外交部副部长谢锋：推动构建人类命运共同体是应对世界之变、时代之变、历史之变的中国方案 [Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng: Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind is China's solution to changes in the world, times, and history]

 

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 Chinese Communist Internationalism is, according to those who believe this, built on the smoldering ashes of the failures of the post 1945 World ordering--as envisioned and constructed under the leadership of the United States and its allies--the realities of the failures of which have only definitively emerged  in the last decade or so of the 21st century. Into this void, and articulated for the world in a more developed form by General Secretary Xi published in Qiushi (Seeking Truth),  and recirculated through Xinhua (1 January 2021), is a Communist (Socialist) alternative grounded in what is described as a different set of ordering principles built on the experiences of the post-colonial and developing world the leading forces of which are represented by China. That alternative is commonly amalgamated as the core internationalist principle of "Jointly building a community with a shared future for mankind." 习近平：共同构建人类命运共同体 2021-01-01 [Xi Jinping: Jointly build a community with a shared future for mankind].

What happened to the world, what should we do? This is the question that the whole world is thinking about, and it is the question that I have been thinking about. In my opinion, to answer this question, we must first clarify the most basic question, that is, where did we come from, where are we now, and where are we going? . . . The common aspiration of all mankind for more than 100 years is peace and development. However, this task is far from complete. We must obey the voice of the people, take over the baton of history, and continue to forge ahead on the marathon track of peace and development. . . China's plan is to build a community with a shared future for mankind and achieve win-win and shared benefits. . .The key to building a community with a shared future for mankind lies in action. I believe that the international community should make efforts in terms of partnership, security structure, economic development, civilization exchanges, and ecological construction. (习近平：共同构建人类命运共同体 ).

This was elaborated in a serious way for global consumption since the start of the Trump Administration (see, e.g.,  Wang Yi, "Work Together to Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind" (31 May 2016)

The latest elaboration of this Socialist construction of the basic premises for shaping the global order through a revived Communist International(ism) was recently circulated by Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng [外交部副部长谢锋]--"Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind is China's solution to changes in the world, times, and history (16 January 2023) [推动构建人类命运共同体是应对世界之变、时代之变、历史之变的中国方案]. The original text in Chinese and my crude translation follows below.  I add only these brief comments:

1. It may be useful to foreground that the Chinese approach is grounded in a premise that politics is a means of expressing economic inevitability, and that internationalism as politics and economics is closely tied to the central objective of interaction at the national and international levels--the imperative of development.  "The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China made it clear that promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind is one of the essential requirements of Chinese-style modernization." [二十大报告明确将推动构建人类命运共同体作为中国式现代化的本质要求之一。(推动构建人类命运共同体是应对世界之变)] It is also important to understand the trajectories of that modernization--a trajectory first clarified during the Reform and Opening Up Era and now better aligned with the political front in the New Era. That overarching objective is tied to the fundamental mission of the Leninist leading forces vanguard--to establish a communist society. The path to that establishment is development at a sufficiently high enough level to make issues of economic necessity irrelevant to the organization of social relations. Modernization, of course, may be bent to other objectives.  That is the point of "Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind." And yet, by framing post-liberal democratic internationalism around a Chinese Leninist understanding of modernization, it pulls all variants within the orbit of its core historical and policy objectives. That said, the point is not that this redirecting is either good or bad; the point is that it is there and rarely engaged in its own right. 

2. The general outline of the principal elements of "Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind" remain substantially unchanged.

First, we must adhere to common development and inject impetus into solving the global development deficit. . . Second, we must promote common security and contribute to the realization of lasting peace for mankind. . . Third, we must promote common opening up and create opportunities for deepening cooperation and win-win results. . . Fourth, we must promote common values and build bridges for exchanges and mutual learning among different civilizations. . .Fifth, we must assume common responsibilities and do our best to maintain international strategic stability. (推动构建人类命运共同体是应对世界之变)

 Here the important element is the way ion which these are manifested in contemporary Chinese policy. That manifestation suggests the way different policy areas are valued (that is arranged in orders of importance), as well as the ways in which the trajectories of modernization based Chinese internationalism would then suggest a value maximizing set of alternatives (as well as alternatives worth rejection). 

3. China continues to use its current palette of international programs as the model against which elaboration of the five elements of Chinese internationalism ought to be measured and with respect to which the working styles of the international community ought to align. Thus, for example, with respect to common development, the Belt & Road Initiative is offered as " a platform for common development and cooperation created by China, and a vivid practice of realizing the 'world version of common prosperity'."(推动构建人类命运共同体是应对世界之变). Common security, the second prong, in interpreted in tyhe shadow of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China's foreign policy choices in that conflict. 

For this reason, President Xi Jinping proposed a global security initiative, emphasizing that mankind is an indivisible security community, advocating a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security concept, paying attention to the legitimate security concerns of all countries, and advocating the construction of a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture. (Ibid.).

That position, of course, is incompatible in the strongest possible way, with that of at least some of the leading social forces in the liberal democratic camp; though it is quite useful in fostering factionalism in that camp by offering a conceptual rabbit hole into which certain elements of German, French, Hungarian and reactionary isolationist American vanguard members (among others) might find shelter. The third prong, common opening up and global integration elaborates the understanding of the so called win-win policy in trade. It is also the basis for moving forward economic interactions based on a dual circulation strategy (at least at the core). It is also a basis for attacking the American version of dual circulation grounded in national security imperatives--especially in the tech field. That makes sense from the Chinese side but poses challenges for those who seek to protect their own national security in a context where the appearances suggests that national security will be determined elsewhere. At the same time there is an intimation that only great powers have national security concerns that are not a cover for domestic market protection--a concept that is likely to be further elaborated this year. 

4. The common values prong tends to be undervalued by China's liberal democratic competitors. But it is important.  The elaboration of "whole process democracy" as a counter to liberal democratic  electoral based orthodoxies poses a substantial challenge to the contemporary structures of markets driven collective organization facilitated through notions of electoral representative politics manifested in public state organs. The last common responsibilities prong was the most interesting.  It suggests a further step toward the public elaboration of the principles of post-global empire in which the leading states--China and the United States--bear substantially heightened responsibility for the organization and management of the global collective orders. 

China and the United States share broad common interests and shoulder special and important responsibilities in maintaining world peace and stability and promoting global development and prosperity. Sino-US relations go beyond the bilateral scope and have a bearing on the future and destiny of the world. (Ibid.)

5. And thus the shape of post-global imperial management, which is tied both to the common security prong and  frames the basis for ideological competition critical for framing the way geo-politics is judged and shaped, especially in the context of war and social relations:

China and the United States have extensive common interests in bilateral and multilateral fields. There are many things that can and should be cooperated. The two sides should strive to make the list of cooperation longer and longer instead of shortening and shortening. Cooperation should take care of each other's concerns, give and take; it should be mutually beneficial, equal and balanced; it should benefit the whole world and benefit the world. [作为最大的发展中国家和最大的发达国家，中美在双多边领域存在广泛共同利益，可以合作、应该合作的事情很多，双方应努力使合作清单越拉越长，而不是越缩越短。合作要照顾彼此关切，有取有予；要互利互惠，对等平衡；要兼济天下，造福世界。] (Ibid.)

This is a delicate task as it threatens the public adherence to the principle of sovereign equality., and the notion of imperialism is still so discursively tied to its racist, ethnocentric and territoriality driven manifestations that ended after 1945, that either a new vocabulary for imperial responsibilities will have to be developed or re-education will be necessary to box the prior iteration of the imperial impulse within the cage of history. It also suggests that the borderlands of the new imperial order is ideological rather than territorial, abstract rather than concrete, and that stability at the borderlands is the optimum task of global management of the community of states and sub-national communities.

China and the United States should recognize the differences in each other's social systems and development paths, and respect these differences, instead of trying to change or even subvert each other's systems. China welcomes the United States to maintain prosperity and development, and the United States should also respect the rights of the Chinese people to pursue a better life. [相互尊重是中美交往互动的前提。中美应该承认彼此社会制度和发展道路的不同，尊重这种不同，而不是试图去改变甚至颠覆对方的制度。中国欢迎美国保持繁荣发展，美国也应该尊重中国人民追求美好生活的权利。] (Ibid).

 6. What is missing is the development and deployment of the counter vision from the liberal democratic camp.When it does come, it appears in fits and starts  perhaps (see eg Summit for Democracy) in part because of the focus of American elites on the internal squabbling that reached its high water mark during and after the 2020 elections and its institutionalization of a high level of corrosive internal fracture. Not that the counter narrative cannot be more strategically developed and deployed; strategic advantage, though may suffer as a result of less attention.

The speech, then, is richer than it might appear on first reading.  It is well worth a read and follows below in the original Chinese text and in a crude English translation.  A summary of the remarks, prepared in English by the Foreign Ministry may be found HERE.

Greetings and Best Wishes to Those Who Celebrate

 

《中国共产党处分违纪党员批准权限和程序规定》 ["Regulations on the Approval Authority and Procedures of the Communist Party of China for Disciplining Party Members Who Violate Disciplines"]

 

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It has turned out, despite  the sneering in some quarters, that one of the most relentlessly implemented principles that has emerged in its New Era formulation (because nothing ever emerges out of whole cloth) has been the principle of rule of law understood in its most relevant application--the development of rule based structures for the constraining of the exercise of administrative discretion by functionaries. Most well known as 把权力关进制度的笼子里 [locking power in a cage of regulation], the principle emerged very early in the leadership of Xi Jinping (though often misunderstood because of the premises and expectations built into some of the analytic lenses available at the time). As nicely considered at the time by Kong Ling (孔玲 把权力关进制度的笼子里 ), 

On January 22, 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized at the second plenary meeting of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that "we must strengthen the restriction and supervision of the exercise of power, and lock power in the cage of the system." . . "Put power in a cage" can be described as a famous political saying in today's society. Before General Secretary Xi Jinping spoke, some politicians once said similar words: "In the thousands of years of human history, the most precious thing is not the dazzling technology, not the classic works of the vast masters, but the realization of the rule of the taming of those who lived there, and the fulfillment of the dream of keeping them in cages". Today, General Secretary Xi has made it even more clear that power should be locked in a cage of "systems," which is to emphasize the need to use a rigid legal system to restrain and control state power. . . Why do we have to put power or rulers in a cage? In the final analysis, it is determined by the nature of human beings. . .

In western countries, the traditional basic way to restrict power is "rule of law", and its basic method is "use power to restrict power" or "use force to deal with force" as mentioned above.  In our China, the basic way of its political tradition to restrict power is "rule of virtue". Political personality, strongly advocates them to implement "benevolent government", implement "kingly way", resolutely oppose blindly "tyranny" and wanton "hegemony". In today's society, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, while inheriting and carrying forward China's fine political traditions, it also draws on the achievements of human political civilization, and puts forward "the combination of governing the country by law and governing the country by virtue". But it also pointed out that this combination must be based on the basic strategy of "ruling the country by law". (孔玲 把权力关进制度的笼子里 )

While much of the focus of 把权力关进制度的笼子里 [locking power in a cage of regulation] has been on the administrative apparatus of the state, the Chinese Communist Party has also sought to develop such rule systems to more tightly discipline the institutional operation of the vanguard. Important development in the context of caging regulatory and discretionary administrative authority within cages of regulation  within the CPC were announced in the run up to the 20th CPC Congress, one of which--regulation for the promotion and demotion of cadres was considered here). 

Nonetheless, the CPC has indicated that additional reform is necessary. Most interesting in that respect has been the 17 January 2023 issuance by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of "Regulations on the Approval Authority and Procedures of the Communist Party of China for Disciplining Party Members Who Violate Disciplines" --中共中央印发《中国共产党处分违纪党员批准权限和程序规定》. The Reforms reflect the objectives of CPC improvement specified in the Report to the 20th CPC Congress:

In strengthening the Party politically, we will enforce strict political discipline and rules, ensure that Party committees (leading Party members groups) at all levels fully assume their principal responsibilities, and enhance the political judgment, understanding, and implementation of Party organizations and Party officials at all levels. (Xi Jinping, "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects" Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (October 16, 2022)).

The Reforms touch on the twin an intertwined objectives of strengthening ideological integrity and practical efficiency of the mechanisms.

Regarding violations of Party discipline, each and every infraction identified must be strictly investigated and handled. We will work in concert to enhance Party consciousness, improve Party conduct, and tighten Party discipline. This will enable Party members to maintain firm ideals and convictions, enhance their Party consciousness, and bolster their resistance to corruption and moral decline. (Ibid; Part XV, 6 )

These regulations reformed and superseded the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection July 6, 1983 the "Specific Provisions on the Approval Authority of Party Members Who Violate Party Discipline" (6 July 1983) and the "Notice on Amending the Specific Provisions on the Approval Authority of Party Members Who Violate Party Discipline" (March 28, 1987) ( 中国共产党处分违纪党员批准权限和程序规定》 ¶56). Article 54 The Central Military Commission and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection share authority for administrative elaboration and interpretation. (Ibid., ¶¶ 54-55). 

The reform of the Party Discipline Regulations focus as well on better aligning its provisions with the New Era's ideological and policy framework in the “两个确立”与“两个维护” [Two Establishments and Two Safeguard] principles. These were also elaborated at about the time of the 20th CPC Congress. See 胡长栓 “两个确立”与“两个维护”内在统一的本质和要求 [Hu Changshuan, "The Essence and Requirements of the Internal Unity of "Two Establishments" and "Two Safeguards"]. These suggest the deep embedding of ideological principles into the constitution and operation of any system of disciplinary supervision.  In effect, the cage of regulation may constrain the range of discretionary decision making, but the cage of regulation is itself a practical application--and subject to--the hierarchically superior cage of ideology. 

The revised regulation follows below along with Hu's essay in the original Chinese and in crude English translations. 

Just Published, "The UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: A Commentary" (Barnali Choudry and Jack & Mae Nathanson (eds); Edward Elgar)

 

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推进干部能上能下 激励干部担当作为 [Promote the ability of cadres to go up and down, and encourage cadres to take responsibility]

 

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 In 1981, Deng Xiaoping put forward his well known essay-remarks: The Primary Task of Veteran Cadres Is To Select Young and Middle-Aged Cadres For Promotion (2 July 1981).

Nevertheless, if we don’t solve the problem of succession on a nationwide scale within three to five years, chaos may ensue. Some veteran cadres are no longer with us and others are no longer able to work, while new cadres cannot be promoted, or if they are, there is always some kind of objection. Many veteran cadres think the only good cadres are those who support them, and this seems to be a widespread phenomenon in the Party. To put it bluntly, the question of whether people are appointed on their merits or by favouritism has not been settled satisfactorily. I don’t mean that this applies to all veteran comrades, but it does apply to a considerable number. (Ibid.)

The issue, one nearly as old as the Communist Party itself, was the challenge of efficient management of cadres against the institutional evils (which appeared with similar effect but in different forms) of cronyism, bureaucratization,  and the corrosive effects of personal agendas reshaping Party objectives and interests. The danger in virtually every bureaucratized system is what might be termed the feudal or aristocratic trap. That trap is created where the logic and dynamics of institutional orders (irrespective of the guiding ideologies that they are meant to tend and further), shift from the primary task of institutional enhancement to the task of developing internally coherent and self-referencing solidarity among an increasingly closed loop of differentiated functionaries whose collective authority is protected by developing barriers to penetration of their ranks by others. The primary task of this aristocratic bureaucracy is necessarily the perfection of and autonomy of their collective and the protection of their status. 

The issue remains important as Chinese Leninism matures into its New Era evolution. It's latest manifestation as operational policy may be gleaned by considering "the Regulations on Promoting the Promotion and Demotion of Leading Cadres" [《推进领导干部能上能下规定》] disturbed September 2022. Its intent and effects were nicely described by something akin to a Frequently Asked Questions guidance circulated at the same time as the revised regulations--推进干部能上能下 激励干部担当作为——中央组织部负责人就修订颁布《推进领导干部能上能下规定》答记者问 [Promote the ability of cadres to go up and down, and encourage cadres to take responsibility ——The person in charge of the Organization Department of the Central Committee answered the reporter's question on the revision and promulgation of the "Regulations on Promoting the Promotion and Demotion of Leading Cadres"].

Both documents appear below in the original Chinese and in crude English translations. That they were issued in the run up tp the 20th CPC Congress is not unexpected.  They form part of the supporting architecture of what would then be announced in the Report to the Congress as the fully matured New Era Chinese Leninist theory. Most interesting, perhaps, is this from the explanation: 

The newly revised "Regulations" put forward a series of new requirements for the party committee (party group) and its organization (personnel) department, mainly including the following aspects: First, accurately grasp the policy boundaries. The purpose of promoting cadres to go up and down is not to go down, but to encourage cadres to faithfully perform their duties and take responsibility on the new journey in the new era. . . Second, strengthen daily management and supervision. Adhere to grasping early and catching small ones. When cadres have symptoms, tendencies or minor problems, they should promptly remind, talk, consult, criticize and educate, order inspections or admonish them, help cadres recognize problems, make corrections seriously, and prevent small problems from turning into  big problems. . . . Third, realize normalized promotion. The newly revised "Regulations" clearly stated that it is necessary to promote the normalization of being able to go up and down. . . Fourth, strictly implement work responsibilities. The newly revised "Regulations" further strengthen the responsibilities of the principals and relevant leading members of the party committee (party group) and its organization (personnel) department. . .(推进干部能上能下 激励干部担当作为).

From COVID ZERO Measures to ZERO COVID Measures: Brief Thoughts on 习近平 坚持人民至上 (Xi Jinping, "Uphold the Supremacy of the People"), 爱国卫生运 动作出重要指示 [Patriotic Health Campaign Issues Important Instructions], and the Manifestation of 群众路线 (Mass Line) Politics in the Chinese New Era

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In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses, to the masses". This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge. (Mao Zedong, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership" (1 June 1943))

There will be much discussion both about the development of China's zero tolerance COVID policy, and then, after protests (or in concert with them) the equally swift adoption of the reform of the methods of that policy that effectively eliminated strict testing and quarantine regimes. Both the development of the zero tolerance and the zero testing policies might, at their foundation, provide quite fascinating expressions of the workings of the mass line in the formulation and reform of important policies in China under the leadership of the Communist Party bit within a cage of consultation tied to the New Era whole process democracy principles.

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Much of that discussion will be useful, especially for those who delight in the  hothouse politics of a closed circuit of power relationships within the institutions of the leading social forces of China.  Perhaps more neglected than it ought to be, are more careful studies of the ways of thinking through issues and challenges and pathways to response--like COVID ZERO in the face of mounting economic pressures and geopolitical realities--that made it not just predictable but predictable stabilizing for the senior leadership  of the Communist Part to move swiftly to a ZERO COVID MEASURES policy. Given the basic orienting toward (for decision making) principles of New Era Leninism, it was inevitable that Party organs would move, precipitously but quite strategically. The real question was the choice of pathway from out of COVID ZERO; and that was effectively decided in the months after the end of the 20th Party Congress, and signaled by the response of authorities to protests at the end of 2022 (here; in quite dramatic contrast to state responses during the Shanghai lockdown, see童之伟对上海新冠防疫两措施的法律意见 [Tong Zhiwei, Legal Opinion on Two Measures of Shanghai's New COVID Epidemic Prevention and Control]). 

That pathway to response first required both a judgment about the measures undertaken (at its broadest level of generality) to date. To that end it was necessary to frame the pivot in terms of policy success.

The sense of official momentum towards a landmark shift built on Thursday as Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, who oversees COVID efforts, told a meeting of frontline experts that the Omicron variant was weakening in its ability to cause disease, allowing China to improve prevention efforts. "After nearly three years fighting against the epidemic, our country's medical and healthcare system has withstood the test," she said in remarks published by the official Xinhua news agency. (China set to loosen COVID curbs after week of protests)

Nonetheless, that more careful study might lead one back to a core principle of the mass line (群众路线), , at least with respect to policy choices and responses to popular sentiment in a context in which, after the 20th Party Congress, there was more flexibility in policy pivots aligned with an unchanging objective. The Mass Line has seen dramatic ideological development in the New Era, one discounted by foreigners but at least within policy circles one the rationalizing power of which ought not to be dismissed lightly in framing thinking and the politics around which change is actually produced. In that respect, the relationship between the masses, mass protest, the response of authorities on the ground, and the modification of policy, might be usefully considered against an essay authored by Xi Jinping and published in the leading theoretical organ of the Communist Party "Seeking Truth" 《求是》in October 2022 just ahead of the protests. That essay, 坚持人民至上 [Uphold the Supremacy of the People], describes the relationship between the reading social forces of society, whose leadership manifestation in the form of the Communist Party, formed a bilateral linkage with the patriotic masses (for the rest--dictatorship) that together drives the form of policy on the ground even as the vanguard drives its ideology and the direction of its movement. In the language of the essay: "The fundamental purpose of our party is to enable the people to live a better life. Adhering to the people-centered development concept is not an empty slogan, but must be implemented in various decision-making arrangements and practical work." (坚持人民至上 ).

In the essay, the main part of which is drawn from the General Secretary's 22 May 2020 speech, delivered to  the Inner Mongolia delegation at the Third Session of the Thirteenth National People's Congress, framed the analytic structures of the application of the mass line to the working style of the Communist Party and its operational policy.

 1. "First, uphold the supremacy of the people. . . In the face of a major epidemic, we made it clear from the very beginning that we put people's life safety and health first." This militates in favor of stricter disease prevention and mitigation measures even at a substantial cost to social and economic life.

2. "Second, rely on the people closely. . . The broad masses of the people understand the general situation, take into account the overall situation, and consciously cooperate with the overall situation of the epidemic prevention and control struggle, forming a basic force for epidemic prevention and control." That works until the masses decisively demonstrate a different understanding as conditions change. 

3. "Third, continue to benefit the people. In the final analysis, our promotion of economic and social development is to continuously meet the needs of the people for a better life." Popular demonstrations in this case suggest a shift in popular sentiment from the important objective of protecting health to the equally important objective of preserving economic health. There is no defeat in either policy, just a balancing for which popular manifestation of preference is important (especially since it does not threaten the core of Leninist ideology in theory or as policy). 

4. And this then provides the New Era Leninist basis for changing course: "The benefit of the people should be regarded as the most important political achievement. The Communist Party of China regards doing things for the people and benefiting the people as the most important achievements, and regards how many good deeds it has done for the people as an important criterion for evaluating its achievements." 

5. Popular manifestation in the context of covering course corrections may continue to provide a useful basis for making choices among equally authentic policy choices; though it is more likely that this will be manifested through the consultation channels of whole process democracy, the vanguard has signaled its toleration of more direct and potentially volatile communication, with the masses. 

6. Such direct manifestation, however, will not be cost free.Arrests and discipline will likely continue to follow, though on a muted scale.  The effort is likely meant to set the price on mass direct communication through protests--in effect the masses will have to feel strongly enough to face the possibility of arrest and discipline before they act. The echo of liberal democratic non violent civil disobedience can be heard in the distance.  On the other hand, violence will likely be crushed and punished swiftly. There also what ought to be something echoed in liberal democratic conversations between their apparatus of government and mass sentiment. 

7. This provides the necessary background for a deeper understanding of text and subtext in the critically important announcement of Xi Jinping on 爱国卫生运 [The Patriotic Health Campaign] of 26 December 2022--爱国卫生运 动作出重要指示 [Patriotic Health Campaign Issues Important Instructions].

Xi Jinping emphasized that at present, my country's COVID epidemic prevention and control is facing new situations and new tasks. It is necessary to carry out patriotic health campaigns in a more targeted manner, give full play to the advantages of patriotic health campaigns in organization and mass mobilization, and guide the broad masses of the people to actively learn health knowledge and master the knowledge of health .[习近平强调，当前，我国新冠疫情防控面临新形势新任务，要更加有针对性地开展爱国卫生运动，充分发挥爱国卫生运动的组织优势和群众动员优势，引导广大人民群众主动学习健康知识] (爱国卫生运, supra)

Embedded within this re-direction was the application of a working style principle not unknown in liberal democratic regulatory administration: "adhere to prevention first, innovate mechanisms and working methods" (爱国卫生运, supra). In the West this is more commonly adhered top under the principle: prevent, mitigate, and remedy.  The framing of this pivot, of course, was necessarily dependent on the conclusion that the first phase of epidemic response--focused almost entirely on health, had succeeded--as success is measured by the authorities. That predicate then made it possible to respond  in mass line fashion to changing circumstances, including popular sentiment.  

Both Brief Thoughts on 习近平 坚持人民至上 (Xi Jinping, "Uphold the Supremacy of the People"), and 爱国卫生运 动作出重要指示 [Patriotic Health Campaign Issues Important Instructions],  follow below in the original Chinese and in my crude English translation follow below.

"What kind of country do we want to be?": Text of President Biden's Federal Holiday Proclamation of 16 January 2023 in Honor of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King and Text of Sermon at Ebenezer Baptist Church 15 January 2023

 

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It has become an American tradition to hold the third Monday in January as a day to commemorate the life and work of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King. That tradition was continued and, also as now traditional, given recognition by the instruments of the federal government  by proclamation of the President of the United States, the text of which follows below.  The proclamation provided a space where the President could attempt to align his program of domestic policy and governance with those ideals and principles he extracted from and interpreted from the work and like of the Reverend Dr. King. The focus was, as it has been for many members of the contemporary elite--on the wrestling with the signification of the term "justice" and its manifestation as an ideal form suitable for application to the historically situated context of the United States. That has always been both a dynamic process and one with respect to which, at least at its margins, remains hotly contested, both with respect to the meaning of the principle "justice" and the authentic way in which governmental, social and economic power ought to be bent toward the realization of its ideal form.   That this has become a central element of the politics of the United States, and that it has, to some extent, centered what  passes for the construction, consequences, and utilization of another meaning-object, race, the construction and deployment of which remains a work in progress, might well have pleased the Rev. Dr. King. The effort, and its contestation in the political sphere, certainly honors his memory and pushed forward the essence of his work.

This year the President did more than issue the traditional proclamation. "Joe Biden delivered a sermon on Sunday at Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, becoming the first sitting president to do so at the church where Martin Luther King Jr. was a pastor." (Biden becomes the first sitting president to deliver a Sunday sermon at MLK's church). The sermon was preached before dignitaries and congregants gathered  for this special Sunday service. The text of the sermon follows below and is well worth reading.
 

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Mr. Biden does seem to be at his best when he is preaching.  And this is a good example of the power and discursive style of American style sermons now heading into the 21st century. The entire sermon is quite revealing and also in its own way honors the memory of the Rev. Dr. King. Personally noteworthy were these brief points:

1. The personification of principle through the incarnation or manifestation of a (not the) holy spirit serves as a central element of the positioning of the sermon. Incarnation and the role of the divine messenger is an old trope in religions discourse and practice.  And it remains a powerful one.  It has been a long time since religious culture moves from the centrality of the divine and remote kingship to that of the personality of the messenger and the martyr.  That continues to resonate and aligns with cultures of individual (free) will and its relationship with and as a manifestation of divine will or order. In that context the early invocation of Moses, Joseph, and John the Baptist, is telling, even if one quibbles about the choices of essentialization (as symbol representation of making flesh of divine inspiration, of dreaming, and of witness to a closer alignment with divine and unalterable principle)..

2. The imagery of the warrior, in this case the justice warrior, is never far from the discursive tropes of religious preaching--or its secular manifestation in the work of ideologically committed reformer. And thus the Rev, Dr. King becomes the justice warrior. While this aligns with the times, it does reduce perhaps one of the Rev. Dr. King's most divinely aligned imagery. That focuses not on the traits and imagery of the warrior, but rather on ἀγάπη (agápē), the love that binds the divine to the human, and caritas (charity in its broadest sense). It is from the reservoir of strength that is love and charity, that it might be possible to manifest that sort of love among humans and for the natural world within which humanity lives. (Matthew 5:43-46).

3. But we are, it seems, a nation at war on the battlefields of which the Rev. Dr. King was martyred. 

What — what is the soul of America? Easy to say, but what is the soul of America? Well, the soul is the breath, the life, the essence of who we are. The soul makes us “us.” The soul of America is embodied in the sacred proposition that we’re all created equal in the image of God. That was the sacred proposition for which — for which Dr. King gave his life. . . And the battle for the soul of this nation is perennial. It’s a constant struggle. It’s a constant struggle between hope and fear, kindness and cruelty, justice and injustice against those who traffic in racism, extremism, and insurrection; a battle fought on battlefields and bridges, from courthouses and ballot boxes, to pulpits and protests. (Biden Sermon, supra).

It is only on the battlefield, then, that caritas and agape  may be revealed: "And that joy comes with the commandments of Scripture and the Sermon on the Mount: “Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, all thy mind, and all thy soul.” And “Love thy neighbor as thy self.” Yet one is also reminded of another way, one perhaps also reflected in much of the work of the Rev. Dr. King, and for the Catholic faithful articulated in Benedict XVI's encyclical Deus Caritas Est (2005) (considered in Values Economics and Theology: The Contribution of Catholic Social Thought and its Implications for Legal Regulatory Systems). In this respect, the reference to Micah 6:8 ("He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the LORD require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?") suggests the tenor of the times within which meaning is extracted from the life and legacy of the Rev. Dr King. But it is also well to remember what comes after (Micah 6:9-16) promising desolation to the wicked who do not reform. In the words of the President's sermon:

Dr. Martin Luther King was born into a nation where segregation was a tragic fact of life. He had every reason to believe, as others of the generation did, that history had already been written, that the division would be America’s destiny. But he rejected that outcome. He heard Micah’s command to do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly. . . Every generation is required to keep it, defend it, protect it, to be repairers of the breach, and to remember that the power to redeem the soul of America lies where it always has lie — lay: in the hands of “We the People.”(Biden, Sermon, supra).

It is to the understanding of these terms and to the great unending conversations, warring, love, and charity that those who strive for solidarity will continue to struggle. It is in that perhaps that a kernel of divine inspiration descends onto the text of this sermon.

The Management of Misery and the Risks to Cuban Stability: Brief Reflections on Domingo Amuchastegui, "Mirando a Cuba el el 2023" ["A Look at Cuba in 2023]

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The state of the economic stability in Cuba has been very much in the news since the effects of the COVID pandemic, combined with geopolitical challenges, have pushed the Cuban economy to a crisis that comes close to matching that when its subsidies disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Both times, foreigners, and especially the chattering class of people on both the left and right who harbor (quite different) grievances against the current government, have predicted that economic collapse would inevitably produce political collapse and transformation into a form more desired by those prognosticating, Since (1) the San Isidro Movement's challenge to the political establishment (from the liberal democratic left) and (2) the rioting in the summer of 2021 (consistent with the foreign position of the liberal democratic right), the likelihood of political collapse to match economic collapse appeared more certain.  With no great revolutionary charismatic figure (or his brother) to mute dissent, it might be assumed that  some reaction will eventually succeed in toppling the current government.

But of course, that sort of wishful thinking has plagued many both inside and outside Cuba for a generation or more.  Three factors make that sort of revolutionary scenario less likely.  The first is migration (though here the grandees of the Biden Administration appear ready to strategically weaponize migration generally and more specifically in the Cuban context to enhance the likelihood of fatal instability). The second is the naturalization of a politics of hope and marginal gestures of reform, just sufficient enough to take the edge off revolutionary anger and action (certainly since 2008 and well exhibited after 2021. This is a policy of stability built around the management of misery. The state responds to eruptions or crises with grand promises and immediate small reforms that appear to be responsive but do not change anything in a fundamental way). The third is the security apparatus superstructure, which remains intact and committed and against which resistance would require a substantial effort to destabilize. As it has been the case in Cuba since 1959, it is the military that is the key to maintaining or undermining stability in ways that have real effect.   

It is in this context that Domingo Amuchastegui offers us his essay "Mirando a Cuba en el 2023" "A Look at Cuba in 2023] which takes a look at the factors that may affect the fine tuning (and the risks) of Cuba's current approach  of reform marginalization that leaves the core of the current system intact. in the process he nicely describes the key factors that drive decision making grounded on keeping the population griping but home (or in line for food and services and transport). It is important, though, to keep in mind that those policy choices that produce long lines, scarcity, and infrastructure inefficiencies may be as important to the stability of the current government as it contributes to the protection of its theoretical and operational core (and thus the position and prerogatives of those with a hand in managing the state). 

The key constituent parts of the internal economic sector include (a) agriculture; (b) mining nickel; (c) non-sugar agricultural production; (d) livestock and fishing; (e) energy; and (6) the non-state sector.Each is facing substantial challenges (when measured against the ideal) but may be operating far enough away from collapse to sustain the desired stability of economic misery. Of great interest here and the greatest threats to the state: (1) the failure to replace sugar with an equally useful export commodity; (2) the inability to successfully manage mining though here mining deferred may have positive longer term benefits; (3) the inability to sustain adequate levels of meat production is having cumulative effects, offset by an important piece of marginal reform--the bureaucratic opening up of fishing for local consumption; (4) the crisis of the energy sector and the incapacity of the state to maintain its stability (though here Cuba and South Africa share something in common); and (5) the unbalanced development of the retail private sector which following Cuban traditional practices is concentrated in the large urban areas leaving the rest of the country yo deal with greater scarcity. 

Internal economic challenges are augmented by external challenges that will not change much in 2023.  These include Cuban debt.  Here again a sort of stability: Cuba's debt crisis is itself a positive element of stability in the sense that neither Cuba nor its lenders appear eager to move away from the stability of the current practice of lending Cuba to a precipice and then renegotiating. The idea here appears to be that such lending is useful in the politics of foreign lenders and the international community, but from the internal  perspective it provides just enough money to ensure survival. Cuba's outward debt, then, might be understood as necessary, and profitable for all sides. Financial crisis is, itself the apex point of stability.  It is in that sense that one might discount crisis as a key element contributing to crisis. That just enough policy is reflected in the stability of cash exports (rum and tobacco) but with the future banking on a well subsidized pharma sector, the collapse of which would indeed be ruinous. Remittances, Amuchastegui points out are impossible to accurately count.  But that suits all sides. The Cubans and the US prefer the optics of remittances as a strategic weapon--the Americans to show from time to time their resolve against Cuban human rights abuses and their generosity to help the Cuban people; the Cubans because it is possible to mask the extent of the tax on these remittances and their laundering within the internal economy. The tourist industry is, though, one that requires some care.  Its recovery is important and despite the usual US-Cuba tensions, appears to be in the interests of all sides to allow to return to something like a useful "normal." Along the same ines the sale of medical services abroad--an excellent means of intelligence and political work, and an important source of funds. Its human rights effects may threaten this source in the coming years. 

Tied to the politics of debt relief is that of charity.  Cuba subsists, to some extent, on the success of its self promotion as a value added recipient of public and private charity from states and foundations.  That has been successful enough in the past  It is likely to be more so in the future.  The key, though, is the ability to maintaon at least the optics of suffering through the policy of economic misery (all donors like to see suffering sufficient to add value to their offerings). In a sense, then, state charity creates incentives to ensuring that the economic crisis is unresolved. . . at least entirely. And lastly foreign investment remains unchanged.  Cuban stability is still (in the opinion of those who run the state) essentially a function of preventing dfoect contact with foreigners that is not carefully supervised.  The boundaries of the national territory are a barrier (natural and artificial) through which the state can control the quality and quantity of interactions with foreigners and their footprint within the national territory.  Though it is expensive in terms of foregone investment, the price appears to be cheap enough to prevent change. Again the optics and discourse of foreign investment and its reality are quite different things.

lastly, tensions and conflicts remain unchanged.  The policy of strategic misery is risky and more risky now that the state is permitting a greater degree of misery than perhaps the population can tolerate. But it is also permitting a greater degree of open protest. The balancing is risky but now appears to ne stabilizing in some respects. In October 2022, for example, limited protests were tolerated (though of course post protest arrests and other disciplinary measures tend to be under reported.

“The police are supporting them, not assaulting them,” he says. “They blocked the four corners because they’ve been without electricity for four days, and all the food is spoiled.” “Everyone is amazed,” says this newspaper’s contact, “because none of the agents has been aggressive. The police let them protest, waiting for them to get power.” (Protests Are Spreading in Cuba, with Barricades in the Streets of Havana and Other Cities)

This perhaps temporary strategy is then aligned with the offsetting policy on migration; a strategic use of population successfuly deployed by the Cuban state since the 1970s and Mariel.  But that provides a weapon to the great enemy of the Cuban state--the Americans. It is hard for the state to be held hostage to the Americans by operation of the consequences of the policies that now are deemed essential to stability.  And it produces a diaspora that itself is far more difficult (though not impossible) to manage.  The essay does a very nice job of analyzing  this situation and the threat it poses to the Cuban state, a threat it may not be able to control. To manage this correctly in 2023 will require a careful orchestration of just the right amount of corruption (that adds to stability tot he extent it creates incentives against reform by those with authority), the development of human capital (the universities remain, as they have been since the start of the Republic) an important source of human capital and the generative space for revolutionary activity. In the end the good management of misery. 

In this context all behaviors and choices are risky and there will be no recourse to history.  Amuchastegui's ending reference to Fidel Castro's famous "History Will Absolve Me" provides the proper level of irony to the 2023 assessment. An way one looks at it, the situation in Cuba produces far more cynicism than it does either hope or re¡course to some saving ideology.  That may come later--the the time being the essay suggests that very little will change and 2023 will be a year of continuing but strategically useful crisis. 

The essay is reproduced below in the original Spanish and in my English translation.

Domingo Amuchastegui has had a long and distinguished career. He has served as Cuba's Chargé d'Affaires in Guatemala, was Department Head of Socialist Countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department Head of the Organization Departament at the Tricontinental Organization (1960s-70s), Chief Analyst in the Intelligence Directorate and "Liberación", and a Professor of Contemporary History and Regional Conflicts at the Universidad Pedagógica and the Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales (Cuba). He is the author of Historia Contemporánea de Asia y Africa (4 volumes), Palestina: Dimensiones de un Conflicto, Angola in the XX Century (1988)and the co-author of Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition he has written hundred of articles and essays for Cuba News, Cuba Standard, and various Cuban publications. He participated in fact-finding missions throughout Africa, Asia and Chile, served as Chief analyst during Fidel Castro's visit to Chile and adviser to the Angolan Government (1986-1988). He has resided in the United States since 1994.