Between Currency Internationalization, Production, and Trade--Considering Yuan Oil Futures in a Production and Trade Context

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018)

In Strategic Disclosure in an Age of Transparency: Cuba as Model for Emerging State-Based Trade and Production Orders I suggested that it is possible to discern an emerging consensus trend in global trade and production.  With OBOR and America First,  two of the largest participants in unified global have begun steps toward its fracture.  Were once the assumption was for the construction of a unified trading and production space among all states, increasingly it appears that the trend, at least among some key stakeholders--is to develop  self contained production spheres and interconnected trade spheres.   

In place of a global market built on the foundations of the structures created after 1945 and refined only recently, there will emerge (again) regional trading blocks around the most powerful states, within which information and the power of markets will be protected, and beyond which information, and the barriers of equal treatment in market activity, will be fostered. This possibility, already well evident by 2006, has now become a possible successor ruling ideology around which global economic activity (and the politics that follow) will be structured (Economic Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis of the State: Four Perspective on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, pp. 154-158).

These trends suggest a restructuring of markets through hierarchically arranged state based trade relations and their conflation with state to state routed production chains. Where once there might have been a global approach to production with markets increasingly indifferent to states, the new trade relations that might well emerge--OBOR and America First--offer a distinctive view where production chains and power chains among states begin to conflate.  In that environment information becomes important,

But the move toward global production fracture enhanced through control of information (strategic transparency initiatives) is not the only element that suggests fracture and restructuring along the new silk roads that will shift global production into distinct channels even as global trade continues to build a global market space. 

This post considers how China's recent announcement of trading in Yuan Oil Futures (China Ends 25-Year Wait as Yuan Oil Futures to Start Trading) ought to be read in a different context, one in which the object is not merely internationalization and efforts to supplant the Dollar as a global trading currency but also as another step to insulate increasingly fractured production blocks among apex states and will in this sense contribute to this divergence between production and trade. 

Strategic Disclosure in an Age of Transparency: Cuba as Model for Emerging State-Based Trade and Production Orders

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017)

It appears to be something of a global trend now, or at least a movement with sufficient repetitions to merit some notice, that governments are becoming more selective in the scope and character of the information they make available and yet increasingly eager to produce transparency in non governmental enterprises and other institutions. In the United States the trend toward governmental selectivity about the information it makes available has been decreasing. Slowly during the Obama a Administration (e.g., here) and then more comprehensively (e.g. here, here, here; here) the U.S. government has not so much reduced openness as it has made its willingness to be open a strategic asset. At the same time, states have become increasingly eager to devolve disclosure requirements on enterprises with respect to a variety of activities (e.g., here, here).  And not just the U.S. (e.g., here; here, here, here, here). One begins to wonder the extent to which these actions are not mere serendipity but suggests something else.

The development of that trend in Cuba merits considerable attention.  This post considers the recent failure of Cuba to disclose data on economic performance in the larger context of the willingness of states to disclose information. Brief comments and Marc Frank's reporting from Cuba follows.

Flora Sapio: "Form and Function in International Human Rights Instruments. An Attempt to Work Constructively on John Knox's Vision on Human Rights and the Environment (Part 1)"

John H. Knox, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment (former Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment) and Henry C. Lauerman Professor of International Law has been advancing his mandate. (See HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE. HERE, HERE, Here, HERE and here, and here).

In an earlier post I set out the text of Professor Knox's 1 February Report of the "Framework Principles" (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment A/HRC/37/59 (Advance Edited Version 24 Jan. 2018)). 

 

In this post includes Flora Sapio's reflections on the Framework: Form and Function in International Human Rights Instruments. An Attempt to Work Constructively on John Knox's Vision on Human Rights and the Environment (Part 1), that follows below.  It may also be accessed HERE.

Irressistible Disruption and the Weaponization of Knowledge Production, Analysis, and Education--A View From National Battle Lines Between Germany and China

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017)

Global elites have been fascinated (more fear, loathing, desire and the expectation of exploitation) with disruption and disruptive technologies (see, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, and here), even as these elements seek stability and the preservation of the structures of order (and power) (e.g., here, here, here, and here).  They mean to capture disruption and bend it to whatever orthodoxy suits their fancy (and there are many fancies in the world today) (here, here, and here).  Indeed markets may well be emerging for satisfying the demand for stability in disruption (see, e.g., here).  

None of this is either profoundly new.  In the economic sphere, the discussion tends to be fairly transparent and directed toward the protection and promotion of power and position within the interplay of key economic actors in relevant markets (whether to not managed to some extent or other by political forces). Yet these basic relations may tend to be veiled in the usual rhetorics of the vanguards of powerful orthodoxies in the political, social and religious spheres. This is particularly in the context of advanced stage of conflicts, or where the alignments of power relationships among competing structures appear to be shifting. 

But a critical element of disruption is the way it helps to see the world in a different way--that is, in the way it may change the perception of reality and the ordering and significance of knowledge within and among communities. Changing the way one views the world is likely the most disruptive  ends to which the "technologies" of economics, law, politics, society and religion are deployed.   And deploying such technologies in the service of the preservation of world view (and its stability enhancing absorption of that which cannot be avoided) represents the the other side of disruption.  In either case, change comes, and with change a realignment of relationships even among those who manage to retain their place in the world.   

This post considers the way that disruptions in knowledge and the preservation of old knowledge now fuels  the contests for position among key actors in all sectors of human activity. Disruption is aligned with the weaponization of education (and through it knowledge) to advance objectives for which education is a means. It is clear that global society is already in the midst of great disruption--the technological aspects are merely the tip of icebergs under which the great disruption in the shape and use of knowledgeable are already proving their value in the high stakes games of states, of societies and of other communities.  The recent interactions between German civil society organizations and China suggest some of its current contours. 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Program: "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later"

The U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission  was created on October 30, 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C.§ 7002 (2001)) as later amended by a variety of legislation. Its purpose is to "monitor, investigate, and submit to congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action." (Fact Sheet).  It last annual report was produced in 2017: 2017 Annual Report, 2017 Executive Summary and Recommendations.pdf, Comprehensive List of the Commission's Recommendations.pdf.  Annual Reports may be accessed via links HERE. 

On January 25, 2018, the Commission hosted a program, "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later."  The Program provided an opportunity top hear elaborated the official position of senior government officials and policy drivers.  It also provided an opportunity to understand the way that these important people tend to understand the China's OBOR from an American perspective.   The Program was recorded and may be accessed HERE. The Program (with links to written participant statements follows below). These are worth a careful read whatever one thinks of the perspectives  for which they are used and the soundness of the conclusions derived or the advice given.

Disciplinary Inspection After the 19th CPC Congress--十九大后中央首轮巡视的“不变”与“变”

Disciplinary Inspection is an important element of "New Era" focus after the 19th CPC Congress. That was plain enough from both the 19th CPC Congress Report of Xi Jinping, as well as the amendments to the CPC Constitution.

This post includes reporting on the consequences of those actions on the operation of discipline inspection in China.   It includes the relevant provisions on Discipline and inspection of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (Arts. 46 and 47 (English version) and reporting on discipline inspection going forward, 十九大后中央首轮巡视的“不变”与“变” (Changes and Continuities in Inspection After the 19th Congress)(只有中文).

 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC): Chairs Raise Alarm About Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang; Nominate Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Umbrella Movement for the Nobel Peace Prize

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues (e.g., here).

CECC tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political and academic elites in the United States about issues touching on China and the official American line developed in connection with those issues. CECC becomes an even more important barometer of coherence and fracture in policy approaches as the discipline of activities between the political parties and the President and Legislature fractures in new and dynamic ways. As such it is an important source of information about the way official and academic sectors think about China. As one can imagine many of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chinese policies and institutions (see, e.g., (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here).

Two issues that CECC has been driving with some consistency has been connected with Chinese policies in Xinjiang (e.g., here) and also the political situation in Hong Kong (see, e.g., here). Two recent activities are worth mention.  The first is the CECC statement "Chairs Raise Alarm About Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang," and the second  is "Bipartisan Group of Lawmakers Nominates Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Umbrella Movement for the Nobel Peace Prize." Both appear below.

Both are interesting in different ways. The focus on the Xinjiang situation focuses the CECC on the methods of political discipline and control, especially where they might be tinged with an anti-religious element. The Nobel nomination, on the other hand, focuses on the internal political autonomy of Hong Kong.  To some extent these are meant to suggest the challenges of the China Dream especially in comparison to the American Dream. In both cases the statements are gestures to a large extent directed inward  for consumption by U.S. elites that have authority over U.S. policy toward China.  At the same time they also serve the interests of the United States in its global efforts to sell the U.S. brand in global markets by suggesting the reasons it might better accord with the tastes of those to which it is directed than its competitors.  Both the U.S. and China are making it clear that each will work diligently to project their respective "Dream" aggressively in global markets where such things are consumed or can be turned to advantage. To that end each will be tempted to extol their "Dream" by negative reference to the competitor "Dream."  The target markets are obvious.  The effectiveness of these initiatives await future assessment.But expect to see similar initiatives from the other side. That is the irony--the extent to which competition is bringing methodological convergence. 

Expert workshop to discuss the role and contribution of civil society organizations, academia, national human rights institutions and other relevant stakeholders in the prevention of human rights abuses

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018)

Since at least 1945 there have been significant efforts to produce global consensus on baseline norms through which states, individuals, and collectives could judge the legitimacy of state actors (and recently other transnational actors).  That judgment of legitimacy itself is made more powerful when it is used as a presumption for the application of the noninterference and recognition principles of inter-institutional relations (see, e.g., here, and here). 

The United Nations continues this work through its many mandate holders.  Among them, and recently most interesting has been the work of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence Mr. Pablo de Greiff (Colombia; since 1 May 2012; on Special Rapporteurs, see Fact Sheet N° 27: Seventeen Frequently Asked Questions about United Nations Special Rapporteurs).  That work included the quite interesting 2017 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/72/523 (12 Oct. 2017)), which suggested a framework for building disciplinary mechanisms into the structures of states that sought to conform to U.N. centered legitimacy baseline norms for their constitutional orders. 

Building in part on that work, the Office of the High Commissioner has recently announced the convening of an expert workshop on 21-22 February 2018, to discuss the role and contribution of civil society organizations, academia, national human rights institutions and other relevant stakeholders in the prevention of human rights abuses.  The draft Concept Note for the session follows along with an excerpt from the 2017 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/72/523), which might inform the proceedings with respect to the substantial interplay between the construction of law-based legitimacy and the control and management of the substance, and mechanisms for the development, of social and cultural norms 

¶ 92 "Finally, because prevention is not simply a matter of institutional engineering, the Special Rapporteur urges those in charge of designing prevention strategies to also include interventions in the cultural sphere and in the domain of personal dispositions that are supportive of the full realization of human rights. Education, arts and other cultural interventions, including memorialization and museums, and investments in archives and documentation will all contribute to nourishing cultures and individuals that can sustain prevention aims over time, including those periods during which institutions cannot be solely expected to guarantee the full realization of rights.").

In many societies, this presents complex issues not wholly free from intense contention.

The Human Rights Responsibilities of Lawyers In Representing Clients: Revisions to the Geneva Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct

This from Sandrine Giroud, Partner at LALIVE in Geneva:

I am proud to announce that the Geneva Bar Association includes as of today the role of lawyers in the protection of human rights in its Professional Code of Conduct in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. “Social Responsibility” is now part of the new Geneva Bar Association Professional Code of Conduct which comes into force on 1 February 2018.

Article 2(3) provides that lawyers are required to take into account Human Rights in all advisory activity, in accordance with the new standards: the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

The article reads as follows: “Each lawyer shall do her/his best to mitigate the risks of fundamental right and of Human Right violations by promoting their inclusion from the early stages of an advising activity or when assisting in the preparation of agreements or contracts”. [Il s’efforce d’atténuer les risques de violation des droits fondamentaux et des droits de l’Homme en favorisant leur prise en compte dès le stade du conseil ou de l’assistance dans l’élaboration d’accords ou de contrats.]

The Professional Code of Conduct is available here: https://lnkd.in/eUVT-NK. The Human Rights Commission is proud of this development which shows the dedication of the Geneva Bar Association to Human Rights and looks forward to working towards the implementation of this responsibility by workshops to come soon.

This post includes a little more information about the Geneva Bar Association (Française). Also useful is the International Bar Association "IBA Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers" (adopted IBA Council 28 May 2016). Also Below ABA Resolution 109 (adopted 6 Feb. 2012). 

February 2018 Newsletter from John Knox: Presenting the "Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment" (Including Text of the Framework)

John H. Knox, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment (former Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment) and Henry C. Lauerman Professor of International Law has been advancing his mandate. (See HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE. HERE, HERE, Here, HERE and here, and here). 

Professor Knox has now circulated his February 2018 Newsletter,  He reminds us that his work under the current mandate may be coming to an end.   At the March 2018 meeting of the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur will present the "Report on Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment" along with reports on the human right to a healthy environment, children's rights and the environment, and reports on country visits.  

This post includes Professor Knox's 1 February Report and the text of the "Framework Principles" (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment A/HRC/37/59 (Advance Edited Version 24 Jan. 2018)). With the sixteen (16) Framework Principles around which the the normative structures of environmental human rights are constructed Professor Knox has developed a coherent aspirational vision.  It reinforces the good order and authority hierarchy of what appears to be the current stage of the state based system of international law and norms. It affirms and seeks to further the logic of what had for a moment had been the powerful vision operationalized over a generation or more through the instruments of the post 1945 world order, and with it the great hope that states--all of them eventually (and their peoples), could live up to their responsibilities in noble and sensitive way.  Those responsibilities are meant to accord not merely with the (often transitory) wills of their respective peoples (as expressed through their governments and otherwise), but also with the consensus of the community of nations, whoever expressed (through law or norm or declaration or other expression of collective will).  

To that end another global instrument is recommended.  And that is indeed precisely what the logic of the post 1945 world order ought to produce.  One wonders, however, about the extent to which the community of states, alone, can now carry the full burden of a duty to manage the transboundary effects of economic or social activity, of national policy or traditional customs and practices, with respect to which other forces may well have a substantial degree of control.  The Framework Principles are directed to States--as will the  international instrument whose negotiation will no doubt be undertaken shortly.  That is an excellent start, but also a pity. It is a pity to the extent that the old habits of the post 1945 global order may no longer, in practice, adhere to its ancient forms. What, after all, is the state today? To answer that question is to begin to work constructively on the vision that Professor Knox so ably develops here into an operational system suitable for the times.