Democracy Wars II: Remarks By President Biden At The Summit For Democracy Opening Session and Video Remarks by Other Participating National Delegations

 

Pix Credit here

I have been chronicling the development of a Chinese Marxist-Leninist democracy counter-narrative to the once virtually unchallenged democracy narratives aligned with liberal democratic principles (See here). Those narratives were made available as a counter dialogue to the U.S. sponsored Summit for Democracy.

The liberal democratic democracy narrative remains important, and a powerful expression of the organization and policy sensibilities  of most states in the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Australia-New Zealand. Yet it is also changing as it engages in a period of intense self reflection and internal contests for the control of its own narrative among factions.

The liberal democratic democracy narrative, their internal tensions and normative thrust were very much in evidence during the course of President Biden's Remarks that opened th Summit of the Americas.

It is reproduced below. along with links to the video recordings of interventions by participating delegations who shared their vision for strengthening democracy through Summit for Democracy Official Interventions. Interventions broadcast on Day 1 are linked below; this page will update at the conclusion of Day 2 and as additional Interventions are submitted.

Lastly also included is the Fact Sheet: Announcing the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal which suggests the focus of democracy enhancing measures, and through them the privileged principles of contemporary liberal democracy as it seeks renewal and advancement in its new era. These include (1) Supporting Free and Independent Media; (2) Fighting Corruption; (3) Bolstering Democratic Reformers; (4) Advancing Technology for Democracy; and (5) Defending Free and Fair Elections and Political Processes

"'The Flower of Democracy Blooms Brilliantly in China’ ['中国的民主之花绚丽绽放']: The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Constitutional Order " Presentation and Paper for Workshop: "Constitutional Law of Greater China"

 

The extraordinary  Ngoc Son Bui (my interview with him here) has organized a very interesting workshop (Constitutional Law of Greater China, 9-10 December 2021, Oxford Programme in Asian Laws) around essays that will be contributed to a Handbook of Constitutional Law in Greater China that is likely to become a standard in the field and an important reference for anyone interested in issues of Chinese constitutionalism (Program here).  

My own contribution touches on China's vanguard, the leading forces of the nation, organized as the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), within the Chinese constitutional order. This contribution has been made more interesting by the distribution (in English) of the State Council's White Paper:  China: Democracy That Works on 4 December 2021 (original:  中国的民主 also distributed on 4 December) and its companion White Paper "The State of Democracy in the United States"  (5 December 2021; Official English translation HERE); [美国民主情况] (original Chinese HERE). Discussed at greater lenfgth HERE.

Whatever its 'true' complexion, these provided a site of motivation for reaction from Chinese authorities.The distributions were timed to coincide, and perhaps detract, from the much publicized U.S. effort to host a democracy conference among the leading forces of liberal democratic constitutionalism (the "Summit for Democracy"). The three great themes of the Summit for Democracy might have been read as an effort to challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese path (defending against authoritarianism; addressing and fighting corruption; and promoting respect for human rights) and promoting anti-Chinese internationalism.  It could as easily be understood as reinvigorating the conceptual basis of markets driven liberal democratic constitutionalism. But the Summit also provided a convenient backdrop against which Chinese authorities might more effectively re-focus their energies on the deeper conceptualization and projection outward of their own imaginaries of legitimate constitutional systems.  Indeed, in comments proffered on the release of the State Council White Paper Tian Peiyan, the deputy director of the Communist Party's Policy Research Office took great pains to contrast the Chinese path of democratic constitutionalism with that advanced by the United States and its larger camp. 

He blamed the high COVID-19 death toll in the U.S. on political disputes and a divided government from the highest to the lowest levels. Such democracy brings not happiness but disaster to voters,” he said at a news conference to release a government report on what the Communist Party calls its form of democracy, which is firmly under party control. Neither China nor Russia are among about 110 governments that have been invited to Biden's two-day virtual “Summit for Democracy,” which starts Thursday and will address strengthening democracy, defending against authoritarianism, corruption and human rights. (China's communists bash US democracy before Biden summit)

 In the same vein, Xu Lin, the vice minister of the party’s publicity department was quoted as stating that “The U.S. calls itself a ‘leader of democracy’ and organizes and manipulates the so-called Summit for Democracy," he said. “In fact, it cracks down and hampers countries with different social systems and development models in the name of democracy."China's communists bash US democracy before Biden summit)

All of this debating takes one back to basic principles in either camp.  More importantly, it ought to take one back to the understanding of the fundamentally divergent ways in which Marxist Leninism and liberal democracy understand the impulse toward democratic organization and its institutionalization within quite distinct democratic collectives. Both view the other as transgressing core taboos of legitimacy.  Both see in the other as necessary stage in transition toward their own way of conceiving the world and imparting meaning to basic terms and principles. Both have significant and divergent consequences both for the ordering of national collectives and for the structuring of relations among collectives in quite distinct approaches to globalization and economic production.  But all of it is fundamentally attached to the core principles around which the political-economic order is established, political power is collected and delegated, and the relation of the individual to the collective is set.  At the same time it is a reminder that constitutional systems, however incompatible, share a core characteristic--the institution of legitimacy framing principles and rules, of conceptual and policy taboos--that mark the difference between systems for the unimpeded exercise of discretion, from those that are bounded (strictly at least in theory) by the normative and rule constraints that reflect their fundamental character (discussed in From Constitution to Constitutionalism).

It is therefore useful to understand the conceptual basis and the theoretical framing of democratic constitutionalism around which Chinese officials have developed their own political order, now offered to the world.  That is the principal objective of my contribution: ‘The Flower of Democracy Blooms Brilliantly in China’ [中国的民主之花绚丽绽放]: The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Constitutional Order . 

My paper may be accessed HERE. The PPT of my own presentation may be accessed HERE and follows below. The Abstract and Introduction follows below.

The Democracy Wars: State Council White Papers--[中国的民主] "China: Democracy That Works" and [美国民主情况] "The State of Democracy in the United States"

 

Pix Credit Xinhuanet 5 Dec 2021

 

"（一）制度痼疾积重难返; （二）民主实践乱象丛生; （三）输出所谓民主产生恶果 ((1) The system's chronic defects are difficult to overcome; (2) the practice of democracy is chaotic, and (3) exporting the so-called democracy produces evil results)" These are the principal judgments elaborated at length in the Chinese State Council White Paper: "The State of Democracy in the United States"  (5 December 2021; Official English translation HERE); [美国民主情况] (original Chinese HERE). 

This judgment is embedded in two fundamental propositions. The first is that the traditional expression of liberal democratic democracy, exercised through elections and plebiscites (exogenous democratic practices) may fatally limit full participation of the people in their government.  The second is that the democratic character of a political system ought to be judged by its own people. 

A functional democracy must have a full set of institutional procedures; more importantly, it should have full participation of the people. It must ensure democracy in terms of both process and outcomes. It must encompass both procedural and substantive democracy, both direct and indirect democracy. It must ensure both people’s democracy and the will of the State. If the people of a country are only called upon to vote and then are forgotten once they have cast their votes; if the people only hear high-sounding promises during an election campaign but have no say whatsoever afterwards; or if they are wooed when their votes are wanted but are ignored once the election is over, then such a democracy is not a true democracy. Whether a country is democratic should be judged and determined by its own people, not by a minority of self-righteous outsiders. ("The State of Democracy in the United States"). 一个行之有效的民主制度不仅要有完整的制度程序，而且要有完整的参与实践，能够做到过程民主和成果民主、程序民主和实质民主、直接民主和间接民主、人民民主和国家意志的相统一。如果人民只有在投票时被唤醒、投票后就进入休眠期，只有竞选时聆听天花乱坠的口号、竞选后就毫无发言权，只有拉票时受宠、选举后就被冷落，这样的民主绝不是真正的民主。一个国家是不是民主，应该由这个国家的人民来评判，而不是由外部少数人来指手画脚。(美国民主情况)

In contrast, the State Council elaborates might might be a system that at least in the Chinese context, comes closer to realizing the democratic ideal of full popular participation, now offered in English as whole process people's democracy (China: Democracy that Works (4 December 2021) official English Translation HERE); 中国的民主 (original Chinese HERE). This is a system of endogenous democracy grounded in consultation. In its "New Era" form it incorporates the insights of the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and its notions of consultative democracy (discussed in  Chinese Constitutionalism in the “New Era”: The Constitution in Emerging Idea and Practice). 

The development of "whole process people's democracy" from consultative democracy embeds a number of key concepts elaborated more fully in the State Council White paper. In that elaboration, the State Council tightly interweaves Chinese Marxist Leninist theory with the theory of democratic governance. These include (quoted from Part I of the White Paper original and official translation but note the interesting translation choices): 

(1) "全过程人民民主，是中国共产党团结带领人民追求民主、发展民主、实现民主的伟大创造，是党不断推进中国民主理论创新、制度创新、实践创新的经验结晶。" ( " Whole-process people’s democracy is a creation of the CPC in leading the people to pursue, develop and realize democracy, embodying the Party’s innovation in advancing China’s democratic theories, systems and practices. " ).

(2) "全过程人民民主，充分彰显社会主义国家性质，充分彰显人民主体地位，使人民意志得到更好体现、人民权益得到更好保障、人民创造活力进一步激发。" (" Whole-process people’s democracy, giving full expression to the socialist nature of the state and the people’s principal position, serves to better represent the people’s will, protect their rights and fully unleash their potential to create. ")

(3) "全过程人民民主，具有完整的制度程序和完整的参与实践，使选举民主和协商民主这两种重要民主形式更好结合起来，"(" Whole-process people’s democracy is a complete system with supporting mechanisms and procedures, and has been fully tested through wide participation. It integrates two major democratic models – electoral democracy and consultative democracy. ").

(4)  "中国共产党的领导，是中国发展全过程人民民主的根本保证。在中国这样一个大国，真正把14亿多人民的意愿表达好、实现好并不容易，必须有坚强有力的统一领导。"("CPC leadership is the fundamental guarantee for whole-process people’s democracy. It is no easy job for a country as big as China to fully represent and address the concerns of its 1.4 billion people. It must have a robust and centralized leadership.")

Not that one didn't know this was coming (even in English).  The CPC's journal, Qiushi (求是网 ), had published in English "Implementing Whole-Process Democracy for High-Quality Legislative Work in the New Era" in its July/August 2021 issue (discussing the Organic Law of the National People's Congress in terms of whole process democracy). Indeed, a recurring theme in the speeches of Xi Jinping during 2021 was centered on approaching answers to the question "what should democracy be? [ 民主应该什么样？] (in Chinese 民主应该什么样？习近平这样说 13 October 2021 求是网 (various paths to democratic expression in a curated collection of portions of speeches and addresses)).

Equally important, is the construction of the basic parameters of whole process democracy as a template that is not merely scalable but transposable within all national institutional organs. Whole process democracy is the expression of the from of basic political structure that is replicated not just within the organs of state but also in the constitution and working style of the vanguard itself. It is to the CPC that the system of whole process democracy delegates the leadership role of people centered development that follows the "mass line", that guides intra-CPC democratic practice and its adherence to law based governance of itself and of the nation (summarized in Part I White Paper then elaboredt throughout the rest of the  document).

The contrast could not be starker--or better timed.  Both White papers were distributed on the eve of and to serve as a critique of the United States sponsored Summit for Democracy which is scheduled as a virtual event 9-10 December 2021. It elaborates the emerging core principles of liberal democratic approaches to a democratic order built around individual expression o autonomy, the delegation of authority to officials through processes of open elections, and the accountability of such systems based on judicially overseen rule of law principles founded on the protection of individual human rights.

For the United States, the summit will offer an opportunity to listen, learn, and engage with a diverse range of actors whose support and commitment is critical for global democratic renewal. It will also showcase one of democracy’s unique strengths: the ability to acknowledge its imperfections and confront them openly and transparently, so that we may, as the United States Constitution puts it, “form a more perfect union.” In advance of the first summit, we are consulting with experts from government, multilateral organizations, philanthropies, civil society, and the private sector to solicit bold, practicable ideas around three key themes: Defending against authoritarianism; Addressing and fighting corruption; Promoting respect for human rights. Leaders will be encouraged to announce specific actions and commitments to meaningful internal reforms and international initiatives that advance the Summit’s goals. These pledges will include domestic and international initiatives that counter authoritarianism, combat corruption, and promote respect for human rights. Civil society will be represented on panels and in townhalls as a part of the official program. Their inclusion is based on a variety of factors including geographic representation, political context, and subject matter expertise. (Summit for Democracy)

It evidences  well the working style of 21st century liberal democracy with its focus groups, influencers, and markets driven contests for control of the discursive and administrative machinery of state. It's essence is in fact critique, debate, and eventually resolution in a continuous system of disagreement within (if it works) system stabilizing taboo limits.

In this way, the process of disengagement, of decoupling, between liberal democratic ad Marxist Leninist camps--emerging economic and discursive imperial centers--continues to be perfected. It is most often marked by the evidences of economic decoupling (eg here: Didi shares plunge more than 20% on plan to delist from NYSE). Now even within the liberal camp of liberal democratic organs, the trajectories can no longer be demonized as a fantasy of a much despised (by that faction at least) Presidential administration. With this Summit for Democracy and the two State Council White papers, the normative and discursive decoupling has moved to a more advanced stage as well.  For the est of the world, the consequences are likley more important than for the resident populations of either imperial center.  For them, the projection of these decoupled visions of the world and its better operations will present constant choices and the challenges of navigation, as the periphery is pressured to choose sides and to order and reorder their own operations in the shadow of these choices.  

The two State Council White papers--in the official English translation and in the original Chinese follow below.

Workshop: "Constitutional Law of Greater China" Organised by Ngoc Son Bui and the Oxford Programme in Asian Laws (Virtual; 9-10 December 2021)

I am delighted to share information about the upcoming Workshop: Constitutional Law of Greater China. It is organized by Ngoc Son Bui and the Oxford Programme in Asian Laws. It will be held virtually on 9-10 December 2021. 

The Conference program follows.  It is expected that the essays produced will be included in a collection edited by the marvelous  Ngoc Son Bui (Oxford). Please reach out to the participants for more information about their papers/presentations. 

"The Algorithmic Law of Business and Human Rights: Constructing a Private Transnational Law of Ratings, Social Credit, and Accountability Measures": Presentation at Algorithmic Law and Society Symposium 2 December 2021 (PPT and Draft)

 

It was my great delight to be able to present a paper, The Algorithmic Law of Business and Human Rights: Constructing a Private Transnational Law of Ratings, Social Credit, and Accountability Measures authored together with Matthew McQuilla (Penn State SIA MIA 2021) at the Algorithmic Law and Society Symposium 2 December 2021.

The paper suggests the consequences of the iconoclasm of emerging principles of algorithmic governance--the move from law as an exogenous force to a system of rationalized trolling realized through the application of dense webs of quantifiable measures. The focus of law shifts in an algorithmic environment in the sense that the social control at the heart of the enterprise of law is now delegated out and its language transformed. Law produces the granular application of normative principles that are give effect to socio-political taboos and behavior expectations. These are realized  not through the traditional bureaucratic-administrative apparatus, but rather through its conversion to measurable indicators against which collective and individual behaviors are judged, punished and rewarded.  The ratings system environment that increasingly structures the consequences of human agency provides a very nice example of the way in which algorithmic governance both expresses law and managed behaviors directly. 

But the emerging apparatus of algorithmic law shares common socio-legal characteristics with the apparatus of traditional law--like legal systems it is supplementing or displacing algorithmic governance appears to converge around three important characteristics.  

The first is that is is marked by an increasing division of labor.  Those who harvest data may not be the same as those who develop analytics.  Different still may be those collectives that produce algorithms--the judgments and interpretations of data and analytics for developing appropriate blacklists, whitelists and rewards and punishments. Specialization has produced division of labor that makes accountability more difficult to coordinate. 

Second, like the business of law, algorithmic governance has become a business--and a business that enhances the business models of non-governmental and non-profit collectives. But as a business algorithmic governance also exhibits the core characteristics of market behaviors. These include privileging principles of property and property rights that make transparency more difficult.  It also enhances normative fracture as competition among data collectors, data analytics, and providers of interpreters of data and those who craft systems of effective compliance sharpens in the search for influence, and funding.

Third, even as markets for both the production and consumption of ratings as a form of algorithmic governance grow, so does the consolidation of producer groups and perhaps ultimately their control of entry into markets for the production and interpretation of ratings.   And indeed one already sees in the elaboration of systems of ratings studied the development of tight interconnections among a small group of financing institutions (foundations, states), data harvesters and analytics providers, and government all of whom contribute  and control (1) the goods necessary for the production of ratings and (2) control the parameters for production and valuation.

The PPT of the presentation follows below (and may be downloaded HERE).  The draft (including tables and figures of interconnected ratings maker relationships) may be accessed here (the Abstract and Introduction is included below).  Matthew and I welcome comments, engagements and suggestions!

Please Join the Celebration of Erika George's New Book, "Incorporating Rights: Taking Stock of Strategies to Advance Corporate Accountability" (9 December 2021 Noon US Mountain Time)

I am delighted to pass along information about a virtual celebration of the publication of Erika George's important new book: Incorporating Rights: Taking Stock of Strategies to Advance Corporate Accountability (OUP 2021) to take place 9 December 2021 at NOON US Mountain time.

"Professor of Law Erika George’s book considers market-based strategies to bring business practices into alignment with the responsibility to respect human rights. It also explores how corporate social responsibility initiatives could close a global governance gap that currently places human rights at risk—and that puts commercial actors in the position of becoming complicit in human rights abuses. George examines corporate codes of conduct, sustainability reporting, shareholder activism, and multi-stakeholder initiatives that could become the building blocks of a set of baseline standards for better business practices." (Here)

 Please consider joining Professor Erika George for a virtual celebration on December 9th at noon MT. For this celebration, Professor George is joined by some of the brightest luminaries  in the project of incorporating human rights into economic activity of public and private collectives -- including Surya Deva (UN Working Group for Business and Human Rights) and Bennett Freeman (Bennett Freeman Associates), Ryan Gellert (CEO of Patagonia), Philip Alston (NYU andf former holder of other UN mandate) and Fernanda Hopenhaym (newest member of UN Working Group).

A recording of the event will be available on the University if Utah Law School's website. More information about the book, the event, and its stellar participants follows below.

 REGISTER HERE. 

The VIDEO OF THE CELEBRATION MAY BE ACCESSED HERE.

 

 

 

Algorithmic Law and Society Symposium: 1-3 December 2021HEC Paris--Zoom Pre-Program, Registration and Program

 

 

I am happy to pass along information about the Algorithmic Law and Society Symposium scheduled for 1-3 December 2021 and held at HEC Paris--HEC Amphi Bellon S101, 1 Rue de la Libération78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France

The purpose of this symposium is to foster reflection among the academic and professional communities on the emergence of algorithmic law and its effects in contemporary societies.

REGISTRATION HERE. 

 

Why this symposium ?


Our daily lives are currently impacted by ubiquitous decisions made by algorithms, as mathematical formulas and computer code establish instructions that shape the outcomes of markets, state, and society. Because orders embedded in computer programs command how reality ought to be, algorithms are normative and constitute algorithmic law. In this context, the idea of SMART – acronym for Scientific, Mathematical, Algorithmic, Risk, and Technology driven – Law becomes a perspective for analysis of new regulatory techniques already applied for taxation, fin tech, and banking, among other fields.

Importantly, critical analysis of select algorithms reveals that they may also be opaque, discriminatory, fraudulent, and unfair. Artificial intelligence and machine learning brings another layer of complexity to this brave new world of algorithmic law, especially because of demands for more transparency, the right for an explanation, and for algorithmic auditing.

Likewise, courts are already experimenting with digital justice, by moving from Alternative Dispute Resolution to Online Dispute Resolution. Algorithms are already trained to substitute repetitive work from lawyers and robots may identify similar claims, repetitive appeals, and analogous cases for purposes of unifying these files and providing a single coherent decision applicable for all of them. Exploring the borderlands of law, technology, and society, this symposium provides opportunity for interdisciplinary conversations on theoretical and practical issues, possibilities and contemporary challenges related to algorithmic law in our contemporary societies.

 

For those who can make it, the online pre-program is available via Zoom:ç

Online Pre-program

ALGORITHMIC LAW AND SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2021; 3.30.pm – 5.00pm

Chair: Pedro Rubim Borges Fortes, UFRJ

Paper: “Regulation and Human Rights in ASEAN’s Smart Cities Network: Promise and the Perils”, Alice de Jonge (Monash University)

Paper: “Toward A Practical Legal Rule Revision in Legal Debugging” – Ken Satoh

(National Institute of Informatics, Japan) and Wachara Fungwacharakorn (National Institute of Informatics, Japan)

Paper: “The Femtech Paradox: How Workplace Monitoring Threatens Women’s Equity” – Elizabeth Brown (Bentley University)

Discussants: Janine Hiller (Virginia Tech) and Winston Maxwell (Telecom Paris)

The conference is accessible via Zoom. The link for the meeting room is: https://hec-fr.zoom.us/j/97765828364, 

The Program follows below.

Frank S. Ravitch and Larry Catá Backer Discuss Ceremonial Deism, the Role of Custom and Tradition, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014)

Pix Credit HERE

Frank S. Ravitch and I have just published the 4th Edition to our casebook, Law and Religion: Cases and Materials (West Academic, 2021; ISBN 978-1-64708-764-7). The Preface nicely describes our aims for the book:

This book focuses on Law and Religion. The book covers three general topics: 1) Church/State Law (issues arising under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and statutes such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); 2) Religious Law (the role and substance of law in various religious traditions); and 3) Comparative Law and Religion (the law relating to religious freedom in other countries). Most books in this field have little or no material on the latter two topics. The bulk of this book is devoted to First Amendment Law, but the book also provides an overview of Jewish Law (Halakha), Islamic Law (Shari’ah), Buddhist conceptions of law, Catholic Canon Law, Protestant conceptions of law, and Hindu law as well as significant background on comparative Law and Religion. The discussion of First Amendment law integrates cases, questions and narrative to provide an in-depth understanding of the Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Each topic in this book begins with a brief narrative discussion of the topic, followed by relevant cases and articles, and finally notes and questions. The goal of the narrative is to provide students with context (the forest) so that they can grapple with the many complex issues that are raised in the cases and articles (the trees). The sections on religious law and comparative law will follow a similar format.

We have tried to add a comparative law element to the study of the jurisprudence of religious liberties in the United States by tying that study to the broader global conversations and currents in the development of legal frameworks for the protection of religious liberty. We hope all of this can be accomplished in ways that are useful for law students not just in the US (though US students are our principal audience) but elsewhere as well. 

To enrich the casebook materials Frank and I have started producing a series of video discussions of key cases from the jurisprudence. We hope students and faculty may find the discussions of some use as they consider the casebook materials or as a springboard to deeper discussion of themes and complications raised in the cases.   These may be used by faculty and students to enrich their consideration of the casebook materials or as a springboard to deeper discussion of themes and complications raised in the cases.  

We discuss the pedagogy of the casebook here: Frank S. Ravitch and Larry Catá Backer Talk Pedagogy and Approach as they Introduce the 4th Edition to their Casebook, Law and Religion: Cases and Materials (West Academic, 2021)

 To date we have videos discussing the following cases: 

1.  Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. -- (2021)

2. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

3. Engle v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962), and Sch Dist Abington Twnshp v. Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963).

4.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).

5.  Student Initiated Prayer and Moment of Silence Cases (Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 US 290 (2000); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985)

6.  Creationism, Intelligent Design, and Evolution; Reading Edwards v. Aguillard 482 US 578 (1987) and Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist, 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (2005)

For this conversation we focus on ceremonials deism, its challenges and the rise of the principle of "custom and tradition" as a means of rationalizing the protection of references to and invocations of religious symbols and practices in public life. Here one encounters the drive toward the erection of the wall of separation--at the limits of which might be the notion of the state as a religion free zone, with the realities that religion and religious practices have been enmeshed in the everyday practices of public life from the time of the establishment of the Republic. These include every from from the invocation of "In God We Trust", to references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, to the invocation of God at the commencement of judicial proceedings and the start of legislative sessions. The term ceremonial denim came late and from efforts by academics to rationalize the role of religious "relics" in the life of a republic moving, it appeared at the time, toward a vigorous separation of public from religious life. The entanglement that results is considered.

 

The effort to provide a small space for these expression began with what appeared to be an exception the the rule of separation, articulated in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), to its transformation into an important standard for applying the Establishment Clause in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). We discuss these cases, the notion of ceremonial denim and its relation to religion clause jurisprudence, and the importance of the role of intention in the application of this principle. To that end, the generalization of the methodological and inferential problemmatique nicely evidenced in Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F3d 292 (4th Cir 2004) and Wallace v. Jaffree 472 US 38 (1985). Among the interesting wrinkles are the role of narrative and the art of drawing inferences from facts.  The Galloway case is particularly useful in that regard offering the plausible reading of the actions of the town board as either suggesting the intention to discriminate in favor of some religions or suggesting a willingness to comply with constitutional standards once apprised of deficiencies in local practice. We encounter this often in Establishment Clause cases, though it is quite usefully apparent here.   Of significant interest, as well is the viability of the Galloway court's history and tradition standard--("accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change").

 

 

The Video recording of  this conversation may be accessed HERE.

 It is also available on the Coalition for Peace & Ethics YouTube Channel HERE.

 

The Discursive Edifice of the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative in Africa: State Council of China White Paper-- "China and Africa in the New Era: A Partnership of Equals" [《新时代的中非合作》白皮书（全文）]

Pix Credit South China Morning Post

Recently, it was announced that the China-Africa Conference will be geld in Senegal 29-30 November (see here).

In Dakar, Foreign Minister Aïssata Tall Sall and Chinese ambassador Xiao Han肖晗 (top right photo) jointly convened a briefing for all local African ambassadors where they provided an outline of the four documents that will be adopted at the conference and serve as the key pillars of the upcoming forum:
--The Dakar Action Plan 2022-2024 (This is the most important of the four documents)
--The 2035 vision of China-Africa cooperation
--The Sino-African declaration on cooperation on climate change
--The Dakar declaration (most likely a sort of final communiqué) (Chinese, Senegalese Governments Formally Announce FOCAC Dates and Themes)

In the run up to the event, the Chinese State Council Information Office has released its position (white) paper: China and Africa in the New Era: A Partnership of Equals [original:《新时代的中非合作》白皮书（全文)]  It provides a discursive and thematic foundation for the further elaboration of the framing of the China-Africa relationship through the lens of the Belt & Road Initiative.

Pix Credit HERE

The eighth edition of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is due to be held in Dakar, Senegal, from 29-30 November 2021, Senegal’s foreign minister, Aïssata Tall Sall, and the Chinese ambassador to Dakar, Xiao Han, have announced.  The theme of the conference will be “Deepen China-Africa Partnership and Promote Sustainable Development to Build a China-Africa Community with a Shared Future in the New Era”, according to Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin. (What can Africa expect from FOCAC 2021?)

The Chinese discursive position builds on now common themes: "The two sides will focus on boosting quality development and further align the goals of the Belt and Road Initiative with those of the AU’s Agenda 2063, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the development strategies of individual African countries. They will build the Belt and Road into a road to peace, prosperity, openness, green development, innovation and cultural exchanges, and create a China-Africa community of shared future in the new era." (China and Africa in the New Era supra, Part IV(2)). 

Yet African leaders, still quite eager for deepening economic relations (South China Morning Post), are also increasingly sensitive to the terms of those arrangements, especially after the usually confidential arrangements have been revealed in part. (Database reveals secrets of China's loans to developing nations, says study) The terms of the loans suggest the nature of the  relationships between Chinese entities and African states--and are worth considering in parallel with the discursive efforts to suggest equality in the official public documents.  "These include confidentiality clauses that prevent borrowers from revealing the terms of the loans, informal collateral arrangements that benefit Chinese lenders over other creditors and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructurings - dubbed by the authors as “no Paris Club” clauses, the report said. The contracts also give substantial leeway for China to cancel loans or accelerate repayment, it added." (Ibid.). Recent reporting of the precarious condition of the ownership and control of Uganda's Entebbe Airport suggest the complexities of the relationship (How Uganda coughed up Entebbe airport to China) (Exim Bank of China). There appears to be a push as well for reform in the structures through which these cooperation arrangements are structured and operationalized (for thoughtful commentary: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation at 21: Where to Next?).

Chinese efforts, though, focus elsewhere: "In an interview with the Seychelles News Agency on 17 November, China’s ambassador to the Seychelles, Guo Wei, said that the forum would “adopt measures in such key areas as health, investment and trade, food security, climate change, human resources and digital innovation, with a focus on transforming and upgrading China-Africa cooperation to improve its quality and efficiency.”" (What can Africa expect from FOCAC 2021?). The issue is not whether any of this is good or bad--African states have been undertaking quite risky financial relationships with outsiders since the current era of post colonial independence.   The more interesting question is the way that the variation in these risky relationships now focused on new Chinese partners may or may not align with the discourse of socialist internationalism and its ideals as expressed in the discourse of Belt & Road and the structuring of the ideologies versus the realities of socialist internationalism. Badly done, of course, these discursive disjunctions will eventually reduce the long term effectiveness  of projections of Chinese power in Africa as it had those who had stood in a similar place a generation or so before. 

Pix Credit HERE

 

But for the moment, this document provides a solid glimpse, at least discursively, as the way in which China now projects the Communist International with itself at the center.  No more dreary Soviet-Russified ideological catechisms. In contrast to this offering up of a darker Dostoevsky built into the Comintern and its successors, China builds an ideological foundation on the notion of a  full belly and a prosperous state (prosperous at least for the interlinked networks of elite groups who dominate politics and economics). That enterprise, in turn, is to be guided by a national-Chinese partnership that aligns African national and regional aspirations to the engine of the Chinese core. Instead what is offered is arability and prosperity--with China at the center.  This approach, already long in the making, was refined in the development of a powerful discursive counter-thrust to the Hong Kong protests (Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems'). Stability and prosperity are then built on a Maoist-Leninist foundation of binaries: core-collective; patriot-traitor; vanguard-masses; order-chaos; planning-markets; interference-cooperation; mutual benefit-neocolonial exploitation and so on.  It is a powerful set of discursive tropes, ones which remain unmatched by a liberal democratic camp that has become mired in its own ideological civil wars and can offer up little more  than the sort of dreary catechisms once reserved for the Soviets.  The irony of this inversion from the 1960s ought not to be lost on anyone.

The English language version of the per-Conference paper, China and Africa in the New Era: A Partnership of Equals, appears below, along with the original Chinese. Note the sometimes subtle differences, starting with the title which in the original leaves off the "Partnership of Equals" part.

 

24. Conversations About the Book "Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems': Chapter 23 (Sunday 19 April 2020) The COVID-19 Accelerator Effect: The Situation in Hong Kong and the Virtual Conflict Between the United States and China.

 

Pix Credit Hong Kong Free Press HERE

 “言有尽而意无穷” [Words and meanings are endless]. 

In the run up to the book launch scheduled for 13 July 2021 (registration required but free HERE), the folks at Little Sir Press have organized a series of short conversations about my new book, "Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems'." 

About the Book: Hong Kong Between “One Country” and “Two Systems” examines the battle of ideas that started with the June 2019 anti-extradition law protests and ended with the enactment of the National Security and National Anthem Laws a year later. At the center of these battles was the “One Country, Two Systems” principle. By June 2020, the meaning of that principle was highly contested, with Chinese authorities taking decisive steps to implement their own understanding of the principle and its normative foundations , and the international community taking countermeasures. All of this occurred well before the 2047 end of the 1985 Sino-British Joint Declaration (中英联合声明) that had been the blueprint for the return of Hong Kong to China. Between these events, global actors battled for control of the narrative and of the meaning of the governing principles that were meant to frame the scope and character of Hong Kong’s autonomy within China. The book critically examines the conflict of words between Hong Kong protesters, the Chinese central and local authorities, and important elements of the international community. This decisive discursive contest paralleled the fighting for control of the streets and that pitted protesters and the international community that supported them against the central authorities of China and Hong Kong local authorities. In the end the Chinese central authorities largely prevailed in the discursive realm as well as on the streets. Their victory was aided, in part by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. But their triumph also produced the seeds of a new and potentially stronger international constitutional discourse that may reduce the magnitude and scope of that success. These essays were written as the events unfolded. Together the essays analytically chronicle the discursive battles that were fought, won and lost, between June 2019 and June 2020. Without an underlying political or polemical agenda, the essays retain the freshness of the moment, reflecting the uncertainties of the time as events unfolded. What was won on the streets of Hong Kong from June to December 2019, the public and physical manifestation of a principled internationalist and liberal democratic narrative of self-determination, and of civil and political rights, was lost by June 2020 within a cage of authoritative legality legitimated through the resurgence of the normative authority of the state and the application of a strong and coherent expression of the principled narrative of its Marxist-Leninist constitutional order. Ironically enough, both political ideologies emerged stronger and more coherent from the conflict, each now better prepared for the next.

The book may be purchased through AMAZON (kindle and paperback),  book information including free chapters  and the access to all video conversations HERE.

I am delighted, then, to make available the next in the series of video recordings of conversations about the book with my former research assistant Matthew McQuilla (Penn State International Affairs MIA 2021). Today we discuss Chapter 23 (Sunday 19 April 2020) The COVID-19 Accelerator Effect: The Situation in Hong Kong and the Virtual Conflict Between the United States and China.

In this Chapter one begins to see how COVID-19 has not merely changed the playing field, but how each of the parties has sometimes more and sometimes less successfully have sought to use the challenges and opportunities afforded by the pandemic to advance their positions.The trigger here is the April arrests of key figures in the protests by the authorities for actions taken in 2019. The response of both the central authorities and the international community then draw in shape focus the transformation in Hong Kong brought about through the realities of pandemic. 

 

Pix Credit: Hong Kong Free Press HERE

For those without the necessary imagination to connect the dots and draw the intended picture, the West provides a substantial set of sources of appropriate explanation to drive home the point, one which is then underlined by the US line adopted in the wake of the Hong Kong arrests. One cannot understand the international position on Hong Kong without understanding the contradictions between internationalization for Hong Kong, and the re-nationalization of home state communities by the very liberal democratic states advancing internationalist policies. The arrests of high profile protest leaders or influencers, the controversy over the projection of central authority opinions within the policy bailiwick of local officials and their characterization as “foreign” interference within the Two Systems principle, and the liberal democratic simultaneous policies of decoupling with China and engaging (within international parameters) in Hong Kong suggest a set of criss-crossing vectors of actions and policies that inevitably weaken the approach of the internationalist camp. Here, then, is the advantage to the Chinese approach to One Country that is now likely to be pressed and intensified. Against this, the internationalists appear to offer little effective resistance--only concepts. 

 

It is in this context that one can usefully consider recent actions undertaken in Hong Kong, as well as the power of the international reactions it might produce. Those together will then be even more purposefully fitted together within the larger framework of the construction of the meaning of the global order from the narrative spinning of its Chinese and American makers. None of this is spectacular or new--what makes it interesting is the way that it might be used to understand and define the characteristics and modalities of the COVID-19 Accelerator Effect on inter-imperial systemic relations.

 

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 The video of the conversation about Chapter 21 may be accessed HERE.

All conversations are posted to the Coalition for Peace & Ethics YouTube page and may be found on its Playlist: Talking About the Book: "Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems'." All conversation videos are hosted by Little Sir Press. I hope you find the conversation of some use. 

 

A pre-publication version of some of the book chapters may be accessed (free) on the Book's webpage (here). All videos may also be accessed through the Little Sir Press Book Website HERE.