Discussion Draft Posted for Comment: "Linking People to Governing Institutions Through Leninist Political Parties: 全过程民主 (Whole Process Democracy), Socialist Consultative Democracy, and 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System)"

 

 

Pix Credit Beijing Review

I take this opportunity to post for comment a discussion draft recently completed. The essay, Linking People to Governing Institutions Through Leninist Political Parties: 全过程民主 (Whole Process Democracy), Socialist Consultative Democracy, and 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System)," considers the development of a socialist theory of political parties within the an already quite important development of a Chinese Leninist theory of 'whole process democracy.' The embedding of the role of political parties within Leninist democratic theory sits at the nexus point of vanguard party theory, of the nature and role of representation within Leninist systems, of the relationship between endogenous (consultative) and exogenous (elections facilitated) forms of democratic expression, and most pointedly, of the differences between Leninist and liberal democratic forms of popular governance. The abstract provides some detail of the focus of the examination:

Pix Credit here

The role of political parties in the Chinese democratic socialist political order has always been deeply misunderstood, even within Chinese academic and popular circles. The misunderstanding at a macro level is likely a product of great ideological battles of the last century between liberal democratic and Marxist Leninist approaches to the organization of states, the positioning of political authority and its exercise through political parties--mass collectives developed for that purpose. These organizational differences reflect an even deeper conceptual gap between the way that these ideologies construct and apply the notion of party within their democratic imaginaries. Though both systems use the same word to describe collective political organization—the ideological basis of the meaning of that term could not produce a greater distance in the way in which meaning is embedded in those terms. This study takes a deeper dive into the current elaboration of the political theory of Chinese socialist constitutional democracy, the role of political parties within it, and the connection between the people and both. To those ends, the study focuses on three key documents produced by the Chinese State Council: (1) 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System; 25 June 2021); (2) : 中国的民主 (China: Democracy That Works; 4 December 2021); and (3) [美国民主情况] (The State of Democracy in the United States; 5 December 2021). Through the lens of these contemporary elaborations of Chinese Marxist-Leninist theory, the study considers the hypothesis: ‘the emerging theory of Leninist political parties contributes to the development of a coherent theory of endogenous socialist constitutional democracy.’ It’s subsidiary hypothesis is that at least conceptually, the transformation of the ‘mass line’ principle into ‘whole process democracy’ provides a basis within Leninist political theory to link the people to their state institutions through the structuring of a system of well managed mass political organizations under the leadership of the vanguard.

Pix credit here

In the process of this examination, I hope to engage the following questions: (1) What are differences between exogenous and endogenous democratic constitutional orders? ; (2) What is the theoretical roles of parties within each linking people to governing institutions? ; (3) How does a Leninist conception of party fix into this framework; what are the differences and relation between a vanguard party and other political mass organizations?; (4) How does Leninist party system fit within conception of consultative democracy?; (5) The role of elections in endogenous democratic systems and the utility of the ‘mass line’ principle in connecting people to political organs; (6) Potential and challenges for Leninist party frameworks and constitutional consultative democracy frameworks in the operation of endogenous democratic systems; (7) implications and value for other (Asian) political systems especially in developing states.

The object of the essay is not to engage in political work. There is no aim to convince anyone of the superiority or value or legitimacy of one or another system. I do, however, examine  the coherence of the conceptual basis of the system (especially here relating to the role of political parties) as a function of the core animating principles around which the overall political-economic model is structured. To that end it is worth carefully considering the extent to which Chinese theory now suggests a coherent and well integrated conceptual basis, within the "life world" (rationalizing complex of foundational principles) of Leninism, of the role of political parties and of the system within which they operate. In the process it is also worth considering the potential extent to which that theory may prove both influential (abroad) and legitimating (within China). The focus is entirely theoretical--that is the study focuses on the development of the theoretical basis for political parties and whole process democracy. The great spaces between the ideal and its realization (like that gap within liberal democratic systems) is left for another time.

The Abstract and Introduction follow. The paper may be accessed and downloaded through SSRN HERE.

Upcoming Conference: "War Economies, Human Rights, and Responsibler Business Practices: Recent Challenges From Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond"

 

 

 Join us on 21 June 2022 at 4 pm CET for a debate on "War economies, human rights, and responsible business practices: Recent challenges from Ukraine, Russia, and beyond" with Olena Uvarova Beata Faracik Dr. Jelena Aparac Larry Catá Backer and Mark Taylor. Please register for Zoom webinar here: https://lnkd.in/gN4dZc2v

"Enhancing the accessibility, dissemination and implementation of the Accountability and Remedy Project" Report on the Status of the ARP IV Project

1. In 2013, as part of its mandate to advance the promotion and protection of human
rights globally, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) initiated a process to strengthen the implementation of the access to remedy pillar
of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
2. In its resolution 26/22, the Human Rights Council requested the High Commissioner
for Human Rights to continue work on improving access to remedy and to report back to the
Council. In November 2014, and pursuant to that mandate, OHCHR formally launched the
Accountability and Remedy Project with the goal of delivering credible and workable
recommendations for enhancing accountability and access to remedy in cases of business-
related human rights abuse.
3. In the first six years of the project, and in response to a series of mandates from the
Human Rights Council, three substantive phases were completed, with each phase resulting
in recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of one of the three categories of
grievance mechanisms referred to in the Guiding Principles: State-based judicial
mechanisms,  State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms 5 and non-State-based
grievance mechanisms6
4. Following those phases of work, the Council adopted resolution 44/15, in which it
requested the High Commissioner to continue the work in the area of accountability and
remedy. In response to that mandate, OHCHR started a fourth phase of the project devoted
to enhancing the accessibility, dissemination and implementation of the project’s findings to
date. The present report covers the main activities undertaken during that phase of the project,
some examples of good practices of uptake of findings and recommendations from the project
and ideas for what the project should focus on going forward. An addendum to the present
report provides details from two multi-stakeholder consultations convened during the fourth
phase of the project in response to resolution 44/15.

The Report may be accessed HERE.  The Addendum HERE. 

Broken Parallels--President Biden Marks the 78th Anniversary of the Allied Landing in Normandy

 

This year marks the 78th anniversary of the time in which the predecessors of the current cores of leadership of liberal democratic Anglo-America-Europe, at great cost, began the last successful campaign to liberate Europe from the control of the invading forces of the Nazi Reich and its allies and collaborators.  One might have imagined that in the shadow of another European war precipitated by the invasion of a small country by a large state with imperial ambitions (Of an old fashioned sort) the commemoration might have been a good time to highlight the symbolic value of the landing and the principles for which so many gave their lives--then. . . .and now.

For Mr. Biden, however, the commemoration of that event merited a tweet. A very nice tweet to be sure.  And one produced by adept staff--adept at least in the making of cool looking messaging on contemporary modes of social media. And it was a tweet made at the close of the day in Washington, long after most Europeans had gone to bed.

Putting that aside; what then was commemorated? What was chosen to be highlighted? How was the message of this event carried forward to the current day?

1. The Past: The words used speak for themselves:

"Today, we mark 78 years since D-Day and honor those who answered duty's call on the beaches of Normandy," Biden tweeted. "We must never forget the service and sacrifice in defense of freedom, and we must strive every day to live up to the ideals they fought to defend."

This speaks to the past, to memory, and to the distillation of the event into a sacrifice that gave form to ideal to which striving continues to be necessary.  One might as well speak of Agincourt. 

2. The Present: In a way that parallels the limits of the ways in which American officials now "strive every day to live up to the ideals they fought to defend"; the President sent Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Normandy, for the purpose of connecting past to present--but now as an involved spectator rather than as the leading force. 

“The fight in Ukraine is about honoring these veterans of World War II,” Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the American Cemetery of Colleville-sur-Mer, overlooking Omaha Beach in Normandy.  He added: “It’s about maintaining the so-called global rules-based international order that was established by the dead who are buried here at this cemetery.” (AP Exclusive: Ukraine recovers bodies from steel-plant siege).

So, it seems, that the Ukrainians are now honoring the ideals. "Striving" has again become a term rich in differentiated meaning, the nature of the responsibilities, duties, and obligations  of which vary. 

3. Ukraine as a footnote of a glorious historical past (‘Darkness returned’). The disconnect between the pieties that can be uttered about events now relegated to the safety of a Search of Lost Time (À la recherche du temps perdu), a history in which most who lived it are dead (see Ruminations 78: Reflections on the 74th Anniversary of D-Day; Memory, Remembrance and Recollection) is nicely framed by the reflections posted on the websites of some US Embassies (D-Day anniversary prompts reflection).

‘Darkness returned’:

Invoking “the Great Patriotic War” (another term for World War II in Russia), Putin seeks to justify his aggression against Ukraine by “repeating his false claim that Ukraine is run by Nazis controlled by the West,” according to a May 9 NBC News report.

(© Ukrainian Presidential Press Office/AP Images)

But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the grandson of a Holocaust survivor, draws a straight line from the Nazis’ quest for dominion over Europe to Putin’s aggression against Ukraine.

“Decades after World War II, darkness returned to Ukraine,” Zelensky said in a May 8 address. “Evil has returned. Again! In a different uniform, under different slogans, but for the same purpose.”

Pix Credit here

 This anniversary of the landing at Normandy, then, suggests some of the great tensions that have now emerged in the constitution and operation of the liberal democracy, the scope of its responsibilities, and the extent to which it is willing to protect itself and its values. In a sense, Mr. Biden was right to downplay the centrality of its its meaning--and the reminder of the responsibilities it represented for the vanguard forces of the liberal democratic world.  Periods of transition are painful; and one of its primary elements is the distancing of foundations (as disconnected historical events) with a diminishing connection to the present. Normandy reminds the liberal democracies that risk and sacrifice are elements of that responsibility for their self-preservation and those seeking to embrace its values, customs, and practices.  The inability to effectively embed the rhetoric of Ukraine with the bolder discursive meanings of the Normandy landing suggests the great discursive cracks in the way way the liberal democratic west now confronts old fashioned threats on its flanks. To have said more would have forced Mr. Biden either to explain the way in which the Americans are making good on the sacrifice of Normandy in the contemporary world (always a challenge even in good times but especially now) or to acknowledge that the nature of what constitutes striving has now changed complexion. This is not to suggest that direct warfare is inevitable for the US and NATO in Ukraine--certainly that sort of thinking might have produced a very different responses to earlier Russian invasions in Europe (Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968).  But in those cases, the liberal democratic West had conceded imperium to the Soviets over those territories (decisions that will occupy future students of that era).  That is not the case now--in Georgia, in Moldova, or in Ukraine. And in any case, one can't fight 21srt century wars with the limited palette of 20th century techniques. The best way of engaging 19th century adventurism in the current era may be asymmetrical and de-centered; certainly the Americans, their allies, and the non-state community provide hints of that possibility. And what the masses don't know about asymmetrical tactics may be more important than what is on display.  Silence--and the ability to silence--has become a potent weapon in its own right. One can, therefore, on this day and grateful for the tweeting of the US President, look forward to the greater expression of the "striving" to which Normandy calls the nation (and certainly its officials) in the current historical era that one hopes points to development and not decrepitude.  At the same time one might lament the missed opportunity to use the occasion to build a new discursive allegiance to the old values in contemporary forms, that is to bring forward the expressions of gratitude for a now disintegrating past. 

 

Lecture on Cuba's Energy Sector

 

« une puissance médiatrice » The Semiotics of Humiliating Russia

 

 

Wars need their distractions.  Recently French President Macron provided a nice, if brief, respite from the drudgery of a war now in a phase of consuming substantial numbers of humans  on an alter to ther vanity of a national leader. Reuters (among others) reported:

"We must not humiliate Russia so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means," Macron said in an interview with regional newspapers published on Saturday. "I am convinced that it is France's role to be a mediating power." . . .  Macron has spoken with Putin regularly since the invasion as part of efforts to achieve a ceasefire and begin a credible negotiation between Kyiv and Moscow, although he has had no tangible success to show for it. "I think, and I told him (Putin), that he is making a historic and fundamental mistake for his people, for himself and for history," Macron said. (Ukraine says Macron remarks on Russia 'can only humiliate France')

Or, in the original:

« Je suis convaincu que c’est le rôle de la France d’être une puissance médiatrice », a déclaré M. Macron. « Nous ne devons pas humilier la Russie pour que le jour où les combats cessent, nous puissions construire une rampe de sortie par des moyens diplomatiques », a-t-il ajouté." (Emmanuel Macron fustigé pour ses propos « humiliants » sur la Russie).

The reaction was predictable and not entirely undeserved. Like Henry Kissinger at Davos, Macros is letting his desire to approach this conflict through the lens of 19th century sensibilities cloud his usually better judgment. From a 19th century perspective, there is certainly some sense in seeking to feed a great territorial power: through partitioning 2nd order states and producing formally constituted neutral zones.  Likewise the rules of inter-national politesse require that traditional ethno-territorial empires be treated respectfully, even when their actions are vile by contemporary standards. Humiliating empires always appeared to go bad, right through  the humiliation of the 2nd Reich in 1918.  That, at any rate was a theory.  Little states, on the other hand, ought to have been trained to understand national humiliation as a way of life.  Ukraine, in that context ought to have the good sense to understand that its existence was a function of their tolerance for humiliation; Russia, on the other hand could expect to avoid humiliation for its adventures in Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Chechnya, and Crimea. After all, naughty empires will be naughty--wink wink.  A little hand wringing in local news organs, some desultory protests by diplomats, and strategically targeted sanctions.   And so the Ukrainian adventure.

Pix Credit here

But it is not the 19th century; and the Ukrainians are not anyone but themselves. They are much less likely to humiliate themselves to make the current leadership structure of the Russian Federation feel better about the shape of the Russian adventure in Ukrainian territory. And despite the sensibilities of the past--this war is not a war game; it is not played out on tan environmental simulator (holodeck) of some future space craft.  Mr. Macron, then, deployed 19th century discursive tools powerfully.  But those who might have been affected in an acceptable way are long dead. Today, Mr. Macron might have considered instead worrying about the consequences of the humiliation of Ukraine for the future of Franco-Ukrainian relations within the EU (eventually) or in NATO (maybe), or even the road to peace negotiations with Russia.

France, bereft of its empire (though not informally to some extent)  has had the sense to abandon 19th century territorial aspirations for a conceptually more powerful empire--the empire of mediation. That is also the likely path to power for a Europe that will need substantially longer to flush the detritus of forms of empire that became obsolete after 1945.  But such abstract empires require a better sense of the discursive realities of the 21st century: and that is something that Mr. Macron might yet have to master. And thus the semiotics of humiliating Russia: its basis is a set of discursive premises that died with the old order in 1945; its sensibilities suggest national expectations as a function of the rank of a state in the world order. And yet the semiotics of mediation requires a quite different sensibility in 2022.  That ios something the liberal democratic West has learned the hard way--from the error of writing off Ukraine in February 2022, to the reluctance to deny Ukraine its European identity, to the disastrous consequence of seeking to avoid humiliation of Russia by tolerating the humiliation of the international order and lower ranked states. For a state seeking to rise to the status of mediator world power, these are close to fatal errors. A correction is likely in order.

 

Colin Hawes: Transforming the Culture of Chinese Prosecutors through Guiding Cases (European Chinese Law Research Hub)

 

 

The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub (with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have posted a discussion of a new work by Dr. Colin Hawes (associate professor, Law Faculty, University of Technology Sydney, Australia): Transforming the Culture of Chinese Prosecutors through Guiding Cases.

Marianne von Bloomberg explains:

Much attention has been paid to the Guiding Cases issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China’s top prosecutor, likewise issues guiding cases. In his recent paper, Colin Hawes finds that these cases in recent years indicate a significant turn in prosecution work in China, which is characterized by close cooperation between police, local governments and courts (see Grace Mou’s work).

One of the most interesting aspects of the paper touches on the strategic utility of guidance as a characteristics of the administrative state.  In China, that guidance is now emerging in the form of guiding cases; but also emerges as ratings, assessments, reputation scoring and the like.  The idea is to develop a comprehensive system of guidance--with substantial consequential frameworks of rewards and punishments to minimize the possibility of deviance.  Guiding cases now emerge from the great formal legal and prosecutorial institutions--the Supreme People's Court, the Procuraturate, as well as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission. The connection on the ground then, is as Dr. Hawes suggests.  Nonetheless that implememntaiton connection points to a higher order coordination of instructions for the exercise of discretion that has been the central cunundrum of both Marxist Leninist and liberal democratic administrative orders.

I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE. And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.

UN Global Compact "China Strategy": Exceptionalism and Its Avoidance in Developing Engagement with Sustainable Development Goals

 

 

Engagement with China has come slowly.  From an almost uniform attitude that started from the presumption that China and Chinese approaches had to be corrected so that they might conform with those of the drivers of international institutional forces, it now appears that a more ambiguous engagement strategy is in the offing. Thus, the UN Global Compact has recently announced a China Strategy (May 2022).  The Global Compact thus suggests:

The UN Global Compact China Strategy aims to accelerate and scale the global collective impact of Chinese businesses by upholding the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact in delivering the Sustainable Development Goals. (Global Compact China Strategy).

 To that end the Global Compact has reshaped the matrix of  Chines engagement with the sustainability development goals:

China Strategy p. 5

This is worthwhile, of course.  But also sets a template that may be equally useful in bringing other states into the Sustainability Development Goals conversation outside of Europe.  I might encourage, for example, all developing states to develop their own Sustainable Development goals matrix and circulate them. Using a process of layering analytics, it might then be possible to better understand the forms and approaches to embracing the Sustainable Development goals on a country by country basis.

But of course, apex states are different.  And that is the great pity of the thing. So one is told:

Recognizing China’s long history, rich culture and social values, UN Global Compact China Strategy strives to factor in China’s uniqueness and local priorities while ensuring its alignment with our Ten Principles and global ambition. The process to develop the China strategy has involved interviews with more than 50 stakeholder groups both from China and globally. Building upon these rich inputs and existing operations of the UN Global Compact in China, the strategy re- designs the key focus areas and value propositions  for UN Global Compact to engage stakeholders more effectively to achieve our strategic aspirations. In order to enable meaningful impact by delivering values in selected key areas, the strategy includes five key enablers: membership strategy, stakeholder engagement, fundraising strategy, marketing and communications strategy, and organizational development. ( China Strategy p. 3; see also CGTN Reporting: "Siddharth Chatterjee, United Nations Resident Coordinator in China called for action and empathy, saying countries and organizations must consider China "unique context" when developing new strategies and partnerships towards the achievement of the SDGs in China. He also noted the necessity for more South-South cooperation and North-South knowledge sharing.").

And indeed, the China Strategy might be more usefully generalized and applied to all states, with the Global Compact and the UN instrumentalities in NY and Geneva serving as patient oversight and assessment bodies, with capacity building and coordinating capabilities.  But that is a story for another day. 

The text of the China Strategy follows below.  It may also be accessed in Chinese HERE. 

 

Marxist Dialectics and the Synthesis of a Sustainable Development Model 'For' and 'From' China

 

Venus and Mars, c 1485. National Gallery, London

 

At the 5th Plenary Sess. of the CPC, I emphasized that my country's construction of socialist modernization has many important characteristics, one of which is that my country's modernization is a modernization in which man and nature coexist in harmony, and it focuses on the simultaneous promotion of the construction of material civilization and ecological civilization. (Xi Jinping, Efforts to build a modernization of harmonious coexistence between man and nature, Qiushi 31 May 2022 (我在党的十九届五中全会上强调，我国建设社会主义现代化具有许多重要特征，其中之一就是我国现代化是人与自然和谐共生的现代化，))

 Chinese Marxist dialectics has sought to produce a union of development and of sustainability as the synthesis of the oppositions of (1) development and modernization (the thesis of the Reform and Opening Up Era) on the one hand, and (2) environmental sensitivity and sustainability (the antithesis at the core of the current principal contradiction of the New Era). In a recently published version of remarks made in 30 April 2022, Xi Jinping is quoted as remarking in this vein that "Practice has shown that ecological environmental protection and economic development are dialectically unified and mutually reinforcing."(Xi Jinping, Efforts to build a modernization of harmonious coexistence, supra (实践表明，生态环境保护和经济发展是辩证统一、相辅相成的，建设生态文明) speech delivered by Gen. Sec.  Xi at the 29th collective study of the Politburo of the 19th Central Committee 30 April 2021 (这是习近平总书记2021年4月30日在十九届中央政治局第二十九次集体学习时的讲话)).

In the remarks, Mr. Xi weaves together strands from many of his prior remarks about elements of what will emerge as a comprehensive conceptualization of Socialist sustainable development both as an answer to Western criticism that Chinese Marxist-Leninism is devoid of solutions to the contradiction between traditional development frameworks and emerging sustainability principles ("Pressure is being exerted on my country in many ways, and the game of major powers around ecological and environmental issues is very fierce." Xi Jinping, Efforts to build a modernization of harmonious coexistence, supra (多方面对我国施压，围绕生态环境问题的大国博弈十分激烈。).  But the effort is not entirelñy driven by reaction to criticism; there are strong elements of proactive  construction consonant with and advancing MChinese Marxist Leninist theory in its New Era configuration. 

To that end, Mr. Xi proposes now a five prong approach that is to serve as the framework for the conceptualization of the synthesis and the guide to the construction and implementation of specific policies at the national, provincial, local. . . and international levels). Whether it works or not remains to be seen--either as a conceptual model or in practice; yet this is the very challenge facing the equally vigorous efforts being undertaken within liberal democratic collectives which also remain to be fully elaborated and tested (see,Brief Thoughts on "Sustainable Global Supply Chains: G7 Leadership on UNGP Implementation Report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 2022 German Presidency of the G7").

The five point approach was nicely described in the speech itself (Xi Jinping, Efforts to build a modernization of harmonious coexistence, supra):

Pix credit Veronese 1570s Mars and Venus United by Love

第一，坚持不懈推动绿色低碳发展。我多次强调，生态环境问题归根到底是发展方式和生活方式问题。建立健全绿色低碳循环发展经济体系、促进经济社会发展全面绿色转型是解决我国生态环境问题的基础之策。("First, unremittingly promote green and low-carbon development. I have emphasized many times that ecological and environmental issues are, in the final analysis, issues of development methods and lifestyles. Establishing and improving a green, low-carbon and circular development economic system and promoting a comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development are the basic strategies to solve my country's ecological and environmental problems.").

第二，深入打好污染防治攻坚战。现在，人民群众对生态环境质量的期望值更高，对生态环境问题的容忍度更低。要集中攻克老百姓身边的突出生态环境问题，让老百姓实实在在感受到生态环境质量改善。("Second, we must do a good job in the tough battle of pollution prevention and control. Now, the people have higher expectations for the quality of the ecological environment and lower tolerance for ecological and environmental problems. It is necessary to focus on overcoming the prominent ecological and environmental problems around the common people, so that the common people can truly feel the improvement of the quality of the ecological environment.")

第三，提升生态系统质量和稳定性。这既是增加优质生态产品供给的必然要求，也是减缓和适应气候变化带来不利影响的重要手段。“草木植成，国之富也。("Third, improve the quality and stability of the ecosystem. This is not only an inevitable requirement to increase the supply of high-quality ecological products, but also an important means to mitigate and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. "When plants and trees are planted, the country is rich.").

第四，积极推动全球可持续发展。保护生态环境、应对气候变化，是全人类面临的共同挑战。("Fourth, actively promote global sustainable development. Protecting the ecological environment and responding to climate change are common challenges faced by all mankind.")

第五，提高生态环境领域国家治理体系和治理能力现代化水平。要健全党委领导、政府主导、企业主体、社会组织和公众共同参与的现代环境治理体系，构建一体谋划、一体部署、一体推进、一体考核的制度机制。("Fifth, improve the modernization level of the national governance system and governance capacity in the field of ecological environment. It is necessary to improve the modern environmental governance system led by the party committee, led by the government, and participated by the main body of enterprises, social organizations and the public, and build an institutional mechanism for integrated planning, integrated deployment, integrated promotion, and integrated assessment.").

Pix Credit HERE

There is a certain level of convergence, at least with respect to objectives, with the development of international approaches to development and sustainability outside of China.  But the great differences are also evident.  First is the distinction of the role of the state in the construction, oversight, and management of the synergies of development and sustainability (including climate sensitive actions). The efforts here are driven by the state; and while there may be a 'smart mix' of measures utilized, markets driven tools do not appear to be among them to any significant extent. Second, it is clear that this alternative model is meant for export. Export here has two dimensions: (1) an operational dimension diffused through China's Belt & Road partners to develop 'facts' (evidence of the success of the model); and (2) a conceptual dimension to be put forward likely in traditional international public fora (and IFIs including AIIB) to seek an international consensus on a 'truth' evidenced by the success of 'facts on the ground (a 'seek truth  from facts' approach 实事求是). Third, a comprehensive and centralized coordination that will necessarily be built on big data, analytics, and modeling (both descriptive and predictive). At the same time there ius an element of combativeness that while promoting Chinese Socialist approaches tends to distract from the Chinese task of building Socialist sustainable development in domestic and exportable forms (e.g., "We must adhere to the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, fairness and respective capabilities, firmly uphold multilateralism, effectively respond to the attempts of some Western countries to "regulate" my country, and resolutely safeguard my country's development interests."(Xi Jinping, Efforts to build a modernization of harmonious coexistence, supra (要坚持共同但有区别的责任原则、公平原则和各自能力原则，坚定维护多边主义，有效应对一些西方国家对我国进行“规锁”的企图，坚决维护我国发展利益。))

There are substantially more clues about the approach, again at a very great level of generality as these things are usually undertaken from the center in China.  But still, enough to chew on in comparative study. More importantly, it suggests the basis around which conversation about the forms, practice and expression of human rights and development--whether or not centered on the human (here)  will likely take place in international arenas where China will seek to promote its concepts and practices (and pitch them most strongly at developing states) (see here).  

These clues will be essential for the process, as the UN has now "unveiled a new China strategy to help businesses in China to work towards Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). . . [which] identifies seven areas where UN Global Compact wants to further engage with Chinese governments at all levels, businesses and other stakeholders to maximize impact. " (UN launches new strategy to boost engagement with China).

The original Chinese text follows along with a crude English translation.

Brief Thoughts on "Sustainable Global Supply Chains: G7 Leadership on UNGP Implementation Report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 2022 German Presidency of the G7"

Everyone who is anyone, it seems, have their knives sharpened, and their forks at the ready to gorge on the anticipated meal that the Germans will bring as they ascend to the Presidency of the G7. One course of that meal will feature a tartar of due diligence in an aspic of human rights and sustainability, served on a bed of select enterprises with a soupçon of governmentalization  and a garnish of Administrative cultures. I am hungry too.  But this is not a table at which I will be dining. Still, scraps are always welcome when one sits not merely below the salt but also out of sight and out of mind. 

Pix Credit HERE

A delectable scrap has been provided us by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who gratefully acknowledged the financial support of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ). That morsel,

Pix Credit HERE

Sustainable Global Supply Chains: G7 Leadership on UNGP Implementation Report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 2022 German Presidency of the G7 (2022) provides a quite tasty sample of the substance  and shaping of the regulatory projects that those who drive those things.  Its production is intimately connected to other events orchestrated by German administrative officials  in furtherance of their regulatory goals during their time as the core of leadership of the G7 ("Sustainability, like pollen, is very much in the air north of the Equator. It is sticky and meant to fertilize just the right receptacle to produce from this connection those fruits or encapsulations that can be consumed by others the seeds of which, then excreted, or unconsumed and rotting can fall  to earth, in either case giving rise to new life." HERE). No blame here--this is a project that has been cooking for quite a while and plays well within elite Central Western European politics among those working at this level.   

Sustainable Global Supply Chains is especially important for what it tells us about the governmentalization of markets, and the transformation of economic actors into a privatized administrative apparatus of public policy grounded in the sensibilities of compliance and accountability directed toward a values based productivity, the articulation and assessment of which will become a matter of policy set by superior vanguards in liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist states rather than by the (uninformed but to be reformed) masses expressed in the form of consumption and production based decisions. Not that this is necessarily bad or good--but either way it appears to be coming and in the process will transform the concept and operation of markets. In this case that is undertaken in the service of important substantive objectives--human rights and sustainability. Yet its principal expression--as due diligence based systematization of human activity undertaken in collective form--can be as easily applied to any aspect of human activity. Most interesting of all is the way that these efforts are built on a foundation of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, which in the process are transformed a driver to a means of legitimating policy., a useful vessel into which to pour objectives for the consumption of others.

The Executive Summary of Sustainable Global Supply Chains appears below, with a few brief thoughts in the form of annotations.