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| Pix credit here (Hogarth, the Bench 1758) |
One of the great taboos of contemporary discussion revolves around the narratives of courts and their role within the political system of this (or in variation any) liberal democratic republic. There are many excellent reasons, rooted in history, but also in the development of the normative bedrock on which the American Republic has been erected, for both the development of this narrative and its protection. Foremost among these untouchable narrative premises (again on which our cognitive cage of all things judicial are grounded) are notions of (1) judicial neutrality (bounded by the disciplinary power of appeal, the role of precedent, rules of statutory construction bounded at some level by text, the requirement for decisions reasoning, the customs of deep embedding within jurisprudential conversations, and the threat of impeachment or removal), of (2) limited powers (bounded by politically and constitutionally derived notions of jurisdiction), and of (3) a limited and rationalized framework from exercising a remedial authority.
That remedial authority, of course, has been evolving over the course of the last century and into this one. It has been moving from its centering in notions of post facto compensation of some sort (built into ideologies manifested in case or controversy limitations on bringing claims grounded in injury) and of the inherent limitations of the judicial power (grounded in history and tradition, and more recently around issues touching on separation of powers at the federal level) toward the sensibilities and broadening scope of remedial authority increasingly built into equitable remedies. By the end of the 20th century, the authority of courts to "do right" by infusing traditional forms of equity with new vigor and extending the scope equitable orders in time and place, courts increasingly bumped up against questions of the limits of remedial authority. And not just with respect to equity. Traditional notions of punitive damages, for example, have also been the subject of jurisprudential discussion. The development of a reinvigorated jurisprudence of official abuse of discretion (with a private sector analogue in breach of fiduciary duty), deploying at times bot the sensibilities of equity and its remedial palette continues into current times
There are many many reasons for this evolution. Some of it might be traced to the great social movements of the 20th century and the evolution of notions of equality and "right" with respect to identity issues. Some of it rooted in the relative efficiency of seeking remedy in courts rather than through the legislative or administrative authority of the political branches. Some of it focused--and now increasingly so--on the use of the courts against the state and its apparatus itself. The courts, generally, have been welcoming, and most social organs have acquiesced--perhaps reflecting evolving tastes for the practice of separation of powers in the US, and perhaps reflection willingness to judicialize disputes and conversations that had, in another age, been resolved within non political spheres, or which had focused energies on the political branches. The mountain of academic attention to the phenomenon, as well as (increasingly) academic sector advocacy around these (discerned) trends--and the construction of narratives of progress or threat built around them have occupied much space in those sectors in a way that might suggest that wit respect to courts, at least, political discussion has assumed a techno-bureaucratic and elite character which separates the debate "that counts" from the masses who are expected to receive the products of these debates and then exercise their (limited) franchise accordingly. That is fair, one can suppose, given the transformation of both governance and political tastes for popular involvement. But the opposite is also fair. The absence of any sort of popular discussion about the nature and extent of jurisdiction, equity, and its remedial palette, in this respect might be lamented in a Republic that is supposed to be popular--or it might suggest that, as in the 18th century, popular meant masses guided by those whose social (and now economic and technical) positions suggest a position of authority to lead and guide.
Nonetheless, while the focus might be on the judge, the lawyer plays a substantial role both in the evolution of judicial practice and in shaping the "fact bundles" through which this jurisprudence is developed. Lawyers have helped shaped the current culture and understanding of the judge and the judicial function. They have helped empower and enlarge the role of the courts not merely as sites for the resolution of private disputes, but also as sites for the articulation and resolution of political issues with respect to which the political branches may not be as helpful. Sometimes this requires action against the State; sometimes it requires actions in court to reconcieve law (text of common law/equity) in ways that serve social, cultural, political and other goals. In the process the scope and practice of politics has also been reshaped, and with it the role of lawyers and the understanding of what rule of law means, both with respect to "rule" and "law." (My earlier discussion Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law and the Interpretive Process;Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges). Judges make and shape; lawyers facilitate; these shape their relationship with the political apparatus of the state and in the process embeds them within it as both legal and political actors. That suggests, in turn, obligation, duty, and constraint under law.
It comes as no surprise that the objects of all of this activity in the courts, especially officials in the executive branch and its organs, and of the lawyers that fuel them, have sometimes found the divergence of what it might prefer to be political issues into courts to be either an annoyance or a threat. The current administration is no exception. Yet the intensification of these efforts, and their success, in the 21st century, inevitably would invite push back. And so, in that spirit, it is also no surprise that President Trump has issued an Executive Order on 11 March, Ensuring the Enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), one that represents what is likely to be the first salvo in this "conversation" about the exercise of equity remedies in the courts. What has most annoyed this Administration (like its predecessors to some extent) has been the increasing effective effort to induce lowest level courts considering an issue within their jurisdiction to issue equitable permanent or provisional) with nationwide effect. The counter thrust by the Trump administration is, as a function of their level of annoyance, fairly mild--to insist that such injunctive orders include security equal to the full costs of potential damage to the State.
That requires application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65( c) cover the full amount of potential injury to the state:
(c) SECURITY. The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. The United States, its officers, and its agencies are not required to give security.
Of course, the Administration means to push the courts to focus on the potential costs to the State as they determine the extent to which they will issue injunctions and restraining orders under FRCP 65; and they may desire to use Mr. Trump's Memorandum as the basis for forcing situations that can be used to take refusals to require giving full and adequate security as a means of testing the limits of the proper exercise of judicial discretion under FRCP 65 (and also FRCP 65.1 on actions against security providers). The issues are not entirely hypothetical. There is caselaw, or at least discussion (however authoritative one wants to make it) in which judges have argued that it is within their discretion to require a security equal to no money.
[t]he law is clear that a federal district court has broad discretion to set a bond amount as the court sees fit and may waive a security requirement altogether as Judge Vorhees did here. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 332 (4th Cir. 2013)(citation omitted); see also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir. 1988)("posting of a bond is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the validity of a preliminary injunction"); Clarkson Co, v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2nd Cir. 1976)("[B]ecause, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, the amount of any bond to be given upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, the district court may dispense with the filing of a bond." (citations omitted). (Bolier & Co., LLC v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc., 2015 NCBC 52; cited in Something That You Might Not Have Known About Injunctions (JD Supra).
Here the equity power of the courts meets the discretionary power of the judge in determining the equities of compliance with rules limiting the extent of equity remedial power. Whatever happens, it is clear that this is another issue that litigants will have to contend with as they choose when and whether to take their disputes with the Trump administration to the courts, the streets, the States, or Congress. The object, of course, is to make the "real costs" of litigation more transparent and to shift that cost, or the risk of incurring that cost, more fully onto those who seek injunctive relief or restraining orders.The effect may be to reduce the willingness of litigants to seek these orders or perhaps to seek these orders with nationwide effect. For the political classes the question is whether or to what extent such actions are to be encouraged or discouraged when the object of the litigation is the state itself.
Nonetheless, the real object of this effort may not be primarily the litigants but the judicial system itself --lawyers and judges--and their jurisprudence and practice with respect to FRCP 65 injunctions and restraining orders. In his 6 March 2025 "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Ensures the Enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)" the President made this clear in suggesting the rationale and approach that is carried forward to the 11 March 2025 Memorandum. The three rationales: (1) ensuring accountability in federal courts (2) ensuring government serves the American people; and (3) ensuring accountability clarify the nature of the objectives of which these actions forms a part.
With respect to accountability, the "Fact Sheet" focuses on the determination of an accurate assessment of financial harm borne by the State in the context of injunctive or restraining order relief. Here the issues of good faith and the methodologies used to calculate injury will be at issue. The object is to increase the costs of such litigation to reduce the potential for what the State might view as frivolous claims. The larger issue, of course, is whether the State can be said to suffer financial harm in such cases. With respect to accountability, the focus turns directly to judges, and indirectly to lawyers. "Unelected district judges have issued sweeping injunctions beyond their authority, inserting themselves into executive policymaking and stalling policies voters supported. Activist groups file meritless suits for fundraising and political gain, facing no consequences when they lose, while taxpayers bear the costs and delays." (Fact Sheet:).
With respect to judges the claim focuses on abuse of discretion and separation of powers--but mostly abuse of discretion that creates a separation of powers issue. With respect to lawyers, the issue turns on the ethics of representation where the lawyer might or ought to know that the claim is frivolous. This, in turn, enlarges an much older debate about the ethical obligations of lawyers to represent and their duty (if any) to effectively avoid making frivolous claims. The issue, though has tended to turn on intent and a wide margin of error has been permitted (Cf., Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from Perkins Coie LLP). But the size of that margin of error and the extent of the due diligence obligations of lawyers before they take on a case that might be frivolous may be in the cross hairs of this policy. It is possible to the development of new rules of facilitation that is emerging in transnational law might find a home in this new regulatory space. Whatever the source, however, the risk of representation will likely increase, and with it the greater the likelihood of substantially enhanced due diligence requirements--without for the moment any safe harbor.
The last targets judges--and the jurisprudence of the extent of the judiciary's equity powers: "Multiple Supreme Court justices have recently warned that “single district-court judges” acting outside their judicial power are “abusing” the power entrusted to them." (Fact Sheet). Again the two issues align--aone, buse of discretion (here the allusion to incompetent judges in the (Fact Sheet); two, the constitutional limits of the judiciary's equity powers. The former, in normal curse, might hint at a much more aggressive use of the impeachment power (with pressure for the judiciary to better police its own house). These issues then touch on judicial independence and its limits in ways that have not been discussed for a very long time. The later brings back a discussion about the scope of equity power that had last been contentiously debated during the era of judicial oversight of school integration cases (e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1976)) but also in play in cases involving other areas, for example elections: Race, "The Race," and the Republic: Re-conceiving Judicial Authority After Bush v. Gore). Here it is possible that new context will breath new life into old cases; or that old cases will be the springboard for some quite different jurisprudence. The safer course would be to transpose emerging abuse of discretion jurisprudence from the administrative state to the judiciary--but such a transposition would harm the narrative of the judicial power as sui generis. And always, the lawyer in the middle.
These efforts will not go unchallenged. In addition to the expected litigation, the American Bar Association has issued several statements advancing their own view of the nature of the judicial power, the character of the law disputes about which the courts oversee, and the role of the lawyer. See, e.g., The ABA supports the rule of law (10 February 2025); and The ABA rejects efforts to undermine the courts and the legal profession (3 March 2025). The legalization of politics, and the judicialization of political disputes again advances its forms and characteristics in this new era (see further: "With the rarest of exceptions": Statement of the Association of American Law Schools on Executive Branch Compliance With Court Orders and Text of ABA Statement "The ABA Supports the Rule of Law").
The text of Ensuring the Enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Ensures the Enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)", and Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from Perkins Coie LLP; The ABA supports the rule of law (10 February 2025); and The ABA rejects efforts to undermine the courts and the legal profession (3 March 2025) follow below.

















