(© Carter County Detention Center via AP This Thursday, Aug. 3, 2015 photo made available by the Carter County Detention Center shows Kim Davis. From Adam Beam, Kentucky clerks to license marriages as their boss is jailed, AP through MSN, Sept. 3, 2015)
It was expected that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Obergefell vs. Hodges would produce push back along religious lines.Many across the globe have been following what has become the spectacle of an elected official of the state of Kentucky refuse to abide by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of her duties--in this case to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples (see here).
Most people seem to agree that the county clerk, Kim Davis, ought to be required to fulfill the functions of her office. Many probably believe that the contradictions between the duties of the office and her religious beliefs should have been resolved by her resignation--thereby preserving her beliefs intact and not interfering with the beliefs of others now entitled to protection.
But that is not the way events have progressed. Having been abandoned by the courts to which she turned for the vindication of her substantive right to either (1) assert a duty to avoid application of a constitutional interpretation and any law grounded therein which she believes is unconstitutional (compliance with which would force her to violate her oath of office); or (2) assert a right to dissent from the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court, absolving her from issuing marriage licenses that violate her religious beliefs, Ms. Davis chose to engage in an act of civil disobedience. She chose to defy court orders to do her duty as the elected clerk and issue marriage licenses.
To no one's surprise, this has infuriated the judge whose order she defies now on religious grounds. Because she both refused to issue licenses or to allow officials in her employ to do so, the judge incarcerated Ms. Davis. (Adam Beam, Kentucky clerks to license marriages as their boss is jailed, AP through MSN, Sept. 3, 2015).
This post considers the consequences for the continuing national discussion about the relationship between the state, the individual, religious belief, and religious institutions. My sense is that the court, while technically within its authority to use its power of contempt, undermined its authority by doing so. It might have been better, and especially in cases involving religious dissent, to consider the legal capacity of the actor in her ministerial role rather than asserting a power of contempt over the person for the exercise of her personal religious convictions.






