 |
| Pix credit here |
But here’s what this really means. It means that like millions and millions of Americans, President Trump loves this country and wants to see it do well in the world – not at the expense of others, but to the benefit of our people, and by extension, the nations that share our values and our strategic goals. It’s really that simple. If there is a natural law of foreign policy, this is it. And while he wishes every country enjoyed the freedoms we enjoy here, he has no aspiration to use force to spread the American model. You can see it in the administration’s record of its using force. I can prove it to you. And so – and so importantly − he believes America is exceptional – a place and history apart from normal human experience, the ones that our Founders spoke about. President Trump believes it is right – indeed more than right – for America to unashamedly advance policy that serves our interests and reflects American ideals. (Applause.) Certainly, our course of action in this administration reflects a gut-level – a gut-level – for love of country. But taking the pursuit of America’s interests up a notch is not just honorable; it’s urgent in this new era of great power competition. (Michael P. Pompeo, "A Foreign Policy From the Founding," Speech delivered at the Claremont Institute 40th Anniversary Gala , Beverly Wilshire Hotel, Beverly Hills, California, May 11, 2019)
I am happy to share with those interested the roughed out discussion draft of an article: The Conceptual Architecture of America First—Ideological Transactionalism and the Case of Cuba. The question considered goes to the ordering premises within which it is possible to rationalize and order our social and political systems--something that had been more or less stable since the middle of the last century:
How does one reboot the now traditional discursive tropes of sovereignty and the state system, one deeply embedded in the culture of States and memorialized initially in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, and one grounded in the protection of the internal affairs by states by others, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and self-determination; how does one engage in this sort of reboot in a context where the discursive tropes of sovereignty, have been dissipated by globalization--everyone, multinational enterprises (economic and societal, Apple Inc., and Amnesty Int'l), perhaps now have varying "rights" to auto-determination, if not territory; how does one do that rebooting where those old discursive tropes may now be perhaps dispositively displaced by the discourse of the transformation of the ordering premises of the global from one foregrounding institutions, management, and bureaucratic ordering within hierarchically arranged systems, to one embedded within an ethos of transactional discourse and the values that discourse represents?These are, indeed, a longish set of questions. They are perhaps also better understood as a challenge (for states and others) as the primary contradiction of international relations shifts from one grounded in the perfection of States, their system and their language/values (through Rule of Law infused tropes, to one in which merchants rather than bureaucrats might be more comfortable. It is made more difficult because even the old terms acquire ambiguity in the contemporary Cuban context (auto-determination including the Cuban diaspora?; for example).
Here is the abstract:
Since 2016 the conceptual basis of the foreign relations architecture of the United States has experienced a profound dialectic. On the one side is the contemporary product of a long evolution of conceptual premises that are grounded in the orienting conception of an institutional state overseen by an expert techno bureaucracy in the service of institutions around which political, economic, social, and cultural life is organized both domestically and in relations with other similarly organized institutions in the public and private sphere. This had produced both the deeply institutionally integrated systems of international organizations and of economic globalization around which the rules based legal order operated. On the other side were forces of opposition to this vision that emerged in a dominant form with the election of President Trump in 2016 and again in 2024. This oppositional vision was grounded in a rejection of centering the organization of collective life around and through institutions. It did not reject institutions as such; it sought to refocus the driving force of social organization from institutions to the transactions that with respect to which institutions and other actors. While this possible cognitive shift appears at first blush to be one of emphasis, its consequences can be significant. This essay has two objectives. The first is to sketch out the current framework of conceptual transactionalism around which America First is evolving. The second is to consider its application in the case of the Cuban crisis of 2026.
 |
| Pix credit here |
CONTENTS:
I. Introduction: Situating Cuba and the Caribbean Within America First
2. The Cognitive and Analytical Age that is America First.
A. Cognitive Typologies Need Archetypes: The "Merchant" (商) and the "Bureaucrat" (士)
B. The Primary Sources
i. National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) [NSS 2025].
ii. U.S. Department of State Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026)
iii. The 2026 National Defense Strategy
iv. Remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference.
C. The Parameters of Perception, Analysis and Policy.
i. Donald Trump, Presidential Memorandum: Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations.
ii. Marco Rubio, 100 Days of an America First State Department.
3. The Merchant/Transactional Approach to the problem of Cuba in 2026.
A. Prelude: The Merchant/Transactional Approach to the Cuban Problem Projected Back into History
B. The Template: Venezuela 2026.
C. Cuba Within the Transactional Institutional Lens.
4. Conclusions.
The discussion draft may be accessed HERE: America_First_Cuba_Transition_2026.
The Introduction and Conclusion follow below.
 |
| Pix credit here |
The Conceptual Architecture of America First—IdeologicalTransactionalism and the Case of Cuba
Larry Catá Backer[1]
ABSTRACT: Since 2016 the conceptual basis of the foreign relations architecture of the United States has experienced a profound dialectic. On the one side is the contemporary product of a long evolution of conceptual premises that are grounded in the orienting conception of an institutional state overseen by an expert techno bureaucracy in the service of institutions around which political, economic, social, and cultural life is organized both domestically and in relations with other similarly organized institutions in the public and private sphere. This had produced both the deeply institutionally integrated systems of international organizations and of e4conomic globalization around which the rules based legal order operated. On the other side were forces of opposition to this vision that emerged in a dominant form with the election of President Trump in 2016 and again in 2024. This oppositional vision was grounded in a rejection of centering the organization of collective life around and through institutions. It did not reject institutions as such; it sought to refocus the driving force of social organization from institutions to the transactions that with respect to which institutions and other actors. While this possible cognitive shift appears at first blush to be one of emphasis, its consequences can be significant . This essay has two objectives. The first is to sketch out the current framework of conceptual transactionalism around which America First is evolving. The second is to consider its application in the case of the Cuban crisis of 2026.
* * *
I. Introduction: Situating Cuba and the Caribbean Within America First
Cuba’s political-economic system is in crisis. That crisis has been generated by decades of ideological paralysis internally, and by sustained pressure from the Unted States and others . The Cubans appear to desire to retain their system unchanged from the time it reached an apex of development in the 1970s.[2]The United States has been committed to regime change since the 1960s and the establishment of the Cuban revolutionary regime and later its Marxist-Leninist system. This survived changes in U.S. presidential administrations and their contrasting ideologies. It was evident even in the remarks of President Obama at a time when there was an effort at opening up and accommodation.[3] But the dynamic changed rapidly with the start of the 2nd Trump Administration in 2025. By January 2025, the U.S. Administration had intervened to change the governance of Venezuela, significantly limiting the supply of petroleum to Cuba at a time when its infrastructure, through years of neglect, had begun to collapse in ways that defied repair. After January 2026 the Trump Administration appeared to intensify its pressure on Cuba. It sought to impose tariffs of states supplying petroleum to Cuba and began negotiations with elements of the Cuban leadership for changes . The US began supplying petroleum to the private sector though.[4] The situation remained fluid by the start of April 2026. The Cubans sought to provide enough reform to preserve their political economic model without much change,[5] while also producing changes at the margins.[6] Other states sought to alleviate the situation with humanitarian aid,[7] including limited supplies of petroleum.[8] By the end of March 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump was quoted as suggesting that "Cuba is next" during a speech at an investment forum in Miami during which he touted the successes of U.S. military action in Venezuela and Iran.[9]
All of this is quite interesting in itself. It is more interesting still as elements of a distinct way of approaching issues of relations between States. On this, more general, level, the US engagement with Cuban transition may be symptomatic of a perhaps much more profound transition that has been emerging within the United States, and which is proving to have substantial consequences globally. At the same time, it suggests the difficulties in deal making where the fundamental approach to framing, understanding, and approaching values based resolution of conflict differ in fundamental respects. As the American administration shifts its fundamental orientation for framing the world, and then deploys its legalities and politics to the fulfillment of the ends premised within that framework, other states continue to embrace the older fundamental world rationalizing orientation—one grounded in the primacy of institutions, and institutions managers as both the primary vehicle for the fulfillment of national objectives, overseen by a techno-bureaucracy interconnected with their peers in other institutions. While the United States now begins to frame its law and relations in fulfillment of a basic need to protect and enhance deal making, transactions, which in the aggregate serve society, Cuba, among others, continues to frame its politics, law, and approaches to relations with others (and their own people) in fulfillment of the basic operating premise that institutional organs serve as the building blocks of a well-managed society overseen and curated through increasingly inter-connected and techno-bureaucracies who serve the interests of a society now arranged as the objects of the institutions that serve them.
The Cuban situation provides a quite useful space within which it is possible to understand the consequences and behaviors driven by bureaucratic/institutional cognitive frameworks and those driven by the merchant/transactional one. The Cuban situation will resolve itself one way or another, either by following patterns now well developed in its current form from 1959,[10] or breaking them and producing some sort of transition. That current (and recurring) Cuban crisis, however, might also be used to understand the fundamental shift in the cognitive premises[11] under or through which American foreign policy is understood, analyzed, and the range of plausible approaches developed and applied. It is that shift, understood through the lens of the Cuban transition crisis of 2026, that is the subject of this essay.
Since 2016 the conceptual basis of the foreign relations architecture of the United States has experienced a profound dialectic and their conceptual basis, the “taken for granted assumptions at the core of social action.”[12] On the one side is the contemporary product of a long evolution of conceptual premises that are grounded in the orienting conception of an institutional state overseen by an expert techno bureaucracy in the service of institutions around which political, economic, social, and cultural life is organized both domestically and in relations with other similarly organized institutions in the public and private sphere. This had produced both the deeply institutionally integrated systems of international organizations and of economic globalization around which the rules based legal order operated. For the last generation or so one spoke to a cognitive cage the framing of which was built around the premises of institutionalism.[13] This was the “new world order”[14] at the “end of history.”[15] One did not, however, build the architectures of behavior around national institutions but rather around the notion of networks; the way in which institutions responded to governance challenges that retained the institution, and its techno-bureaucracies, at its center.[16] These networks might be of the governments or states, or increasingly if actors and institutions within states and international public and private organizations with substantial interconnection among themselves.[17] These could be understood in a variety of ways. Anne Marie Slaughter suggested resilience, task, and scale networks.[18] However one understood this, the foundational premises of relations was focused on institutions; not just institutions but their networks; and perhaps, not just institutions but systems, the structural couplings of which could be understood, in a more popularizing way, as “network.”[19]
On the other side were forces of opposition to this vision. There were a number of variations, especially within academic debates.[20] IN 2016 what appeared to animate them all was the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its institutional/normative significance. “The centering of transnational orders, of marginalization of transparency and engagement by states founded on a governing ideology of engagement and transparency, and the construction of governance orders beyond states and their democratic sovereign masses in which states and enterprises would become the major stakeholders enraged many—on both left and right in the United States.”[21] One approach to such opposition, however, has come to dominate the field with the election of President Trump in 2016 and again in 2024.[22] This oppositional vision was grounded in a rejection of centering the organization of collective life around and through institutions. It did not reject institutions as such; it sought to refocus the driving force of social organization from institutions to the transactions that with respect to which institutions and other actors. While this possible cognitive shift appears at first blush to be one of emphasis, its consequences can be significant.[23]
This essay has two objectives. The first is to sketch out the current framework of conceptual transactionalism around which America First is evolving. The second is to consider its application in the case of the Cuban crisis of 2026. Section 2, which follows, provides a brief discussion of the emerging parameters of the new American transactionalist framework, drawing on recent original sources from Trump Administration officials and what may be key public facing documents. Together with the National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025),[24] and the U.S. Department of State Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026),[25] the 2026 National Defense Strategy[26] rounds out the elaboration of the America First basic political line of the Republic when it comes to the role and focus of the Republic's external relations with its (re) focus on the general contradiction of the Republic in its "new era of historical development" from the now foundational orienting lens of the protection and elaboration of a transactional ordering framework--the fundamental need of ensuring peace (the territorial space of a transactional universe projected outward and directed inward) for the appropriate forward movement along the path to the realization of the Republic's rebirth in its new golden age. These are then rationalized within the discursive framework developed by Secretary of State Rubio in his 2026 Address to the Munich Security Organization 14 February 2026.[27]
Section 3 then applies these to the Cuban crisis of 2026 and the American response. These are woven around the discourse of confrontation and negotiation between the United States and Cuba after the rendition of Mr. Maduro from Venezuela suggested the character and context of US engagement in the Caribbean. It is one distinctively different from the traditional institutionalist approaches. An example of its advanced discursive elaboration is exemplified by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Address to the Munich Security Organization 14 February 2026.[28]
What appears to be emerging in the United States, and its trajectories or even its longevity remain open questions, but let's assume it is emerging for the moment, is something that in some ways in quite distinct. I have been referring to it as a merchant-type cognitive cage. It is one that is not organized around managing but rather foregrounds transactions, as a consequence of which orderliness is necessary and a certain amount of stability, but stability and order are understood differently by a merchant than by a vanguardist bureaucrat. It is one that accepts territory and categorization, but is indifferent to their character except to the extent they are useful in organizing transactions and maximizing their value. Territories and official are useful servants as long as they serve the transaction. And the most effective public official is one that is the transactional-protector-in-chief. In this conceptual cage every concept can and must be bent to the transaction and, beyond the transaction, becomes malleable, its character and importance a function of its value in transaction. At the same time there is nothing inherently permanent of distinctive about categories. In this world, experts are useful but they are commodities whose value lies in their expertness, but who are not understood as capable of driving transactions--just in undertaking them. Managerialism is what is necessary to operationalize the stable platforms maintained for the consumption and production of the "means of production" (of culture, knowledge, society, politics, economics, etc.) the purpose of which (the rules of the game of transactions) is never left to techno-managers but to those whose role it is to drive transactions within and for whatever transactional culture/objective/expectations they operate in (and might transform if they are capable).
The discussion that follows, then, is neither an invitation to love or hate or be indifferent to the cognitive structures within which it is possible to elaborate a reality within which it is possible to organize collective life "naturally." The discussion is an invitation to encounter and understand that relevance and character of these cognitive structures. It is, as well, an invitation to consider the effects of these perspective lenses that these cognitive cages produce and the way they can result in quite different perception (and assessments) of any action, condition, or "fact."[29]
* * *
4. Conclusions.
How does one reboot the now traditional discursive tropes of sovereignty and the state system, one deeply embedded in the culture of States and memorialized initially in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, and one grounded in the protection of the internal affairs by states by others, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and self-determination; how does one engage in this sort of reboot in a context where the discursive tropes of sovereignty, have been dissipated by globalization--everyone, multinational enterprises (economic and societal, Apple Inc., and Amnesty Int'l), perhaps now have varying "rights" to auto-determination, if not territory; how does one do that rebooting where those old discursive tropes may now be perhaps dispositively displaced by the discourse of the transformation of the ordering premises of the global from one foregrounding institutions, management, and bureaucratic ordering within hierarchically arranged systems, to one embedded within an ethos of transactional discourse and the values that discourse represents?
These are, indeed, a longish set of questions. They are perhaps also better understood as a challenge (for states and others) as the primary contradiction of international relations shifts from one grounded in the perfection of States, their system and their language/values (through Rule of Law infused tropes, to one in which merchants rather than bureaucrats might be more comfortable. It is made more difficult because even the old terms acquire ambiguity in the contemporary Cuban context (auto-determination including the Cuban diaspora?; for example).
In the face of a rules based multilateral order, the United States appears to be shifting toward a publicly guided but privately fulfilled, and in the fulfilling driven, multilateral order. It is grounded in values proper to transactional world ordering: (1) autonomy, at least autonomy within contextual and temporal constraints (bound up in its public institutional narratives of "sovereignty"); (2) values based transactional rule making that furthers interest with echoes of the Caribbean socialist variation of public driven "complementarity" in intergovernmental relations (now bound up in the narratives grounded in the ordering premise of iterative "transaction", of requiring value (an internal measure) for effort, from NATO membership, to the need to project power into territorial spaces used against interests); and (3) that, like the automated decision making systems that are increasingly coded into all aspects of collective life, and like the basic cognitive framework for artificial intelligence (AI) based systems that public regulation and the theories used to drive, global engagement is meant to be framed within an endless iterative inductive process driven by pragmatics and guided though not directed from the articulation of vision of "meaning" of temporally shifting aggregations of action. That is that multilateral activity, and especially those sub-national and transnational actions that manifest and realize these activities, are understood, at least subconsciously (modern political administrations, nor their techno-bureaucratic vanguardists, are particularly good at theory), (a) as block chain temporal sequences of aggregated individuated economic transactions (tariffs, natural resources, exploitation of labor and production), (b) the blockchain nodes, the aggregation of data (activity) from which they are constructed, their housing (institutional organs, for example), and their inter-actions, serve as the data ecologies from out of which self-referencing but constantly changing generalized observations, sometimes passing for theories of this or that, may be extracted as a guide for rationalizing (for the ambitious managing, for the truly ambitious bending these flows to their rationalizations), and (c) this self-referencing dialectic then produces the "signal" or for others a "flow" of data that feeds and becomes its own analytics, and the premises extracted from which can guide choices in future engagements that flow with, against, around, or beyond.[1]
These changes and contradictions were exposed both in the policy toward Venezuela and the extraction of Mr. Madura , and then in the way that the US approached its policy in Cuba. In both cases the object was interest based analysis rather than politics; it was in transactional spaces rather than ideological or institutional spaces; and it was in interaction that produced positive impact rather than in control or management. Dominance remains an important element of the transactional lens. But where dominance was driven by politics and normative orders under the olde institutionalist framework, what is becoming clear is that dominance is now a function of transactional productivity and production opportunities, In this the effect has been to bring China and the US closer in effective functional operation, even as China continues to embrace the rhetoric of public ordering (grounded in its strong alignment with political-institutionalist lens) while the United States embraces the rhetoric of interest analysis driven by transactional interactions rather than institutional ones.
[1] On the nature of "signal" and "flow" see e.g. Larry Catá Backer, The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, and the “Human” Condition: An Encounter with Jan M. Broekman, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversion (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023), 37 Int J Semiot Law 969–1083 (2024).
[1] W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar; Professor of Law and International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University. Originally presented as remarks prepared for delivery at the 2025 Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, Florida, 25 October 2025 (extended and lightly annotated from the text as delivered). Great thanks to my research assistant Daniil Rose (BS, MIA Penn State expected 2027).
[2] Larry Catá Backer, Cuba’s Caribbean Marxism: Essays on Ideology, Government, Society, and
Economy in the Post Fidel Castro Era (Little Sir Press, 2018).
[3] Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba (22 March 2016); available [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/22/remarks-president-obama-people-cuba].
[5] Government of the Republic of Cuba, Programa Económico y Social del Gobierno 2026; available [https://www.presidencia.gob.cu/static/assets/gpdf/1_prog_gob.pdf].
[6] Cuba releases over 2,000 prisoners amid mounting US pressure, Al Jazeera (3 April 2026); available [https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/4/3/cuba-releases-over-2000-prisoners-amid-mounting-us-pressure].
[7] EU announces a further $2.3 million in humanitarian aid for Cuba (1 April 2026).
[8] Russian oil tanker begins discharging cargo in Cuba's Matanzas terminal; President Sheinbaum defends Mexico's right to supply oil to Cuba
[10] Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little Brown , 1971).
[11] Cf., Scott Soames, Cognitive Propositions, 27 Philosophy of Language 479-501 (2013) (how things bear specific properties because the propositions they entertain do, pp. 443-4); Oleksandr Kolesnyk, The Cognitive Premises of Myth-Oriented Semiosis, 19 Cognitive Studies/Étudess cognitives 1-11 (2019); available [https://doi.org/10.11649/cs.1916] (address the phenomenon of alternative ways of construing the world as a result of semio- /noematic genesis, the latter also being the premise of texts generated in specific contexts (related to corresponding discourse types. . . Mental models representing abstract irrational entities: 1) comprise hierarchical blocks that come in and out of an individual’s focus; 2) dynamically follow the interpreter’s pragmatic objectives; 3) can be re-arranged and re-structured.” Ibid., pp. 1, 5).
[12] Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Theories of Organization, 13 Am. Rev. Sociol. 443-464 , 443(1987).
[13] See, e.g., Paul Pierson, and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science.” Political Science: The State of the Discipline 693–721 (I. Katznelson and H. V. Milner. (eds), New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2002); Edwin Amenta, “State-Centered and Political Institutionalist Theory: Retrospect and Prospect.” Pp. 96–114 in Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization 94-114 (T. Janoski, R. Alford, A. Hicks, and M. A. Schwartz (eds); New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[14] Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2005).
[15] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992).
[16] Andrew Jordan and Adriaaan Schout, The Coordination of the European Union: Exploring the Capacities of Networked Governance (OUP, 2006).
[17] See, e.g., John Boli and George M. Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture” 13–49 in Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875, 13-49 (J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds); Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).Generally, Anne Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: Power in a Networked Century, 88(1) Foreign Affairs 94-113 (2009).
[18] See, Gabriel A. Huppé, Heather Creech, Doris Knoblauch, The Frontiers of Networked Governance,” IISD Report (February 2012); available [https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/frontiers_networked_gov.pdf], Anne Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World ((Yale University Press, 2017).
[19] See especially Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (John Bednarz, Jr., and Dirk Baecker (trans)Stanford University Press, 1995).
[20] Christopher Carrigan, and Cary Coglianese, The Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance, 14 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 107-129 (2011).
[21] See, Larry Catá Backer, "Let's Make a Deal" as Economic Policy, Jurist—Academic Commentary (29 December 2016); available [https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2016/12/backer-lets-make-a-deal/].
[22] Cf., Philip Dandolov, The Insistence on Transactonalism and Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy—Some Long Term Risks and Disconnects, 70(1) Knowledge –International Journal 87-93(2025).
[23] See, e.g., Goran Ilik, Artur Adamczyk, The EU’s Compensatory Power Amid Global Transactionalism, 1 Journal: Studia Europejskie 155-171 (2025); ChuChu Zhang and Sujata Ashwarya, Rising Asian transactionalist players in the Middle East: deciphering the roles of China and India in the Persian Gulf, International Relations, available [https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178241231719]; Lak Chansok, Hegemonic Stability Theory: Trump’s Transactional Hegemony and the Cambodia-Thailand Border Dispute. E-International Relations (8 August 2025); available [https://www.e-ir.info/2025/08/08/hegemonic-stability-theory-trumps-transactional-hegemony-and-the-cambodia-thailand-border-dispute/.]
[25] Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026)
[27] U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference, Remarks (14 February 2026); available [https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-the-munich-security-conference].
[28] U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference, Remarks (14 February 2026); available [https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-the-munich-security-conference].
[29] See, e.g., Sophie M. A. Wallace-Hadrill and Sunjeev K. Kamboj , The Impact of Perspective Change As a Cognitive Reappraisal Strategy on Affect: A Systematic Review, 7 Front. Psychol. 1715 (2016); available [doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01715. PMID: 27867366; PMCID: PMC5095639].
No comments:
Post a Comment