Tuesday, June 21, 2022

Part 2 Reflections on Völkerrechtsblog Online Symposium: "Framing Business & Human Rights?": Giulia Botta, 'Unpacking the Potentials of a Framework Agreement on Business and Human Rights'

 



It is with great delight that I pass along the announcement of an exciting new Online Symposium. It is  hosted by Völkerrechtsblog and brilliantly co-organized by Justine Batura (Völkerrechtsblog), Anna Sophia Tiedeke (Völkerrechtsblog) and Michael Riegner (University of Erfurt; co-founder of the Völkerrechtsblog), who will feature as guest editor of the Symposium. The Symposium Summary nicely captures the spirit of the event: 

With a view to regulating business in the field of human rights, an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) has been negotiating an international binding treaty in business and human rights (BHR) since 2014. Confounding the dichotomy of hard and soft law approaches to BHR, the Biden Administration recently expressed openness to a legally binding framework agreement that would build on the UNGPs. Framework agreements are a type of treaty, that establish key objectives and a system of governance but leave details to be determined in the future by an agreed-on mechanism. Perceived by some as a distraction from existing efforts to create a binding treaty in the field, others consider the treaty design choice for a framework agreement as offering a promising and realistic route. In any event, the joining of the US delegation to the OEIGWG has (re-)fuelled long smouldering discussions about the prospects of success of the OEIGWG endeavour and the need to explore alternative avenues, such as opting for the treaty design of a framework agreement. With this symposium, we take a deep dive into exploring a framework convention as an alternative regulatory proposal and examine potentials and challenges from different angles. (Völkerrechtsblog, Symposium, Framing Human Rights? Introductory Note )

Throughout the week starting 20 June 2022, the co-editors will post written contributions on the homepage of the Symposium in the following order:

--Monday: Introduction by co-editors Justine Batura (Twitter: @JustineBatura), Anna Sophia Tiedeke & Michael Riegner (Twitter: @riegnerm)
--Monday, 1 pm: Giulia Botta
--Tuesday, 8 am: Jonathan Klaaren (Twitter: @JonathanKlaaren)
--Tuesday, 1 pm: Lucas Roorda (Twitter: @LRoordaLaw)
--Wednesday, 8 am: Claire Methven O‘Brien (Twitter: @Claire_OB1)
--Wednesday, 1 pm: Tara Van Ho (Twitter: @TaraVanHo)
--Thursday, 8 am: Nils Grohmann
--Thursday, 1 pm: Flávia do Amaral Vieira (Twitter: @eiflavia)
--Friday, 8 am: Larry Catá Backer (Twitter: @BackerLarry)
--Friday, 1 pm: Concluding Interview with Claire Methven O'Brien (Twitter: @Claire_OB1) & Surya Deva (Twitter: @ProfSuryaDeva)

 I was delighted to have been invited to participate.  I will be posting the Symposium contributions here and will also contribute some brief reflections and engagement with each of the excellent and thought provoking contributions.

For this Part 2 we consider the wonderful opening essay: Giulia Botta: Unpacking the Potentials of a Framework Agreement on Business and Human Rights: An Opportunity to Transcend the Hard and Soft-Law Dichotomy for More Policy Coherence, Völkerrechtsblog, 20.06.2022, doi:10.17176/20220620-153018-0 which follows along with my brief reflections. 

 

 Other Essays and Reflections may be accessed here:

Part I Introduction 

Part 2 Giulia Botta 

Part 3 Jonathan Klaaren

Part 4 Lucas Roorda

Part 5 Claire Methven O'Brien 

Part 6 Tara van Ho

Part 7 Nils Grohmann

Part 8 Flávia do Amaral Vieira

Part 9 Larry Catá Backer

Part 10 Interview: Surya Deva and Claire Methven O'Brien

 

Monday, June 20, 2022

Part 1Reflections on Völkerrechtsblog Online Symposium: "Framing Business & Human Rights?": Introducing the Symposium

 


It is with great delight that I pass along the announcement of an exciting new Online Symposium. It is  hosted by Völkerrechtsblog and brilliantly co-organized by Justine Batura (Völkerrechtsblog), Anna Sophia Tiedeke (Völkerrechtsblog) and Michael Riegner (University of Erfurt; co-founder of the Völkerrechtsblog), who will feature as guest editor of the Symposium. The Symposium Summary nicely captures the spirit of the event: 

With a view to regulating business in the field of human rights, an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) has been negotiating an international binding treaty in business and human rights (BHR) since 2014. Confounding the dichotomy of hard and soft law approaches to BHR, the Biden Administration recently expressed openness to a legally binding framework agreement that would build on the UNGPs. Framework agreements are a type of treaty, that establish key objectives and a system of governance but leave details to be determined in the future by an agreed-on mechanism. Perceived by some as a distraction from existing efforts to create a binding treaty in the field, others consider the treaty design choice for a framework agreement as offering a promising and realistic route. In any event, the joining of the US delegation to the OEIGWG has (re-)fuelled long smouldering discussions about the prospects of success of the OEIGWG endeavour and the need to explore alternative avenues, such as opting for the treaty design of a framework agreement. With this symposium, we take a deep dive into exploring a framework convention as an alternative regulatory proposal and examine potentials and challenges from different angles. (Völkerrechtsblog, Symposium, Framing Human Rights? Introductory Note )

Throughout the week starting 20 June 2022, the co-editors will post written contributions on the homepage of the Symposium in the following order:

--Monday: Introduction by co-editors Justine Batura (Twitter: @JustineBatura), Anna Sophia Tiedeke & Michael Riegner (Twitter: @riegnerm)
--Monday, 1 pm: Giulia Botta
--Tuesday, 8 am: Jonathan Klaaren (Twitter: @JonathanKlaaren)
--Tuesday, 1 pm: Lucas Roorda (Twitter: @LRoordaLaw)
--Wednesday, 8 am: Claire Methven O‘Brien (Twitter: @Claire_OB1)
--Wednesday, 1 pm: Tara Van Ho (Twitter: @TaraVanHo)
--Thursday, 8 am: Nils Grohmann
--Thursday, 1 pm: Flávia do Amaral Vieira (Twitter: @eiflavia)
--Friday, 8 am: Larry Catá Backer (Twitter: @BackerLarry)
--Friday, 1 pm: Concluding Interview with Claire Methven O'Brien (Twitter: @Claire_OB1) & Surya Deva (Twitter: @ProfSuryaDeva)

 I was delighted to have been invited to participate.  I will be posting the Symposium contributions here and will also contribute some brief reflections and engagement with each of the excellent and thought provoking contributions.

For this Part 1 we consider the co-editors' excellent introduction: Justine Batura, Anna Sophia Tiedeke & Michael Riegner, Framing Business & Human Rights?: Introducing the Symposium on a Framework Agreement as an Alternative Regulatory Proposal, Völkerrechtsblog, 20.06.2022, doi: 10.17176/20220620-153101-0 which follows along with my brief reflections. 

 Other Essays and Reflections may be accessed here:

Part I Introduction 

Part 2 Giulia Botta 

Part 3 Jonathan Klaaren

Part 4 Lucas Roorda

Part 5 Claire Methven O'Brien 

Part 6 Tara van Ho

Part 7 Nils Grohmann

Part 8 Flávia do Amaral Vieira

Part 9 Larry Catá Backer

Part 10 Interview: Surya Deva and Claire Methven O'Brien

Sunday, June 19, 2022

“三不腐” [Three No Corrupts]; The Chinese Core of Leadership's Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Campaign Focus on Individual Agency, Institutional Function, and Ideological Embedding

 

Pix Credit HERE

 

The fight against corruption is the biggest political struggle that affects people's hearts and minds. It is necessary to deepen the understanding of the construction of party conduct and clean government and the fight against corruption under the new situation, improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of not daring to be corrupt , not being corruptible, and not wanting to be corrupt [the “三不腐” (Three No Corrupts)], and comprehensively winning the tough and protracted battle against corruption. [反腐败斗争关系民心这个最大的政治,是一场输不起也决不能输的重大政治斗争。要加深对新形势下党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争的认识,提高一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐能力和水平,全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战、持久战] ("Xi Jinping emphasized during the 40th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of "three non-corruption", and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption" ["习近平在中共中央政治局第四十次集体学习时强调: 提高一体推进“三不腐”能力和水平 全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战"]) People's Daily 20 June 2022).

That struggle against corruption now centers on a more comprehensive approach to corruption that focuses on the individual and individual agency (不敢腐),  institutional structures (不能腐), and the ideological framework within which individuals make decisions and institutions function (不想腐进行).  In the process, corruption itself acquires a new more comprehensive meaning, one ties to overarching integrity and trustworthiness campaigns (and with it the development of social credit and monitoring-nudging systems), as well as with the core socialist values and its political expression as New Era ideology-operationalization. The initial focus is on the rectification of cadres at all levels, and then the state apparatus along with public and private mass organizations. More broadly, they are meant to provide a foundation, which if successful can also be used as a model to export along the spokes of the Belt & Road, and from there as a basis for Chinese interventions in international forums.

Even as Mr. Xi was underscoring the central importance of anti-corruption efforts to the high priory policy to enhance the integrity and trustworthiness of government, the  Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision Commission (中央纪委国家监委网站 发布时间) released to its Website (Release time: 2022-06-18 18:02) a graphic to improve the ability and level of promoting the "three non-corruptions" in an integrated manner, and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption (图解 | 提高一体推进“三不腐”能力和水平 全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战).

This was at the direction of Mr. Xi.

习近平指出,纪检监察机关要主动应对反腐败斗争新形势新挑战,深化对管党治党规律、反腐败斗争规律的认识,不断提高工作能力和水平,主动接受党内和社会各方面的监督,以自我革命精神坚决防止“灯下黑”。纪检监察干部要做到忠诚坚定、无私无畏,始终以党性立身,秉公执纪、谨慎用权,敢于善于斗争,真正做到让党中央放心、让人民群众满意。[Xi Jinping pointed out that the discipline inspection and supervision organs should take the initiative to respond to the new situation and new challenges in the fight against corruption, deepen their understanding of the laws of governing the Party and the laws of the fight against corruption, continuously improve their work ability and level, and take the initiative to accept supervision from all aspects of the Party and society. Resolutely prevent "darkness under the lights" with the spirit of self-revolution. Discipline inspection and supervision cadres must be loyal, firm, selfless and fearless, always stand in the spirit of the party, exercise discipline impartially, exercise power prudently, and dare to be good at fighting, so as to truly reassure the Party Central Committee and satisfy the people.] ("Xi Jinping emphasized during the 40th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of "three non-corruption", and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption" ["习近平在中共中央政治局第四十次集体学习时强调: 提高一体推进“三不腐”能力和水平 全面打赢反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战"]) People's Daily 20 June 2022).

And it was directed at Party officials, especially senior cadres.  The projection of the effort in that direction is important--especially in the run up to the October meetings, and in preparation for the next Communist Party Congress. 

习近平强调,要从源头着手,完善管权治吏的体制机制,更加常态化、长效化地防范和治理腐败问题。要着力减少腐败机会,抓住政策制定、决策程序、审批监管、执法司法等关键权力,严格职责权限,规范工作程序,强化权力制约,减少权力对微观经济活动的不当干预。[Xi Jinping emphasized that it is necessary to start from the source, improve the system and mechanism for the management of power and officials, and prevent and control corruption in a more normalized and long-term manner. Efforts should be made to reduce opportunities for corruption, seize key powers such as policy formulation, decision-making procedures, approval and supervision, and law enforcement and judiciary.] (Ibid.)

It is even more important in terms of the more long term project to promote Socialist whole process democracy and the Socialist path toward governance (and with it stability and prosperity) (see Discussion Draft Posted for Comment: "Linking People to Governing Institutions Through Leninist Political Parties: 全过程民主 (Whole Process Democracy), Socialist Consultative Democracy, and 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System)". The stakes are high, time is short, and the likelihood of quite targeted rectification now much higher. And behind this, perhaps, some frustration at the effectiveness of implementation of the national zero COVID  policy.

 The key element in this campaign is the “三不腐” [Three No Corrupts];

反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利并全面巩固,但形势依然严峻复杂。我们对腐败的顽固性和危害性绝不能低估,必须将反腐败斗争进行到底。一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐,必须三者同时发力、同向发力、综合发力,把不敢腐的强大震慑效能、不能腐的刚性制度约束、不想腐的思想教育优势融于一体,用“全周期管理”方式,推动各项措施在政策取向上相互配合、在实施过程中相互促进、在工作成效上相得益彰 [The fight against corruption has won an overwhelming victory and has been consolidated in an all-round way, but the situation remains grim and complex. We must not underestimate the stubbornness and harmfulness of corruption, and we must carry out the fight against corruption to the end. To promote the one that does not dare to be corrupt, cannot be corrupt, and do not want to be corrupt, the three must exert their efforts at the same time, in the same direction, and comprehensively, so as to combine the powerful deterrent effect of not being corrupt, the rigid system constraints that cannot be corrupt, and the ideological and educational advantages of not wanting to be corrupt. Integrate into one, and use the "full-cycle management" approach to promote various measures to cooperate with each other in terms of policy orientation, promote each other in the implementation process, and complement each other in terms of work results.] ("Xi Jinping emphasized during the 40th collective study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Improve the ability and level of integrated promotion of "three non-corruption", and comprehensively win the protracted battle against corruption" supra)
To understand the new forms of Chinese anti-corruption efforts, then, it will be useful to understand the way that efforts will be undertaken to integrate individual, institutional, and ideological/educational measures. What this means remains to be seen, though it will be likely to draw on and coordinate the large number of measures already in place. The shape of the anticipated rectification will be comprehensive--and it is likely to be both data driven, and guided by a quantitative set of accountability measures. Senior cadres, bit much more middle level officials at the senior and senior provincial and provincial level officials are likely to feel the effects in a new set of measures designed to manage their behaviors and decision making, and to refine the ideological pathways by which both are undertaken in ways that can be assessed. More importantly, the suggestion of institutional measures points to reform in the operation of the political and administrative apparatus--these will likely align with the evolving principles of whole process democracy.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision Commission graphic follows in the original Chinese.

Friday, June 17, 2022

Countering Passport Conquest: "On termination of the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on visa-free travel"

 

Pix Credit here

 

Zelenskiy / Official ✔
Україна запроваджує візовий режим для громадян РФ.

У межах протидії безпрецедентним загрозам національній безпеці, суверенітету й територіальній цілісності нашої держави запропонував Кабінету Міністрів опрацювати питання перегляду режиму в’їзду російських громадян на територію України.

І сьогодні Кабмін має ухвалити це важливе рішення – Постанову «Про припинення дії Угоди між Урядом України і Урядом Російської Федерації про безвізові поїздки громадян України і Російської Федерації та застосування деяких міжнародних договорів України з Російською Федерацією».

Згідно із запланованим рішенням Кабінету Міністрів, з 1 липня 2022 року Україна запровадить візовий режим в’їзду для громадян РФ.

Zelenskiy / Official
✔
Ukraine introduces visa regime for Russian citizens.

In the framework of counteracting unprecedented threats to the national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of our state, he suggested that the Cabinet of Ministers consider revising the regime of entry of Russian citizens into Ukraine.

And today the Cabinet of Ministers must make this important decision - the Resolution "On termination of the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on visa-free travel for citizens of Ukraine and the Russian Federation and application of some international agreements of Ukraine with the Russian Federation."

According to the planned decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, from July 1, 2022, Ukraine will introduce a visa regime for Russian citizens.

At the start of this century, the idea that the world was not moving toward fundamental convergence would have seemed incomprehensible. It was an article of faith that  the future peace and stability of th world order was  built on a foundation of interdependencies woven together by an expectation of political perfectibility as a form of liberal democracy driven by private ordered markets driven mechanisms for prosperity and the augmentation of human happiness.  Even that--human happiness, was to be understood as effectively driven by the proper set of values. And it appears that those driving global order development came close: capacity building and integration through highly networked international financial institutions; a movement toward a comprehensive and uniform internationalism as the primary source of the expression of normative convergence (and with it the triumph of international legality); and even the convergence of ideological systems with the expectation that despite national variation, all systems were inevitably moving toward globalized liberal democracy in which borders would become increasingly irrelevant, and culture like a set of clothes that can be worn or changed to suit the mood of the individual. 

By the end of the second decade of this century the great stress points of that system became impossible to ignore. Ideological differences became more than mere shades of convergence toward  a broad liberal democratic consensus.  Identitarian fractures produced a aggregation of polit6ical units even as political units converged in their approaches to governance. At the same time ethnos became a thing again--especially for traditionalists frightened both of the consequences of convergence, and the dangers of national fracture. Divergence was inevitable--and its leading forces became the leadership cores of the United States and China. They developed the template for detachment of what had been an intricately interwoven global system of production, in which borders became more important. This was layered on the reversal of the trend toward the porosity of national borders after the rise of non-state combatant communities and their successes on 11 September 2001. 

There was more, of course, but the tectonic movements that appeared to be moving solely toward convergence, coordination, and consensus, suddenly was not. And states (along with powerful enough non-state actors) could use the faith in convergence that produced sometimes deep patterns of dependency, to their advantage. Functional differentiation and specialization could serve as a good faith commitment to a unifying world; at the same time it could be weaponized by those with nio taste for convergence.

The Russo-Ukrainian war provided an excellent (through symptomatic) expression of these trajectories.  It was made more possible because of the personalities involved--and their ambitions.  Beyond its enormous human tragedy--the destruction of property, communities, ways of life and connectivity within communities that were interwoven if not always loving--was another tragedy, the acceleration of the trajectories of detachment. 

This time detachment occurs at a micro level. The Russian strategy of passport conquest (Passports as Pretext) has been used with at least a little success to detach populations from the states in which they were resident.  That was the tactic in Georgia. And it is now the tactic in Ukraine. Borders here are constructed one person at a time; they are built around the location of people and the management of their political identification.  It is no surprise then that a counter strategy is necessary.  And this one from the Ukrainian authorities may be more interesting than at first sight.  Surely it is meant to keep Russian citizens resident in pre-2014 Russia under better control.  But it also has application for those people, formerly Ukrainian nationals, who now hold Russian passports in Crimea, and in any other part of Ukrainian territory claimed by Russia.  With respect to them, the application of the new rules provides an opportunity to turn the instrumentation of nationality against the Russians themselves. This is necessary.  Nonetheless, a very aggressive process of application to Russian passport holders irrespective of former nationality will have to be sensitive to the potential to produce human rights harms. Deportation may  not be a plausible or human rights proactive consequence (at least of individuals who held Ukrainian nationality before 2014)--but monitoring and development of struct rules governing the rights of foreigners to participate in national life may well be on the table--along with systems of taxation, surveillance, monitoring, and access to security sensitive positions. That said, individual choices, including the choice of nationality, ought to have consequences when  not embraced because of circumstances or under duress.



 

Thursday, June 16, 2022

Joel Slawotsky on "Digital currencies and great power rivalry: China as a disseminator in the digital age"

 

Pix Credit here

Joel Slawotsky has just published a fascinating article:  "Digital currencies and great power rivalry: China as a disseminator in the digital age," Asia Pacific Law Review. The abstract nicely describes the object:

The United States reign as global hegemon has been empowered by massive structural power over key international economic, technological and ideological networks. As chief disseminator during the era of emerging computer technology and communications, the U.S. became a rules-maker, empowered to shape international governance in its favour. However, a new era of digitalized assets, transactions and networks will provide an opportunity for Central Bank Digital Currencies (‘CBDCs’) to constitute the technological-financial-business bones of the developing digitalized global economy. CBDCs will exert massive influence on the international economic, technological and ideological orders. Moreover, all of these impacts are inextricably connected to the hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China. Astutely, China has been developing the digital Yuan and is the first major economy to distribute a CBDC. If China’s CBDC successfully migrates to external usage, and depending upon the degree of crucial Chinese domestic reforms, the digital Yuan may offer an opportunity for China to be a disseminator in the digital age. Chinese influence over global networks and governance frameworks would vest China with advantageous structural power in the economic, technological and ideological spheres – the fulcrums of the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry.

And, indeed, what appears to be a reactionary turn in both political and bureaucratic elite politics in the United States--the backwards looking stubborn insistence that golden age narratives and suppositions still apply now twenty or more years after the collapse (by the hand of its creators) of that world--has produced substantial challenges for confronting contemporary challenges. That is the great potential tragedy of the United States in the New Era; an America that insists on building back better (Brief Refections on Emerging Global Trade Empires: From Trans Pacific Partnership to “Building Back Better” (B3W) in the Shadow of China's Belt & Road Initiative) rather than building forward. Professor Slawotsky well examines the dangers of this emerging governance culture for the foundations on which U.S. dominance is based. Digitalization within the public space, generally, and digitalized currency are critical components  of future economic activity.  The private sector understands this well within the liberal democratic camp and in the United States. The American public policy caste less so it seems. The opportunity it presents is real; and states like China will not hesitate to exploit faltering leadership to advance its own interests.  

The Introduction follows below.  The entire article is worth a careful read.  Whether one agrees with the details of digitalization; the reality is that absent some crisis of tragic proportion, currency digitalization is the future.  The United States,  to paraphrase Lee Iacocca now famous quip (“You lead, follow or get out of the way”), will by its actions choose to lead, follow or be pushed out of the way.



Wednesday, June 15, 2022

The Norwegian Pension Fund Global: Observation for risk of contributing to human rights abuses; Revocation of Exclusion for Severe Environmental Damage as a Reward for Divestment

 

Pix Credit here

 
Despite an Ethics Council recommendation for exclusion due to an unacceptable risk that the company is contributing to human rights abuses, Norges Bank announced its decision to place the company Supermax Corp Bhd (a Malaysian manufacturer of rubber gloves with several factories in Malaysia) under observation. The Council on Ethics issued its recommendation on exclusion on 24 February 2022. Norge Bank announced its decision to place the company under observation on 15 June 2022. Please find the Council’s recommendation here: https://etikkradet.no/supermax-corp-bhd-2/

Also, Norges Bank has announced its decision to revoke the exclusion of the company IJM Corp Bhd (a company involved in the conversion of tropical forest into oil palm plantations; the company seemed not to have implemented measures to reduce the loss of biodiversity). The company had been excluded under the criterion for severe environmental damage which was thereafter revoked when IJM divested its stake in its plantations business. Please find the Council’s recommendation here: https://etikkradet.no/ijm-corp-bhd-revocation-of-exclusion/

Superrmax Corp is particularly interesting  for what it suggests is the refinement of standards of risk in the context of human rights risk of corporate activity. In that case, having been accused of human rights abuses respecting their workers, the company announced a series of reforms.  But there was no satisfactory examination of implementation.  It is in that gap between announcement and implemention that risk resides; risk sufficient enough to warrant an assessment of exclusion. And that even that proves murky--at least with respect to the specific standards to be applied. The decision summary explains:

The Council takes a positive view of the measures the company has announced. However, the Council has not been able to assess the implementation of these measures, and it remains unclear whether the measures will reduce the risk of human rights abuse in the longer term. On this basis, the Council has concluded that the risk of future violations is unacceptably high.

As is becoming more common in these decisions, the Ethics Council--and the Pension Fund--are becoming more passive in the sense of relying on better funded and more aggressive regulators elsewhere.  In the case of Supermax, the Americans, Canadians, and British (see Opinion §3). That is not a bad thing, but it does raise the question of autonomy and control.  This becomes a more acute issue where reliance becomes dependent on press investigations (Ibid.). 

 For all that, the determination of Norges Bank to place the company under observation suggests at least some disquiet with the Ethics Council's approach.  That disquiet may not touch on the findings--in this case mostly derivative, bur rather on its application of the Ethics Guidelines, and more specifically on its standards for determining whether a company should be placed under observation or excluded. One of the more interesting developments in the operation of the Ethics Council has been the challenge it faces in developing robust standards for determining the factors it considers in making a determination of exclusion or observation. The Guidelines for observation and exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global provide little help. It would be helpful if the exe4rcise of discretion in these cases by both Ethics Council and Norges Bank might be better rationalized through a more public and precise set of standards for exercising judgment. 

In the IJM case, the revocation was a product of divestment.  No amount of reform might have been sufficient to overcome the presumptions of plantation agriculture as inherently environmentally damaging. And the criteria for preserving bio-diversity sufficiently enough to avoid an exclusion analysis remains undefined. Divestment appears to be the cure.  First, it appears that the continued invocati6on of qualitative assessment of quantitative issues produces a large space for abuse of discretion and little space for guidance. More importantly, perhaps, the response of the company suggests that the easiest way to avoid entanglement with the Pension Fund is to divest.  The result is not greater sensitivity to bio-diversity or better managed palm oil plantations. It produces instead the opposite effect--potentially. But now that potential remain opaque: by shifting plantation agriculture from the sphere of public scrutiny to that of private  operations less susceptible to public or investor pressure.

Both decisions are worth reading. In the end, though, each suggests, in its own way, good intentions without a guiding center. Each is the product of a system that is reduced to a faith in the episodic expression of good intentions but within a system that provides substantially little guidance to those who are blessed with the result--or to others seeking some measure of certainty and predictability. More troublesome is the unguided practice of decisions that veer in unpredictable ways veer between quantitative and qualitative measures, neither of them precisely defined. The result is the development of a decision context in which the accountability of the procedures of exclusion (and observation) themselves become fair game for analysis. It also raises the question of values and of autonomy.  It may be time to seriously consider a comprehensive revisiting the structure of the Ethics Council and decision making: starting with its foundational organization to the modalities of its decision analysis model. Periodic "guiding case" or exemplar actions like these no longer appear to have the impact they might have had a decade or more ago. Jurisprudence by example worked well enough under conditions of modernity--in an age of data driven accountability and compliance based measures, they appear not just inefficient, but increasingly irrelevant. The failure to embrace quantitative measures and platform or algorithmic methods severely impedes the work of the Ethics Council. It may be time to bring the structures of the good intentions of the Ethics Guidelines administration closer to the 21st century.

Tuesday, June 14, 2022

H.R.4521, the Bipartisan Innovation Act, Goes Forward--Detachment Between the US and Chinese Economies Takes Another Step Forward

 

Pix Credit HERE

 

"A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers said on Monday they had agreed on a proposal to give the government sweeping new powers to block billions in U.S. investment into China, though the measure is part of a broader bill with an uncertain future." (China investment curbs gain momentum in U.S. lawmaker talks). This has been in the works for some time (reporting HERE).  The object is to provide state guidance on the detachment of key elements pf the US economy (and its dependencies) from that of China, while leaving a smaller and more carefully targeted sphere of mutual engagement between the two imperial centers.

On 13 June 2022,U.S. Senators Bob Casey (D-PA) and John Cornyn (R-TX) and Representatives Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ), Michael McCaul (R-TX), Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) and Victoria Spartz (R-IN) released a joint statement on the new proposal for an outbound investment mechanism in the conference of H.R.4521, the Bipartisan Innovation Act. The Statement  follows:

“Over the last couple months, we have engaged in constructive discussions with stakeholders on developing a robust, targeted outbound investment mechanism to ensure the United States is not ceding its manufacturing power in industries critical to our economic and national security to foreign adversaries. The refined proposal released today has bipartisan, bicameral support and addresses industry concerns, including the scope of prospective activities, industries covered, and the prevention of duplicative authorities. This discussion draft aligns the United States with the outbound investment mechanisms of our allies. We look forward to meaningful engagement in writing from stakeholders as we work to secure this bill in the conference report. Creating an outbound investment review mechanism is a critical tool as Congress works to provide guardrails on taxpayer funds and safeguard our supply chains from countries of concern, including the People’s Republic of China.”(Joint Press Release)

Here for information on the Conference Committee on Bipartisan Innovation and Competition Legislation.

For the text in its current form and as introduced: here.

Monday, June 13, 2022

The Year of Due Diligence as a Legal Construct: Claire Methven O'Brien and Olga Martin-Ortega on "Commission proposal on corporate sustainability due diligence: analysis from a human rights perspective"

 


 2022 is shaping up to be the year of due diligence. This is an especially European project.  Unable to resist the temptation of legalizing the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, while ignoring the rationalization of a comprehensive and globally coherent practice of state duty to protect human rights, European states and the European Union have been at the forefront of using the concept of "due diligence as the turn key compliance based concept for the regulation of corporate regulation of its private law based governance systems through global production chains. Not that this is necessarily a bad thing.  Done correctly, the legalization of privately administered compliance and accountability based regimes of due diligence, through state based regal regimens is promising.  Such approaches, of course, have several challenges: (1) extraterritoriality and the constraints of blocking legislation; (2) respect for the corporate form across national boundaries; (3) choice of law and forum issues; (4) alignment of national with international standards (the "I will apply international standards as my national courts determine" syndrome); (5) coordination with bilateral other investment agreements; and (6) enforcement across borders.

It is in that context that Claire Methven O'Brien and Olga Martin-Ortega provide an excellent analysis on the EU's proposal for sustainable due diligence. The abstract of their work, "Commission proposal on corporate sustainability due diligence: analysis from a human rights perspective" explains:

On 23 February 2022, the European Commission (EC) published its proposal for a corporate sustainability due diligence directive. This In-depth Analysis for the European Parliament Sub-Committee on Human Rights (DROI) initially presents the EC proposal and its main features, contextualising these against broader European and international developments in business and human rights regulations. It then undertakes an in-depth comparative analysis of the EC’s 2022 draft Directive against (i) the position adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET/DROI) in its opinion for the Legal Affairs Committee of 25 November 2020; (ii) the final EP position as adopted in March 2021. This is followed by evaluation of the EC draft Directive’s approach on key elements relating to human rights and environmental due diligence from the point of view of human rights standards and in light of the rationale presented in the EC’s Impact Assessment Report (23 February 2022) and Annexes (29 March 2022). Overall, the analysis provides an assessment of the extent to which key positions of AFET/DROI and the Parliament regarding human rights due diligence, as well as relevant international and regional legal standards, policies and guidance, are either reflected in the EC draft Directive or might be better reflected in it. ("Commission proposal on corporate sustainability due diligence: analysis from a human rights perspective").

The analysis is worth a careful read.  It may be accessed HERE.



 

Saturday, June 11, 2022

Discussion Draft Posted for Comment: "Linking People to Governing Institutions Through Leninist Political Parties: 全过程民主 (Whole Process Democracy), Socialist Consultative Democracy, and 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System)"

 

 

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I take this opportunity to post for comment a discussion draft recently completed. The essay, Linking People to Governing Institutions Through Leninist Political Parties: 全过程民主 (Whole Process Democracy), Socialist Consultative Democracy, and 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System)," considers the development of a socialist theory of political parties within the an already quite important development of a Chinese Leninist theory of 'whole process democracy.' The embedding of the role of political parties within Leninist democratic theory sits at the nexus point of vanguard party theory, of the nature and role of representation within Leninist systems, of the relationship between endogenous (consultative) and exogenous (elections facilitated) forms of democratic expression, and most pointedly, of the differences between Leninist and liberal democratic forms of popular governance. The abstract provides some detail of the focus of the examination:

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The role of political parties in the Chinese democratic socialist political order has always been deeply misunderstood, even within Chinese academic and popular circles. The misunderstanding at a macro level is likely a product of great ideological battles of the last century between liberal democratic and Marxist Leninist approaches to the organization of states, the positioning of political authority and its exercise through political parties--mass collectives developed for that purpose. These organizational differences reflect an even deeper conceptual gap between the way that these ideologies construct and apply the notion of party within their democratic imaginaries. Though both systems use the same word to describe collective political organization—the ideological basis of the meaning of that term could not produce a greater distance in the way in which meaning is embedded in those terms. This study takes a deeper dive into the current elaboration of the political theory of Chinese socialist constitutional democracy, the role of political parties within it, and the connection between the people and both. To those ends, the study focuses on three key documents produced by the Chinese State Council: (1) 《中国新型政党制度》 (China's New Political Party System; 25 June 2021); (2) : 中国的民主 (China: Democracy That Works; 4 December 2021); and (3) [美国民主情况] (The State of Democracy in the United States; 5 December 2021). Through the lens of these contemporary elaborations of Chinese Marxist-Leninist theory, the study considers the hypothesis: ‘the emerging theory of Leninist political parties contributes to the development of a coherent theory of endogenous socialist constitutional democracy.’ It’s subsidiary hypothesis is that at least conceptually, the transformation of the ‘mass line’ principle into ‘whole process democracy’ provides a basis within Leninist political theory to link the people to their state institutions through the structuring of a system of well managed mass political organizations under the leadership of the vanguard.

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In the process of this examination, I hope to engage the following questions: (1) What are differences between exogenous and endogenous democratic constitutional orders? ; (2) What is the theoretical roles of parties within each linking people to governing institutions? ; (3) How does a Leninist conception of party fix into this framework; what are the differences and relation between a vanguard party and other political mass organizations?; (4) How does Leninist party system fit within conception of consultative democracy?; (5) The role of elections in endogenous democratic systems and the utility of the ‘mass line’ principle in connecting people to political organs; (6) Potential and challenges for Leninist party frameworks and constitutional consultative democracy frameworks in the operation of endogenous democratic systems; (7) implications and value for other (Asian) political systems especially in developing states.

The object of the essay is not to engage in political work. There is no aim to convince anyone of the superiority or value or legitimacy of one or another system. I do, however, examine  the coherence of the conceptual basis of the system (especially here relating to the role of political parties) as a function of the core animating principles around which the overall political-economic model is structured. To that end it is worth carefully considering the extent to which Chinese theory now suggests a coherent and well integrated conceptual basis, within the "life world" (rationalizing complex of foundational principles) of Leninism, of the role of political parties and of the system within which they operate. In the process it is also worth considering the potential extent to which that theory may prove both influential (abroad) and legitimating (within China). The focus is entirely theoretical--that is the study focuses on the development of the theoretical basis for political parties and whole process democracy. The great spaces between the ideal and its realization (like that gap within liberal democratic systems) is left for another time.

The Abstract and Introduction follow. The paper may be accessed and downloaded through SSRN HERE.

Friday, June 10, 2022