Thursday, August 07, 2025

Call for Interest, Section 23 (Ceremonies and Rituals of Authority in Legal and Political Systems)--International Handbook of Legal Language and Communication: From Text to Semiotics

 

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With my my co-editors,  Martin Belov, and Mirosław Michał Sadowski, we are delighted to share with you this "Call for Interest" in participating in Section 23 of the International Handbook of Legal Language and Communication: From Text to Semiotics--Ceremonies and Rituals of Authority in Legal and Political Systems. The Call follows; Please contact us if interested or with questions.

 

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LEGAL LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION - FROM TEXTS TO SEMIOTICS 

https://meteor.springer.com/ihllc

Call for Interests – Section 23: Ceremonies and Rituals of Authority in Legal and Political Systems

Editors: Larry Catá Backer; Martin Belov, and Mirosław Michał Sadowski


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We invite scholars, practitioners, and interdisciplinary researchers to express interest in contributing to Section 23: Ceremonies and Rituals of Authority in Legal and Political Systems This section explores the ceremonial and ritualistic practices that underscore transitions of authority and power in legal and political systems.

The performance of the authority of law has been an essential element to the construction not just of law and legal text (in the ceremonials of enactment; transpositions to code and code books, and oral textualism), but also of the processes around the resolution of legal disputes among private litigants, and the assertion of public power in courts, and before other hearings tribunals.  The ceremonials touch not just in performance but also in performers—officials, judges, and layers, principally but not exclusively. It also touches on the event itself—the hearing, the pre hearing processes of evidence gathering and at the initial stages the ceremonials of jurisdiction, process and initiation.  It focuses on the symbolic, cultural, and historical dimensions of such events, including presidential inaugurations, judicial inductions, and the nomination of key figures. These rituals serve as public affirmations of legitimacy and continuity, blending tradition with the evolving needs of governance.

The section examines the semiotics of these ceremonies—the gestures, symbols, attire, and spaces that communicate authority and inspire trust. Through comparative analysis and case studies, it highlights the global diversity in practices while emphasizing their shared significance in upholding legal and political order.

We welcome expressions of interest from those exploring the following (and related) themes: 

1.     Symbolism in Ceremonial Practices:

Examination of oaths, attire, gestures, and artifacts (e.g., constitutions, gavels) as symbols of power and commitment.

2.     Ceremonial Spaces and Public Participation:

The role of architectural and public settings in legitimizing authority and engaging audiences.

3.     Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspectives: 

Evolution of ceremonial practices across time and their adaptation in various legal and political traditions.

4.     Media and the Modern Spectacle of Rituals:

Impact of digital and broadcast media in amplifying the reach and significance of these events.

5.     Case Studies of Iconic Ceremonies:

Analysis of landmark inaugurations, inductions, and enthronements as transformative events in governance.

 This section emphasizes critical, comparative, and interdisciplinary approaches. We encourage submissions from legal scholars, sociologists, political scientists, economists, anthropologists, historians, and sport management researchers, among others.

Whether you are engaging with case law, regulatory analysis, ethnography, or normative theory, this section offers a platform to explore how law shapes—and is shaped by—the global game beyond the whistle.

To express your interest, please submit a short abstract (approx. 250 words) outlining your proposed contribution, along with a brief bio, by 20 September 2025.

For inquiries and submissions, contact the Section Editors, Larry Catá Backer; Martin Belov, and Mirosław Michał Sadowski , at lac11[AT]psu.edu.

Join us in rethinking the legal architecture of sport—its power plays, its promises, and its profound consequences.

 

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Tuesday, August 05, 2025

Open for Registration--United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights; Geneva 24-26 November 2025

 

Happy to pass along notice of the scheduling of the 2025 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights.  This year the BHR Forum takes place on 24-26 November (in the U.S. Thanksgiving Day occurs on 27 November this year). The theme for this year is "Accelerating action on business and human rights amidst crises and transformations." The Concept Note explains: "The goal is for participants  to leave the Forum with new perspectives on how to navigate these difficult times, creating hope for the future of business and human rights and renewed commitments for action." (Concept note: PDF | Word)

For those who can attend a marvelous venue for connecting with the many others who are engaged in work in the field of business and human Rights. 

The Secretariat of the Forum received a very large number of submissions from a range of stakeholders. Please note that due to the current financial situation and related limited resources, this year’s Forum will feature a reduced number of agenda slots.

 The Concept Note for 2025 follows.

 Registration visathis link: Open

 

Reflections on "'Accelerating American Exports'--Remarks by Director Kratsios at the APEC Digital and AI Ministerial Meeting"

 

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Thanks to President Trump, American AI is open for business. "'Accelerating American AI Exports':  Remarks by Director Kratsios at the APEC Digital and AI Ministerial Meeting,"

 The U.S. Director of  Michael Kratsios, the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has been quite busy of late selling the America First AI Initiative both at home and abroad  (my earlier reflections here: Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress: Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat and "The Golden Age of American Innovation"; and  CSIS EVENT: Unpacking the White House AI Action Plan with OSTP Director Michael Kratsios; my reflections on the US AI Action plan here: "Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan" (July 2025)--A Reverie on Building and Racing on A.I.'s Structural "Fury Road". 

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Most of these efforts, as is to be expected, add layers of meaning on a core of desire/objectives, wrapped around a way of looking at the world that is then encoded into the action-operationalization systems put in place to move from the recognition/articulation of desire to its realization. That is both fair and necessary; intensely so in the face of competing efforts to code Lebenswelt premises (collective and self-evident or given premises shared by collectives around which meaning and reality is ordered) onto the architecture of the cognitive cages within which social collectives will contain (if they can) tech enhanced generative intelligence systems and especially their control of engagements with it. As is appropriate to the project of constructing reality from its simulacra--the dialectics of facticity and its physical mirror mediated through mutual analytic simulation  as a sort of phenomenology of reality--this Lebenswelt project (among all the others) is built an imaginary of fact/data. This facticity is itself a micro encoding on belief and supposition on the basic units (humans) around which a collective Lebenswelt can be built, and thus built made as invisible as the coding of the programming of generative analytics furthered by this project, one in which Jacob von Uexküll's notion of ‘Umwelt’ provides a useful analytical doorway.  And its building depends as much on unlearning as it does on learning. Encoding bias is the essence of both tech enhanced human activity as it is central to the constitution of the normative cages within which socially acceptable expectations can be plugged into systems for the management of humans and their systems. 

None of this, of course, can or ought to make the slightest difference to Director Kratsios. He is in the cage; he is not designing it or ought to be particularly interested in its composition, materials, structures, resilience, etc. Indeed, spending too much time on these meta-cognitive issues would prove both distracting and a threat to the objective--to take a vision of cognitive reality already shaped through its collective given and self evident premises, and to impose it on targeted collectives in ways that achieve desired objectives. It is only in this--from the bottom up conceptually, that Director Kratsios stands in any relation to the larger issues. He represents, in this sense an active Umwelt the actions of which contribute to and shape--solely by their iterative and aggregating action--the Lebenswelt in which it necessarily operates--both in its physical and simulated (virtual) aspects.  

With this as foundation, it is possible to extract something useful from Director Kratsio's remarks beyond the necessary word salad expected of political figures and officials tasked with "selling" idea--in this case a reality structure for coding of a certain sort and the platforms within which it is meant to operate. This has particular application to Director Kratsios' latest remarks:  "'Accelerating American AI Exports':  Remarks by Director Kratsios at the APEC Digital and AI Ministerial Meeting," the text of which, as prepared for delivery was posted to the White House Website on 5 August 2025 (and follows in full below) (Bloomberg Interview clip here). 

The object of the Remarks was to focus on one particular aspect of the AI Action Plan--a part of the AI Action Plan critically relevant to another Trump Administration Initiative, its America First Project (20 January 2025; "From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first").  

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As you no doubt know, on July 23rd, just two weeks ago, the White House published the President’s AI Action Plan. The plan outlines America’s national effort to remain the leader in pioneering AI and to be the global partner of choice as this technology transforms industries and information flows around the world. The United States stands resolved to do all it can to accelerate AI innovation, to build out AI infrastructure, and to conduct AI diplomacy. President Trump began executing the AI Action plan immediately, signing three executive orders following his remarks on the occasion. These included an executive order preventing U.S. government procurement of ideologically biased AI models, an order providing resources for the rapid construction of data centers and power systems, and, finally, an order promoting the export of full-stack American AI technology packages to allies and partners worldwide. That is why I am here today. (Remarks )

From this opening Director Kratsios then elaborated a number of themes worth unpacking a little.

1. AI will be a powerful tool for bilateral diplomacy. The Remarks elaborate briefly the alignment of AI policy and the America First Initiative in the constitution of a system of deeply integrated win-win relationships in which States may engage in mutual beneficial transactions around a "quality product" which then will both tie States together in a transactional platform and enhance their interest, however these interests may be valued by the parties.

2. Place your Bets: The AI Space Race. A good chunk of the opening of the Remarks were devoted to painting a picture of the importance of the AI Initiative. That was undertaken by aligning it to the Space Race of the middle of the last century. 

[M]y colleague David Sacks, White House AI Czar, has described the president’s Action Plan remarks as the most significant technology speech since President John F. Kennedy told the nation that America had chosen to go to the Moon. History will prove Mr. Sacks right, I think. We know that here in 2025, we meet in a time much like the one President Kennedy described in 1962, “in an hour of change and challenge, in a decade of hope and fear, in an age of both knowledge and ignorance.” Our challenge is to confront the changes promised by AI with strength on behalf of our fellow citizens, and our hope is that these technologies will be tools for the growth and exercise of knowledge, and not instruments of ignorance and fear. (Remarks ).

In a sense that is an apt analogy--certainly in its socio-political intensity. If technology is power, then technology, like power is both unavoidable, and the consequence of failing to exploit its potential to the fullest--come what may--will realign not just power relations but the cognitive cages through which power systems are arranged in hierarchies that tend to perpetuate dominance.  

3. Let's Make a Deal. Director Kratsios, however, did not project his image all the way to the meeting at which his remarks were delivered to make an historical analogy, or to consider the normative metaphysics of power in a tech fueled environment.  Rather, in his own words, "I am here to discuss not the technology that may arise tomorrow but the technology ready for application today. I come to you not to talk of the promise of potential future technologies but of economic partnerships and the mutual prosperity we can achieve now." (Remarks ). Metaphysics and historical analogy will sort themselves out well enough through a phenomenology of transaction--a way of approaching the organization of reality that is action oriented and determined to wrest meaning from the accumulation of action rather than wresting action as a function of the application of meaning. One focuses on the individual but one manages the individual within a predetermined deal space constructed out of expectations about the role of individuals, of markets, and of the state, especially where the state represents collective activity to their peers. 

With the AI Action Plan, the Trump Administration is getting the Federal government out of the way of America’s AI innovators, to create space for real competition and creativity, so that companies can create the kinds of products every type of consumer will find truly useful. This administration seeks to free the power of private industry to commercialize breakthrough technologies, prevent monopoly, and build the future. It believes that the broad overregulation of AI incentivizes centralization and censorship. (Remarks)

The State avoids regulation of the factors of production of AI; it oversees the process of transactions in AI of whatever it is that is built or offered for sale.  Whatever it is, it will be based on US tech, and that, itself, provides a powerful (trans)actional attachment between American producers and (foreign) consumers of tech.  

All of this has already been nicely explained by Director Kratsios in earlier remarks (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress).  

4. The Deal-making Platform and the America First Tech Mass Line.  That alignment of technology and individual capacity, protected within the structures of the State, itself exhibits the core expectations of the America First Lebenswelt and its connection to the constellation of the Umwelt from out of which it arises and which it both serves and incarnates as a collective manifestation. 

 The Trump administration believes that by extending human capacities and complementing human work, AI already heralds a new industrial revolution, information revolution, and even cultural renaissance.* * * The true technological and new industrial revolution we look forward to today is not the frontier AI systems themselves, but what our peoples will do with them. AI applications as we experience them today already appear poised to be an enormous multiplier for improving our productivity * * *Where it takes us next, the Trump administration believes, is for inventors to show us, but we will labor to ensure that it betters the lives of all of our citizens. (Remarks ).

This system provides an efficient cage within which to realize its ambitions.  It builds an engine in which tech and ambition can be ignited to produce propulsion that takes the chassis of State in which it is placed in whatever direction it is meant to go--toward enhanced wealth and prosperity or towards some sort of apotheosis of human striving in others. 

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5. To enhance the dealmaking and innovation of individuals (Unwelten) within a State protective Lebenswelt. Director Kratsios then turns to the deal making. 

We are ready to make deals under the dealmaker in chief. As we speak, the clock is ticking as my office at the White House and the Secretary of State assist the Secretary of Commerce in establishing the American AI Exports Program, which will carry out the development and deployment of the U.S. AI stack, packaged for each customer nation’s convenience. * * *As needed, the United States is eager to employ all available U.S. Federal financial tools to support priority AI export packages. These include direct loans, loan guarantees, equity investments, co-financing, political risk insurance, credit guarantees, technical assistance, and feasibility studies. (Remarks )

Just as Foucault a generation ago could speak to the foundational impact of power/knowledge systems, so, it seems, the Trump Administration may speak to the power of market/State systems.  Markets may go where they like, but deals are protected, enhanced, and to some extent directed, by the State through the mechanisms of power. And here the object is to enhance dealmaking (Umwelt power relations in and as markets) to the ends of encoding U.S. tech among (State to State) partners in developing the lebens-platform that will constitute a marketplace where competing tech may find it harder to find a point of entry. It is only in this way that one can make sense of Director Kratsio's understanding that "With the AI Action Plan, the Trump Administration is getting the Federal government out of the way of America’s AI innovators, to create space for real competition and creativity, so that companies can create the kinds of products every type of consumer will find truly useful." That is true, but only within the platform that the U.S. creates and for the purpose (projection of US AI tech) it is instituted and subsidized.

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6. America First as a Global Warehouse Club Store. The result, as Director Kratsios suggests is savings and enhanced  ability to achieve local goals. But to enter one must become a member. Once one pays the price (encoding U.S. tech into the fabric of markets for and with tech), one can engage in whatever deal making suits. 

President Trump’s administration is unapologetically America First. We want what is best for the American people, above all. Fortunately, as AI transforms the future of global commerce it presents an opportunity for mutual benefit. We know you want what’s best for your country, too. With the AI export packages we are developing, we want you to have the AI sovereignty, data privacy, and technical customization that you so rightly demand on behalf of your peoples. We are committed to finding a way to enable America’s private companies to meet your national technological needs. (Remarks )

The system tolerates unequal valuation of transactions. One judges one's engagement in this tech warehouse club store solely from one's own perspective.  There is very little difference once one is in the American warehouse club store  between it and its rivals--particularly the EU's Brussels Effect Club and the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative Warehouse Store. The difference is the cost of membership, the limitations of shopping elsewhere, and the quality and availability of goods and services of interest to those willing to pay the membership fees and abide by the rules. That, perhaps, is the fundamental insight of what is emerging post-globalization within global ordering.  Everything else is of interest to public intellectuals and to those who would either destroy these emerging systems or shift them elsewhere--perhaps to local shopping districts. 

7. Normative quality assurance. Products will be attractive to buyers, especially if they commit to long term attachment, only if those products meet quality measures. With tech quality measures are as much normative as they are operational.  What Director Kratsios offers is American normative quality assurance--not with respect to the way that tech works, but with respect to the value enhancing factor in the operation of tech--data. 

I also want to reiterate the independence and privacy that can be expected from AI technologies and infrastructure that have been Made In America. There are features of the American character—our commitment to property rights, to freedom, yes, even to endless lawsuits—that stand guard against danger to your sovereignty. (Remarks )
That is a critical point worth savoring. When one buys or consumes tech one is also consuming the normative framework under which it was produced. That applies in equal measure to the tech on offer from the other greater powers--the E.U. and China.  For some states the American normative quality baseline may be less appealing than that proffered by China, or Europe.  But the reverse may be true. Not just tech, but norms also are for sale in this new era of the race for tech based dominance ("Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan" ). 

Sunday, August 03, 2025

In the Face of a Merchant President Mexico Bargains and Brazil Administers; President Claudia Sheinbaum, "Evitamos el aumento de aranceles y logramos 90 días para construir un acuerdo de largo plazo" [We avoided tariff increases and achieved 90 days to build a long-term agreement: President Claudia Sheinbaum: "We have the best possible agreement, even compared to other nations; that is, investing in Mexico remains the best option": Chief Executive]

 

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I have considered the difference among states in their ability, and disposition, to engage with the Trump Presidency's America(s) First Initiative (Merchants Negotiate and Officials Manage Discretion Fueled Legal Structures--While Mexico Bargains Brazil Adopts Countermeasures). The difference is not merely a matter of temperament, though that plays a part. The trajectories to power and authority of President Sheinbaum and President Lula da Silva  have been quite different. And though they both are  liberal politically, that category stretches quite a bit to include them both within it. 

President Lula represents old style left of center politics; it is bound up in the frenzy and intellectual currents of the second half of the 20th century--with its ideological purities, its pragmatic ruthlessness, and its state centered institutionalism in which the State and its organs, fueled by officials exercising discretion in the serve of grand top down plans (for the people) (eg here and here). It is institutional, suspicious of private actors, and fond of democratic centralism centered on the State and its organs.  It is decidedly democratic, to be sure--and robustly so--but it is also a creature of institutional foundations and administrative cultures that tend to vaunt the official (and in the case of Brazil post dictatorship, the judiciary) into an apex position.  None f this is either bad or good--but it does have consequences when it encounters oppositional forces of distinctive characteristics. 

President Sheinbaum may well represent a post 20th century Latin American liberalism. It is More pragmatic and objectives driven, though at the same time it is fiercely protective of the foundational political and social principles. It is also fiercely heterodox in its hybridity--one that extends to virtually all sectors of social collectivism. Ideology is a tool of that heterodoxy, to be sure, but it creates a space rather than a path. One sees this, for example, in the constitution of a commission to undertake a deep review of the Mexican electoral system "Esta comisión tendrá por objetivo la elaboración de un diagnóstico profundo del estado en el que se encuentra el modelo electoral y de partidos, y como segunda tarea el confeccionar una reforma legislativa que esté acorde con los tiempos actuales en México, en donde se ponga en el centro la democracia y el pueblo." [The objective of this commission will be to elaborate a deep diagnostic s of the electoral system and of political parties within it, and as a second task to present a package of legislative reform that is in line with the current times in Mexico, where democracy and the people are placed at the centre.] (Tarjeta informativa 34/2025: El Gobierno de México, que preside la Jefa del Ejecutivo federal, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, anuncia la creación de la Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma Electoral, que será encabezada por Pablo Gómez Álvarez).

But it is more acutely visible in the transactional platform within which President Sheinbaum and President Trump seek to engage in what the Chinese call win-win negotiations to develop a framework (the principal transaction) within which it is possible for  Mexico and the United States to do business in ways that are respectful of the core principles and norms around which each is centered.  That is a nice way of saying that Mexico may be as adept as the United States in deploying America First to its own benefit within the context of current power relations between the U.S. and Mexico, and with an eye toward Mexico's leading position within Latin American regionalist and integrationist circles. See Evitamos el aumento de aranceles y logramos 90 días para construir un acuerdo de largo plazo: Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum: “Tenemos el mejor acuerdo posible, comparado incluso con las demás naciones; es decir, invertir en México sigue siendo la mejor opción”: Jefa del Ejecutivo Federal [We avoided tariff increases and achieved 90 days to build a long-term agreement: President Claudia Sheinbaum: "We have the best possible agreement, even compared to other nations; that is, investing in Mexico remains the best option": Chief Executive] In that text President Sheinbaum presents  a glimpse at the mindset and framework that now drive Mexican engagement with the United States under this administration. Mexico perhaps realizes what Brazil may not--that at the end of the day popular assessment will be undertaken as a function of personal welfare; ideological purity is more compelling on a full stomach, with work to go to, fuel in the car and a house to live in. At the same time pragmatism works only to the extent that core principles are protected. That is is a self-consciously deliberate strategy is undeniable--but one made possible only because of the structire of political culture. The trick, of course, is to make good on all of this. For Mexico, that means a fairly large porfolio of win-win arrangements. The ideal would entail such arrangement of win-win transactions that can be used to create a web of pathways in. among and through them. The object is not to re-create an America First or Belt & Road Initiative structire, but to use the genius of both or either in the interests of Mexican goals. 

The text of the remarks follow below in the original Spanish and in an English translation. 

Brief Reflections on Ciro Sbailò, Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili [Quantum Grammar of Power in the Age of Unstable Systems]

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 Ciro Sbailò, full professor of Comparative Public Law and president of the Master's Degree Course in Investigation, Crime and International Security at the University of International Studies of Rome - UNINT, and director of the Geodi - Geopolitics, Law and Data Intelligence study center, has published a quite interesting essay in Geodis' journal, "Alexis" , previewed on Huffpost. The essay, Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili [Quantum Grammar of Power in the Age of Unstable Systems]  offers a fascinating semiotic glimpse of the underbelly of the ordering of collective cognitive systems on which it is possible to build, with necessary appearance of certainty, political or related systems. In the process, Professor Sbailò offers a glimpse at a way of rethinking notions of corridors, pathways and trade routes as a sort of dynamic reality pathways toward a window onto a different approach to structuring a reality into which one might embed the usual tools of social organization, and from which its phenomenology can be usefully managed (authoritatively) in dynamic states.

Professor Sbailò sets the tone with the opening epigraph: "Governare oggi non significa più conservare l’ordine, ma progettare il possibile. E capire dove e come il reale si forma, prima che lo facciano altri" [Governing today no longer means preserving order, but designing the possible. And understanding where and how reality is formed, before others do]. In a coded society, where the underlying premises and the bars of conceptual cages are invisible to those caged, order becomes a secondary element. The primary element focuses on the means of coding those situations which can be perceived as ordered, and thus perceived internalized as "naturally" or "correctly" ordered. Coding, however, is performative--one does not derive the materials for the building of cognitive cages from nowhere--one hunts around for the possible, in space and time, one lathers oneself with desires however detached from its own mooring, and one than builds cages in the sky into which one places the birds of collective order. For those with the talent, a rules based international aviary, or the aviary of transactional elements, may well be possible.

Professor Sbailò starts with something of an eternal return--but to Foucault:


"“Il potere produce realtà: produce ambiti di oggetti e rituali di verità" (Michel Foucault, 1977). Questa affermazione, spesso letta in chiave critica o genealogica, assume oggi un significato più radicale e inatteso: esce dal registro della denuncia per entrare in quello dell’analisi operativa. Il potere non si limita a intervenire su una realtà già data, ma concorre attivamente alla sua definizione." ["Power produces reality: it produces spheres of objects and rituals of truth" (Michel Foucault, 1977). This statement, often interpreted critically or genealogically, today takes on a more radical and unexpected meaning: it moves beyond the register of denunciation to that of operational analysis. Power does not simply intervene in a pre-existing reality, but actively contributes to its definition. ] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili )
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Power is, indeed, fun, and as useful a way of organizing the structures of self- and collective relations as any other (for Foucault on power see, e.g. here among many others; generally for starters here). Its semiotics suggests its nature both as a "thing" (force); as a signifier of the concession of the consequences of that "thing"(authority/control); and as the reality around which the exercise of that object on oneself and in social relations is organized and exercised (reality/power-knowledge systems). Its essence is in its self-reflective phenomenology. It is known only by the detritus of its effect. One distills power from the memory of power relations; and one understands power relations as the means by which social relations (and the relations within oneself that serve as its mimetic heartland) are caged and organized. That caging and organization, then, (re)produce Professor Sbailò's operaitonal analysis.  And indeed, its etymology suggests the way it folds in on itself--from the Vulgar Latin *potere, pointing to both an ability and the connection between that ability and the action undertaken to realize that ability on something else through the exercise of authority, from the Latin auctoritatem (nominative auctoritas) "invention, advice, opinion, influence, command," from auctor "master, leader, author". Taken together, one understands both the radical  notion of power and also its deep roots in the understanding of the ordering of society through the organization of social self-actualization, which is, in turn possible only by the constitution of the premises around which all this ordering (power) can be identified, curated, managed and exercised). 

But this is only a picture--a still life of a flow (see here) or a stream (see here) of actions and objects that themselves are the particles around which it is possible to weave this reality making, and perhaps control or direct it. 

Ciò che appare come “reale” – nella forma di soggetti, oggetti, norme, verità – è il risultato di osservazioni, selezioni, dispositivi regolativi e interferenze strategiche. Pensare in termini quantistici significa riconoscere che la realtà giuridica e geopolitica non è più uno sfondo stabile su cui si applicano decisioni, ma un campo dinamico, retroattivo, sensibile alle condizioni iniziali e ai punti di osservazione. Le norme operano. Le strategie producono. [What appears "real"—in the form of subjects, objects, norms, truths—is the result of observations, selections, regulatory mechanisms, and strategic interference. Thinking in quantum terms means recognizing that legal and geopolitical reality is no longer a stable backdrop against which decisions are made, but a dynamic, retroactive field, sensitive to initial conditions and observation points. Norms operate [act]; strategies produce [cause]. ] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili )

This reminder of an ancient understanding, lost to the pragmatic realities of managing people towards whatever ends appear useful at the time, ought now to be recaptured.  Technology makes that unavoidable, it seems. Technology refocuses for us, whether we like it or not, on the foundations--on the roots and starting points for coding the simulacra from which realities (virtual and consequently real or physical) are now made (producono) through the architecture of norms. "occorre comprendere come si ristrutturano oggi le soglie teoriche, come si genera rilevanza, come si costruisce intelligenza operativa in ambienti complessi. "[there is a need to understand how theoretical thresholds are restructured today, how relevance is generated, how operational intelligence is built in complex environments]. (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ).

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What is needed, then, Professor Sbailò suggests, is an architecture of power/knowledge to suit the times. It is no longer partocularly useful to cling to the ordered linearity--the theory of "pathways" that can be followed toward a desired end (whatever that is). 

"La linearità, la separabilità, l’oggettività restano efficaci in contesti coerenti. Ma nei sistemi instabili, retroattivi, ad alta interconnessione – come quelli giuridici, politici, strategici contemporanei – servono modelli capaci di trattare interferenze, fluttuazioni, salti di scala." [Linearity, separability, and objectivity remain effective in coherent contexts. But in unstable, retroactive, highly interconnected systems—such as contemporary legal, political, and strategic systems—we need models capable of dealing with interference, fluctuations, and scale shifts.] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ).

For this enterprise he suggests, a quantum grammar of power (grammatica quantistica del potere) is necessary. It is meant to offer "a theoretical framework for acting in environments that elude deductive regulation" [offre un quadro teorico per agire in ambienti che sfuggono a regolazione deduttiv] that is grounded in what is called the precise formalisms of "entanglement, decoherence, non-commutativity" [entanglement, decoerenza, non-commutatività]. (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ).

Within this conceptual universe legal norms serve as the sauce for the constitution of reality. "Treaties, rulings, and directives do not merely describe or regulate: they produce. If we ignore its quantum implications, we risk adopting tools unsuitable for a reality that is no longer stable or separable." [Il trattato, la sentenza, la direttiva non si limitano a descrivere o a regolare: producono. Se ne ignorano le implicazioni quantistiche, si rischia di adottare strumenti inadatti a una realtà che non è più stabile, né separabile.]. (Ibid.). These are the semiotic objects the signification of which serve as the bricks for building realities that must (may) follow. Obne codes the structures of action.  But one also acts to structure normative cages within which one desires to fit in. In this sense there may also be a strong phenomenology to quantum grammar. "Geopolitics, too, if it still intends to act, must abandon the logic of linear projection and embrace a logic of coemergence—understood as the simultaneous and interdependent emergence of actors and context. Acting strategically today means generating worlds."[Anche la geopolitica, se intende ancora agire, deve abbandonare la logica della proiezione lineare e accettare una logica di coemergenza (coemergence) – intesa come l’emersione simultanea e interdipendente di attori e contesto. Agire strategicamente, oggi, significa generare mondi.] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ). This has an American aspect as well (The Phenomenology of Peace and the Price of the Deal--Text of and Reflections on the Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Brian Kilmeade of Fox Radio).

The contest of two corridor realities: Professor Sbailò offers the contemporary Chinese experience as a model and a cautionary tale. 

The cycle of accumulation, industrialization, export, and containment has stalled. The cracks are not only economic (deflation, housing crisis, demographic decline), but systemic: loss of plasticity, adaptive rigidity, strategic rigidity. China displays the entropic form of a system that rejects probability, that demands determinism in an indeterminate world. Its every reaction—repression, closure, aggressive exportation of risk—accelerates domestic and global instability. [Il ciclo di accumulo, industrializzazione, esportazione e contenimento si è inceppato. Le crepe non sono solo economiche (deflazione, crisi immobiliare, contrazione demografica), ma sistemiche: perdita di plasticità, rigidità adattiva, rigidità strategica. La Cina mostra la forma entropica di un sistema che non accetta la probabilità, che pretende determinismo in un mondo indeterminato. Ogni sua reazione – repressione, chiusura, esportazione aggressiva del rischio – accentua l’instabilità interna e globale.] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ).
China and its Belt & Road is proffered as an example of the old way of thinking and doing--static, two-dimensional, and stubborn. In essence a system led by its theory rather than a theory used to advance its system. He offers an alternative trajectory in the form of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC).

It is not just an infrastructure, but a strategic operator: a device that acts on geopolitical space like a quantum observer acts on an open system. It does not impose, but interferes; it does not stabilize, but generates local coherence; it does not pit force against force, but constructs possibilities. It is a physical corridor, but also a cognitive, semantic, and normative one: it restructures the field of observation and action, redefining the criteria of relevance and marginality. [Non è solo un’infrastruttura, ma un operatore strategico: un dispositivo che agisce sullo spazio geopolitico come un osservatore quantistico agisce su un sistema aperto. Non impone, ma interferisce; non stabilizza, ma genera coerenze locali; non contrappone forza a forza, ma costruisce possibilità. È un corridoio fisico, ma anche cognitivo, semantico e normativo: ristruttura il campo dell’osservazione e dell’azione, ridefinendo i criteri di rilevanza e marginalità.] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili).
And yet there is nothing that suggests that Chinese ideological dialectics may not also, out of the fundamental contradiction noted by Professor Sbailò, also (re)produce itself in forms consistent with the times.  Yet that gap between realization and change, especially where change requires a more dynamic engagement with change--an automated dialectices within Marxist-Leninist realities that may require a fundamental shift in modernization that has already been inted at in China's 20th Congress 3rd Plenum.  

In this new context, the role of jurists, strategists, and decision-makers  must also change.  They must, in effect, become the coders of the quantum--they are perhaps not the architects or designers, but rather the engineers of systems in constant states of dynamic change. In one sense, then, one can understand this as the transformation of traditional normative elites from that of "white collar" to "blue collar" roles. They make things happen.  But perhaps they are less essential to its conceptualization. Who or what, then, is the architect? Perhaps it is its object itself.  Power may serve not just as its own object, but as the essence of its own positive signification; and thus signified, the master of its own interpretation. "This faculty is already active. It is exercised by algorithmic platforms, opaque legal systems, adaptive regimes. A truth is not imposed: environments are constructed in which alternatives become impracticable. The new authoritarianism does not prohibit—it dictates. Invisible, operational, performative." [Questa facoltà è già attiva. La esercitano piattaforme algoritmiche, sistemi giuridici opachi, regimi adattivi. Non si impone una verità: si costruiscono ambienti in cui le alternative diventano impraticabili. Il nuovo autoritarismo non vieta – dispone. Invisibile, operativo, performante.] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ).

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For that effort person/objects are needed to transpose the abstractness of cognitive systems into the realities of action in simulated and physical space.  That is the work of jurists, strategists, and decision-makers. This power is objecti-fiable--through the aggregation of its mimetic iterative actions, actions which are controlled by and reflect the "flow", the "stream" rather than serving to make either.  As Nietzsche might have suggested--this is a time in which an embedded priestly class may find itself unemployed, or relegated to the margins of the new structural basis of reality and the ways of its care and feeding. 

It is in this sense, perhaps, that quantum grammar becomes far more interesting. Professor Sbailò suggests the power of a democratic turn, both as an active agent of quantum grammar of power and as its salvation from automation and its transposition from the physical world to that of the simulacra. "Every rule,  infrastructure, or strategic device is a transformative agent. What is at stake is no longer the preservation of order, but the design of the possible. And it is in this gesture—selective, situated, responsible—that the quality of public action is measured today." [Ogni norma, infrastruttura o dispositivo strategico è un operatore trasformativo. La posta in gioco non è più la conservazione dell’ordine, ma la progettazione del possibile. Ed è in questo gesto – selettivo, situato, responsabile – che si misura oggi la qualità dell’azione pubblica.] (Grammatica quantistica del potere nell’era dei sistemi instabili ).

I suspect we are well beyond that--and out of desire. Professor Sbailò offers us thew world of the multiverse in which humans can all be Dr. Strange.  I might suspect that we have moved on to a different sort of multiverse, one that has created itself out of itself--risen from the swamp of infinite flows of data and streams of action from out of which it could produce itself in real time (Describe, Predict, Intervene!—On Objective Subjectivities and the Simulacra of Semiotics in the New Era; Simulated Signification and Mechanical Meaning Making in Managing Post-COVID Human Society). 

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The essay appears below in the original Italian and in acrude English translaiton. 

Saturday, August 02, 2025

The Phenomenology of Peace and the Price of the Deal--Text of and Reflections on the Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Brian Kilmeade of Fox Radio

 

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And I think what bothers the President the most is he has these great phone calls where everyone sort of claims yeah, we’d like to see this end, if we could find a way forward, and then he turns on the news and another city has been bombed, including those far from the frontlines. So at some point, he’s got to make a decision here about what – how much to continue to engage in an effort to do ceasefires if one of the two sides is not interested in one.(Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Brian Kilmeade of Fox Radio).

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Secretary Rubio gave a quite interesting interview to Brian Kilmeade at Fox on the last day of July, the text of which was published to the State Department website and also follows below.

The interview covered the usual ground. It did however, offer a peek at some less usual nooks and crannies of the U.S. position as it seeks to lurch toward some sort of deal, virtually any sort of deal at this point as long as the President can say "we have a deal" in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The question is the extent to which the President can be played or at least manipulated as a function of desperation to declare a deal. Hamas as been doing the same thing, of course, but there the problem is compounded because of the ease with which that entity has been able to manage mass perception and thus  skew pathways toward "win". But it also shed much more interesting light on the nature of the U.S.-India relationship that was refreshingly honest--and reasonable. And reasonable does not produce a "happily ever after ending"--just the realities of a marriage in which there is always work to be done. And at the heart of the work are iterative transactions that have no direction or purpose other than the win-win possibilities of transactional success. In this sense one comes to the essential transactional nature of America First; and its difference from its fraternal twin, the Belt & Road Initiative. In transactional cognitive cages of the America First sort, the deal as the essence of actin; in the Belt & Road cognitive cage, the deal is necessary in itself but more so as an instrument of  extra-transactional objectives. 

In both cases the essence of the driving force is "transaction."--at least on the U.S. side.  In Russia-Ukraine, the context can be made as complicated as one wants (or needs), the temptation, realized, draws on historical (re)constructions back going back at least to the settlement of the area in the 7th century. But that is irrelevant to the Americans. On the U.S. side these are understood as the objects and instruments of strategic negotiation, but with substantially little relevance to the deal itself--the deal that forms the self-referencing universe of action-object. For them, the transactional universe is simple--the first "deal" is to get the shooting to stop. That is it.  How one gets there, the price to be paid is secondary to  creating a situation in which proper deal making can start: "Again, I think our hope is to avoid that and to sort of figure out a way that we can get the fighting to stop.  We think that’s the best path forward, but we’re open to some different paths.  But the best path forward is to have the shooting stop and the talking start." (Rubio Interview). That first deal makes secondary deal making possible. The rest, as Secretary Rubio noted, are merely considerations of pathways to the substance of the deal. But that, too, is transactional--rewards and punishments that drive an analysis of costs and benefits that nudge parties toward a transactional goal--and no more--no great ideological master plan, no "American Path" toward some sort of ideal apotheosis, no master plan for dominating the world or even caring enough about it to try to change anyone (unless and to the extent they interfere with US interests or otherwise annoy the President--e-g-. Brazil). 

India feels more like the transactional bargaining of partners in a committed but newish relationship where at least one of the partners is coming out of a prior "marriage." Marriage transactions are iterative, constant, and negotiated within a very different conceptual cage. It is all about the "peace" in a relationship grounded in a constant state of negotiation but as a function of the necessary state of stability. As long as the partners are committed to a long term relationship--bound together by ties of culture, history, interests, needs or migratory consequences--transactional behaviors can be reduced to the endless jokes about the endlessly quarreling partners in a long term marriages: a love built on pragmatic transactional decisions and bound together by annoyance as the triggering element of compromise, but one grounded in the fundamental premise of commitment to "make this work".  

 Look, global trade – India is an ally.  It’s a strategic partner.  Like anything in foreign policy, you’re not going to align a hundred percent of the time on everything.  India has huge energy needs and that includes the ability to buy oil and coal and gas and things that it needs to power its economy like every country does, and it buys it from Russia, because Russian oil is sanctioned and cheap and – meaning they have to – in many cases, they’re selling it under the global price because of the sanctions. * * *  So it is most certainly a point of irritation in our relationship with India – not the only point of irritation.  We also have many other points of cooperation with them.  But I think what you’re seeing the President express is the very clear frustration that with so many other oil vendors available, India continues to buy so much from Russia, which in essence is helping to fund the war effort. . .  (Rubio Interview).

This works best where both parties are merchants and for which life is no more than a series of transactions bound within the frameworks of marriage, alliance or interest.  So, the Secretary tells us--expect more squabbling--the U.S. with Russian oil purchases, the Indians with American cozying up to Pakistan's leadership--then arguments and some sort of transactional accommodation to keep the marriage going on terms that suits both. 

But perhaps the most interesting element of the interview was Secretary Rubio's reaction to the now well orchestrated international public and private movement toward the "resolution" of the Gaza situation (political, humanitarian, governance, etc.).  Here, again, the primary deal is to get the shooting to stop.  But with a difference. 

QUESTION. Another big thing on your plate is what Steve Witkoff’s doing today.  He’s heading over to Israel.  Then he wants to possibly go to Gaza.  We have allies – UK, Canada, and France – all either threatening to or have already done recognizing a Palestinian state.  That’s over 140 in the UN.  How does the U.S. view this move? 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Irrelevant.  It’s irrelevant.  I mean, it’s annoying to some, but it’s irrelevant.  It doesn’t mean anything.  First of all, none of these countries have the ability to create a Palestinian state.  There can be no Palestinian state unless Israel agrees to it.  Number two, they can’t even tell you where this Palestinian state is.  They can’t tell you who will govern it.  And I think number three, it’s counterproductive.  (Rubio Interview).

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That is the essence of the position. Peer interference with deal making. Peers negotiate with peers.  If one is not a player in the transaction then one is not relevant to it except as an annoyance which may scuttle any deal worth making. "Transaction" tells us here that  deals reveal hierarchies of participation. And in this case there are few places that count fr much--even if they can complicate matters.  And the deal? The same as Russia-Ukraine--to get the f(military) fighting to stop so that long term deal making may be attempted. That provided the essence of the explanation that came after from the Secretary.

Beyond that there were tidbits worth savoring--US-China relations and the question of Taiwan; and of course the 2016 Russia meddling affair. The former will acquire a life of its own and a meta-transactional situation, one requiring the adjustment of the parameters of markets and borders before the more relevant issues of  transactions may be attempted. The latter provides the sort of salacious tidbits that help augment the Administration's claims about the nature of corruption within key organs of state institutions.  

At the end of all of this one gets a better sense of the parameters of America First under conditions of transaction within a cognitive cage of merchants jealous of the deal but indifferent to the function of priests and officials to develop some sort of semiotic overlay, an interpretive covering, for what merchants do best, iterative deal making in the service of their interests and for the protection of their markets.  

That, anyway, is one way of looking at things. As they say in some movies--peace, like death, is not an end but a doorway. That acquires a quite interesting aspect in transactional spaces. 

Friday, August 01, 2025

Debating Genocide--Shifting Frameworks for Ordering Facts, Theory, Significace, and Conseqeunce

 


One of the most interesting things of the current round of debate about genocide (as distinguished from prior rounds in the 1990s around the killings in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia among others) is not so much whether the facts on the ground in Ukraine and Gaza fit the definition of genocide, or can be made to so fit, so much as whether the definition of genocide and the theoretical understanding of its "essence" as norm, law, and ethos, ought to be changed. That change, in turn, is grounded , in some respects on a changing sensibility about killing people in the course of war--a change well underway during the course of the more intense periods of civilian rich fighting in Iraq in the  early part of the century, and in the way in which civilian based casualties are meant to relate to military operations--mostly by State actors, though, sometimes grudgingly, by others.  

In a sense, then, the contemporary debates about genocide are occurring at two different but inevitably interconnected levels.  The first is one that more or less accepts whatever legal parameters are thought currently to exist and then to "lawyer" them in the traditional way.  The other is to use the occurrences on the ground as a means of effecting a change in the fundamental character and normative baselines of the concept (within legal structures or otherwise), which are then to be applied to the facts on the ground. Genocide, in these senses, may be understood either as an instrument for a larger object, or as the consequential collective rationalization of aggregated events and objects the collection of which produces its meaning; and its consequences. One either sees and understands things the way one sees them or one changes the lens through which it is possible to see some "thing" in a particular way.

That, more than its substance, serves as a quite fascinating element of the current dynamic nature of law and legal systems, and with it, on the notion of "rule of law."  In one sense there is a semiotic and phenomenological conflict that goes to the heart of the enterprise of law in liberal democratic states and as the normative structural foundation of international legality (institutional or not). That conflict centers on the signification of objects and actions in the context of their relationship with the meaning (and the consequences of that meaning) which are attached to them. In one sense, genocide may be increasingly understood as a set of triggering actions around killing that can be aggregated in a way that in their context produces a "living" definition or interpretation or confirmation of genocide. That is that genocide is driven by its contextual objectivity.  On the other side is the notion that the signification of objects and actions--the rationalization and investment of phenomenological events and their objects--must be a function of the structures of interpretation from which it is possible to extract meaning (and consequences). 

At its heart one encounters a meaning phenomenology of killing--the typologies of which appear to be changing, and changing rapidly. At the same time the normative semiotics of genocide have also been changing, as a function of changes in the normative understanding of killing. The value of genocide in this changing typology is its normative punch. If one wants to end war, and if one wants to eliminate the killing of as many people as possible in war then the impact--culturally (and legally) of the accusation of genocide may serve as a substantial inducement to avoid the charge even as becomes easier to make. At its limit, one might envision the conflation of civilian killing with genocide, and thus with a core objective of viewing all killing of civilians as genocidal--as taboo. In either sense, there is no inherent or natural "truth" or facticity in genocide--there is only a normative judgment producing interpretive structures and collectively embraced consequences flowing from collective meaning making generally, or varying by context.  

It is in the latter respect, of course, that things becomes more fascinating still--intersectionality in genocide has hardly begun to be considered at a deeply theoretical level. That intersectionality produces its own typologies of killing in which even in regimes where all killing is presumptively suspect in conflict, not all killing is suspect in conflict--the presumption can be overcome.  And it is in that overcoming that intersectionality, politics, and normative judgments about collectives can have a significant impact on a reality shaping set of core assumptions--all killing is bad, some killing that can be aggregated around a set of motives or intentions are worse (genocide at its limits), but some killing, even aggregated and tainted by nonspecific collective intent, may be excused. It is in the construction of these Baroque cognitive cages that, as lawyers like to say (and sometimes philosophers) that context matters; if that is the case then multilevel context can have substantially interesting effects on the application of genocide if not its conceptual basis. And, of course, in a world that has deeply embraced identity and identity topographies (sometimes with characteristics attached), the dangers of intersecting interpretations and their effects on each other can have profoundly distorting effect, ones which then make it impossible, at the limit, to suggest that these concepts produce anything like predictable and consistent results (if only because that is very little that can be generalized). That latter point can be generalized as the fundamental conundrum of law and its rule at the start of the second quarter of the 21st century. It follows that though none of this is peculiar to genocide theory and practice (and its evolution in whatever direction one desires to take it), the normative nature of genocide is itself an intensifier of effect.  

Whatever one's position on the underlying theory or its application to current context, the debate is worth considering. To that end Verena Buser, a historian of the Holocaust in Berlin, has recently published an essay that may be worth reading: "Targeting History: Anti-Israel Activism among Progressive Holocaust and Genocide Scholars" published to the Telos website. It may be accessed here and follows below.  Dr. Buser takes a side, and has a target; but then so do many others in all sorts of directions. That is what makes the essay worth pondering whatever conclusion one comes to at the end. I leave it to readers to engage as they like and draw their own conclusions.