2024 campaign ("garbage").  One would have thought they might have learned to mask the hierarchies and leadership power. They did not.  On the other hand, the election appears to nudge that elite power back, at least marginally, from the public to the private techno-bureaucracies.

 7. The Issues that weren't. Mr. Trump's enemies overestimated the power of certain key social issues (among them abortion rights), and, more importantly, Mr. Trump's effective counter.  Mr. Trump's wrapping himself in state's rights--the federalism and localism principle--as a counter to the Democratic Party efforts to paint him as an anti-abortion zealot at the federal level did not get far off the ground.  More interesting was the failure of the Project 2025 to capture the imagination. In the end, that was effectively an elite issue (see the Versailles effect above) and it proved difficult to use it effectively in the campaign--sort of like Party Platforms, the half life of which is short indeed.

8. Borders matter now. Mr. Trump's opponents underestimated the power of the border issue for the election. And they were singularly unable to detach Mrs. Harris from what was effectively portrayed as the Biden administration failures with respect to the border. That issue did not cut in ways that were anticipated; especially among voters from the Latino community. Related to that was the remarkable inability of the Democratic Party to retain the level of support among minority communities they thought they had.  A large part of the problem was the product of success.  The successful (there is still a lot of work to be done certainly) of minority communities into the larger economic and social mainstream at least at the margins also changed the basket of issue sof importance to them.  Minority communities of small and medium sized firms, of families seeking to educate their kids, etc, have the same basket of concerns as other middle class people though in contextually different ways.  That was not exploited by Mr. Trump's opponents.

9. The enigmatic Mrs. Harris. To some extent Mrs. Harris began the campaign already at a disadvantage.  The way she was selected as the Democratic Party candidate and relations with the current office holder created negatives that were never fully overcome.  Mrs. Harris came late to the issues and her careful relationship with the press organs made it easier to paint her as remote, ineffective, and unprepared. Certainly one could argue that these tropes were more easily deployed given gender prejudices. But that would not have been unknown to Democratic Party leaders and their retinues of consultants. On top of everything else, what proved to be an ineffective campaign and an inability to show their candidate in the best possible light proved significant. 

. 

Maximilian Robespierre, Rapport sur les principes de morale politique dans l'administration intérieure de la République [On the Moral and Political Principles of Domestic Policy]--Text and Reflections on Modernity

 

La démocratie périt par deux excès, l'aristocratie de ceux qui gouvernent, ou le mépris du peuple pour les autorités qu'il a lui-même établies, mépris qui fait que chaque coterie, que chaque individu attire à lui la puissance publique, et ramène le peuple, par l'excès du désordre, à l'anéantissement, ou au pouvoir d'un seul. La double tâche des modérés et des faux révolutionnaires est de nous ballotter perpétuellement entre ces deux écueils.* * * On dirait que les deux génies contraires que Ton a représentés se disputant l'empire de la nature combattent dans cette grande époque de l'histoire humaine pour fixer sans retour les destinées du monde, et que la France est le théâtre de cette lutte redoutable. Au dehors, tous les tyrans vous cernent; au dedans, tous les amis de la tyrannie conspirent: ils conspirent jusqu'à ce que l'espérance ait été ravie au crime. Il faut étouffer les ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs de la République, ou périr avec elle; or, dans cette situation, la première maxime de votre politique doit être qu'on conduit le peuple par la raison, et les ennemis du peuple par la terreur. (Rapport sur les principes de morale politique dans l'administration intérieure de la République [On the Moral and Political Principles of Domestic Policy])

Democracy perishes by two kinds of excess: the aristocracy of those who govern or the people's scorn for the authorities whom the people itself has established, scorn which makes each clique, each individual take over the public power and lead the people, through excessive disorders, to its destruction or to the power of one man. The double effort of the moderates and the false revolutionaries is to drive us back and forth perpetually between these two perils. * * * The two opposing spirits that have been represented in a struggle to rule nature might be said to be fighting in this great period of human history to fix irrevocably the world's destinies, and France is the scene of this fearful combat. Without, all the tyrants encircle you; within, all tyranny's friends conspire; they will conspire until hope is wrested from crime. We must smother the internal and external enemies of the Republic or perish with it; now in this situation, the first maxim of your policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people's enemies by terror. (On the Moral and Political Principles of Domestic Policy [Rapport sur les principes de morale politique dans l'administration intérieure de la République])

Pix Credit Library of Congress

 The perception and defense of popular democracy has always been a fragile enterprise, one caught up by both the glories and traps of its own contradictions. That applies with equal force, of course, to all contemporary variation on the democratic consciousness.  That insight tends to be lost in the enthusiasm of the cohorts of enthusiasts who, in every age, experience the contradictions without perceiving their own role as phenomenological objects in the dialectics of democratic intensity suited ot the times and place in which it is experienced. Among its greatest strengths and contradiction are the proclivities of democratic enthusiasts to insist on the essential role of 'othering' in the constitution of a system the great virtue of which is its impulse toward universality. That its power has remained substantially unimpeded at least from the start of the contemporary age of democratic consciousness in the 1770s, speaks to its power. That its approach is indifferent toward the political-economic model within which it is deployed (liberal-democratic, Marxist-Leninist, Theocratic, ethno-tribalist, etc.) speaks to its character as a fundamental premise of the enterprise.

It is in this area, perhaps, that Maximilian Robespierre still has much to teach--despite his own obliviousness to the lessons he was crafting in his speeches leading up to his execution in 1794 (Rapport sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention nationale dans l'administration intérieure de la République, fait au nom du Comité de salut public).  Among the more relevant now may be his remarkable, and to modern ears quite contemporary, speech on the moral politics that ought to guide manifestations of public power in the management of domestic policy--and, of course, the masses. The speech is extraordinarily rich, and modern, and worth contemplating for its relevance and lessons that touch on, at the least, the the discursive featsts which the masses have been invited to eat. The speech serves as reminder of the power, perhaps the inevitability, of the trajectories of the experience of a certain 'othering' within the democratic enterprise that carries with it a remarkably consistent set of consequences. And the Jacobin conundrum--hierarchy, leadership,  and control within idealized perceptions of equality remain at the center, the justification for which remains a central element of democracies whether in the form of "brain trust" techno-bureaucratic democracy, traditional populism (irrespective of its ideological tilts), or any of the forms of vanguardism--either progressive  (that is progressing toward some eventual ideal state) or otherwise--remains at the core element of the current general contradiction for the times.

Is it possible to move beyond the Jacobin conundrum--played and replayed in a variety of forms since the 1790's? Does one even need the democratic form to be subject to the Jacobin conundrum?   The speech, and a nice English translation follow below.  May be accessed here (original French), and here (English).

International Scientific Conference ‘Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear’ 9 November 2024, Sofia Bulgaria

 

I am delighted to be part of this conference and with thanks to the remarkable Martin Belov for bringing us all together. The Conference, ‘Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear’, will he held from 8:30 - 18:30 in the New Conference Hall, Main Building (Rectorate) of the University of Sofia ‘St. Kliment Ohridski’.

The conference ‘Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear’ aims at exploring the legally relevant feelings, emotions, and imaginaries of fear. It will present the outcomes of a multifaceted scientific analysis of the constitutional and international law dimensions of crisis and fear. Dark feelings and the (un)constitutional politics of fear are at the core of the research interest of a group of leading and internationally recognized scholars that have been gathered by prof. Dr. Martin Belov of Sofia University in a network researching the legal imaginaries of fear.

The conference shall start with an outline of fear constitutionalism. It will present the epistemological, semiotic, semantic, and heuristic approaches to dark emotions in constitutions and constitutional law. Special attention shall be devoted to affectual constitutionalism and the collective emotional self-identification of the constitutionally framed socio-political communities and the various groups that are framed by them. Dark constitutional memories, memory politics of fear, and the emotions of constitutional transition and social transformation will be assessed marking the transtemporal research of constitutional darkness and fear politics. Special part of the conference shall be devoted to the international and transnational imaginaries of crisis and fear. The conference shall conclude with heuristic analysis of the images of fear.

This event is organised by the European Values and Social Challenges (EUVaSC) research group under the SUMMIT project of Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski. The project SUMMIT - Sofia University Marking Momentum for Innovation and Technological Transfer is financed by the European Union-NextGenerationEU, through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Republic of Bulgaria, project No BG-RRP-2.004-0008.

The Programme follows below. More information ay be accessed through the QR Code:

Looking forward to presenting my paper there as well.

The Contradictions of Employment in New Era Socialist Modernization: 习近平 促进高质量充分就业 [Xi Jinping, Promoting high-quality full employment]

 

 IN its latest issue (2024/21), Qiushi 《求是》distributed  the text of a speech given by General Secretary Xi Jinping speech at the 14th collective study session of the 20th Central Political Bureau on May 27, 2024. The speech is entitled 习近平  促进高质量充分就业 [Xi Jinping, Promoting high-quality full employment].

The distribution of this speech is important for several reasons.  The first is to foreground the importance to which the State attaches to employment--or rather to the challenge of unemployment.  The second is to align employment policy with the core principles of socialist modernization and high quality productivity as developed in the 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Central Committee (here, here). And the third is to distill the general structure of the application of New Era Socialist modernization to the challenge of employment. These were reduced to five points of emphasis:

1. First, always adhere to employment priority. We must unswervingly implement the new development concept, more consciously take high-quality and full employment as the priority goal of economic and social development, make the process of high-quality development a process of improving the quality and expanding the capacity of employment, and enhance the employment driving force of development. [第一，始终坚持就业优先。要坚定不移贯彻新发展理念，更加自觉地把高质量充分就业作为经济社会发展的优先目标，使高质量发展的过程成为就业提质扩容的过程，提高发展的就业带动力。] This serves as the framework for applying the general principles of high quality development of the 3rd Plenum. But it also suggests the ways in which the premises of new quality development will be contextualized in the employment context. It also suggests the potentially important foregrounded alignment of employment with the general contradiction of the new era--that is employment as an element of just distribution of the benefits (and responsibilities) of socialist modernization.

2. Second, focus on solving structural employment contradictions. The mismatch between supply and demand of human resources is the main contradiction facing my country's current employment field. [第二，着力解决结构性就业矛盾。人力资源供需不匹配，是当前我国就业领域面临的主要矛盾。] Among the most interesting aspects of this is the effort to overcome the hierarchy of labor value. "We should create a favorable public opinion atmosphere and inclusive social environment that is conducive to employment and entrepreneurship, such as "no profession is noble or humble, and labor is respected", "there are top talents in all 360 professions", and "grassroots employment can also be outstanding"," [营造“职业无贵贱，劳动受尊重”、“三百六十行，行行出状元”、“基层就业，同样出彩”等有利于就业创业的良好舆论氛围和包容社会环境，]

3. Third, improve the employment support policy for key groups. [第三，完善重点群体就业支持政策。]. These include students, migrant workers (especially in encouraging relocation back to place of origin), groups with employment difficulties (the elderly, disabled and the long term unemployed), and retired soldiers and women. Again, the focus appears to be on employment at the margins and in contexts where both the state and private sector wil have to expend a more substantial effort to achieve goals.  The critical questions here, though is the extent to which provincial and local officials will require nudging from the center.  In this context, certainly, the use of data driven assessment measures might be usefully applied--assuming the administrative apparatus takes the tie to develop and correctly deploy them.

4. Fourth, deepen the reform of the employment system and mechanism. We must give full play to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of human resources, better play the role of the government, and focus on solving the problems that restrict the improvement of employment quality, the expansion of employment capacity, and the optimization of employment structure. [第四，深化就业体制机制改革。要充分发挥市场在人力资源配置中的决定性作用，更好发挥政府作用，着力解决制约提升就业质量、扩大就业容量、优化就业结构的卡点堵点问题。]. Here the complementary dual pathway system of public and private enterprises coordinated by the CPC, will play a leading role. But that differentiation may also become more visible. See for example Law of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promoting Private Economy (Draft for Comments) [中华人民共和国民营经济促进法 （草案征求意见稿）] Text and Source Materials.

5. Fifth, strengthen the protection of workers' rights and interests. It is necessary to improve labor laws and regulations, standardize labor standards for new employment forms, improve the social security system, and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers in labor remuneration, rest and vacation, labor safety, skills training, social insurance and welfare. [第五，加强劳动者权益保障。要健全劳动法律法规，规范新就业形态劳动基准，完善社会保障体系，维护劳动者在劳动报酬、休息休假、劳动安全、技能培训、社会保险和福利等方面的合法权益]. This includes a number of projects, from flexible employment and occupational injurt policies to stricter supervision of labor and labor rights.

 The full text of the remarks follow below in the original Chinese and in a crude English  translation.

Risky Business--A New Batch of Exclusions From the Norwegian Pension Fund Global's Investment Universe and One Discontinuance of Observation: Suppressed Economic Sectors, Human Rights, Corruption, Environmental Harm

Pix credit here

The Norwegian Pension Fund Global has recently announced a number of exclusions on the basis of a variety of bases. Three touch on investment or operation of investment-suppressed fields (tobacco and nuclear weapons); one was based on risk of contributing to human rights abuse; one was based on contributing to or responsibility for gross corruption; and the last for contributing to severe environmental damage. 

The three forbidden economic sector decisions include the following. It bears recalling that the Fund applies a broad reading to its rule respecting nuclear weapons ("The assessment’s starting point is that companies which produce nuclear weapons or key components thereof shall be excluded from the GPFG" (General Dynamics, text, below).

Turning Point Brands Inc 

Turning Point Brands Inc is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and manufactures and distributes tobacco products, among other things. The company's annual report for 2022 states that it produces snuff tobacco in its own operations. The company distributes a number of other products based on tobacco and cannabis, but these are produced by others. The Council has approached the company and invited it to disclose further details. The company has not replied to the Council’s query

Company is excluded from the Fund’s investment universe due to its production of tobacco products.
Please find the Council’s recommendation here; text here.


Larsen & Toubro Ltd  

 Since the 1990s, India has undertaken the development of its own SSBN fleet for use as launch platforms for nuclear weapons. The country’s first domestically produced SSBN, INS Arihant, was launched in 2016. In 2022, another SSBN, the INS Arighat, was launched. A further two Arihant-class submarines are presumed to be under construction. . . Part of L&T’s role is to produce the boats’ hulls, which are fabricated and equipped at L&T’s shipyards. The company has mentioned this in several of its annual reports

Company is excluded from investment by the Fund Global (GPFG) due to its production of key components of nuclear weapons. Please find the Council’s recommendation here: text here.

 General Dynamics Corp 

 It is clear that GD is the main contractor for the construction of Columbia-class SSBNs and that these boats are built and equipped at the company’s shipyards. Since the construction of the Columbia-class fleet will continue for many years to come, it must be presumed that the company will engage in this activity for the foreseeable future. It is further evident that GD supplies components for the construction of the UK’s Dreadnought-class SSBNs.

Company is excluded from investment by the Fund Global (GPFG) due to its production of key components of nuclear weapons. Please find the Council’s recommendation here; text here.

Decisions based on risk of serious human rights abuses, risk of gross corruption, and risk of severe environmental damage include the following decisions.

Prosegur Cia de Seguridad SA 

Prosegur is a Spanish company which, among other things, provides security services in several Latin American countries. The company’s subsidiary in Brazil has been involved in severe acts of violence and abuse of tribal people’s rights, providing security services for two clients. Since the company continues to perform the assignments where the abuse took place, and also operates in numerous countries in which there are land disputes and serious antagonism between commercial companies and local populations, the Council presumes that new situations may arise involving a considerable risk of human rights abuses. The Council on Ethics finds that Prosegur has not substantiated that its systems for identifying and managing such risks are adequate, and deems the risk that Prosegur will contribute to serious human rights abuses in future to be unacceptable.

Company is excluded from investment by the Fund due to an unacceptable risk that the company is contributing to serious human rights abuses. Please find the Council’s recommendation here; text here. The most interesting aspect of this decision is the continued refinement of the risk analysis of decision making. Even more interesting is the presumption of an increasingly tight alignment between the administrative structures and operational policies and informal determinations of public authorities and expectations of seamless compliance by the administrative apparatus of private enterprises around which their operations are to be organized. 

The Council notes that Prosegur has established governing instruments and reporting systems that are intended to ensure respect for human rights. Since the company does not perceive recommendations from the prosecuting authorities as alerts of human rights abuses, the Council considers that these systems are of limited significance. When the company sets such a high threshold for addressing the risk of human rights abuses, it is difficult to both identify risks and establish adequate initiatives to mitigate them. (text here.)

Neither bad nor good, but further indication of the trajectories of alignment of public and private techno-bureaucracies operating under conditions of compliance driven by public policy.

China State Construction Engineering Corp Ltd (CSCEC) 

CSCEC’s primary business activities include the construction of all types of public buildings, as well as infrastructure such as railway lines, motorways, bridges, ports, etc. The Council’s inquiries have shown that CSCEC may be linked to allegations or suspicions of corruption in a number of countries in the period 2004–2021. CSCEC operates in a business sector and in many countries in which the risk of corruption is high. Moreover, China’s enforcement of corruption abroad has been ranked in the lowest category by Transparency International. The Council has therefore contacted CSCEC and asked it a number of questions concerning the company’s measures to prevent, detect and react to corruption, but the company has failed to reply to the Council’s queries. On this basis, and in light of the cases described, the Council considers that the risk of gross corruption linked to CSCEC’s operations is unacceptable. (here)

Company is excluded from investment by the Fund due to an unacceptable risk that the company is contributing to or is itself responsible for gross corruption. Please find the Council’s recommendation here; text here. The case is interesting both for its reminder that failure to reply to Fund inquiries can be read quite negatively and for the presumptions built on the relationship between risk and compliance measures. The real question centers around sanction (exclusion versus observation), the jurisprudence of which remains still uncomfortably close to discretionary determinaitons with no real check. The Ethics Council's summary of its anti-corruption structural and compliance expectations follow below. 

Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Re Tang Group Corp Ltd 

Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Re Tang Group Corp Ltd is a Chinese pharmaceutical company that manufactures and markets Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM). The company’s products contain body parts from globally threatened species such as leopard bones, pangolin scales and musk from musk deer. The use of threatened animal species in TCM products may contribute to illegal wildlife trade and increases the risk to of these species becoming extinct. There is no information concerning the quantity of body parts of threatened species that the company uses, where the animal parts originate from, what stockpiles exist and how these are replenished. When such data is not made available, the Council on Ethics concludes that the company contributes to severe environmental damage. The company has not disclosed any specific plans to replace the ingredients based on threatened species with other ingredients. Company is excluded from investment by the Fund due to an unacceptable risk of the company contributes to severe environmental damage.

Please find the Council’s recommendation here; text here. This case is another in a growing list of cases that suggest that the Fund has a special interest in the environmental consequences of Chinese traditional medicine procurement.

In addition, following a recommendation from the Council on Ethics, Norges Bank announced its decision to discontinue the observation of the company Supermax Corp Bhd.

Supermax is a Malaysian company that produces rubber and latex gloves. . . In February 2022, the Council on Ethics recommended that Supermax be excluded from the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) due to an unacceptable risk that the company was contributing to human rights abuses. The Council’s recommendation was based on reports of extremely poor living and working conditions for migrant workers at the company’s production facilities in Malaysia. In June the same year, Norges Bank decided to place Supermax under observation. During the observation period, Supermax reported that it has implemented measures to improve conditions for migrant workers. . . In September 2023, furthermore, the US authorities lifted import restrictions on Supermax’s products because the conditions that had led to the company being blacklisted due to the risk of forced labour had been rectified. This could indicate that conditions for workers at Supermax’s production facilities have improved, and that the risk of the company contributing to serious or systematic human rights abuses no longer unacceptable.

Please find the Council’s recommendation here; text here. Here, as in earlier cases, the Fund appears willing to rely determinations by the state apparatus of other public bodies on which to base its assessment. The regularization of this impulse remains to be developed in a useful way.