Rising Stakes in the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack--Cuba's Food Insecurity Added to the Mix; Is there an Ethics to the Political Use of Hunger?

(Pix Reuters; Cuban food output stagnates, may decline in 2017)

Like a stone thrown in a pond, the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack will complicate a number of collateral initiatives of both the United States and Cuba. That, after all, is the nature of Affairs of this sort--to disrupt a trend pointing to a particular direction and to use the resulting instability to reshape policy and undermine opponents. Thus there is always both a policy and personal element to these political thrusts for which events serve as opportunity (see, e.g., here).

 (Pix credit HERE)

For Cuba, the collateral issue is now food security made worse by the serendipity of the hurricanes this summer. But the problem has been compounded by the stubbornness of the old Stalinist nomenklatura to resist replaying over and over again the errors of Soviet agricultural policies starting with the horrors of the Kulak affair. Those errors, of course, are inevitable in this case--like a Greek tragic hero the product of a basic (ideological) character trait that cannot be avoided, even when the full consequences of the result are well understood.

As Marc Frank reports (Cuban food output stagnates, may decline in 2017; Reuters17 Oct. 2017), Cuban food production continues to stagnate and Cuba spends what for it is an enormous amount of its income to feed its people. This is a self inflicted wound--made all the greater by the unwillingness of the Cuban state to reduce its control of wholesale markets, the inefficiencies of the "informal" sector and the resulting transaction costs of the  corruption necessary to run a system around official constraints. Under normal circumstances these inefficiencies and costs would be bearable (and have been for a long time), defining a stable state for Cuban agricultural sectors.  But the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack adds a new element.  It promises to thwart rising expectations for food security and reduce the public cost of food provision (which would permit greater allocation of resources to other sectors identified for development--particularly pharma, infrastructure, and tourism). And the expected changes to U.S. export policies may well make the situation worse.

On the one hand, that is Cuba's calculated risk, which should have been well known to its security analysts as they weighed the costs and advantages of staking a particular position in the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack.  Perhaps Cuban officials guessed that the Russians, Latin American states or the Chinese will provide the subsidies necessary to ride out this phase of U.S. Cuban relations. Or perhaps they miscalculated. But one ought to stop and ask the question often raised ion the context of boycotts and other non-combat tactics applied in the course of international "conversations" among states:  to what extent ought populations to be used as a weapon in international relations.   All states enjoy condemning the practice even as they eagerly embrace its tactics.  Perhaps it is inevitable--the modern version of ancient siege practice for a modern age.  And thus the most interesting insight--the way that the international community has not so much eliminated warfare as it has transposed and legalized the methods of warfare in new forms.  In place of siege warfare there is boycott and embargo; in place of direct violence by organized armies there are advanced techniques of warfare; etc. Our ethics have substantially constrained the use of old fashioned warfare; we might again consider its role in modern forms of conflict. But perhaps we might also consider the morality of a state advancing its international relations objectives on the stomachs of its own people.  Though that might be thought of as politics, it speaks to ethics and morals as well, an ethics and morals that invites judgment, both within and without the state. Yet at the same time, an ethics and morals that might do well to better reflect the sensibilities and practices of this new era.

Marc Frank's reporting follows.   

Cuban food output stagnates, may decline in 2017
By Marc Frank (

HAVANA, Oct 17 (Reuters) - Cuban food output stagnated during the first half of 2017, the government reported this week, and may decline this year because of damage from Hurricane Irma.

The non-sugar agricultural sector, which has stagnated for a decade, further suffered through June from a severe drought and less input from the financially strapped state.

Root and vegetable production was down 1.1 percent through June, the most productive part of the year, according to this week's report, issued by the National Statistics Office (http://www.one.cu/mensualprincipalesindicadoresagropecuario.htm).

The report said grains also declined with the exception of rice, fruit production improved with the exception of citrus, livestock was mixed and both milk and egg production fell.

The report did not provide an overall percentage for the sector.

Communist-run Cuba imports between 60 percent and 70 percent of the food it consumes at a cost of around $2 billion, mainly bulk cereals and grains such as rice, corn, soy and beans, as well as items such as powdered milk and chicken.

The government says it imports 80 percent of the food it distributes on a World War Two-like ration system that covers some basics such as rice, beans, sugar and a bit of chicken and cooking oil.

Hurricane Irma caused significant, but yet to be quantified, damage to agriculture in six rural provinces last month, ending the drought but flattening and flooding crops and downing citrus and other fruits.

"I do not think there will be any growth this year and perhaps a bit of a decline," a local expert with intimate knowledge of the sector said, asking not to be identified because of a prohibition on talking with foreign journalists.

The state owns 80 percent of the land and leases most of that to farmers and cooperatives. The remainder is owned by private family farmers and their cooperatives.

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Castro began leasing land, decentralizing decision-making and introducing market mechanisms into the sector. But most of the effort has faltered and the state has backtracked on market reforms, once more assigning resources, setting prices and controlling most distribution.