Saturday, January 23, 2010

China's Sovereign Wealth Fund's Operations August 2009 Through January 2010: The ActionPlans of Sovereign Activity in Private Markets

The Chinese Sovereign Wealth Fund has emerged at the end of last year as a powerful force in private markets. A review of its activities during the last six months suggests the way in which state policy, political objectives for economic activity can be harmoniously mixed with profit maximization to deepen a new form of investing that is neither entirely private (as conventionally understood) or wholly public. 

I have suggested that
The Chinese efforts to coordinate sovereign investing present a potentially substantial advance in the integration of programs of sovereign investing, public policy, and private markets.[1] This integration suggests that it may not make sense to segregate SWF regulation from other investment vehicles. Instead it may be possible for a state to employ a policy of politically motivated interventions in foreign markets and markets for control that is, simultaneously, financially motivated. It follows that sovereign investing may not be adequately regulated through frameworks that pretend sovereigns can detach pieces of themselves and operate them as if they had no connection to them or interest in them. At the same time, this integration suggests that sovereign investing is, to some extent, a captive of the markets in which they operate—sovereign investment entities abroad will be subject to those host state national regulatory regimes that affect, in equal measure, all economic organs and the markets in which they operate. Yet, the measure of that success, actualized in conventional terms, may continue to reflect a public and sovereign purpose effectuated within the territory of competitor sovereigns. The rise of sovereign market participatory entities, operating as a coordinated network of both sovereign and private actors, seeking to maximize economic and political objectives, will require a responsive regulatory framework substantially different from those currently in gestation. Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2009; Penn State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-2009
Xie Ping & Chao Chen, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Macroeconomic Policy Alignment and Financial Stability 3 (China Investment Corporation, Working Paper Series, 2008), suggested that  CIC was engaged in a sovereign investment strategy that coordinates all elements of public and private power, and, to some extent, private actors as well, to project state power abroad in a coordinated and directed way. “It is possible for size and behavior of investments by SWFs to affect a country’s financial market, monetary policy, balance of international payments, and fiscal policy, even wealth allocation in public sector and investment behaviors in private sector.” Id. at 3. The pattern of investment of CIC provides some support for this view.

I. Investment in Natural Resources and Energy Developing Companies

UP to the end of year 2009, CIC has reached out to the U.S., Canada, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, and several other countries in its hunt for resources. The reason is simple: China needs more resources to fuel its economy and it is a good time to buy. In the past, political opposition from developed countries encumbered China from seeking natural resources in these countries, so that China used to target areas like Central Asia and Africa to secure energy resources. “China has good relations with developing countries like Nigeria and Angola and this helps secure deals.”[1] The economic recession has rendered some natural resources firms in most developed countries in urgent need of finance. As a result, these firms would not say no to CIC’s investment, which suggests a possibility that, from now on, China might be able to secure natural resources not only from developing countries, but also globally through its investment in large international entities that have presence all over the world.


A. AES Corp. In September 2009. The Wall Street Journal reported CIC’s negotiation and prospective investment with the Virginia-based power-plant developer, AES Corp..[2] AES Corp. describes itself as “a global power company with generation and distribution businesses.”[3] “Founded in 1981, AES built its first power plant in 1985 in Texas, which was also one of the first competitive power plants in the United States.”[4] AES has also been seeking global expansion. Currently, it is active in 29 countries. Also according to The Wall Street Journal, about two-thirds of its investments are in the power-generation business and one third in utilities.[5]

Two possible reasons drove AES’s seeking of cooperation and investment in China. First, AES suffered as Enron Corp.'s collapse prompted investors to pull back from power-plant developers and credit got tight.[6] Second, although it has a significant power-plant development business, AES has had little presence in one of the fastest-growing markets -- China.[7] At the same time, “China is especially alluring to AES because many other nations, including the U.S., are experiencing declining electricity demand, while demand in China is still growing. About 6% of AES's megawatts under development are in China, compared with 37% in Chile, 25% in Bulgaria and 12% in Jordan, its top three countries for expansion.”

In November, the said negotiation came to a close. As CIC declared on its official website,

“[CIC] made an investment through a wholly-owned subsidiary in the amount of USD 1.58 billion in AES Corporation (“AES”). At close, CIC will acquire 125.5 million shares of AES stock for USD 12.6 per share, representing approximately 15% equity interest in the company. According to the investment agreement, CIC will nominate one director to the AES board.”[8]
In addition, CIC also declared that CIC had signed a letter of intent with AES to invest an additional USD 571 million for an approximate 35% in the wind generation business of AES.[9]

The Wall Street Journal commented on this deal:
“A deal with AES would demonstrate China's increasing comfort with politically sensitive investments. Historically, the U.S. has been leery of any Chinese investments in American infrastructure companies, fearing potential espionage. …… In 2005, China created an uproar in the U.S. when a state-owned oil company made a bid for California-based Unocal Corp. But fears in the U.S. and elsewhere about China taking control of major companies have subsided in recent years, largely because tight credit has made both companies and governments eager to gain access to Chinese capital.”
B. Noble Group Limited. CIC declared on its official website in November that it had completed a USD-858-million investment in Noble Group Limited (“Noble”).[10] In this investment, CIC purchased 573 million shares in Noble, at SGD2.1137 per share, accounting for 14.91% of Noble’s outstanding shares on an undiluted basis.[11]

Earlier than CIC’s declaration on this investment, the Noble Group announced the investment agreement. Transactional statistics provided by both parties are consistent. Noble stated that
“[The investment] comprised of 438,000,000 newly issued shares by the Company and 135,000,000 shares from trusts associated with the interests of Noble founder and CEO Richard Elman.”[12] Noble further stated that
“The shares sold by interests associated with Mr. Elman represent a small fraction of his holdings in the Noble Group and are only the second such sale by Mr. Elman since he founded the Group. It is the intention of Mr. Elman to use some of the proceeds associated with the sale of his interests in Noble to fund a charitable foundation with a focus on fostering international relations amongst Asian nations.”[13]

Noble engages in the business of supply chain management. It manages the global supply chain of agricultural, industrial and energy products.[14] Expanding from its traditional business of transportation, Noble has showed interest in natural resources.

“With 2008 annual revenues exceeding US$36 billion, Noble continues its transition to owning and managing more strategic assets, sourcing from low cost producers such as Brazil, Australia and Indonesia and supplying to high growth demand markets including China, India and the Middle East. Today, Noble has interests in coal and iron ore mines, grain crushing facilities, sugar and ethanol plants, fuel terminals and storage facilities, vessels, ports and other infrastructure to ensure high quality products are delivered in the most efficient and timely manner to its customers.”[15]


C. Kazakh Gas Companies. In September 2009, it was reported that CIC had bought a stake in the London-traded unit of Kazakhstan’s state-run energy company, taking its spending on resources to at least $3.69 billion.[16] “[CIC] bought an 11 percent stake in Astana, Kazakhstan-based JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration Production for about $939 million by purchasing global depositary receipts.”

At the same time, PetroChina Co., the country’s biggest listed oil company, agreed in April to pay up to $1.4 billion for half of a gas joint venture in Kazakhstan. PetroChina will hold 50 percent of the venture and state-owned KazMunayGaz National Co. will own the remainder.[17]

D. PT Bumi Resources Tbk – CIC’s “First Significant Investment in Indonesia”[18]. CIC declared on its official website that CIC invested US$1.9 billion strategic investment in PT Bumi Resources Tbk (“Bumi”).[19]

In addition, CIC also declared that it and Bumi have agreed to form “a strategic alliance, which would allow CIC to facilitate and participate in the future financing needs of Bumi or its affiliates, including project finance for its expanding infrastructure. CIC and Bumi will also jointly pursue other investment opportunities in the mining sector.”[20]

E. Russia Nobel Oil group. CIC has agreed to invest US$ 300 million in aggregation in Russia Nobel Oil Group.[21]
“The US$ 150 million in Phase I investment includes $ 100 million for the purchase of equity stake from Russian shareholders and $ 50 million for Nobel's operating expenses. In Phase II, the remaining US$ 150million is to be used within 9 months for acquiring and developing oil reserve assets (approximately 150 million barrels) in close proximity to Nobel's existing oilfields.”[22]
By November 2009, CIC had completed the settlement for its Phase I investment in 45% of the equity in Nobel. HongKong’s Oriental Patron had acquired 5% equity stake. The original Russian shareholders maintain their 50% stake. The name of the new holding company is Nobel Holdings Investments Limited ("Nobel").[23]

F. GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Limited (“GCL-Poly”). In November 2009, CIC signed a binding framework agreement with GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Limited (“GCL-Poly”) for the subscription of approximately 3,108 million shares of GCL-Poly at a price of HK$1.79 per share.[24] “CIC and GCL-Poly intend to establish a joint venture to invest in and develop photovoltaic projects or other solar energy projects based on an initial capitalization of US$500 million.”[25]

II. Investment in Financial Companies

A. Oaktree. The Wall Street Journal reported that CIC had agreed to invest about $1 billion in Los Angeles-based Oaktree Capital Management.[26] CIC may further invest another $2 billion directly into other hedge funds, but it is pressing for lower fees.[27] “The paper said other funds that could get CIC money include Winton Capital Management, Lansdowne Capital, Och-Ziff Capital Management and Canyon Partners.” [28]

III. IFC's Debt and Asset Recovery Program (DARP)

World Bank President Robert Zoellick said in October 2009 that the CIC had shown interest in investing in a new International Finance Corp program to acquire and restructure distressed debt in developing countries.[29] IFC's Debt and Asset Recovery Program (DARP) is aimed to mobilize private investment to buy into pools of distressed debt and invest directly in businesses that need to restructure debt.[30]

IV. CIC May Receive Additional Funds from China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves

The Financial Times reported in December 2009 that CIC may get $200 billion in new funds from China’s foreign exchange hoard.[31]

China set up CIC to actively manage the country’s foreign exchange reserves. It was reported that CIC could earn more than 10 percent from its investment for 2009, up from 6.8 percent for the previous year.[32] In addition, people expect CIC’s assets to increase as the global economy and financial markets showed signs of recovery. Under these circumstances,  it is no wonder the Chinese government would like to allocate more funds to CIC, looking forward to more return.

In an excellent article, Ashby Monk and Gordon Clark recently provided insightful context to these moves:
The rapid ascent of the CIC proves that, despite the global financial turmoil, China's economic power is intact. In 2009, China may have supplanted Japan as the world's second-largest economy and edged past Germany as the world's leading exporter. Meanwhile, the country's foreign exchange reserves have continued to set records, recently reaching $2.4 trillion, almost all of which has been accumulated during this millennium.  In fact, rather than stemming the CIC's growth, the global financial crisis has had a profoundly positive effect on China's SWF. Although the fund struggled to overcome a series of managerial, financial, and geopolitical hurdles upon its creation, the financial crisis set the stage for a remarkable transformation. Now, the fund has matured into perhaps the world's largest and most influential strategic investor. Ashby Monk and Gordon L. Clark, Singing in the Rain: How China's fund of billions prospered during the financial crisis -- and what that means for the future of Asia's fast-growing economic superpower, Foreign Policy, Jan. 24, 2010.

The Chinese sovereign wealth fund moves over the course of the last six months suggests not merely power within global private markets, but also the mechanics of an operation that are neither entirely public nor private.  The size, strength and character of Chinese sovereign investing is now poised to change the nature of our understanding of "private" global markets in ways that will pose a challenge not to states, but to the power of private capital.  Monk and Clark suggest "Perhaps the crisis illustrated to many the benefits of having a fund that can underwrite a public purpose and facilitate long-term planning, when compared to the apparent failure of our politicians and financial institutions to look beyond the present election or fiscal quarter."  Id.  That is certainly true; but it also suggests a growing acceptance of sovereign activity in markets, the consequences of which may be both hard to gauge and will affect everything from conceptions of sovereign immunity, to the governance role of private institutions.  Most importantly, where global regulators become major players in the markets they regulate (and now increasingly  in the form of transnational norms) the conceptual basis of globalization dominant since the 1980s may also give way to emerging realities.   Jurists in the European Union developed  the notion that a state may only rarely (and with difficulty) shed its sovereign and regulatory character even when engaged in private market activity especially within its own regulatory space.  Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law. Tulane Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2008  In such a context state investment  inevitably had a distorting effect on the operation of private markets to its advantage.  If this notion is correct, then the extension of global sovereign investing in transnational markets regulated by its principal political players will require close scrutiny as it developes over the next half decade. 
 

ENDNOTES:









[5] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125290044302807951.html. The Wall Street Journal further stated, “[AES] owns 14 utilities that serve 11 million customers, including customers in Indianapolis. It also has power facilities in New York, Texas, and California. AES's earnings growth is largely driven by its construction program, as projects are completed and begin producing cash. Earlier in the decade it was considered a hot stock and traded for $50 to $70 a share.”




[7] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125290044302807951.html. “It has about 200 megawatts of wind-generating capacity under construction there now, half-owned by a Chinese partner, Guohua Energy.”


































[24] http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/resources/news_20091120_703967.html. “The total investment is around HK$5.5 billion. The subscription is conditional upon, among other things, the signing of definitive documentation and approval by GCL-Poly’s shareholders. Upon completion of the subscription, CIC will own an approximately 20% stake in GCL-Poly on a fully-diluted basis.”




[26] http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58O6LG20090925. “Oaktree was founded in 1995 in Los Angeles and New York by a team of debt investors including Howard Marks, who is still its chairman. In July, Oaktree was among nine big asset-management firms chosen by the U.S. Treasury as fund managers for the Public-Private Investment Partnership, or PPIP, the government program designed to rid banks of toxic assets.” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125390976193641883.html.












When the Human Rights Obligations of Corporations Under National and International Standards Conflict: A Proposed Method for Analysis and Action

The Special Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations, John Ruggie, has been engaged in the valuable exercise of seeking broad input as he refines a transnational framework for business and human rights. An important participatory vehicle for individuals and organizations interested in contributing to the developing transnational framework for regulating the human rights impacting conduct of economic enterprises was launched through the global online forum, www.srsgconsultation.org. The purpose of the forum is to gather input for the SRSG as he develops guiding principles to operationalize the U.N. "Protect, Respect, Remedy" framework, as requested by the Human Rights Council. See press release, Dec. 1, 2009.

The consultation project was targeted to the second pillar of the three pillar framework.
The U.N. "Protect, Respect, Remedy" framework is made up of three pillars: the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means to avoid infringing on the rights of others; and greater access by victims to effective remedy, judicial and non-judicial. At least initially, this forum will focus on the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the second pillar of the framework. These topics will remain in place through February 2010, although they may be amended in response to how the discussion proceeds.
Welcome to the online consultation for the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on business & human rights. One of the more interesting and complex of the issues posed by the SRSG through this consultation involves an issue of implementation of the second pillar respect obligations of corporations--what are a company's obligations when international and national noms conflict?

Companies sometimes face situations in which national law or local practice conflicts with international human rights principles. National authorities generally require compliance with their laws; local communities may demand observance of traditional practices; while others may advocate adherence to international human rights standards, as might the company itself for reasons of principle and consistency.

There are places in which law (including United Nations or home state sanctions) prohibits companies from operating, or where the risk of becoming involved in international crimes is so great that companies should refrain from doing business there. But the vast majority of cases do not fall into these categories, leaving companies left with the challenge of finding ways to honor the principles of international human rights standards without violating national law.

Companies faced with this situation have taken different approaches:

* Some multinational companies left South Africa during Apartheid to avoid having to implement discriminatory practices, while others stayed and explicitly disobeyed segregation laws, challenging the government to enforce its own legislation.

* To honor the spirit of freedom of association where it is curtailed by the government, some companies have encouraged workers to form their own representative structures, facilitated elections of worker representatives, provided education on labor rights, and trained local management on how to respond constructively to worker grievances.

* Companies in the internet and telecommunications sector have responded to government challenges to free expression and privacy by working with human rights advocates to develop guidance on what steps companies should take when faced with such challenges.
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on business & human rights; The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights,What are a company's obligations when international and national noms conflict?
The SRSG posed four questions:
[1] What principled guidance can the SRSG provide to companies faced with conflicts between national and international norms?
[2] How should the nature of the rights at risk and the severity of possible abuses be taken into account when dealing with such conflicts?
[3] How might multinational companies address this situation differently from domestic companies?
[4] What examples can you cite of a company having grappled with conflicts between norms, and how would you evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s actions? Id.
The problem posed by the SRSG goes to the heart of the second pillar obligation of companies to respect human rights--the way in which that obligation is to be implemented.  The SRSG defined implementation to include "topics that companies grapple with when working to meet their responsibility to respect human rights."  Welcome to the Online Consultation, Discussion Topics.  Considered together, the questions posed suggest the contours of analysis.  That analysis requires systematization of decision elements with respect to which companies are already well versed.  What follows is an effort to pose a reasonable way of thinking through the issues at the heart of the question posed when companies face decision where national and international norms conflict.  The analysis and framework owes much to Christine Bader, whose work is gratefully acknowledged.

Complexity arises when national law conflicts with those international instruments, in which case legal compliance could undermine the responsibility to respect. In such situations, which have come up under South Africa’s Apartheid regime and in relation to, inter alia, freedom of association, gender discrimination, and most recently free expression and privacy in the internet and telecommunications sectors, experience suggests a decision tree for companies.

Each stage of this process results in either an acceptable solution whereby the company can comply with domestic requirements without risking infringement of human rights, or suggests the framework within which further action can be considered.  The process is designed both to confront the issue of conflict, reduce the contours of that conflict to its essential essence, and then refine the actual nature of the conflict with respect to its impact on human rights. 

The decision analysis process can be understood as consisting of four analytical and decisions stages.  Each is identified, and then amplified in more detailed in the "Commentary" section that follows.  It is meant to provide a template for stakeholders (and their lawyers) for working through these situations in a way that minimizes conflict,and keeps the focus on the objective of maximizing human rights benefits to corporate decision making while respecting lawful state power within its own territory. 

Decision Framework:

1. Explore whether there is a way to reconcile the conflict between standards;

2. If no reconciliation possible then attempt to negotiate an exception or solution with the State;

3. If mediation or informal discussion with State officials is unsuccessful, then challenge the law;

4. Where challenge is unsuccessful consider whether operating in the jurisdiction in question is still feasible, assuming that the company is now forced to choose between national and international standards.

Commentary:

1. The exercise of reconciling standards van involve the efforts of a number of departments in the corporation. Lawyers might be tasked to determine whether there are reasonable ways to avoid conflict, or whether reasonable alternative interpretations of national or international law is feasible; industry standards or local practice might be reviewed; officials might reach out to international bodies or local civil society elements for interpretation. Additionally, the company might review its planned actions in light of its objectives. Many times it may be possible to find alternative means to the same objective that avoids conflict. These processes are usually informal but can also lead to a decision to invoke formal processes for definitive interpretation (and thus lead to stage two).

2. In this stage, there is an assumption that reconciliation is impossible and alternative means of avoiding conflict are not feasible. Now both formal and informal contacts must be made with the appropriate State officials to seek top mediate the conflict. This may involve a number of alternative approaches, from negotiating an agreement with the State (with the object of reaching an agreement that avoids violation of human rights norms), to seeking protection under bilateral investment treaties that incorporate international standards, to seeking legislative change in an appropriate manner.

3. It is possible that discussions with State officials may not produce agreement that satisfies the requirements of international standards. In that event, the company miust determine whether it ought to challenge the inconsistent national legislation. Challenge may take one of two forms in most cases. Usually this course suggests a legal challenge to inconsistent state law. Sometimes it may suggest political challenge. In the latter event, it may be important to solicit the help and counsel of local civil society elements. Special sensitivity ought to be exercised when engaging in challenge in countries with weak government or in conflict zones.

4. Only when lawful challenge proves unsuccessful does a company actually face the issue suggested by the problem--reconciling inconsistent national and international obligations to respect human rights. In that case, the company must make a decision based on the greater good in terms of human rights. The example of Google's well publicized initial determination to engage in business in China in the face of national censorship requirements provides a good illustration of the nature of the decision. In that case, Google decided that there was more human rights benefits to providing some greater amount of information to Chinese customers than to abandon China altogether.   Google, Testimony:  The Internet in China, February 15, 2006.  It is important to remember that decisions made in this context are dynamic. They require constant review as circumstances change. Where the human rights benefits diminish in the face of continued inconsistency in legal requirements, then the company must reevaluate its business decision in order to meet its "respect" requirements under the three pillar mandate. Again, Google provides a good illustration.  The Company publicly sought to reevaluate its agreement to comply with Chinese censorship rules in the aftermath of  cyber attacks on its operations.  See, Google, A New Approach to China, Jan. 12, 2010.

All of these steps could be more effective if taken in collaboration with peer companies, nongovernmental allies, and where applicable the home state. This is especially useful where these collectives can develop models of decision and analysis that are context specific--the example for labor issues, or for issues peculiar to a particular industrial sector. It might also provide a useful area to stimulate collaboration between industry and civil society groups.

Engaging in the analysis suggested by this decision tree has a number of advantages.  It clarifies issues relating to the decision. It helps to naturalize human rights within the conventional patterns of corporate routines for making business decisions. In a sense, the decision tree approach suggested here is similar to decision processes whenever businesses must make a decision in the face of conflict and uncertainty. It also provides a method for minimizing the situations where conflicts of this kind actually arise.  It is meant to provide an analytical framework for  eliminating false conflict by rigorously reducing the scope of conflict to its essential elements.  Lastly, it provides a method for reducing the danger of treating human rights issues as either unmanageable or special (in the sense that it represents a class of issues that are unnatural within the corporate decision making context).

Saturday, January 16, 2010

Who Owns the Name of God? Part II: Malaysia and Conflict at the Nexus of Law, Ethnicity, Culture, Politics and Religion

I have written about the controversy that arose in Malaysia over the decision by Christians to use the word Allah as the way to identify their conception of the Deity. Larry Catá Backer, Who Owns the Name of God? The Malaysian Government Knows!, Law at the End of the Day, Nov. 5, 2009). Allah, of course, is an Arabic word (الله‎,)--and over the course of the last millennium and a half has come to be associated with a peculiar reference to the Deity, that is, to the Deity associated with Islamic cosmology. But it is also a referent to the Deity generally. Ownership of the term, and therefore, of the legitimate expression of faith in and a connection to the ultimate Referent itself (that is to the Deity) is tinged with important consequences, none of them particularly Godly: power, legitimacy, subversion of competitor faith communities, categorization for disparate treatment in law, social and political relations, and the like.

All of these issues were in play in Malaysia, a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and sometimes turbulent political society.
The case began two years ago when The Herald, the Roman Catholic Church’s weekly Malaysian publication, filed a suit against the government. The Herald has argued that the word “Allah” predates Islam and is used by Arabic-speaking non-Muslims to refer to God. It filed the suit in order to continue to use the word “Allah” in its Malay language newspaper. The government had issued the ban on the use of “Allah” by non-Muslims in the 1980s, but the law was never enforced. Just in the last few years the government began enforcing the law and confiscating Bibles that contained the word “Allah.” In response to the High Court’s decision, the government appealed the ruling last week. It maintains that “Allah” is an Islamic word and if used by non-Muslims could confuse Muslims into converting to those faiths. Ethan Cole Christian Post, Eight Church Arson Attack After Malaysia's Allah Ruling, Christianity Today, Jan. 12, 2010.
The "ruling has been opposed by Muslim groups, and the Malay-rights group Pribumi Perkasa [in Malay] has called for demonstrations." Malaysia High Court allows non-Muslims to use 'Allah' as translation for 'God', Jurist, Jan. 2, 2010.

The case itself is important in its own right. The High Court suggested a jurisdictional impediment to the law. In this case that impediment centered on the limits of a state's power to mediate between religion in th use of the language employed to indicate reference to the Deity as their faith communities understand the notion. The government's prudential concerns--confusion, practical effects on its ability to limit the effectiveness of Christian evangelism, etc. was not strong enough to overcome this textual impediment. For the moment, however, the decision represents a paper victory. "The High Court ruling in favour of the Herald, which argued for the right to use "Allah" in its Malay-language section, was suspended last week pending an appeal, after the government argued the decision could cause racial conflict. Since then, churches have been hit with Molotov cocktails, splashed with black paint and had windows smashed with stones, triggering tighter security at places of worship nationwide." Romen Bose, Malaysian Catholics' Lawyers Targeted in 'Allah' Row, AFP, Jan. 14, 2010.

The case presented an interesting issue of Constitutional interpretation of articles 11 and 12 of the Malaysian Constitution. Article 11 provides in relevant part: "(1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it. . . . . (4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam."   Article 11(2) provides that
Every religious group has the right -
  • (a) to manage its own religious affairs;
  • (b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and
  • (c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.
Article 12(2) provides that "Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such institutions or in the administration of any such law."  The issue of religion within the Malaysian constitutional order is explored in Backer, Larry Catá, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering (July 28, 2008). Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2008; Islamic Law and Law of the Muslim World Paper No. 08-44 (Section IV.D.).  There I suggested that
an element of toleration within a system of privilege (of Islam) and subordination (of all others) is made necessary by the construction of state organization on the basis of a dominant race religious construct—the Malay. Yet, Islam’s privilege is constrained by the constitution itself.361 And a system of conventionally described fundamental rights is specified.362 Moreover, the courts have resisted a constitutional interpretation that would use Article 3 as the engine through which Islamist constitutionalism could be imported. Backer, Larry Catá, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering, at Section IV.D.1 (referring to article 3(1) that provides "Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.").
In working their way through these provisions, the High Court appears to have adopted a middle course, construing all of the provisions together to derive governing principles.  As summarized in a recent report:
High Court judge Datuk Lau Bee Lan also declared that an order by the Home Minister banning the use of the word as illegal, null and void. Lau, in her oral decision today, held that the Herald had the constitutional right to use the word in the magazine to propagate the Christian religion but not Islam. She said that pursuant to Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution, it is an offence for non-Muslims to use the word 'Allah' to Muslims to propagate the religion. But it is not an offence for non-Muslims to use the word to non-Muslims for the purpose of religion, she added. Pursuant to Articles 11 and 12 of the Federal Constitution, the Herald had the constitutional right to use the word in respect of instruction and education of the congregation in the Christian religion. Article 10 allowed it to use the word in the exercise of its right to freedom of speech and expression, she said. Lau said thus the decision by the Home Minister prohibiting Herald publications from using the word 'Allah' in the magazine was illegal, null and void. She said the minister had also failed to adduce evidence that the use of word would threaten national security and create misunderstanding and confusion among Muslims. Time Leonard and Joseph Masilamany, Court: 'Allah' Not Exclusive to Muslims, Sun to Surf, Dec. 31, 2009.
The opinion, when more readily available may be worth a closer read. Yet it is the limitations of that decision, rather than its widely heralded permissions to the Christian community that deserve more attention. The High Court effectively split the baby. The Court permitted the use of the term 'Allah' within Christian faith communities, but continues the ban on the use of the term in communications between members of different faith communities. Or better put, as between non-Muslims, the use of the term 'Allah' as a referent to the Divinity must be a matter of constitutional indifference to the state. On the other hand, the use of the term 'Allah' is preserved solely to Muslims in communications among Muslims, or with Muslims by members of other faith communities. In a sense, in Malaysia, the constitution allocated ownership rights in the word 'Allah' to Islam, but concedes a limited use right, in private, among members of other faith communities.

Thus understood, it telling that even such a relatively mild concession has provoked a significant degree of action. Muslim groups have opposed the ruling.
The court decision is not right and we are planning to hold a major demonstration to protest this," Syed Hassan Syed Ali, secretary general of Malay rights group Pribumi Perkasa told AFP. He and 50 other Malay activists held a small protest over the ruling outside a central mosque Friday. "We fear that the court victory will mean that Christian missionaries will now use the word, confusing (the identity of) Muslims and undermining religious harmony," he said. Federation of Malay Students' Association advisor Reezal Merican said although the court decision had to be respected, the government needed to appeal it. "We want to live in peace with all religions here but the word Allah has traditionally in Malaysia been used to represent the Muslim God, which is different from Christianity, and this must be addressed," he told AFP. Northern Perak state mufti Harussani Zakaria was also critical of the verdict, calling it "an insult to Muslims in this country," according to the influential Malay-language Utusan Malaysia newspaper. Malaysian Muslim Activists Oppose 'Allah' Ruling, AFP, Jan. 1, 2010.

Perhaps in order to strengthen the political arguments made in court to support a law that meant to manage the relations between and the relative subordination of the different faith communities in Malaysia, certain members of the Muslim community appeared to take the issue directly to the Churches. "Police on Monday reported the eighth arson attack on a church in Malaysia since the High Court ruled that non-Muslims can use the word “Allah” to refer to God." Ethan Cole Christian Post, Eight Church Arson Attack After Malaysia's Allah Ruling, Christianity Today, Jan. 12, 2010.  More importantly, from the perspective of rule of law concerns, religious gropups have sought to attack the lawyers pressing the Christian case. "Malaysia's Catholic Church said Thursday the offices of its lawyers have been burgled and ransacked in the latest of a spate of attacks triggered by a row over the use of the word 'Allah.'" Romen Bose, Malaysian Catholics' Lawyers Targeted in 'Allah' Row, AFP, Jan. 14, 2010.

If this were the end of the story, one might be inclined to shrug the events off as the usual detritus of nasty competitions for dominance, in which law, religion, ethnicity and culture are deployed as the shock troops in battles for power-dominance in both its real and symbolic forms. First, members of the Muslim community have come forward to protect th eproperty of the Christian Churches.
In addition to security provided by police, Muslim non-government organisations have also begun to patrol church areas in the Klang Valley – an area on the west coast that includes the capital Kuala Lumpur – where four churches were targets of arson attacks. Muslim volunteers began patrolling Monday night in two shifts, from 11 pm to 2 am and 4 am until dawn, according to Malaysia’s The Star newspaper. The Muslim NGO’s have committed to be the “eyes and ears” of the government, which has condemned the attacks on churches, to ensure the security of Christian places of worship. Ethan Cole Christian Post, Eight Church Arson Attack After Malaysia's Allah Ruling, Christianity Today, Jan. 12, 2010.
Significantly, Anwar Ibhrahim in his role as opposition leader, has also thrown his support behind the Christian community, and to some extent, behind the decision of the High Court (including its implicit limitations). Anwar Ibrahim, Statement on Church Bombings and Allah Issue, Jan. 10, 2010. His statement nicely weaves the strands of law, religion, politics, ethnicity and religion that are bound up in the issue of the ownership of the Word and the right of religious communities to use it among themselves and with others.
As a nation we struggle to uphold the spirit of unity that our founding fathers envisioned at independence. We must hold fast to Article 11 of the Federal Constitution which guarantees freedom of religion and the right of religious groups to manage their own affairs. In such times the spirit of engagement and dialogue must transcend those voices that would seek to sow discord and enmity across our land. The people of Malaysia must unite against those who exploit race and religion to incite hatred for political gain. We must renew our commitment to religious understanding and religious freedom. This is a time that tests the resolve of all religions for peace and mutual respect. We must remember that the God who we worship is in fact the same God, the Creator and Sustainer of the Universe. With respect to the use of the word Allah, for example, it cannot be disputed that Arabic speaking Muslims, Christians and Jews have collectively prayed to God as Allah throughout the last fourteen centuries. While sensitivities over its usage have arisen in Malaysia, the way to resolve these conflicts is not by burning churches and staging incendiary protests but by reasoned engagement and interreligious dialogue. Anwar Ibrahim, Statement on Church Bombings and Allah Issue, Jan. 10, 2010.
He cites to Koranic injunctions against disrespect of Christians and Jews, and reminds his readers of the actions of the early Caliphs in their relations with these faith communities. He then suggests the political dimension to the legal proceedings and the augmentation of religious sensitivities. "Much of the blame for the recent attacks can be placed at the doorstep of the UMNO-led BN ruling party. Its incessant racist propaganda over the Allah issue and the inflammatory rhetoric issued by government controlled mainstream media especially, Utusan Malaysia, are reprehensible. Such wanton acts of provocation are indeed criminal and demonstrate the duplicity of the 1Malaysia campaign." Id.

And, indeed, the OneMalaysia campaign has all the elements necessary for the cloaking of discord by the language of unity. "Lim Kit Siang, the advisor of DAP said 'Racial politics had only increased in recent times, and that the 'One Malaysia' campaign had failed to unite the country. There is a further polarisation of race and religion, with the hardening of intolerant attitudes and stances, creating situations unseen or unheard of in the previous history of the nation. Let all patriotic Malaysians of goodwill recognise the danger signals to our plural society.'" 1Malaysia campaign not successful in uniting people – Kit Siang, Malaysia Today, Aug. 31, 2009.  It is not a hard matter to go from a campaign of European Union style union in diversity campaigns to old fashioned unity campaigns in which diversity is managed away.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Using Corporate Law to Encourage Respect for Human Rights in Economic Transactions: Considering the November 2009 Summary Report on Corporate Law and Human Rights Under the UN SRSG Mandate

As part of the mandate of John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, an expert, multi-stakeholder consultation on that project was convened by Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto in November 2009. The Summary Report, Expert Meeting on Corporate Law and Human Rights:  Opportunities and Challenges of Using Corporate Law to Encourage Corporations to Respect Human Rights, Toronto, 5-6 Nov. 2009, is available online at the SRSG’s website at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/435476/jump.  The consultation was also supported by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and further assistance was provided by Export Development Canada and PricewaterhouseCoopers."  Summary Report at 1.  The summary report is meant to serve as “the SRSG’s record of the consultation bearing in mind the Chatham House Rule of nonattribution under which each consultation session was held.”  Summary Report at 1.

The Summary Report is both important and well worth reading.  The fundamental objective of the proceedings was to facilitate an exploration of the possibilities of bending the traditionally insular and fairly narrow field of corporate law, as understood in the West.   A hoped for consequence of that exploration was to sketch possible parameters and methods for helping to change behavior, that is to bend traditional forms of positive law to a particular purpose without altering the fundamental character of that field of law.  But in the process, of course, both the nature of the field, and its interactions with other forms of law, governance and regulation (and these are, of course, quite distinct methods of organizing rules of behavior control) would necessarily change, and probably for the better. 

This orientation was well reflected in the organization of the “Corporate Law Tools Project” itself at the heart of the consultation.  Summary Report, at 2. The project was meant to focus on the important first pillar of the SRSG’s important three pillar governance framework around which the governance of business and framework is organized.  That framework posits (1) state responsibility to protect human rights, (2) company responsibility to respect human rights, and (3) access to effective remedies for human rights abuses.  The focus of the Toronto Consultation was on the first Pillar.  The conceptual framework underlying that Pillar was nicely illustrated recently by Vanessa Zimmerman:
A transnational corporation headquartered in Country A builds a plant in Country B and is alleged to employ forced labour in doing so. It is important to know not only what the corporation may have done wrong, but what both countries should have done to prevent the abuse and what they should do to address it. Recognising this, John Ruggie, the UN’s special representative on business and human rights, is mandated to consider the role of states with respect to business and human rights in addition to the responsibilities of corporations.  Ruggie’s research on the roles of states has to date resulted in three main conclusions. First, while the exact content of state duties to protect against corporate abuse remains undefined, there is consensus that states are the primary duty bearers for human rights under international law – states have a duty to protect against abuses by third parties, including corporations, within their jurisdiction.  Vanessa Zimmerman, Human Rights:  Powers Without States, Discussion Paper, Jan. 7, 2008.

Of course, the traditional instruments of domestic regulation of economic enterprises lend themselves powerfully to the objectives of the First Pillar.  “Key tools for doing so include corporate and securities law and policy. Corporate law directly shapes what companies do and how they do it. Yet its implications for human rights remain poorly understood. The two are often viewed as distinct legal and policy spheres, populated by different communities of practice.” Summary Report at 2.  The object, then, is to engage in deliberations for the purpose of deploying traditional regulatory mechanisms to change corporate culture by changing the legal parameters of corporate behavior. 
The CLT Project forms just one part of the SRSG’s work under the state duty to protect. It intentionally focuses on corporate and securities law in order to explore the challenges and opportunities for states in creating and implementing policy and legal reform in that area. The SRSG felt that a designated project was important given the relatively unexplored nature of the corporate and securities law arena vis-à-vis business and human rights.  Summary Report at 2.
The Consultation, then, was meant to harvest ideas and approaches from leading professionals to this end, “with a view to providing the SRSG with broad recommendations on what legal and policy tools might be further explored.”  Summary Report at 2.
 
Reflecting the fundamental instrumentalist focus of the proceedings, the meeting was broken up into eight sessions:
1.  Understanding the UN Framework and how the Corporate Law Tools Project Fits in (Summary Report at 3);
2. Incorporation and Listing (Summary Report at 4);
3.  Directors’ Duties (Summary Report at 6);
4. Reporting (Summary Report at 8)
5. Stakeholder Engagement (Summary Report at 11);
6. Board Composition (Summary Report at 13); 
7.  Policy Coherence and other corporate governance tools (Summary Report at 15);
8.  “Brainstorming” and recommendations (Summary Report at 17).
Thus packaged, the recommendations coming from the sessions would serve “develop guiding principles in this area that make sense to all governments, while not being so abstract as to be meaningless. And as he commented at the outset, while corporate law would remain a priority, he would also continue to look at how to drive human rights considerations into various other areas of policy and law that affect business operations.” Summary Report at 18.  My purpose here is to reflect on some of what might be the more important insights that emerged from that meeting and which are reflected in the Summary Report.   For that purpose, I will track the order in the sessions as set out in the Summary Report.

 1.  Understanding the UN Framework and how the Corporate Law Tools Project Fits in (Summary Report at 3).

This introductory session was meant, to some large extent, to set the conceptual framework for the session that followed.  It is useful for understanding the boundaries of the SRSG project.  This is an important consideration.  While the SRSG’s project is both vital and important, it is meant to be quite focused on one of the great issues of corporate governance, not all of them.  It is this limitation that serves as the foundation of the problem of “coherence” explained by the SRSG in the opening session.
The SRSG’s work suggests that although some states are moving in the right direction, overall their practices exhibit substantial legal and policy incoherence. The most widespread is what he has called “horizontal” incoherence, where economic or business-focused departments and agencies that directly shape business practices—including corporate law, and securities regulation—conduct their work in isolation from and largely uninformed by their government’s human rights agencies and obligations, and vice versa.  Summary Report, at 3.
Horizontal incoherence is an endemic problem in the regulatory role of the modern state.  As its role as regulator has increased since the 19th century, and as  the state has  displaced other potentially competing communal regulators, from religion to ethnic systems for disciplining behavior,  the apparatus of the state has grown increasingly complex.  As a consequence,  the state apparatus has become  more divided along functional lines and the maintenance of system coherence has become more difficult.  System coherence becomes even more difficult when the functional divisions of authority within a bureaucracy lose their normative value or no longer serve to further functional utility.  That difficulty appears to mark the modern state apparatus as it moves from an internal ordering marked by a strict division between economic and individual rights functions, or between domestic and international law.  For the project of corporations and human rights, the coherence issue is critical, and as important in its vertical dimension as in its more internally focused horizontal dimension.  For the former, see, Backer, Larry Catá, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nation's Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as Harbinger of Corporate Responsibility in International Law. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 37, 2005 ; and Kinley, David, Nolan, Justine and Zerial, Natalie, The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations. Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 30-42, 2007; Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 07/10. The management of both horizontal and vertical incoherence, then, serves as a key point in the construction of a useful governance framework for business and human rights—especially in the context of the First Pillar’s focus on the state’s duty to protect human rights.  “Accordingly, the SRSG argued that governments cannot adequately discharge their human rights duties if they segregate business and human rights into a narrow conceptual and institutional box and ignore the issue in other business-related policy domains. Their duty to protect requires a more comprehensive understanding and coherent application.” Summary Report at 3.  It is to that search for coherence that the remainder of the sessions were devoted. 

2. Incorporation and Listing (Summary Report at 4).

Discussion of the utility of bending the incorporation and listing rules to the protection of human rights necessarily invoked consideration of the fundamental character of the corporation, and the relationship of that entity (so characterized) top the state (and its regulatory apparatus).  And, of course, that is the difficulty.  There is no single vision, either within a state, or between states, of the character of the entity.  See, e.g.,  Ktsuhito Iwai, “Persons, Things and Corporations: the Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance,” American Journal of Comparative Law, 47 (4), Fall 1999, pp. 583-632. [PDF file: RIJE Discussion Paper, 97-F-37 version.].  Depending on whether corporations are understood as a nexus of contract, or as a nexus of privilege—that is, as property or institution—different regulatory approaches are possible.  Moreover, traditionally, and certainly from the time of Milton Friedman in the 1960s, there has been a strong political policy aversion to moving too strongly toward an institutionalist model of corporate governance.  Essentially, that fear is grounded on the anti-democratic consequences of vesting private enterprises with public purposes.  Issues of democratic accountability, of the need to and value of preserving a strict distinction between public and private activity all play a role in the continuing strength of this reluctance. 

All of these issues were well represented in the reported discussion on the use of incorporation and listing as instruments of a human rights set of objectives.  One of the more radical proposals entailed undoing, arguably to a small but till significant extent, the fundamental basis of corporate organization:  incorporation as a ministerial and enabling process rather than as a regulatory instrument.  Summary Report at 4.  It was acknowledge that this approach poses substantial conceptual difficulties beyond the significant problem of political feasibility.  Id.  One problem that was not mentioned but would also be worth considering is grounded in issues of class and economic opportunity.  Simply put—enabling statutes with de minimus requirements permits people with substantially small means to have access to a powerful instrument of economic activity, leverage their assets and better their economic circumstances.  The greater the regulatory burden, the larger the regulatory hurdles to access to this form of organization, the less likely that it will be available as a method for economic betterment in developed states and as a powerful instrument of development in poorer states. Limiting the corporate form to the well off might itself violate the letter or spirit of the very human rights instruments that this solution would be designed to protect.   

The South African approach, to liberally permit incorporation, but subjecting all corporations to the human rights norms of the South African constitution has possibilities, but it also implicates the horizontal coherence problem highlighted by the SRSG.  Moreover, it also suggests the critical importance of the vertical incoherence problem of focusing on national clusters of human rights in the context of developing global human rights norms.  Still, there may be value in focusing on fundamental principles, universally applicable within a domestic legal order, that fosters all organizations to become human rights respecting as an integral condition of their operation.  Yet moving beyond implicit incentives and generally applicable obligations implicated the great conceptual difficulty of democratic governance. “The speaker was also concerned that adding human-rights duties as a pre-condition to incorporation could blur already confused state and business responsibilities – effectively setting up private bodies with public duties. Rather, human rights-related responsibilities sit better within other laws such as labor and criminal laws.” Summary Report at 5.  This was a position countered by those who, equating corporate articles of incorporation with domestic political constitutions,  suggested transposing political obligations with respect to human rights into corporate “constitutions” as a condition to incorporation. 

Different perceptions of corporate personality produce different regulatory possibilities.  And there lies the great difficulty of the discussion.  Assuming a sort of polycontextuality in corporate personality, that is of the corporation simultaneously understood as property, institution, a gossamer of contracts or privilege, it would follow that any regulatory approach would necessarily invite opposition on two levels.  The first, the object of the discussion reported, is substantive.  The other, less well recognized but perhaps more important, focuses on the institutionalization of power.  Corporate law, in effect, now reflects a balancing of power among the various notions of corporate personality.  Any significant regulatory movement would tend to change that balance, and the interests of those benefiting from the current arrangement.  Shareholders, for example, are less likely to favor institutionalism in regulation because it has the effect of reducing the power (and legal effects) of corporations as property.  The opposite is true as well.  An interest analysis, grounded in the relationship between corporate personality and the distribution of power among corporate stakeholders within a particular regulatory framework is essential in any discussion seeking to change the mix.  

Missing from the discussion was the application of the discussion to either state owned enterprises or to sovereign investing entities, for example sovereign wealth funds.  These entities ought to more naturally be amenable to treatment under a public law model, especially at the shareholder level.  It is not clear that the enabling principle, so important in the context of private corporations, is particularly relevant in the context of these publicly held entities.  As such, these would be enterprises where the state obligation to protect might well have direct application.  The only objection would be one of parity--that state owned entities engaging in private market activities should be treated like other similar enterprises.  But the argument is substantially weakened by the reality of public ownership.  If the state has a direct duty to protect, that duty applies to all of its instrumentalities and activities, whether direct or indirect.  To claim a power to shield its activities from the obligation of a state to protect human rights by resort to the expedient of shielding public or state operations in private form would subvert the state duty to protect in a fundamental sense.  

3.  Directors’ Duties (Summary Report at 6).

 This last notion, to some extent, also underlies the important discussion of the utility of focusing on the regulation of directors’ duties as a means of naturalizing human rights within corporate governance, the subject of the second session.  The issue of directors’ duties implicates not only human rights, but also the  fundamental purpose of the corporation itself.  This later issue is bound up in the seemingly simple question: who does the corporation serve—shareholders, the entity itself, others, or a combination of all of these?  The answer to this question has been simple and straightforward--the corporation serves the shareholders directly or indirectly by serving the financial interests of the entity itself.  It might consider a range of factors that may bear on the welfare of shareholders and entity, but they may not privilege the welfare of any actor to the detriment of the entity or its shareholders. It is in that context that the most ambitious  thrust of the session--to determine whether it is possible to extend to directors a duty to take into account the human rights impacts of their company's operations (or absent that to permit directors to take such impacts into account)--assumes its most radical aspects.  Summary Report at 6. 

The radicalism of such a proposition--at least within the conventional context of corporate law--was emphasized by the inability of participants generally to directly confront the question in its most aggressive posture.  One noted that even current movements that appear to permit such consideration (in the case of the U.K.'s Section 172(d) with respect to impacts on communities and environment) was still firmly centered on the principal obligation of directors to act in the company's best interest.  It's thrust is to promote the interests of shareholders--now more broadly conceived to include issues besides the direct maximization of short term cash positions--within parameters approved by the state.  "It guides directors in what they should consider in the boardroom (and in doing so explicitly enables directors to consider community and environmental impacts) but does not prescribe how they should do so and does not hold them to account for any impacts that might result if they decide not to act on them. It was contended that section 172 thus codified what was already implied in the common law, and did not amount to a significant change in the status quo." Summary Report at 6.  

Yet even in this exceedingly mild form, the narrowly permissive and ambiguous permission to directors elicited a lively conversation that suggested the strength of the conventional framework privileging shareholder interests in the deliberative processes  required of directors.  Some participants hailed Section 172 "as a positive development given its normative value. One participant highlighted the organic nature of fiduciary duties and the fact that section 172 showed how duties were evolving in the 21st century. It was argued too that the provision, while not perfect, provides directors and shareholders with a negotiating framework for more responsible corporate behavior." Id. at 7.  Yet that sentiment was hedged with the quite sensible suggestion that directors be held harmless for actions undertaken under this modest provision--hardly a sign of confidence in the utility of the provision for broadening the normative base of director duty to consider factors other than shareholder or company welfare. "In particular, some participants remained skeptical of the ability of shareholder-centric provisions to bring about any real change in directors’ accountability for human rights-related abuses, because only shareholders may take action for breach."  Id.  But the problems were not merely substantive.  Procedural hurdles of using director's duties as a basis for considering the human rights impacts of corporate activity.  Thus, for example, "the participants spoke about the obstacles that might face shareholders in bringing derivative actions against directors for breach of section 172 type provisions." Summary Report at 8.  The best that was suggested was South Africa's model that broadened the right of individuals to bring derivative suits (id., at 8), yet the trend in many other states, the United States in particular, is to reduce the scope of private rights of action--transferring that power to the enforcement arms of the state.  See, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring after Sarbanes-Oxley. Law Review of Michigan State University (2004).

Still, despite the power of the conventional model of director duty, the SRSG's questions are worth considering.  It appears unlikely that the shareholder (or even the slightly more broad conventional stakeholder) model of director duty will be abandoned.  And the American experience suggests that a permissive broadening of the scope of duties will have little real effect to change either behavior or the culture which legitimate behavior choices.  But a change in the way in which shareholder or entity welfare maximization is measured would  prompt significant change in director behavior.    This approach was hinted at in the proceedings and merits further considerable investigation.  Director's duties are derivative of shareholder rights.  To change the method of taking the measure of those rights would provide the mandatory flexibility for director conduct that the SRSG seeks through First Pillar action.

4. Reporting (Summary Report at 8).

Monitoring and transparency have come to the forefront of both corporate governance reform efforts at the state level and as a regulatory method in its own right.  Backer, Larry Catá, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 15, 2007. "Reporting can be essential for the company in knowing itself whether its policies are being effectively implemented. It can also facilitate stakeholders (shareholders and non-shareholders alike) to better engage with individual companies, assess risk and compare performance within and across industries." Summary Report at 8.  The participants identified a number of useful reporting templates, from the Global Report Initiative to models from Sweden and Denmark.  See Summary Report at 10. 

Again, the discussion suggested the power of the public/private divide  in legal culture and its effect on limiting conceptualization of issues and solutions.  The problem was posed not as one of capacity but of politics, that is of the concern that changes to corporate governance of this kind would not be deemed legitimate because they would effectively concede the political character of the corporation.  Public entities are accountable to the electorate.  Corporations are accountable directly to their shareholders, indirectly to their stakeholders and remotely to the public regulator that sets the terms of their operations within the territory of a state.  Conceding public obligations to corporations without electoral accountability would appear to cede public functions to private entities without public accountability. Thus, "similar to the incorporation discussion, the issues of “institutional competence” was raised – by imposing reporting obligations on companies with respect to human rights are we placing too much responsibility for the public good in institutions designed for private profit maximization?" Summary Report at 8.  Yet, that is precisely what governments, and in particular that of the United States, has sought to do especially after the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.  Backer, Larry Catá, The Duty to Monitor: Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers and Auditors to Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing Beyond the Securities Laws. St. John's Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 4, p. 919, 2003.
It was suggested that in the United States certain reporting provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were intended to encourage officers to disclose more in order to do more. However, it was also argued that proponents of mandatory disclosure do need to think about where such disclosure would best fit, including within financial reporting. It was highlighted that in Canada there are two materiality tests: (a) the market impact test; and (b) the reasonable investor test. The latter may be more easily used to bring in social, including human rights, considerations into materiality decisions. Summary Report at 9.
For monitoring, of course, the devil is in the detail, and much time was spent discussing the difficulties of implementing an effective system of transparency and monitoring.  Important issues were considered, few lending themselves to easy answers. "The third speaker brought examples from Africa, specifically focusing on the recommendations of the King Commission of Corporate Governance in South Africa. The recent third report of the King Commission suggests integrated financial and sustainability reports, which should record how the company has positively and negatively impacted the communities in which it operates."  Summary Report at 9. Others included--reporting parity among different sorts of entities, materiality concerns (a concept that has bedeviled regulators and courts in the United States), flexible standards for reporting depending on the reputation of host countries, disparities between reporting and remedy obligations, the value of imposing reporting requirements through soft or hard law instruments, the connection between reporting and liability, and enforcement issues. Summary Report at 9-10.  With the issue of coherence, the participants illustrated the power of horizontal incoherence even within a regulatory field.  
Continuing with the theme of enforcement, other participants contended that even shareholders may have difficulty in taking action, particularly where there is no obvious impact on the share price from the company’s reporting failures. However another stressed that enforcement should not only be measured in legal actions - lack of disclosure may dilute investor confidence in a company, which may eventually prompt management changes. It was accepted that this means investors themselves must do more to encourage greater transparency - regulators may only be able to take reporting rules so far.  Summary Report at 10.
The discussion made clear the difficulty of stitching a human rights based monitoring and reporting requirement on a corporate system centered on the maximization of shareholder welfare.   The aggregation suggests a merger of two models that in this respect, and in this form, remain incompatible. Perhaps coherence can be achieved by monitoring efforts targeted to shareholder value.  But that requires a reporting regime  that relies on markets rather than on regulatory constraints.  See, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations. Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, 2008.

5. Stakeholder Engagement (Summary Report at 11).

The discussion of the monitoring issue, then, implicated the substance of the next issue discussed--that of shareholder engagement.  This issue goes to the heart of conventional approaches to corporate governance, that of determining which corporate actors are privileged by law to corporate assets and control.
An example was provided of a shareholder resolution which requested a human rights impact assessment of a mining project. A committee was established to carry out the assessment, including company and shareholder representatives, but no representatives from the affected community. The speaker argued that affected individuals and communities are rights holders, not merely “stakeholders”, and that socially responsible investment firms are companies that have a responsibility to respect rights too.  Summary Report at 12. 
Earlier sessions highlighted how other aspects of corporate governance, such as directors’ duties and reporting rules, may help stakeholders, particularly shareholders, to understand more about a company’s human rights impacts and request that they address them. This session aimed to explore other tools such as shareholder proposals; speaking rights at annual general meetings; bilateral dialogue; stakeholder panels or committees; and divestment. Summary Report at 11.

The panelists usefully first suggested the role of institutional investors in helping shape corporate governance policy.  The suggestion was made that such investor action might be effective in shifting corporate culture and activities with respect to human rights.  The focus was on state pension funds--which are large and effective in the United States and other developed States.  Summary Report at 11-12.  Little mention was made of state sovereign wealth funds.  One in particular, the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund has become a global leader in incorporating considerations of human rights in both its investment decisions and in its role as a shareholder.  See, Backer, Larry Catá, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investment (May 4, 2009). Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2009. 

A very interesting turn in the discussion, especially in light of the sophistication of large investors and their counsel, was the "confusion amongst investors as to whether they were even allowed to consider social issues, including human rights, and thus government declarations could be helpful in assuring investors that such considerations need not conflict with their fiduciary duties."  Summary Report at 12.  Yet it has been a hallmark of American corporate law for almost a century that while directors and perhaps controlling shareholders have fiduciary duties that extend to some extent to their conduct as shareholders, non controlling shareholders are free to vote and act in their own interest--which could include an interest in fostering a greater sensitivity to human rights.  There are limits, of course, but none that would suggest that shareholders breach a duty by insisting on the adoption of human rights sensitive  behavior by corporate officers and directors.  Indeed, as the SRSG suggested elsewhere, such activity could be justified on conventional values maximizing grounds.  Indeed, the suggestion of the use of sustainability of indices, like the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (Summary Report at 12-13) also suggest  the utility of such shareholder action in conventional settings. 


6. Board Composition (Summary Report at 13).

One of the most topical areas of policy discussion in corporate governance circles over the last several decades has focused on the composition of boards of directors.  As policy consensus has moved from notions of managerial privilege (and insider boards) to shareholder democracy (and boards composed of independent directors), this issue has found its way to the center of a host of corporate governance debates.  The work of Stephen Bainbridge in the United States is instructive.  See, Bainbridge, Stephen M., Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance (February 2002). UCLA, School of Law Research Paper No. 02-06.  At the same time, the courts in the United States continue to protect the prerogatives of directors against shareholder direct or derivative action.   While shareholder democracy has advanced as a policy concept, its manifestation has not had much of an effect on changing the distribution of power between shareholders as a class and directors.  For a recent case, see In Re The Dow Chemical Company Derivative Litigation, Cons. No. 4339, (Del. Ch., Jan. 11, 2010), read opinion here.  For a discussion of the opinion, see Kevin Brady and Ryan Newell, Delaware Court of Chancery Dismisses Dow Shareholders' Derivative Claims Regarding Rohm and Haas Acquisition for Failure to Plead Demand Futility, Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog ,January 17, 2010.  Within the debate outside the United States, the issue of board composition has served as the site for advancing a stakeholder model of governance over a shareholder primacy model.  Stakeholder governance has been given short shrift in the United States but remains popular among academics and government officials outside the U.S. Those notions were very much in evidence in the form of the debate.  The combination of issues--outside versus inside director models and stakeholder versus shareholder representation models was nicely represented in the discussion.  

The discussion on board representation was grounded in the conventional parameters of the debate within global corporate law circles--the value of including labor representatives on the board (in two tier board structure son the supervisory board) and the issue of independent directors (again in a two tier board structure at the supervisory board level).  There was a sense that this form of organization can be effective, though there are transaction costs involved.  For some, a two tier board structure "could assist corporate cultures respectful of rights by instituting further checks and balances for the acts of the managerial board. The supervisory board may also provide a safer space for key stakeholders, such as employees, to raise concerns." Summary Report at 14.  But that is only marginally useful in fostering a structural system that meets the SRSG's object of managing corporate governance structures to produce an mandatory engagement with  human rights at the director level.  The same could be said of the utility of independent directors on boards.  See id., at 14.  The difficulty, of course is the inherent coherence of conventional corporate law--in a system nicely structured to further the interests of shareholders, a system in which shareholders are the objects and instruments of director discipline, structural changes to the board that change the decision structure of the board necessarily implicate the shareholder supremacy norm of corporate organization, at least as a matter of corporate law.  

Interestingly, the Chinese perspective suggested that such an approach was more likely to be effective within the state corporate sector, and that "attention will need to be paid to whether it is being respected in substance by privatized companies."  Summary Report at 13.  Yet it is well known that formal inclusion can be a means of effective exclusion--an open secret in the context of German co-determination.  Moreover, in state owned industries, the convergence of public obligation and private responsibility converge.  The critical issue ion the SOE context is enforcement.  States are well practiced int he art of suggesting conclusions and interpretations that advance their interests.  Without effective systems of accountability, including transparency, such statements are untested and subject to abuse.  But here one bumps up against the conventional norms of the state system itself--as the Chinese government officials made clear at the Copenhagen Climate Conference recently, it is one thing to induce states to commit to certain obligations, but it is quite another to implant systems of accountability that are not wholly under the control of the reporting state.  For the Chinese issues of sovereignty mask sensitivities to a neocolonialist past and a desire to avoid international discipline.  But those issues remain very real either when directly implicated in the case of SOEs or indirectly in the context of the First Pillar generally.  If the state's obligation to protect does not include monitoring and transparency requirements vested in the community of states subject to the same strictures, then it will be difficult to monitor compliance.  Balancing sovereignty concerns and the needs for accountability and enforcement in the First Pillar context may prove difficult--yet it presents an important and necessary exercise.

But there was also discussion of gender representation on boards--with reference to France's recent consideration of gender quotas for board representation.  Summary Report at 13-14. "focusing on gender representation, several participants noted other examples of legislative developments in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. It was suggested that much could be done to increase international policy coherence in this area by encouraging governments to consider developments in other states when constructing their own policies and laws." Summary Report at 14. The constitutional difficulties of such approaches was noted as well.  Summary Report at 14.  Additional difficulties of any uniform approach to board composition was emphasized, especially in its application within developing states.  Id.  And indeed, in developing states, issues of essentializing board representation (women members to represent women's interests; ethnic representatives; representatives of religious constituencies and the like) presents both internal and external constituencies difficulties.  This, it was suggested theater "Moving back to the topic of employee and gender representation, it was highlighted that in order for such representation to be effective, it should be accompanied by guidance for those representatives of whose interests they are there to serve and what steps they may take to promote them."  Id., at 14.  And, indeed, the difficulty is a matter of focus--if the object is to manage formal structures of corporate governance to ensure a mandatory sensitivity to issues of human rights in corporate activities, the exercise of formalist pluralism  might miss the mark, though it serves other potentially useful objects. 

But issues of board composition in the context of developing the habit of human rights sensitivity is not merely about board composition.  There is a structural element that is worth discussing.  For that purpose the SRSG focused on "the arguments for or against requiring or incentivizing boards to create “CSR” or “ethics” sub-committees designed to monitor social, environmental and governance issues, including human rights" Summary Report at 13.  The general consensus appeared to be dismissive:  "On the issue of board sub-committees on corporate social responsibility, it was argued that such issues need to be considered as part of the board’s ordinary business. The contention was that as soon as such issues move into a “sub”-committee, they lose prevalence and focus." Summary Report at 13.  Yet form an American perspective, this is a notable conclusion.  The thrust of U.S. law over the last decade or so has been to use the  flexibility in Board organization and operation to demand delegation of critical functions to duly constituted sub committees of the board.  These sub committees  are given broad authority over specific areas--principally relating to nominations to the board, compensation, and financial issues.  Rather than serving as burial grounds for issues that are marginalized, they serve as centers of board power.  And, indeed, in the case of regulation like the Sarbanes Oxley Act, allow the regulator to specify the qualifications of members of such powerful sub committees without otherwise interfering with the power of the company to ground selection of other board members on the basis of other criteria (connections, wealth, etc.).  

7. Policy Coherence and other corporate governance tools (Summary Report at 15).

Of course, the prior discussion implicated issues of coherence in a fairly comprehensive way.  I have suggested that which it is true enough that there is a substantial amount of incoherence within domestic legal orders, especially as between human rights regulation and corporate regulation, there is a substantial coherence within corporate law.  But coherence in this context tends to work against the SRSG's principal objectives with respect to the use of corporate law (as currently framed) to advance the First Pillar state obligation to protect human rights.  The discussion of approaches to "coherence."  

One approach to policy coherence rests on process issues, principally consultation. The U.K. approach suggested a focus on internal coherence, that is on harmonization within a domestic legal order by reference to its own internal logic.   "The first speaker discussed the adoption of the UK Companies Act. It was highlighted that there was a significant level of public consultation for most aspects of the Act, which provided a variety of stakeholders with the opportunity to note their concerns and ideas, including different government departments." Summary Report at 15.  In contrast the Danish approach suggested an externally based approach--grounding coherence on standards generated within a global context and then transposed into the Danish legal order.  Id. The Danish approach suggested difficulties--principally international policy incoherence. Reliance on soft law developments at the transnational level, and contextual flexibility were suggested as necessary for the evolution of transnational standards. Summary Report at 15-16.  Yet this suggests fracture as well as harmonization.  If human rights are understood quite distinctly within particular national orders, the possibility of gaming the system to the advantage of flexible multinational corporations:  such entities might move operations to places that maximize their income and minimize the obtrusiveness of otherwise applicable principles might be too hard to resist--and even harder to police.

Usefully, there was discussion of a convergence of the Protect-Respect-Remedy framework with the emerging standards formulated by entities such as the OECD, but with a caution that such convergence not imperil the autonomy of either effort.  "Reference was made to the OECD Corporate Governance Principles and their possible application in the area of business and human rights. It was suggested by some that greater links be explored between the Principles and the OECD Guidelines for Multi-national Enterprises. However there was caution that any review of either document would likely not be connected to the other on an institutional level." Summary Report at 16.  Enthusiasm was dampened for this project because observers rightly noted that the embrace of the OECD framework was extremely uneven--places like the United Kingdom were moving aggressively to incorporate the OECD norm structure, while others, and notably the United States (even under the current more liberal administration) appear to treat their obligations as an afterthought--at best.   See Backer, Larry Catá, Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) V Das Air and Global Witness V Afrimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations (June 30, 2009). Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, Forthcoming. Yet that problem might be considered an opportunity as well.  Enforcement, the crux of the problem, is at the center of the Third Pillar of the SRSG framework.  It is likely that efforts to confront the enforcement issue within the OECD framework might provide guidance for related efforts, and vice versa. 

And indeed, the participants touched on enforcement efforts that might be more carefully explored in the future.  The most effective of these sought to deploy polycentricity in the service of indirect enforcement in interesting ways.  Most useful for the idea that soft law, like the OECD codes, can move toward effective enforcement, not through public legislative efforts, but through the requirements of other private bodies.  A layering of regulatory efforts by related governance bodies--public and private--might well create an enforcement net that effectively achieves a mandatory compliance.  But that compliance would be a function of choices and desires of the target entities, rather than applied in the usual form--from a regulatory source.   Thus, "there was some consensus amongst participants that voluntary corporate governance codes are (a) rarely entirely voluntary, particularly when they are linked to listing rules or other regulations on a “comply or explain” basis; and (b) can play an important ground clearing role in raising comfort levels for new principles and eventually facilitating legislative change. State CSR policies and other guidance materials may play a similar role."  Summary Report at 16.

Though this discussion was extremely helpful and tended to push the discussion forward in significant ways, the discussion also generated a certain level of frustration.  It became clear that the focus tended toward working around regulatory incoherence rather than confronting it. The principal issue, around which all session were organized, was the possibility of a regulatory convergence of sorts--corporate governance and human rights.  Yet throughout, each remains encapsulated in their own sphere.  As long as human rights remains effectively something other than a natural and critical component of corporate governance, the approach will always involve "stitching" of some sort.  And stitches can never be as secure as strands woven together into an integrated piece.  That reweaving will require more than efforts to modulate the current approaches to corporate governance.  Ultimately that frustration might lead regulators to avoid corporate law in favor of other approaches.  That was implied in my reading of the concluding remarks of the SRSG.
He explained that all points of view would be considered as he decides what practical recommendations to make to states in this area, and that in particular he would further explore the legal and policy reform proposals made throughout the consultation. One of his tasks in doing so would be to develop guiding principles in this area that make sense to all governments, while not being so abstract as to be meaningless. And as he commented at the outset, while corporate law would remain a priority, he would also continue to look at how to drive human rights considerations into various other areas of policy and law that affect business operations.  Summary Report at 18.
But corporate governance ought to provides a better basis for naturalizing human rights concerns within its self-conceptions.  And it ought to be better able to produce regulatory options that naturally reflect the primacy pf human rights, even in regimes in which the economic interests of shareholders are otherwise privileged.  But will require academics and policy makers to begin the task of reordering the way corporate governance--and especially the definitions of its borders-- is conceived.  This is not an unusual task, nor a particularly daunting one.  This is an exercise that has occurred in the past.  An ossified corporate governance framework in the face of changes on the ground suggests an irrelevance of corporate governance rather than the modification of the direction of changes in human organization.       

8.  “Brainstorming” and recommendations (Summary Report at 17).

Yet for all that, the discussion produced a series of very interesting suggestions that are worth considering.  Summary Report at 17-18.  They are worth careful consideration both for their utility and for suggesting the limits  of managing change through the conventional approaches to to corporate governance.

Beyond the excellent suggestions summarized in this section, it might be worthwhile to focus as well on the issue of the internal coherence of the suggested approaches and then, in turn to examine their aggregate coherence in the face of other regulatory movements.  This will provide lots of grist for the academic and policy mill.