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The Telos-Paul Piccone Institute has recently published online on its Telos Insights site a quite interesting essay: Eliyahu V. Sapir, The Collapse of Epistemic Latency: Reflections on Journalism, Judgment, and the Kristof Controversy (10 June 2026).
The controversy surrounding Nicholas Kristof’s recent New York Times column on alleged sexual abuse of Palestinian detainees by Israeli personnel exposed this transformation with unusual clarity. Critics accused the article of relying on activist NGOs, anonymous testimony, and fragile evidentiary conditions. Defenders responded that Palestinian testimony is routinely dismissed, that abuse in Israeli detention facilities has been documented, and that demands for exceptional verification often emerge selectively when Palestinian suffering is involved.
The significance of the controversy extends far beyond the factual status of any individual allegation. Journalism under wartime conditions necessarily unfolds amid uncertainty, emotional intensity, incomplete verification, and competing testimonial worlds. What became visible in the Kristof controversy was not the possibility of error alone, but a broader transformation in the temporal organization of epistemic legitimacy itself.
The essay advances a theory of what the author terms the collapse of epistemic latency—the shrinking temporal interval between the emergence of information, its verification, and its moral or political interpretation. Rather than arguing primarily that contemporary journalism has become more ideologically biased, the paper appears to suggest that the institutional architecture of journalism itself has undergone a transformation. The principal claim is that modern media increasingly derive legitimacy not from delaying judgment until evidence has matured but from demonstrating rapid synchronization with evolving public moral expectations. From a computational perspective, one might recast the argument as describing a transition from high-latency inference systems to real-time optimization systems, where the objective function has shifted from maximizing evidentiary confidence toward one focused on maximizing temporal responsiveness and normative coherence. That is the system of journalism has become a recursive system of reward hacking—a sort of computational populism in which belief and alignment with belief assumes pride of place.
The essay introduces "epistemic latency" as the interval during which evidence accumulates before stable conclusions are drawn. Historically, this interval might be understood as a formatted structure for analysis and textual production: corroboration, contradiction, contextualization, uncertainty management, and revision. In computational language, one might assume that latency functions as a buffer for recursive error correction. That structuring mirrored all sorts of recursive systems and thus would align with what had appeared to be a core premise of rationalized data based knowledge analytics and judgement. Many computational systems deliberately maintain such buffers. Bayesian updating, probabilistic graphical models, Kalman filters, ensemble learning, and many distributed consensus algorithms all postpone stable outputs until sufficient information has accumulated.
The author's central argument, then, appears to be that journalism increasingly minimizes this buffering stage. Instead of
data → validation → inference → judgment
the system increasingly behaves like
event → immediate classification → public amplification.
This produces faster outputs but potentially higher variance in epistemic reliability. In a human collective system that values public amplification or substitutes that amplification for judgment, the shift is inevitable. But it also has consequences.
It might be fair to surmise that rather than viewing journalism as individual reporters producing stories, the essay suggests a conceptualization of journalism as an adaptive information-processing network embedded within larger communication ecosystems—that is as a field in the sense that Bourdieu critically understood the term with quite specific (from my perspective) computational system characteristics.
From a systems perspective, the idealized vision of traditional journalism approximated a processing network along the following lines: centralized filtering→ delayed publication→ hierarchical validation→ controlled update cycles. Contemporary journalism increasingly resembles a different system: decentralized streaming→ continual updates→ recursive feedback→ distributed synchronization.
There may be a significance to that distinction, though its amplitude and consequence remains uncertain. One might conclude that older systems optimized accuracy under uncertainty; current systems optimize coordination under uncertainty. Those objectives are not identical; each is grounded in a quite distinct system of values attached to the signification of facts (data) and their ordering as information, first, and as judgment/knowledge after.
Like the formulation of the essay’s view of journalism as a sort of distributed information network favoring distributed synchronization aligned with public amplification, the essay’s concept of moral acceleration might be reformulated computationally. Computationally aided systems have been programmed, one might surmise, to reward outputs that satisfy several optimization criteria simultaneously, for instance: rapid production; emotional salience; network transmissibility; interpretive simplicity; and moral recognizability.
Under these conditions, narratives function similarly to machine-learning classifiers. Instead of asking “is this proposition fully verified?” the system increasingly asks, “does this proposition fit an already learned classification boundary?” This distinction might be considered to parallel supervised learning. If an incoming observation resembles previously labeled examples, the classifier rapidly assign it to an existing category. The essence of reporting, then, is amplifying patterns. Yet there may be a thin line indeed between pattern recognition-amplification as journalism, and the sort of essentialism-reductionism that, at one point, not too long ago, would have been seen as collective prejudgment that, for instance, when applied by the police, as profiling might be as useful as an amplification of collective signification that can be either corrupted or used for the construction of group characteristics that the law disapproves (see eg here).
And, indeed, a significant element of the essay is built around the argument that contemporary journalism increasingly performs pattern recognition before evidentiary completion. And yet profiling, as a species of pattern recognition, is also the essence of the way in which human are constructing large language models and neural networks. From an AI perspective, large language models, graph neural networks, and deep classifiers all operate primarily through statistical similarity. They infer likely structure before exhaustive verification. The essence of human cognition, now transposed into the computational bones of machine systems, is precisely the construction and deployment of pattern analysis that can be both useful and utterly corrupting as a function of the signification of human collective values about patterning (and their consequences that human collectives mean to suppress).
It is possible to suggest that journalism increasingly now engages in a sort of profiling exercise but with computational characteristics (to take the normative sting out of the practice but also to center normative profiling). Incoming testimony is evaluated partly according to whether it fits established moral templates such as colonial domination; structural oppression; racial hierarchy; sexual violence; carceral abuse and the like, as the lens and the framework through which facts are arranged, evaluated and recursively consumed in the amplification of the normative moral template. It is not that the templates are false; it is that they serve as the anchor around which reality is ordered and in the service of which facts are consumed and reshaped into information. As the essay suggests, these serve as priors that influence how rapidly new information becomes socially credible.
It is here that the so-called “Kristof case becomes important as an illustrative case. The author argues that competing reactio→s to allegations involving Palestinian detainees reveal broader properties of information systems: differential verification thresholds; asymmetric moral activation; unequal temporal treatment of evidence. The essay interprets these asymmetries as indicators of changes in the architecture of public epistemology rather than simply examples of partisan disagreement.
Using computational language, the essay might be said to use positive feedback mechanisms as a descriptor. In simplified form it might look like this: Event→Initial narrative→social amplification→Institutional recognition→additional amplification→further institutional commitment→Reduced openness to contradictory evidence. There is a resemblance to recursive reinforcement processes common in adaptive systems. Once a classification acquires sufficient weight, later evidence is interpreted relative to the established state rather than independently. Were one to use the lens of machine learning one might describe this as a form of path dependence or confirmation through iterative updating.
There is a consequence, of course, from this perspective: symbolic compression. It is possible to assume that human societies cannot process unlimited complexity. Consequently, they compress events into recognizable symbolic forms. These are not marginal but central events with legal, regulatory, cultural or societal consequence. Examples include the concepts of victim, aggressor, oppressor, and consequential concepts: genocide, liberation, or occupation.
Compression reduces computational cost. At its edges, though, “excessive” compression increases information loss. That, in turn, creates degradation of data and corruption of result. Strategically it produces ideological reinforcement in a sort of self-reinforcing loop. That corruption—in this case, of journalism, or perhaps better put, the degradation of journalism from its old idealized centering—is evident in an accelerated media environments that effectively reward high compression ratios. The consequence is that symbolic coherence may emerge before factual complexity has been adequately explored.
It is a small step from this analytical framework to the machining of anti-semitism. The final portion of the essay argues that antisemitism can operate structurally rather than solely through explicit prejudice. In effect, the author argues that Jewish identity has historically functioned as a highly reusable explanatory node within Western symbolic networks. Rather than requiring intentional hostility, institutional processes may repeatedly converge upon similar representational outcomes because existing narrative structures lower the activation threshold for particular interpretations. Expressed computationally, the claim is that certain semantic associations possess unusually high prior probabilities within historical discourse networks. The claim is not empirical but theoretical one that invites further historical and comparative validation.
Perhaps the language of Quantum Computational Interpretation provides a useful analytical lens, at least metaphorically, in this sense: Classical journalism might be understood as assuming, at least in part, that observations eventually collapse into stable facts following sufficient investigation. The essay argues, however, that contemporary journalism increasingly behaves as though measurement precedes stabilization. In quantum terms, one might distinguish among three stages: First, superposition: Multiple plausible interpretations coexist while evidence remains incomplete. Second: measurement: Public institutions assign an initial interpretation. Third: decoherence: That interpretation becomes socially stabilized through repetition and institutional adoption. The essay effectively might be said to advance the supposition that social measurement now occurs earlier than epistemic maturation.
The "collapse" described is not a physical wave-function collapse but a social stabilization of interpretive states. The analogy is useful for illustrating how multiple plausible narratives may narrow rapidly once institutional attention and public discourse converge on a particular interpretation. That, of course, is also the essence of an analysis from the semiotics of collective behaviors.
Where does that leave one? First the Kristof episode, which appears to be the center of the analysis, becomes, in effect marginalia—important marginalia to be sure, but not central to the core issues. That follows from the structure of the analysis itself--it shifts analysis away from accusations of individual bias toward examination of institutional information-processing dynamics. This systems-oriented approach adds a conceptual richness to the analysis beyond the usual accounts that attribute journalistic failures solely to ideology. And, indeed, the concepts of epistemic latency and moral acceleration provide useful analytical vocabulary for studying contemporary digital media beyond the specific Israel–Palestine context.
It is then possible to reframe the analysis of the essay so that it can be understood as focused on a change in optimization criteria even as one considers its directly human impact as grounded in a change in political values. Through the lens what the author observes and analysis can be recast as a shifting of collective and structural prioritization from epistemic robustness—maximizing confidence through delayed, recursive validation—to network synchronization, where rapid alignment with emerging moral interpretations becomes a source of institutional legitimacy. This reflects a move from conservative inference under uncertainty to real-time classification within high-feedback communication networks. On this basis the essay's central contribution can be understood as a reframing of journalism as a dynamic inference system whose performance depends not only on the quality of evidence but also on the temporal architecture governing when evidence is considered sufficient for public judgment.
The Collapse of Epistemic Latency: Reflections on Journalism, Judgment, and the Kristof Controversy
by Eliyahu V. Sapir
Modern journalism confronts a contradiction it cannot fully acknowledge. The institutional demand for continuous moral clarity now exceeds the temporal and epistemic conditions under which truth can responsibly emerge. Contemporary media organizations are no longer expected to investigate events while contextualizing uncertainty and complexity. They are now required to position themselves visibly, publicly, and under conditions of permanent exposure, vis-à-vis unfolding reality in real time.
This transformation changes not only the speed of journalism but its institutional character. News institutions now draw legitimacy from demonstrating synchronization with rapidly consolidating public perception, rather than from interrupting collective normative consolidation through evidentiary restraint. Journalism itself operates inside accelerating ethical judgment rather than standing at meaningful distance from it.
The controversy surrounding Nicholas Kristof’s recent New York Times column on alleged sexual abuse of Palestinian detainees by Israeli personnel exposed this transformation with unusual clarity. Critics accused the article of relying on activist NGOs, anonymous testimony, and fragile evidentiary conditions. Defenders responded that Palestinian testimony is routinely dismissed, that abuse in Israeli detention facilities has been documented, and that demands for exceptional verification often emerge selectively when Palestinian suffering is involved.
The significance of the controversy extends far beyond the factual status of any individual allegation. Journalism under wartime conditions necessarily unfolds amid uncertainty, emotional intensity, incomplete verification, and competing testimonial worlds. What became visible in the Kristof controversy was not the possibility of error alone, but a broader transformation in the temporal organization of epistemic legitimacy itself.
Epistemic Latency
Classical liberal journalism depended upon what might be called epistemic latency. The institutional capacity to remain within uncertainty long enough for verification, contradiction, corroboration, contextualization, and interpretive judgment to occur before normative consolidation crystallized into public certainty. Latency was not a weakness of journalism but one of its central ethical conditions. Responsible reporting required delay precisely because public seriousness depended upon evidentiary seriousness. Journalism derived legitimacy from disciplined restraint under conditions where closure was emotionally and politically desirable, rather than from immediate normative positioning.
This temporal structure is now weakening. The current information environment increasingly rewards immediacy over epistemic duration. Ethical positioning circulates faster than evidentiary consolidation. Public actors now operate under conditions of continuous visibility in which hesitation itself risks appearing ethically compromised. Under such circumstances, the temporal interval separating event, interpretation, verification, and judgment steadily contracts. The distinction between investigation and authorization becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
This transformation should not be reduced to ideological bias alone. Bias implies deviation from an otherwise stable epistemic framework. What became visible through this episode was not the possibility of error alone, but a broader transformation in the temporal organization of epistemic legitimacy itself. Media organizations now derive authority not only from their ability to verify information, but from their capacity to consolidate public meaning under conditions of volatility and acceleration. Modern journalism no longer functions solely as a system that describes reality. It now participates in organizing which realities become collectively actionable in the first place.
Some narratives become publicly coherent before they become epistemically stable. Under present conditions, social recognition depends upon rapid ethical recognizability. Narratives aligned with established structures of suffering, domination, victimhood, and exposure begin acquiring plausibility prior to evidentiary maturation. Testimony itself acquires anticipatory normative authority whenever it echoes recognizable interpretive grammars.
The Kristof controversy exposed this mechanism with unusual clarity because the allegations themselves occupied a uniquely charged symbolic position. Sexual violence functions within liberal discourse not just as criminality but as civilizational transgression. Once allegations of sexual assault become attached to imprisonment, military domination, humiliation, ethnic conflict, and dehumanization, they acquire force far exceeding ordinary evidentiary thresholds. Such allegations rapidly cease functioning as empirical propositions subject to verification. They become ethically saturated objects around which institutional authority itself becomes entangled.
The dynamics visible here did not emerge uniquely within the context of Israel–Palestine. Similar pressures became visible during the MeToo moment, when institutions increasingly confronted moral environments in which skepticism toward accusation itself risked appearing ethically compromised. In many settings, the obligation to demonstrate responsiveness to suffering began competing directly with procedural norms historically associated with evidentiary restraint. The issue is not that such accusations were false or that older procedures were neutral. It is that anticipatory moral recognition increasingly preceded adversarial verification, compressing the interval within which judgment could remain open.
Most revealing is that many institutions now most susceptible to these pressures were historically understood as gatekeepers tasked with slowing judgment through evidentiary restraint. News organizations no longer operate primarily as relatively insulated intermediaries standing between event and public interpretation. They now operate inside continuously circulating environments of escalation in which institutional credibility becomes dependent upon visible responsiveness. Editorial decisions no longer unfold under conditions where interpretation can mature gradually before normative consolidation crystallizes collectively. They unfold inside ecosystems where judgment is already circulating, intensifying, and imposing reputational pressure before verification processes have concluded.
Digital media intensified this transformation, but importantly, it did not create it. Nor can the transformation be reduced simply to partisan bias or the decline of journalistic professionalism, since many of the institutions most susceptible to these dynamics were historically understood precisely as guardians of evidentiary restraint and procedural authority. The decentralization of evidentiary visibility shattered the monopoly that older journalistic systems once possessed over the production of public reality. Images, testimony, activist framings, counterevidence, and interpretive communities now circulate simultaneously outside traditional editorial mediation. This fragmentation can expose realities older systems ignored or suppressed. Yet it also intensifies pressure upon public actors to synchronize rapidly with emerging consensus under conditions where verification, interpretation, emotional consolidation, and public judgment unfold simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Media systems participate in recursive legitimacy structures in which their own authority depends upon demonstrating synchronization with rapidly consolidating interpretive coherence. Classical journalism partially derived authority from temporal asymmetry with the crowd. Journalism now derives legitimacy from temporal synchronization with normative acceleration itself. This synchronization is not just behavioral. It has become structural necessity. Under conditions of permanent circulation, visible desynchronization from rapidly consolidating narratives threatens institutional credibility itself. Public actors therefore experience latency not only as slowness, but as vulnerability.
Moral Acceleration
One could observe this mechanism concretely throughout the post–October 7 media environment. Allegations, images, fragments of testimony, short video clips, activist framings, and emotionally saturated narratives circulated through digital networks at extraordinary speed. Normative consolidation often began before verification processes had meaningfully matured. Under such conditions, editorial caution no longer appeared simply professional. It now risked appearing ethically suspect. Institutions confronted not only the possibility of factual error, but the reputational danger of moral lateness.
These processes did not remain confined to questions of testimonial credibility alone. Allegations concerning starvation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide frequently achieved rapid normative consolidation long before the evidentiary and legal conditions necessary for responsible adjudication had matured. This does not mean that such claims are necessarily false, but rather that contemporary informational environments now accelerate maximal moral convergence under conditions where narrative closure arrives faster than epistemic consolidation. Once such categories harden collectively, they begin organizing the conditions under which subsequent evidence is interpreted in the first place. Contradictory information may still emerge, but it no longer enters an open interpretive environment. It arrives within discursive structures already synchronized around conclusions that had already sedimented socially, where its disruptive capacity becomes significantly diminished.
In such environments, truth no longer emerges primarily through the slow accumulation of corroboration alone. Narratives acquire the status of truth because they satisfy preexisting moral expectations, restore explanatory coherence, and synchronize successfully with emotional and organizational environments already prepared to recognize them as such. The issue is not simply deception or propaganda. It is that contemporary informational systems now blur the distinction between evidentiary consolidation and socially desired intelligibility.
Viewed through this lens, the asymmetrical distribution of latency and acceleration becomes profoundly revealing. Extensive evidence concerning sexual violence committed against Israelis on October 7 often encountered institutional hesitation, fragmentation, or delayed recognition despite survivor testimony, forensic evidence, independent investigations, and substantial documentation, including delayed acknowledgment by organizations such as UN Women and skepticism within elite media discourse. As many institutions struggled to translate such evidence into stable ethical recognition, allegations concerning Israeli abuses against Palestinians achieved rapid public plausibility under far more unstable evidentiary conditions.
The issue is not that allegations concerning Palestinian detainees required the same skepticism directed toward early reports of sexual violence on October 7. Nor is the argument that epistemic hesitation itself constitutes injustice. The asymmetry is diagnostically revealing precisely because latency and acceleration were distributed differently according to already established structures of moral recognizability. In one case, extensive evidentiary accumulation struggled for durable public recognition despite substantial documentation. In the other, moral certainty cohered rapidly before comparable epistemic maturation had occurred. The issue is therefore not inconsistency alone, but the differential organization of epistemic activation itself.
The differential distribution of latency and acceleration across these cases was not accidental. It tracked the moral architecture of contemporary progressive discourse, which now organizes legitimacy through symbolic frameworks centered on anti-colonialism, structural domination, racial asymmetry, carceral violence, and the exposure of hidden abuse. Palestinian suffering now enters Western institutional consciousness through already sedimented moral vocabularies that make such allegations rapidly plausible. This does not invalidate Palestinian testimony. It means the allegations entered a discursive environment already primed for anticipatory moral recognition.
By contrast, Israeli and Jewish victimhood now encounters symbolic instability precisely because Jews no longer occupy a secure position within inherited liberal moral grammars. Jews appear simultaneously vulnerable and sovereign, traumatized and militarized, historically persecuted yet visibly powerful. Within this symbolic structure, Jewish suffering becomes difficult to metabolize because it no longer maps cleanly onto contemporary moral legitimacy.
Historically, evidentiary restraint functioned as a condition of public seriousness. The ethical obligation to expose suffering intensified rather than weakened the obligation to verify claims. Today, under conditions of acceleration, restraint risks appearing as moral insufficiency. Institutions no longer experience delay primarily as responsibility, but as exposure. The result is not the disappearance of judgment but its temporal compression. Institutions now consolidate normative authority before the epistemic conditions necessary for responsible judgment have fully emerged.
What emerges within this transformation is more than institutional bias alone. It is a reconfiguration of the relationship between procedure, judgment, and legitimacy themselves. Weber anticipated aspects of this transformation in his account of rationalization and procedural legitimacy, through which modern institutions increasingly secure authority through formally recognizable procedures rather than through historically situated judgment. Yet procedural legitimacy cannot resolve the problem of judgment itself. Arendt understood judgment not as the mechanical application of moral rules, but as the difficult activity of remaining within spaces of competing perspectives, incomplete evidence, and unresolved ambiguity without surrendering either thought or responsibility. Judgment required temporality, distance, and resistance to collective consolidation. What disappears under conditions of acceleration is precisely this interval between event and closure. Institutions continue speaking in ethical vocabularies while losing the temporal conditions necessary for reflective judgment.
None of this means epistemic latency was historically neutral or universally just. Delay often protected entrenched power. Journalistic hesitation contributed historically to the marginalization of lynching testimony and the dismissal of early reports concerning totalitarian violence. Latency could function both as epistemic discipline and as institutional inertia. The point is not that older journalism represented a lost golden age of objectivity. The point is that liberal institutions historically depended upon temporal intervals within which judgment could remain accountable to evidentiary maturation even when those intervals were imperfectly distributed.
The collapse of latency therefore produces a genuine dialectical problem. Acceleration can expose hidden suffering more rapidly than older information systems permitted. Yet it can also dissolve the temporal conditions necessary for epistemic responsibility itself. The issue is not speed alone. The issue is what happens when public coherence begins outrunning institutional capacities for reflective judgment.
Antisemitism without Antisemites
The consequences are especially serious in relation to Jews because antisemitism historically functioned not only through hatred, exclusion, or dehumanization, but through explanatory condensation. Jews repeatedly became sites onto which broader civilizational anxieties, moral contradictions, political dislocations, and crises of legitimacy were projected and narratively fixed before they were politically understood.
This is what distinguishes antisemitism structurally from many other forms of prejudice. Antisemitism historically transforms Jews into overdetermined explanatory objects. They appear not as a minority among others, but as figures through which diffuse social contradictions can become narratively coherent under conditions of uncertainty and instability. Other groups may experience condensation episodically, but Jews have experienced it structurally across centuries and civilizations.
Antisemitism therefore possesses a distinctive relationship to acceleration. Jewish meaning often coheres publicly before political reality coheres epistemically. Jews become “fast narratives.” Complexity condenses around them with unusual speed. They become narratively available as explanatory resolution mechanisms during moments of institutional disorientation and civilizational anxiety.
This is why antisemitism historically adapts so effectively to environments in which explanatory coherence outruns institutional restraint. Accelerated media systems reward explanatory condensation. They reward narratives capable of rapidly transforming complexity into politically actionable certainty. Antisemitism historically proves unusually adaptive to precisely this operation.
Historically, this process transformed Jews into explanatory infrastructure for diffuse crises. Jews became associated simultaneously with capitalism and anti-capitalism, cosmopolitanism and tribalism, weakness and hyper-power, rootlessness and hidden coordination, revolutionary disorder and financial control. Antisemitism repeatedly abstracted Jews beyond ordinary sociological concreteness and transformed them into portable explanatory mechanisms through which societies narrated disorientation back to themselves.
The issue, however, is not simply the production of negative narratives concerning Jews. It is the preemptive fixation of Jewish meaning before Jewish agency, testimony, ambiguity, or self-description can meaningfully interrupt the explanatory coherence already forming around them.
Liberal institutions remain profoundly uncomfortable with explicit antisemitism and often highly vigilant against it in overt form. Yet antisemitism under contemporary liberal conditions operates not primarily through explicit hostility, but through instability in the institutional conditions under which Jewish vulnerability, agency, legitimacy, and violence become recognizable at all.
Antisemitism no longer necessarily requires antisemites. It can emerge infrastructurally through asymmetries in the thresholds governing plausibility, recognizability, and epistemic legitimacy. This does not mean every asymmetrical institutional outcome constitutes antisemitism. The claim is narrower and more structural. Institutional environments can reproduce historically recognizable asymmetries in the public legibility of Jewish experience without requiring explicit antisemitic intention among the actors operating within them.
The Collapse of Judgment
The danger under present conditions is therefore not simply prejudice in its familiar forms. It is the emergence of institutional environments unable to distinguish between explanatory coherence and epistemic consolidation itself. Once complexity begins collapsing directly into actionable certainty, institutions no longer risk factual error alone. They become susceptible to mythic forms of condensation that transform uncertainty into total explanation before judgment has had time to mature.
This is what makes the current moment so difficult to perceive from within. Institutions continue understanding themselves as ethically responsive even as the temporal conditions necessary for responsible judgment erode. Liberal journalism historically justified its authority not by eliminating uncertainty, but by preserving institutional spaces within which uncertainty could remain socially legitimate long enough for judgment to mature. Once institutions lose that capacity, they risk more than factual error. They risk losing the ability to perceive the distinction between reality and socially authorized meaning itself. And once epistemic latency collapses, institutions may lose the ability to recognize that they have lost it.
The author thanks Russell Berman for his thoughtful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay.
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